HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
MILITARY OPERATIONS
SKETCH
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HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
BY DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
MILITARY OPERATIONS
FRANCE AND BELGIUM, 1914
MONS, THE RETREAT TO THE SEINE, THE MARNE AND THE AISNE
AUGUST— OCTOBER 1914
COMPILED BY V
BRIGADIER-GENERAL jrEJ
C.B., C.M.G., R.E. (Retired), p.s.c.
MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
1922
b
COPYRIGHT
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
PREFACE
THIS history has been compiled with the purpose of pro-
viding within reasonable compass an authoritative account,
suitable for general readers and for students at military
schools, of the operations of the British Army in the
Western theatre of war in 1914-1918. It is based on the
British official records.
The present volume covers events from mobilization
up to the middle of October 1914 only, a period of two
and a half months, and is on a scale which to a large
extent treats the battalion, squadron and battery records
as the basis of the story. In succeeding volumes it will
not be possible or desirable to adhere to this, and succes-
sively the brigade, division and even corps may become
the unit of narrative. For this volume the scale adopted
seems appropriate, in view of the importance of small
units in the early operations, of the lessons to be derived
from the study of the work of these units in open warfare,
and of the desirability of leaving a picture of what war
was like in 1914, when trained soldiers were still of greater
importance than material, and gas, tanks, long-range guns,
creeping barrages and the participation of aircraft in
ground fighting were unknown.
The mass of documents to be dealt with was very
great, and the difficulty has been not in obtaining in-
formation, but in compressing and cutting down what was
available. The British records comprise not only the
war diaries of every staff and unit engaged, with their
voluminous appendices containing all orders, intelligence,
vi MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
etc., received and issued, and detailed reports of actions,
but they include also the General Headquarters files, the
Commander-in-Chief 's diary, and practically every telegram
and message despatched and received. These official
documents have been supplemented by private diaries
and papers which have been kindly lent, by regimental
records, and by interviews with officers who took part in
the operations.
On a modern battlefield, however, knowledge of events
is extraordinarily local, and the transmission of informa-
tion difficult ; in addition important witnesses only too
often become casualties. Though written orders and
messages are absolutely reliable evidence of the matters
with which they deal, war diaries and reports of actions,
written up immediately after events, are liable to contain
mistakes. Commanders and staffs are naturally more
concerned in finding out and reporting the exact situation
and condition of their troops and of the enemy, in sending
up reinforcements, ammunition and supplies, and recording
experience for future use than in the collection of historical
matter. In fact, even officers well known to be specially
interested in military history have confessed that during
the war the idea of collecting or keeping material for its
future historian never occurred to them. Many incidents
deserving of record may therefore have escaped notice.
It will greatly assist in the compilation of monographs or
of a fuller official history in years to come, if readers who
can supply further information or corrections will com-
municate with the Secretary of the Historical Section,
Committee of Imperial Defence, 2 Whitehall Gardens,
London, S.W.I.
The text and maps now presented are the result of the
co-operative labours of the staff, past and present, of the
Historical Section, Military Branch,1 which, in collabora-
tion with the Disposal of Records Department, War Office,
is also charged with the sorting and arrangement of the
1 Special assistance in compiling this volume has been rendered by
Major A. F. Becke, Major F. W. Tomlinson, Captain G. C. Wynne and
Mr. E. A. Dixon.
PREFACE
vn
records dealing with operations overseas. This latter part
of its work absorbed most of its energy and time until well
on into 1921. The Branch did not obtain a permanent
home until October 1919 ; thus a large amount of im-
portant material did not become available until it was
unpacked and sorted after this date, and it was then found
necessary to re-write an account of the initial operations
already partly drafted.
The British Expeditionary Force in France in 1914
was not acting independently, and formed only a small
part of the Allied Armies engaged ; it has therefore been
necessary to include an account of the action of the French
and Belgian forces sufficient to provide a proper frame-
work for the British operations. As regards the Belgian
Army, ample material for this purpose has been published
by the Belgian General Staff. The French General Staff
has not yet issued any history, but much information
with regard to the French plans and operations has
already been made public : officially in the reports of
Parliamentary Enquiries, semi-officially by historians like
M. Hanotaux, M. Engerand, M. Madelin and General
Palat (Pierre Lehautcouri), and in the form of reminiscences
and memoirs by actual participants, such as Generals
Lanrezac, Gallie'ni, Dubail and Mangin. It was not,
therefore, thought necessary to trouble the French General
Staff except as regards the incident of the assistance
rendered by General Sordet's Cavalry Corps at the battle
of Le Cateau, when a copy of the war diary of the troops
concerned was very courteously furnished. With this
exception, it must be understood that for the French
operations the only absolutely authoritative statements
quoted are the orders, instructions, intelligence reports,
etc., received officially by G.H.Q. from the French Grand
Quartier General.
The published German accounts of the early part of
the war are very numerous, and they deal both with the
decisions and orders of the higher commanders and the
operations of many corps and even smaller fighting units.
The most notable are the books of the three Army com-
viii MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
manders, von Kluck, von Billow and von Hausen, the
General Staff monographs " Liittich-Namur " and "Mons,"
the official list of battles and engagements, with the
names of the formations, etc., present, entitled " Schlachten
und Gefechte," and the stories of participants like General
von Zwehl, General von Kuhl, Hauptmann Bloem (the
novelist) and Hofprediger Vogel.1 It was originally in-
tended to give the accounts derived from German sources
in the form of notes at the end of each Chapter ; but, after
consideration, it was decided that such an arrangement
might prove inconvenient, and that it was better as a
general rule to include them in the body of the Chapters,
as close as possible to the events in the British narra-
tive to which they refer. This arrangement, in view
of the difference of the character of the material, has
naturally caused breaks in the style and scope of the
story, but it makes the comparison of the two accounts
easier.
General Freiherr Mertz von Quirheim, the Director of
the German Reichsarchiv, Berlin, which has custody of
the war records, has been good enough to furnish material
in order to clear up a few points on which there seemed
insufficient information.
As separate histories of the Royal Air Force and the
Medical Services are being compiled, a detailed account
of their work has not been included in the narrative.
Two sets of maps have been prepared. The one,
distinguished by the word " Sketches," sufficient for the
general reader, is bound in the volume ; the other, intended
for the use of students of war, is issued separately. Except
the situation maps for the battle of the Aisne, which are
taken from the originals, the maps have been compiled
from data and sketches in the war diaries or furnished
by officers, or from French and German publications.
The typescript or proof sheets have been read by a
number of commanders and staff and regimental officers
who took part in the events narrated, and the compiler
has been greatly assisted by their advice and criticism,
1 See List of Books, pp. xxiii-xxvi.
PREFACE ix
for which he tenders them his most sincere thanks. He
is specially grateful to Mr. C. T. Atkinson, his predecessor
in charge of the Branch, for advice and help at all times,
which his intimate knowledge of the records made most
valuable; and both to him and to Mr. W. B. Wood,
the partner in the compilation of a book on an earlier
war, for the reading and correction of the proof sheets.
J. E. E.
April 1922.
NOTES
THE locations of troops and places are given from right to
left of the front of the Allied Forces, unless otherwise
stated. Thus, even in the retreat to the Seine they are
described from east to west. In translations of German
orders they are left as in the original, but otherwise
enemy troops are enumerated in relation to the British
front.
The convention observed in the British Expeditionary
Force is followed as regards the distinguishing numbers
of Armies, Corps, Divisions, etc., of the British and Allied
Armies, e.g., they are written in full for Armies, but in
Roman figures for Corps, and in Arabic for smaller forma-
tions and units, except Artillery Brigades, which are
Roman ; thus : Fourth Army, IV. Corps, 4th Division,
4th Infantry Brigade, 4th Cavalry Brigade, IV. Brigade,
R.F.A.
German formations and units, to distinguish them
clearly from the Allies, are printed in italic characters,
thus : First Army, I. Corps, 1st Division.
The usual Army, and sometimes the Army List,
abbreviations of regimental names have been used in the
narrative; for example, "2/R. West Kent" or "West
Rents " for 2nd Battalion The Queen's Own (Royal West
Kent Regiment); "the Somerset" or "Somerset L.I." for
The Somerset Light Infantry ; K.O.Y.L.I. for the King's
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry ; K.R.R.C. for The King's
Royal Rifle Corps. To avoid constant repetition, the
"Royal" in regimental titles is often omitted and, for
instance, the Royal Warwickshire are called "the War-
wickshire."
Abbreviations employed occasionally are : —
G.H.Q. for British General Headquarters.
G.Q.G. for French Grand Quartier General (usually spoken
as " Grand Q.G.").
VOL. i xi b
xii MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
O.H.L. for German Oberste Heeresleitung (German Supreme
Command). N.B. — "G.H.Q." in German means
Grosses Haupt-Quartier, that is the Kaiser's
Headquarters, political, military and naval, as
distinguished from O.H.L.
Officers are described by the rank which they held at
the period under consideration.
The accents in French and Belgian place names well
known to British troops have been omitted.
The meaning of Reserve, Ersatz, Landwehr as applied
to German formations is explained on pp. 21, 22. Of other
German terms used, Jdger and Schutzen both signify
riflemen formed in special battalions ; Abteilung means
a group of three batteries of artillery ; a German artillery
brigade consists of two regiments each of two or three
Abteilungen.1
Pioniere : are the German field Engineers ; the word
cannot well be translated by " Engineers " or " Pioneers,"
as the men in the Pioniere units, although they have a
thorough training in field engineering, are not tradesmen
of the class found in R.E. Companies, and are only employed
on field duties ; besides, in Germany there was an " In-
genieur Korps," which had duties in the construction and
maintenance of fortresses.
Time in German narratives and orders, which in the
period dealt with was one hour earlier than British, has
been corrected to our standard, unless it has specifically
stated against it " German time."
1 Abteilung also means a mounted machine-gun battery with cavalry, as
opposed to the M.G. Kompagnie, which forms part of an infantry regiment
or Jdger battalion.
ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA TO VOLUME I
(Kindly pointed out by various correspondents.)
Page 7, line 29. Add footnote : " The 5th Cavalry Brigade was left
independent."
,, 64, penultimate line. Add footnote : " Two companies of the
1 /Fifth Fusiliers were in the line, the remainder of the battalion
was in brigade reserve with the Lincolnshire."
,, 77, line 16. For " supporting " read " reserve".
,, 78, line 13 from bottom. Add after "R.E.," : "the next bridge
near Pommeroeul by the 1st Field Squadron R.E."
80, line 17. Add footnote : " The 2/R. Irish Rifles had been
attached about 2.30 P.M. to the 8th Infantry Brigade and
relieved the Royal Scots on Hill 93."
„ 82, line 9 from bottom. Add after " Nouvelles." the words : " The
two Guards battalions and the Royal Irish Rifles left Hill 93
shortly after 2 A.M."
„ 91, lines 18-20. Delete the words " by the South Lancashire
. . . two brigades." It would appear that the German
attack was delivered before the brigades began to withdraw.
„ 117, line 14. Add after "enemy" the words "except a few
horsemen".
„ 118, line 6. For " south-west " read " 3 miles south-east".
,, 119, line 18. For " division " read " Cavalry Division ".
„ 119, line 5 from bottom. After " slowly " add the words " on
account of the units in front continually halting,".
,, 128, line 22. For " Reumont " read " Maurois".
„ 128, line 23. For " 2 A.M." read " in the grey dawn".
„ 132, note 1, line 8. For " (west of Bousies) " read " (south-east of
Bousies)".
,, 139, first footnote. Add : " Half a squadron North Irish Horse
reported to 4th Division Headquarters on the evening of the
25th, and was sent to assist the flank detachment of the
R. Inniskilling Fusiliers at Bevillers. During the night,
however, it lost touch of the 4th Division and fought at
Caudry on the 26th with the 3rd Division, not returning to
the 4th until late on the 28th."
„ 163, line 10. For " 121st " read " 124th".
„ 166, line 27. For " Two half-companies " read " Three platoons ".
„ 166, line 29. For " here the 59th Field Company R.E. had joined
them " read " here they found the 59th Fd. Co. R.E.".
1
2 ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA TO VOL. I
Pace 166, line 6 from bottom. For " the Highlanders ... at 1200 yards
range " read : " the Highlanders, Middlesex and R.E. opened
fire at 1500 yards range ".
„ 167, line 6 from bottom. For " south-west " read " south-east ".
175. Add as footnote 3 to last line of the text : " Lieut.-Colonel
F. G. Anley, commanding 2/Essex Regiment on the left of
the line, received two direct reports from the French cavalry,
one about ten minutes before the attack opened, and another
about noon, both saying that the French were holding on all
right. He, most unfortunately, failed to get either of these
messages through to 12th Brigade Headquarters."
182, first footnote, line 3. For " these losses " read " the infantry
199, penultimate line of text. For " seventy-five " read " just over
a hundred".
210, line 6 from bottom. For the sentence " the northern of the two
bridges . . . had crossed it " read : " but neither the per-
manent bridge over the Canal near Oisy, nor the temporary
timber one south of it (made by the 23rd Fd. Co. R.E. by
felling trees, as the permanent bridge was in full view of the
high ground near) were blown up or destroyed, though pre-
pared for demolition, as at the last moment the instructions
to do so were cancelled by triplicate orders sent by the 1st
Division, 1st Brigade, and C.R.E."
224, line 5. For 5th Division losses on 26th, for " 2366 " read
" 2631 ", and for the total on 26th, for " 8217 " read " 8482 ".
226, last line. For " llth " read " 10th".
227, line 1. For " All three divisions " read " The main bodies of
all three divisions".
227, line 4. After " force " add the words " except the rear guard ".
227, line 5. After " Oise " add " and during the night the engineers
of the 5th Division blew up behind it the bridges over the Oise
and Oise Canal".
229, line 4. For " llth " read " 10th ".
229, line 5. For " Hunter-Weston " read "Haldane".
229, footnote 2. Add : " The suspension bridge over the Oise at
Pontoise (3 miles south-east of Noyon) in the II. Corps area
was not rendered unserviceable at the first attempt to destroy
it. About 8 A.M. on the 30th a motor cyclist, Lieut. R. R. F.
West (Intelligence Corps) brought the officer commanding
59th Field Company R.E. (5th Division) a private note from
Major M. P. Buckle, D.S.O., second in command of 1/R. West
Kent (13th Infantry Brigade) — killed in action 27th Oct.,
1914 — informing him that the bridge was still passable, and
asking if anything could be done. Lieut. J. A. C. Pennycuick,
R.E., immediately volunteered to return with Lieut. West.
The motor bicycle was loaded up with a box of 14 guncotton
slabs, and Lieut. Pennycuick sat on top, his pockets filled
with fuze, detonators and primers. The two officers then rode
back the eight miles, passing first infantry and then through
the cavalry rear guard. They climbed up one of the suspen-
sion-cables and placed 13 slabs on the cables on top of the
pier, the fourteenth falling into the river. The first detonator
failed, only powdering the primer ; a second attempt was made
and was successful : the top of the pier was blown off and the
ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA TO VOL. I 3
cables cut, and the bridge crashed down into the river No
enemy appeared during the operation, and the two officers
returned safely, after breakfasting at a farm en route. They
both received the Distinguished Service Order."
Page 249, lines 22-23. For " Ammunition Column " read " Ammunition
JL cirlt •
„ 255, fir^oPmrf,-» Penult, line. For " Petit Morin " read " Grand
„ 273, footnote 2, line 2. For " right " read " left ".
„ 282, footnote 1. The numbers of the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions
on Map 25, which shows the evening position, should be
interchanged.
„ 283, line 4. Add footnote : " A single gun of the 16th Battery
XLI. Brigade, which had been sent forward in close support
of the infantry, got a direct hit on and destroyed a German
horse artillery gun and team, which were galloping for the
safety of a reverse slope."
„ 288, second para., line 3. For "both bridges " read "the bridge
at Nogent".
„ 288, line 4 from bottom. After " Charly " add " drove off the
Germans preparing to demolish the bridge and".
„ 328, last line. For " a party " read " a party of the 59th Fd. Co.
R.E."
„ 329, line 2. For " most northern " read " two most northern ".
„ 329, line 3. For " a gap " read " gaps ".
„ 333, line 10. After " Missy bridge " add " where the river was 70 feet
wide and 12 feet deep".
„ 333, line 14. For " south bank " read " north bank by a sapper who
swam across".
„ 333, lines 14-16. For " a small raft . . . R.E." read " five small
rafts constructed by the 59th Fd. Co. R.E. of planks, straw
and wagon covers, each capable of carrying five men."
„ 342. Substitute for the first seven lines : " 2/King's Royal Rifle
Corps leading, followed by the 2/Royal Sussex. The com-
manding officer of the former, Lieut.-Colonel Pearce Serocold,
had orders from General Bulfin to seize the high ground above
Troyon and secure it for the passage of the advanced guard
of the 1st Division, whilst Lieut.-Colonel Montresor of the
Sussex was to keep his battalion in support at Vendresse until
needed. The leading company of the K.R.R.C., with a party
of the 9th Lancers, on reaching the top of the hill, surprised,
about 4.45 A.M., a German piquet, but could not progress
much further, so that Colonel Serocold sent up two more
companies to extend his line. The din of rifle fire now gradu-
ally increased, although there was a marked absence of artillery
fire, and by 5.30 it had become a roar. It was evident that
the Germans were in strength, and Colonel Serocold called
upon the Royal Sussex, who meantime had been brought up
closer in anticipation that they would be required ; by 6.30
A.M. they were deployed on his left, each battalion covering
nearly eight hundred yards of front. At the same time
General Bulfin threw out the Northamptons to the 'spur next
to the eastward to protect the right flank."
4 ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA TO VOL. I
Page 343. After line 29 (end of second paragraph) add : " During the
whole day the fight surged to and fro across some three
hundred yards of ground, the fresh units which arrived as
reinforcements being thrust in where they seemed most
required,"
„ 344, line 2 from bottom. For " south-westward " read " south-
eastward".
„ 347, line 7 from bottom. Delete " (Point 158)".
„ 349, line 5. For "the first parties" read "the vanguard". It was
counter-attacked 400 yards north of the farm and driven back.
„ 349, lines 17-18. For "west . . . Soupir" read: "on either side
of La Cour de Soupir and in the open beyond it and the
Connaught Rangers in the farm".
„ 349, line 21. After " 3/Coldstream " add "and Irish Guards".
The firing line became composed of a mixture of the three
Guards battalions.
,, 353, 2nd para., line 15. Add after " 13th Infantry Brigade "
the words " — the other two battalions remaining south of
the river — ".
Add after paragraph ending " north bank " : " The
ferrying was continued under fire all day until 7 P.M. by
Captain W. H. Johnston and Lieut. R. B. Flint of the Royal
Engineers, carrying wounded one way and ammunition the
other. The former officer received the Victoria Cross and the
latter the Distinguished Service Order. Both officers were
killed in action later in the war."
„ 354, line 4. Add after " the 13th " the words " on their right ".
,, 358, line 21. Evidence appears to show that the white flag incident
took place before the counter-attacks mentioned in line 15.
„ 360, line 23. For " 1/K.R.R.C. over three hundred " read " I/ and
2/K.R.R.C. over three hundred each".
„ 362, line 15 from bottom. " Montberault " is shown as " Mont-
herault " on Map 31.
„ 364, line 4 from bottom. For " eastwards " read "westwards ".
,, 368, line 24. For " out of a wood between these two points " read
" out of their trenches which lay 200 yards north of a wood ".
,, 370, line 16 from bottom. For " Vieil Arcy " read " Pont Arcy ".
„ 371, line 7. For " In rear of the river " read " North of the river ".
„ 374, line 2. Delete "not".
,, 378, line 9. After " easy " add " — though near the river there was
hard rock a foot below the surface — ".
,, 383, line 18. For " Bridging Train " read "1st and 2nd Bridging
Trains".
„ 394, margin. For " Map 13 " read " Map 31 ".
,, 404, line 11. The move to Cassel took place on the 30th, not 28th.
„ 424. Add under " Army Troops — Engineers " the words " 1st and
2nd Bridging Trains."
,, 453, 4th column, " Outposts," last line. For " Army " read " Corps ".
„ 458, lines 8 and 9 from bottom. La Sabliere is not marked on any
map issued with Volume I. It is on the French 1 : 80,000
(Cambrai sheet) issued to the B.E.F. It is a wood 2 miles
S.S.W. of Busigny, i.e. midway between Busigny and Bohain.
ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA TO VOLUME I
ADDITIONAL TO THOSE ISSUED WITH VOL. II.
(Kindly pointed out by various correspondents,1 and extracted from the
French and German Official accounts.)
1 In consequence of some errors as regards the German Army having been pointed out
by critics in the German press, the Director of the Reichsarchiv was asked, and kindly
indicated, where the correct information could be found.
Note. — Where two references are given the first is to the FIRST EDITION ;
that in brackets to the SECOND EDITION.
Page 3, line 8 from bottom. After " and the like " add footnote :
" An assurance has been received from the Reichsarchiv
that neither in the Marine Archiv (Navy Historical Section)
nor in the Military Section and the Espionage Section has
anything of the nature of the sabotage system mentioned in
the text been discovered."
Doubtless the arrangements detected in the Empire were
the work of irresponsible individuals. An unequivocal case of
individual action took place on the 1st January, 1915, near
Broken Hill, South Australia, when two Turks armed with
rifles ambushed a picnic train, killing three men and one
woman and wounding seven.
Page 7, line 13 from bottom (12 from bottom). For " twenty guns "
read : " twenty-four guns ".
Page 14, line 7 from bottom. After " The frontier had no natural pro-
tection " add : " both banks of the Rhine and the crest of
the Vosges being in German hands ".
Page 15. Add to footnote 3 : " See footnote correction to page 21 ".
Page 21, lines 3-9. Add footnote :
"The German Official History of the War, Military
Operations on Land, Volume I., pages 38-39 gives the following
totals for Germany :
Peace strength .... 847,000
Trained officers & men (excluding Navy) 4,900,000
Total available for military service . 9,750,000 "
" The same source gives for France :
Peace strength (including coloured
troops and Foreign Legion) . 1,052,000
Trained officers & men (excluding Navy) 5,067,000
Total available for military service . 5,940,000 '
1
ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA TO VOL. I 2
Page 22, lines 6-15. For the paragraph " In peace . . . divisions."
substitute :
"The Ersatz brigades and divisions of 1914 were not
formed from untrained men of the Ersatz Reserve,3 but from
trained men supernumerary to the numbers required for the
Active and Reserve formations. They were organized like
the Reserve formations but had not the full establishment of
machine guns, cavalry, or artillery, and were entirely without field
kitchens, medical units, train and ammunition columns. They
were therefore not equivalent to other brigades and divisions
in open warfare. (Correction furnished by a German officer.) "
2 This consisted of men temporarily unfit, or fit and liable for military service but not
called up for training either because they were supernumerary to the annual contingent^
or for family reasons, or on account of minor physical defects.
Page 23. Add to footnote :
" The Reichsarchiv states that no mobilization took place
in Germany before the 1st August and that the Landsturm
in the frontier districts was called out on the same date, not
on the 31st July ; the troops employed against Liege were
at peace strength. Movements of men and troops were those
in consequence of the proclamation of drohende Kriegsgefahr
(see correction to page 24)." Some local authorities, however,
did not wait for this ; for General von Moser (Commander
of the 53rd Brigade) in his " Kampf und Siegestage 1914 "
(published by Mittler of Berlin 1915), page 1, says :
" * On 29th July early the order ** Return to garrison "
* reached us on the troop training ground where we had
4 assembled on the previous day for regiment and brigade
* training. [This signifies that one of the precautionary
measures (see correction to page 24) was taken 2 days before
the Precautionary Period (drohende Kriegsgefahr) was pro-
claimed]. On the 1st August "Last preparations for taking
4 the field." On the 2nd August (1st day of mobilization) the
4 brigade reinforced by a squadron and 3 batteries left at 9 A.M.
4 on frontier protection duty.' "
Page 24. At end of 3rd paragraph (11 lines from bottom) after " Belgrade."
add the paragraph :
" In order to avoid the possibility of a frontier incident
the French government ordered that 4 no individual, no
4 patrol, should under any pretext pass a line between Hus-
4 signy (on Luxembourg frontier, east of Longwy) and Delle '
(on Swiss frontier, south-east of Belfort), described by a
precise enumeration of localities. This line on an average
was 10 kilometres inside the frontier." 3
3 French Official Account, Tome I., Vol. I., page 76. This particular order was
repeated on 31st July : —
" This prohibition applies to the cavalry as well as to the other arms. No patrol, no
" reconnoitring party, no post, no individual, must be east of the said line. Anyone who
" crosses it will be liable to court-martial. It is only permitted to transgress this order
" in case of a very definite attack ". (Idem p. 81.) The restriction was withdrawn at
2 P.M on the 2nd August on account of German violation of the French frontier. (Idem
p. 85.') (See below, page 26.)
ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA TO VOL. I 3
Page 24, lines 10 and 9 from bottom. For " On the 31st July Austria
and Russia . . . whereupon" substitute: "At 1 P.M. on the
30th July the ' Berlin Lokalanzeiger ' issued a special number
(Extrablatt), announcing that mobilization had been ordered.
The statement was soon contradicted but it was telegraphed
to Petrograd and at 6 P.M., before contradiction arrived,
Russia ordered general mobilization.4 On the 31st Austria
followed suit, and ".
« See Renouin, " Les origines imme'diates de la Guerre ", p. 146 : General Daniloff
(Quartermaster General of the Russian Army), " Russland in Weltkrieg 1914-15 n 25-6 •
General Suchomlinow (War Minister). " Erinnerungen ", pp. 365-7.
Page 24, lines 7 to 4 from bottom. For " which meant . . . classes of
the Reserve ; "
substitute : " which enabled precautions similar to those of
the British * Precautionary Period ' to be taken ; " 5
8 On the proclamation of drohende Kriegsgefahr, the following precautionary measures
had to be taken in all Army Corps districts : —
Protection of important railway structures : — bridges, tunnels, etc.
Recall from leave of all members of the active army.
Recall of troops, if away, to their garrisons.
Control of railway and other traffic.
Execution of the measures laid down for protection of the frontier.
Move of garrisons of active troops and fighting equipment to the islands of the North
Sea coast.
In addition, in the frontier districts :—
Guard of railway lines ; defence of large bridges and important railway junctions, air-ship
sheds and establishments important to aircraft and wireless, against attempts at demolition,
including attacks by aircraft ; removal of sick into the interior of the country.
" If a hostile attack is made before definite mobilization, or it is evident that such an
' attack is imminent, the Army Corps commanders must take all necessary measures to
' remove inland from the threatened districts and protect all men liable to service, and
' all men found fit for military service, as well as all serviceable horses. They must also,
' as far as possible, remove all material resources from reach of the enemy, particularly
' depots of supplies, the monies of the State, petrol. In case of necessity measures must
4 be taken to destroy them." (Correction furnished by the Reichsarchiv.)
Page 26, line 3 from bottom. After " four different points " add footnote :
** They are enumerated in the French Official History,
Tome I., Vol. I., page 83, which adds that ' at Petit Croix
4 German cyclists fired on French custom house officers '.
" According to the Reichsarchiv : ' There were trans-
* gressions of the frontier by small detachments, contrary
4 to the will of the High Command.' "
Page 27. Add to footnote : " The German Official History of the War,
Military Operations on Land, Vol. I., pages 104 footnote 2,
and 105 footnote 1, revives the charges, although Freiherr
von Schoen, German ambassador in Paris in 1914, in his book
translated as ' The Memoirs of an Ambassador ', p. 201, has
declared the alleged air attacks to be 4 merely the product
4 of highly overwrought imagination '. He adds : ' How such
4 false reports could have been given the weight of facts in
4 pur responsible quarters, and of such momentous facts, is
4 inconceivable.' "
ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA TO VOL. I 4
Page 155, lines 7-8. For " the 12th Infantry Brigade was resting on its
position . . . Esnes." substitute :
" in the 12th Infantry Brigade, which was on the left of
the llth, the Lancashire Fusiliers and two companies of the
Essex Regiment had from 4 A.M. onwards been preparing a
position near Longsart and doing what digging was possible
with their 'grubbers'. The King's Own had been delayed
on the march, but towards 6 A.M. were seen approaching over
the hill in quarter column."
Page 155, lines 12-13. Delete " The King's Own were formed up pre-
paratory to entrenching ".
Page 155, line 17. After " fire of machine guns ", add, between commas,
" after opening on the outpost at the railway crossing north
of Wambaix ".
Page 166, line 16. For " 3.30 P.M." read " 4.30 P.M.".
Page 246, first line of footnote 2. For " These orders seemed to have
been altered, for " substitute : " In consequence of an air
report that the enemy had already reached Villers Cotterets,
General von der Marwitz decided not to continue the march
eastwards, but to strike south (German Official Account,
Vol. III., p. 194)."
Page 251. Add to footnote 2 : " The German Official Account, Vol. III.,
p. 203, adds that it was a I. Corps operation order captured
by the German HI. Corps:'
Page 333, last line but 3 (last line).
For " Brigadier-General H. F. M. Wilson that his brigade
(the 12th) " read :
" Lieut-Colonel F. G. Anley, then commanding that
brigade, that he ".
Page 355, last line but 6 (Page 356, line 27).
For " Bucy le Long " read : " Ste. Marguerite ".
Page 403, lines 5-2 from bottom (Page 404, lines 5-2 from bottom). For
" the Marine Brigade . . . night of the 19th/20th September."
read : ** the Marine Brigade of the Royal Naval Division was
disembarked at Dunkirk on the night of the 19th/20th
September and the Oxfordshire Yeomanry on the 22nd."
Page 404, line 14 (Page 405, line 14). For "On the 2nd October" read :
" At 6 A.M. on the 3rd October ".
line 17 (Page 405, line 17). For " night of the 4th/5th." read :
" night of the 3rd/4th."
MAPS
No. 11 (Le Cateau). The position of the 134th Battery R.F.A. (with the
4th Division) should be 850 yards E.N.E. of the position
shown on the map. It was in action astride the Ligny-
Caullery road, facing north-west.
CONTENTS
TH
INTRODUCTION
E ARMIES OF THE WESTERN ALLIED FORCES
Great Britain .
The Reorganization of 1908
The Expeditionary Force
France ....
Belgium ....
GERMANY ....
Composition of German Formations
1
4
7
14
18
20
21
CHAPTER I
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR . .
PROGRESS OF EVENTS :
England ....
Belgium ....
The Operations of the French
The Operations of the Germans
THE BRITISH ENTRY INTO FRANCE
THE BRITISH ADVANCE
23
30
31
36
41
46
49
CHAPTER II
22ND AUGUST 1914 :
First Contact with the Enemy . . . .53
Advance of the I. and II. Corps . . . .55
The Situation at Nightfall ..... 57
German Uncertainty as to the Position of the B.E.F. . 59
CHAPTER III
THE BATTLE OF MONS :
Description of the Ground
The British Dispositions
The First Encounter with the Enemy :
(a) The Salient
(b) The Canal West of Mons .
xiii
62
63
67
68
xiv MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
PAGE
Front of the I. Corps ...... 72
Progress of the Fight in the Salient . . . .73
The Line of the Mons Canal West of the Salient . . 77
The Salient ....... 78
The Situation at Nightfall . . . . .80
The German Account of Mons 85
CHAPTER IV
THE RETREAT FROM MONS AND THE ACTION OF I£LOUGES :
Situation of the British at Dawn of the 24th August 1914 87
The Retreat of the I. Corps ..... 89
The Retreat of the II. Corps . . . . .90
The German Account of Frameries . . . .92
The Fighting on the Left Flank of the II. Corps . . 93
I. Corps Rear Guard and the 3rd Division, 9 A.M. to 1 P.M. 97
II. Corps : 5th Division, 9 A.M. to 2 P.M. . t .97
The Flank-guard Action at I^louges . . . .99
Resumption of the Retreat . . . . .103
Summary of the Operations on the 24th August . .105
German Movements on the 24th August . . .107
Note : Operations of the French Troops on the British Left . 108
CHAPTER V
THE RETREAT CONTINUED : DAWN TILL DUSK 25TH AUGUST :
Orders for the 25th August . . . . .110
Movements on the 25th August :
The I. Corps . . . . . .113
The II. Corps . . . . . .115
Movements of the German First and Second Armies . 121
Note : Movement of General Valabregue's Group of Reserve
divisions 122
CHAPTER VI
THE RETREAT CONTINUED : EVENING AND NIGHT OF 25TH/
26TH AUGUST:
The Affairs at Landrecies and Maroilles . . .124
The II. Corps — The Rear-guard Action of Solesmes . 127
The Movements of the German First Army on 25th
August ....... 130
First Belgian Sortie during 24th, 25th, 26th August . 132
The Situation at Midnight, 25th/26th August . .133
General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien's Decision . . . 134
Arrival of the 4th Division in its Position 137
CONTENTS xv
CHAPTER VII
PAQE
THE BATTLE OF LE GATEAU. 26ra AUGUST 1914. DAWN
TILL, NOON :
Formation of the Line of Battle . 141
The Battle :
The Right of the Line ..... 147
The Right Centre of the Line . 152
The Left Wing . . . . ', ! 154
CHAPTER VIII
THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU. 26ra AUGUST 1914. NOON TILL
5 P.M. :
The Right of the Line . . . . . .161
The Right Centre of the Line . . . .168
The 3rd Division ...... 170
The 8th Infantry Brigade and the 4th Division . . 171
Summary of the Situation at 5 P.M. . . .174
CHAPTER IX
THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU AND THE CONTINUA-
TION OF THE RETREAT. 26TH-28TH AUGUST. 5 P.M.
TO NIGHTFALL :
The Right of the Line . . . . . .176
The 3rd Division ...... 178
The 4th Division . . . . . .179
German Accounts of Le Cateau . . . .182
General d'Amade's Force on the British Left . . 185
The Troops left on the Battlefield, 3rd and 4th Divisions . 187
THE RETREAT OF THE II. CORPS AND 4ra DIVISION . .190
THE CONTINUATION OF THE RETREAT ON THE 27TH AND
28TH AUGUST . . . . . .193
Notes : I. General Joffre's Congratulatory Telegram . . 199
II. The German Corps at the Battle of Le Cateau . 200
CHAPTER X
OTHER EVENTS OF THE 26TH-28TH AUGUST:
26th August, the Rear-guard Affair of Le Grand Fayt . 203
27th August, the Rear-guard Affair of Etreux . 206
28th August, the Affair at Cerizy . . . .215
General Situation on the Night of 28th/29th August . 216
The Movements of the German First and Second Armies
from 26th to 28th August
Notes : I. The Movements of the French Fifth Army from
Charleroi to Guise 223
II. British Losses, 23rd-27th August . . .224
xvi MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XI
PAGE
29TH-31ST AUGUST. THE EVENTS OF THE RETREAT CON-
TINUED :
29th August . . . . . . .225
30th August . . . . . . .228
31st August ....... 230
The Movements of the German First and Second Armies,
29th to 31st August . . . . .233
CHAPTER XII
THE RETREAT CONTINUED : IST SEPTEMBER 1914 :
The Affair of Nery . . . . . .236
The Rear-guard Action of Crepy en Valois . . 240
The Rear-guard Actions of Villers Cotterets . . 240
General Movements of the 1st September . . . 243
German Movements on 1st September . . . 246
CHAPTER XIII
THE LAST STAGES OF THE RETREAT : 2ND-5TH SEPTEMBER
1914:
2nd September : Retirement to Meaux — Dammartin . 248
Operations of the German First and Second Armies,
2nd September 1914 . . . 250
3rd September : Passage of the Marne . . . 252
4th September : Retirement to the Grand Morin . . 255
5th September : The End of the Retreat . . . 258
The Change of Base ...... 262
Operations of the German First and Second Armies,
3rd-5th September 1914 . .264
CHAPTER XIV
THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE:
6th September : The Return to the Offensive . . 271
7th September : The March to the Grand Morin . . 276
8th September : The Forcing of the Petit Morin . . 280
9th September : The Passage of the Marne . . 288
The Cavalry and I. Corps . . ' . 288
Operations of the II. Corps . . 289
Operations of the III. Corps . . 292
THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE (6TH-9TH SEPTEMBER 1914)
FROM THE GERMAN SIDE .... 296
10th September : The Beginning of the Pursuit . . 307
llth September : The Incline to the North-East . . 312
12th September : The Advance to the Aisne . . 314
The German Retirement from the Battle of the Marne . 319
Note: Second Belgian Sortie from Antwerp . . . 322
CONTENTS xvii
CHAPTER XV
PAGE
THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE :
13th September : The Situation of the German Right Wing
on the Night of the 12th/13th
September .... 324
The Passage of the Aisne . . 325
The 13th September from the German
Side . . . . .338
14th September : The Day of Battle . . . 340
I. Corps : Advance of the 1st Division . 341
do. Advance of the 2nd Division 346
The Centre and Left : II. and III.
Corps 350
The Left Centre : 5th Division . . 353
The Left : 4th Division . . .356
The I. Corps . . . .357
Summary of the 14th September . 360
The 14th September from the German
Side . . . . .362
Situation on the Night of 14th September 365
15th September : The Deadlock . . . .367
CHAPTER XVI
LAST DAYS ON THE AISNE :
General Strategic Situation ..... 372
The Beginning of Trench Warfare .... 374
Operations on the Aisne :
The Week of 16th-22nd September . . .383
16th September 385
17th September . . . . . .386
18th September . . . . . .388
19th September 388
20th September :
Attacks on the 1st Division . . . 389
„ „ 2nd Division . . . 391
„ 3rd Division . . .392
21st-24th September . . . ... 394
25th-27th September :
The Last Attacks .....
28th September-14th October . . . .398
The Extension of the Opposing Armies Northward :
The Race to the Sea 399
Transfer of the British from the Aisne to the Left of
the Line 406
Retrospect of the Battle of the Aisne . . . 407
xviii MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
TABLE OF APPENDICES
PAGE
1. Order of Battle of the British Expeditionary Force,
August and September 1914 .... 413
2. Notes on the organization of some of the principal forma-
tions and units of the British Expeditionary Force in
1914 427
3. Order of Battle of the French Armies in August 1914 . 430
4. Notes on the organization of some of the principal French
formations and units in 1914 .... 432
5. Order of Battle of the Belgian Army in August 1914 . 434
6. Order of Battle of the German Armies in August 1914 . 435
7. Notes on the organization of some of the principal German
formations and units in 1914 .... 439
8. Instructions to Sir John French from Earl Kitchener,
August 1914 .... . 442
9. The French plan of campaign, Plan 17 (translation) . 444
10. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 5, 1 P.M. 20th
August 1914 (with march table and allotment of
Army troops) ...... 450
11. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 6, 11.55 P.M.
21st August 1914 ...... 455
12. Sir John French's supplementary instruction to Cavalry
Division, 11.35 P.M. 21st August 1914 . . . 456
13. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 7, 8.25 P.M.
24th August 1914 ...... 457
14. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 8, 7.30 P.M.
25th August 1914 . . . . . .458
15. 4th Division Operation Order No. 1, 5 P.M. 25th August
1914 ........ 460
16. II. Corps Operation Order No. 6, 10.15 P.M. 25th August
1914 ........ 462
17. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 9, 8.30 P.M.
27th August 1914 . . . . . 463
18. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 10, 11.30 P.M.
28th August 1914 464
19. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 11, 9 P.M. 29th
August 1914 .... .466
20. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 12, 5.15 P.M.
30th August 1914 .... .467
21. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 13, 8.50 P.M.
31st August 1914 469
22. Telegraphic communications between Earl Kitchener
and Sir John French, 30th August to 1st September
1914 471
TABLE OF APPENDICES
xix
PAGE
23. G.H.Q. messages to I. Corps anticipating and confirming
order to retire, 1st September 1914 . . 476
24. Correspondence with regard to halting on the Marne and
the retreat behind the Seine (translation) 477
25. Original of Appendix 24 . . 4gO
26. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 14, 7.30 P.M.
2nd September 1914 ...... 433
27. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 15, 11.50 P.M.
3rd September 1914 ...... 485
28. Le General Commandant en Chef au Field Marechal Sir
John French, Commandant en Chef les forces Britan-
niques, 4th September 1914 . . . . 437
29. Letter of Sir John French to Earl Kitchener, 7th September
1914 . .... 488
30. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 16, 6.35 P.M.
4th September 1914 ...... 490
31. Table giving length of daily marches (in miles) from 20th
August to 5th September (both inclusive) . . 492
32. General Joffre's General Order for the battle of the Marne
(translation) ....... 493
33. Original of Appendix 32 . . . . . 495
34. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 17, 5.15 P.M.
5th September 1914 . . . . . .496
35. Cavalry Division Operation Order No. 11, 5th September
1914 (with march table) ..... 498
36. I. Corps Operation Order No. 10, 5th September 1914 . 500
37. II. Corps Operation Order No. 15, 5th September 1914 . 501
38. III. Corps Operation Order No. 7, 5th September 1914 . 503
39. Sir John French's Special Order of the Day, 6th September
1914 ........ 504
40. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 18, 9 P.M. 7th
September 1914 . . . . . .505
41. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 19, 7.30 P.M.
8th September 1914 .... .507
42. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 20, 8.15 'P.M.
9th September 1914 .... .508
43. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 21, 8.15 P.M.
10th September 1914 . . . 510
44. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 22, 6 P.M. llth
September 1914 . . .512
45. General Joffre's Special Instruction No. 23 of 12th Sep-
tember 1914 . . . . . • 514
46. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 23, 7.45 P.M.
12th September 1914 . . . . . 515
xx MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
PAGE
47. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 24, 6 P.M. 13th
September 1914 . . . . . .517
48. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 25, 14th Sep-
tember 1914 . . . . . . .519
49. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 26, 8.30 P.M.
15th September 1914 ... .521
50. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 27, 8.30 P.M.
16th September 1914 ... .522
51. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 28, 3 P.M. 1st
October 1914 . . . . . .523
52. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 29, 11 A.M. 2nd
October 1914 525
53. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 30, 8 A.M. 4th
October 1914 ...... 527
54. Sir John French's Operation Order No. 31, 8.30 A.M.
5th October 1914 528
SKETCHES AND MAPS
SKETCHES
(Bound in Volume)
Sketch 1. General Theatre of Operations (Western
Front) • .... At beginning
„ 2. Operations, 4th-22nd August 1914 . Facing p. 33
„ 3. Operations, 23rd-28th August 1914 . „ „ 47
„ 4. Operations, 28th August -5th September
1914 . „ „ 213
5. The German Advance, 17th August-5th
September 1914 . . „ „ 221
6. Operations, 6th-13th September 1914 . „ „ 273
7. The Aisne Battlefield, September 1914 . „ „ 325
„ 8. The Extension of the Battle Line north-
wards, -15th September - 8th October
1914 . . „ 399
MAPS
(In Separate Case)
Plate 1. Order of Battle of a German Cavalry Division and a
German Corps in August 1914.
Map 1. The Concentration of the Armies.
„ 2. General Map of Theatre of Operations in Belgium and
France, 1 : 1,000,000.
„ 3. North- West Europe. Mons to Compiegne, 1 : 250,000.
„ 4. France. Compiegne to Paris and Melun, 1 : 250,000.
„ 5. Situation, 17th-24th August 1914.
„ 6. The Battlefield of Mons, 23rd-24th August 1914 (layered
map).
„ 7. Mons, Sunday, 23rd August 1914.
„ 8. Flank-guard Action at ^louges, Monday, 24th August
1914.
„ 9. Situation of B.E.F. night 25th/26th August 1914.
xxi
xxii MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Map 10. The Battlefield of Le Cateau, 26th August 1914 (layered
map).
„ 11. Action of Le Cateau, Wednesday, 26th August 1914.
„ 12. The Fights at Fesmy and Etreux (2/Royal Munster
Fusiliers and 1 section 118th Battery R.F.A.), Thursday,
27th August 1914.
„ 13. The Retreat from Mons, 23rd-29th August 1914.
„ 14. Situation, 29th August 1914.
„ 15. Situation, 30th August 1914.
„ 16. Situation, 31st August 1914.
„ 17. 1st September 1914 (for the Fights at Villers Cotterets,
Crepy en Valois and Nery).
„ 18. Situation, 1st September 1914.
„ 19. Situation, 2nd September 1914.
„ 20. Situation, 3rd September 1914.
„ 21. Situation, 4th September 1914.
„ 22. Situation, 5th September 1914.
„ 23. Situation, 6th September 1914.
„ 24. Situation, 7th September 1914.
„ 25. Situation, 8th September 1914.
„ 26. Situation, 9th September 1914.
„ 27. Situation, 10th September 1914.
„ 28. Situation, llth September 1914.
„ 29. Situation, 12th September 1914.
„ 30. G.H.Q. Situation Map, 8 P.M. 13th September 1914.
„ 31. The Aisne Battlefield, 1914 (layered map).
„ 32. G.H.Q. Situation Map, 8 P.M. 14th September 1914.
„ 33. G.H.Q. Situation Map, evening of 15th September 1914.
„ 34. G.H.Q. Situation Map, evenings of 21st-25/26th September
1914.
LIST OF BOOKS
TO WHICH MOST FREQUENT REFERENCE IS MADE
BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS : " Die Marneschlacht 1914." By General-
major Baumgarten-Crusius. (Leipzig : Lippold, 5 marks.)
An account of the battle of the Marne and the events leading
to it, founded on official records. It is written particularly
from the point of view of the German Third Army by a Saxon
general. This was the first German book which told the truth
about the Marne.
BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS II. : " Deutsche Heerfiihrung im Marne-
feldzug 1914." By Generalmajor Baumgarten-Crusius. (Berlin :
Scherl, 31 marks.)
A further contribution to the solution of the question of
responsibility for the orders to retreat at the battle of the
Marne.
BELGIAN GENERAL STAFF : " Military Operations of Belgium in
Defence of the Country and to Uphold her Neutrality." (English
translation : London, Collingridge, Is. net.)
Report, compiled by the Belgian General Staff, for the
period July 31st to December 31st, 1914.
BLOEM : " Vormarsch." By Walter Bloem. (Leipzig : Grethlein,
6 marks.)
One of the most graphic and dramatic accounts of war yet
written. The author is a well-known German novelist, who
was serving, as a Reserve Captain, in the 12th Brandenburg
Grenadiers (III. Corps of von Kluck's Army). He gives the
story of his experiences from outbreak of war to the Aisne,
where he was wounded on Chivres Spur.
BRANDIS : " Die Sturmer von Douaumont." By Oberleutnant von
Brandis. (Berlin : Scherl, 2 marks.)
The author served in the 24th Regiment of the III. Corps
at Mons, Frameries, etc. He later took part in the capture of
Fort Douaumont, Verdun ; this incident is commemorated in
the title of his book.
BULOW : " Mein Bericht zur Marneschlacht." By Generalfeld-
marschall von Billow. (Berlin : Scherl, 9-60 marks.) (Trans-
lated into French as " Mon rapport sur la bataille de la Marne.")
(Paris : Payot, 6 francs.)
A clear military narrative, with sketch maps, by the com-
mander of the German Second Army, which includes the battle
of the Aisne 1914.
xxiii
xxiv MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
" Deutsche Kavallerie " : " Die Deutsche Kavallerie in Belgien und
Frankreich 1914." By Generalleutnant von Poseck. (Berlin :
Mittler, 60 marks.)
The author was Chief of the Staff of the /. Cavalry Corps,
and is now Inspector of Cavalry. It is a very valuable summary
of the cavalry operations, based on the official records.
ENGERAND : " La Bataille de la Frontiere (Aout 1914)." By
Fernand Engerand, Depute. (Paris : Bossard, 7-50 francs.)
The author was " rapporteur " of the Parliamentary Com-
mission which inquired into the loss of the Briey Basin. He
gives a summary of the report, with important documents as
appendices.
FALKENHAYN : " General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its Critical
Decisions." By General Erich von Falkenhayn. (English
translation, Hutchinson & Co., 21s.)
Von Falkenhayn was Prussian Minister of War in 1914 ;
but on 14th September he took over the duties of Chief of the
General Staff from von Moltke. The book deals mostly with
the successes of the Russian theatre of war, but contains much
of importance as regards decisions in the West.
GALLIENI : " Memoires du General Gallieni. Defense de Paris."
(Paris : Payot, 16 francs.)
A most valuable record. With Situation Maps.
HANOTAUX : " Histoire illustree de la Guerre de 1914." By M. Gabriel
Hanotaux. Nine volumes published. (Paris : Gounouilhou,
25 francs per volume.)
A beautifully illustrated work containing a large number
of official documents, which make it valuable. The ninth
volume carries the narrative to the 6th September 1914.
HAUSEN : " Erinnerungen an der Marnefeldzug 1914." By General-
oberst Freiherr von Hausen. (Leipzig : Koehler, 24 marks.)
(A French translation has been announced.)
A personal and historical account of the campaign up to
the end of the battle of the Marne by the commander of the
German Third Army, with numerous sketch maps and an order
of battle of the German forces.
HEUBNER : " Unter Emmich vor Liittich. Unter Kluck vor
Paris." By H. Heubner, Hauptmann der Reserve und
Professor in Wernigerode. (Schwerin : Bahn, 5 marks.)
A very vivid account by a professor and Reserve captain,
which ends at the Aisne 1914. He belonged to the 20th
Infantry Regiment, llth Infantry Brigade, 6th Division, III.
Corps of von Kluck's Army and was at Mons, the Ourcq, etc.
KLUCK : " Der Marsch auf Paris, und die Marneschlacht 1914."
By A. von Kluck, Generaloberst. (Berlin : Mittler, 27 marks.)
(Translated as " The March on Paris 1914." Edward Arnold,
10s.)
Von Kluck's own statement, with a very fine map showing
the movements of the German First Army.
LIST OF BOOKS
XXV
KUHL : " Der deutsche Generalstab in Vorbereittmg und Durch-
fiihrung des Weltkrieges." By General der Infanterie H. von
Kuhl. (Berlin : Mittler, 27 marks.)
An account of the work of the Great General Staff in
preparation for and during the war, specially valuable for the
part dealing with the development of the German plan of
campaign. The author was the Chief of the Staff to von Kluck
and Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, and had served
22 years on the Great General Staff before the war.
KUHL'S " Marne " : " Der Marnefeldzug 1914." By General der
Infanterie H. von Kuhl. (Berlin : Mittler, 48 marks.)
Published January 1921. Regarded by the German Press
as the last word on the battle of the Marne until the official
account appears.
LOHRISCH : " Im Siegessturm von Liittich an die Marne." By
Oberleutnant der Reserve Dr. H. Lohrisch. (Leipzig : Quelle
und Meyer, 5 marks.)
The author served in the 27th Infantry Regiment of the
IV. Corps in the early fighting, including Le Cateau.
'* Luttich-Namur " : " Der grosse Krieg in Einzeldarstellungen.
Herausgegeben im Auftrage des grossen Generalstabes." (Olden-
burg : Gerhard Stalling, 2-40 marks + war percentage.)
In the series of Great General Staff monographs. A very
complete account of the capture of Liege and Namur.
" Mons " : " Die Schlacht bei Mons."
In the same series as " Luttich-Namur." There are
excellent maps showing the German dispositions.
M.W.B. : Militar Wochenblatt.
PALAT : "La grande guerre sur le front occidental." By General
Palat. Seven volumes published. (Paris : Chapelot, 12 francs
each.)
A valuable unofficial compilation, as regards the movements
of the French. The seventh volume carries the story of the war
on the Western Front to end of the " Race to the Sea," 1914.
The maps are portions of the 1 : 80,000 with no troops marked
on them.
" Schlachten und Gefechte " : " Die Schlachten und Gefechte des
Grossen Krieges, 1914-1918. Quellenwerk nach amtlichen
Bezeichnungen zusammengestellt vom Grossen G'eneralstab."
(Berlin : Sack, 42 marks.)
An official list of battles compiled by the Great General
Staff showing the formations, etc., engaged in each, and lists
of the higher commanders, with excellent index.
STEGEMANN : " Geschichte des Krieges." Vols. I. II. and III. By
H. Stegemann, a Swiss journalist. (Stuttgart : Deutsche
Vertags-Anstalt, 24 marks each.)
A good general account of the war from the German point
of view.
xxvi MILITARY HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR
TAPPEN : " Bis zur Marne." By Generalleutnant Tappen. (Olden-
burg : Stalling, 3 marks.)
The author was head of the Operations Section of Supreme
Headquarters until August 1916. His book gives considerable
insight into the opening operations up to and including the
Marne, but has led to a good deal of controversy in Germany.
VOGEL : " 3,000 Kilometer mit der Garde-Kavallerie." By Hof-
prediger Dr. Vogel. (Leipzig : Velhagen und Klassing, 5
marks.)
This is practically a picturesque diary of the operations
of the Guard Cavalry Division from outbreak of war to May
1915, written by the Divisional Chaplain.
WIRTH : " Von Saale zur Aisne." By Hauptmann der Landwehr
A. Wirth. (Leipzig : Hesse & Becker, 5 marks.)
A small diary by an orderly officer attached to the Staff
of the 13th Reserve Division (IV. Reserve Corps) that fought
at Le Cateau, etc.
" Ypres " : " Ypres 1914 " (Constable : 5s.), translation of " Die
Schlacht an der Yser und bei Ypern im Herbst 1914." (In the
same series as " Liittich-Namur.")
Contains, besides an account of the First Ypres, a good
many details of the organization of the German Army.
ZWEHL : " Maubeuge, Aisne, Verdun." By General der Infanterie
von Zwehl. (Berlin : Curtius, 72 marks.)
The author commanded the VII. Reserve Corps, captured
Maubeuge, and reached the Chemin des Dames ridge at the
Aisne just in time to prevent the British I. Corps from seizing
it. There is a good account of the battle and much else of
interest in the book.
INTRODUCTION
THE ARMIES OF THE WESTERN ALLIED POWERS
GREAT BRITAIN
THE year 1871, which witnessed the foundation of the
German Empire, marked also an epoch in the history of
the British Army. In that year the first steps were taken
to replace the old army of Peninsular model by a force
raised and organized on modern lines : the system of
purchase, under which officers bought their commissions
in each successive rank, was abolished ; short service was
adopted,1 not so much with the idea of attracting recruits
as of building up a reserve ; and regiments of infantry,
except those which were already composed of more than
one battalion, were grouped in pairs. Ten years later, in
1881, this grouping was made permanent, the old numbers
were abolished and the infantry was reconstituted into
double - battalion regiments with territorial titles on a
territorial basis.2
The old Militia remained, as always, on a territorial
basis. It was gradually drifting back to the function,
which it had fulfilled during the Napoleonic wars, of a
recruiting depot for the army, but without the ballot ;
for the enforcement of the ballot had for a long time been
suspended by an annual Act of Parliament.3
1 It had already been tried in Marlborough's time and in the Napoleonic
wars, and had been the rule with the European regiments of the East
India Company's Service.
2 An excellent account of the development of the Army will be found
in " The Army Book of the British Empire " (H.M. Stationery Office,
5s.). It unfortunately stops at 1893.
3 The ballot had been systematically employed almost all through the
Napoleonic wars. There were two kinds of Militia : — the Regular, which
was permanently embodied in war time and provided a home-defence
force; and the Local, which, apart from annual training, was only to be
called out in case of actual invasion and rebellion, so that it was practically
a training reserve.
VOL. I 1 B
2 INTRODUCTION
Side by side with the Militia stood the Yeomanry
Cavalry, first called into being by the threat of a French
invasion in 1794-95. It attracted an excellent class of
recruit, but its training was very limited, both in scope
and duration.
Behind the Militia and Yeomanry were the Volunteers,
chiefly infantry. They also had been first formed in
1794-95 ; but in 1806-7 they had been transformed into
Local Militia, recruited by ballot without power of sub-
stitution, and subject to the same discipline as the Militia.
After 1815 the Local Militia soon died out ; but in
1859 the Volunteers were revived on the original basis of
1794-95.
The best part of a generation, however, was needed for
the new army system, initiated in 1871, to settle down
and bear fruit. The home battalion of a regiment was for
years little more than a group of boys who, as they matured,
were drafted out to the battalion on foreign service. Only
in India was the real British Army of fully-trained and
grown men to be seen.
In 1899-1902 the war in South Africa put the British
military forces to a rude practical test. Never before had
so many troops been sent overseas. The Regular Army
was found to be too small for the work even when the
Reserves had been called out, and means to supplement
it had to be improvised ; the Militia and Yeomanry
volunteered for foreign service almost to a man ; the
Volunteer battalions sent a succession of companies to
the Regular battalions of their regiments in South Africa,
and formed special active service units ; and the Overseas
Dominions and Colonies enthusiastically raised and de-
spatched contingents. The experience acquired by all
arms and by all branches of the Staff in this war was
soon to prove of the utmost value.
In February 1904 the office of Commander-in-Chief was
abolished, and with it the system which had been built up
by the Duke of York between 1795-1809. After his death
in 1827 the Secretary of State, representing the Govern-
ment, had gradually indeed acquired most of the powers
of the Commander-in-Chief, until few of them were left.
An Army Council was set up, which gave the Secretary of
State a board of six advisers : four professional soldiers,
each of them at the head of a great department, and two
civilians, known as the financial and civil members. The
duties of the Commander-in-Chief as regards inspection of
THE BRITISH ARMY 3
troops were transferred to an Inspector-General of the
Forces.
Next came the constitution of a General Staff, on
principles which were decided at a meeting of the Army
Council on 9th August 1905. The Chief of the General
Staff was authorized to proceed with its formation on
llth November 1905. Instructions for its organization were
promulgated by a special Army Order of 12th September
1906. Such a body was a complete innovation in the
British Army. The word " Staff " had been known for
generations, but signified originally no more than the
Department of the Commander-in-Chief as contrasted with
that of the Secretary of State for War — of the Horse
Guards as distinguished from the War Office. This Staff,
however, was an administrative one only; there was no
such thing as a Staff at Headquarters charged with such
duties as are now associated with the name. Nor was the
Headquarters Staff at the Horse Guards consulted as to
military plans and operations. Its business was to pro-
vide such trained men as the Cabinet required, not to advise
as to their duties or employment.
The General Staff came into being under the guidance
of Mr. (now Lord) Haldane, who became Secretary of
State for War in December 1905, and was charged with
the duty of reorganizing the land forces not only of the
country, but of the Empire.
The need of reform was urgent, for the Germans made
little concealment of their intention to enter the lists for
the domination of the world, and were not only perfecting
vast military preparations, but quietly insinuating them-
selves into the control of the most important financial and
commercial undertakings of their neighbours. They had
already established an elaborate system of espionage, and
were abusing the hospitality of friendly States by organizing
also a system of sabotage — that is to say, the destruction,
by secret agents introduced in time of peace, of such im-
portant means of communication as telegraph lines, rail-
way junctions and bridges, and the like. Hitherto our
ancient and glorious rival had been France ; but this new
enemy lay to the east and not to the south ; and the eyes
of those charged with the defence of the United Kingdom
were now turned towards the North Sea instead of towards
the Channel.
In order to fulfil our treaty obligations in respect of
Belgium, there was now also a prospect that it might
4 INTRODUCTION
become necessary to land a force on the continent of
Europe : to protect the integrity of Belgium, and to operate
in conjunction with the French and Belgian armies in case
of a German attack on France which involved the violation
of Belgian neutrality. Britain had always depended
hitherto upon a nominally voluntary army for service
abroad ; bu* the numbers that could thus be raised were
unlikely to be sufficient in an European war on a modern
scale ; and to combine a voluntary with a compulsory
system of recruiting at short notice seemed impracticable,
even if Parliament could have been brought to assent
to it.
The problem presented to Mr. Haldane, therefore, was
how to reorganize the existing forces so as to raise them to
the highest point of efficiency, and to provide for their
rapid expansion in time of need.
THE REORGANIZATION OF 1908
The Staff
The first step was to build up a General Staff which
should be the brains of the army ; and special care was
taken to separate its work, as a department concerned with
strategy and training, from that of the old Headquarters
Staff, whose duties were purely administrative. The
instruction for officers of all branches of the Staff was
provided at the Staff College, Camberley, which was
greatly enlarged, and at the Indian Staff College at Quetta,
recently founded by Lord Kitchener. From the graduates
of these institutions officers for the General Staff and for
the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster -General's De-
partments were chosen. For the technical instruction of
the Administrative Staff special arrangements were made
at the London School of Economics for selected officers,
including Staff College graduates, to be trained in such
matters as business management and railway organization.
Officers
The initial difficulty of providing a reserve of officers
was very great. Mr. Haldane turned to the universities
to supplement the military colleges at Sandhurst and
Woolwich by converting the Volunteer Corps which had
long existed in our older universities into Officers' Training
THE BRITISH ARMY 5
Corps ; x and in these, under the guidance of the General
Staff and with the concurrence of the university authorities,
practical military instruction was given not only to army
candidates but to many members who did not intend
entering the military profession as a career. Public
schools which possessed Volunteer Corps were invited
to convert them into Contingents of the Officers' Training
Corps ; whilst universities and schools which had not
got them were encouraged to form them, and those that
did so were given the privilege of nominating a certain
number of boys for admission to Sandhurst without further
examination.
The Regular Army
The great want of the mounted branches was a reserve
of horses to make good the deficiencies on mobilization.
This was supplied by taking a census of all horses in the
kingdom, and obtaining statutory power to requisition all
that were suitable for military purposes.
In the Artillery there was an insufficiency of ammuni-
tion columns to meet the increased expenditure of ammuni-
tion due to the introduction of quick-firing guns. The
Garrison Artillery Militia was therefore turned into a
Special Reserve, to be used primarily in the formation of
these columns ; and thirty-three regular batteries, which
had their full complement of guns but few men, were
employed to train them. The general reserve of artillery
was, by careful nursing, increased. By 1912 the number
of batteries that could be mobilized for war had been
increased from forty-two to eighty-one. The field artillery
was organized into brigades, each of three batteries and an
ammunition column.
In the Infantry steps were taken to restore the observ-
ance of the system, generally called Lord CardwelPs, that
for every battalion abroad at least one should be at home.
The balance had been upset as a consequence of the South
African War and our rapid Imperial expansion. By the
withdrawal of certain colonial garrisons, the proportion
was eventually established at eighty-four battalions at
home — including nine of Guards that did not come into
the Cardwell system — and seventy-three abroad.
1 The idea of turning the University Volunteers into an Officers'
Training Corps was suggested by Lord Lovat and others just after the
conclusion of the South African war, but was not then taken up by the
authorities.
6 INTRODUCTION
The Army Service Corps, reorganized in 1888, had
proved itself so efficient in South Africa that it needed
little more than such changes in organization as were
entailed by the introduction of motor transport. In 1900
the War Office had appointed a Mechanical Transport
Committee ; and by 1911 two schemes were in operation,
viz. (a) the Provisional Subsidy Scheme, by which civil
vehicles could be requisitioned for military purposes, until
through (b) the Main Subsidy Scheme the number of
vehicles built to the War Office specifications for private
owners should suffice to supply the needs of the Army.
Both schemes were employed to furnish the necessary
vehicles on mobilization in 1914. In 1912 the transport
of the divisions and the cavalry was reorganized. The
horsed baggage and supply wagons were grouped into
Train companies, leaving only first line or fighting trans-
port with regimental units. For each division there was
formed a divisional supply column of motor lorries, whose
business it was to bring up rations to a point where the
supply sections of the divisional Train could refill, and, if
possible, to take back sick and wounded.
In the Medical Services of the Army many important
changes were made in organization, training and adminis-
tration.1 They were due not only to the experience gained
in the South African War, but to the lessons learnt from
the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, and to the revision
of the Geneva Convention in 1906, which afforded a new
basis for the organization of voluntary aid. In the place
of the bearer companies and field hospitals each division
and the cavalry division were provided with self-contained
field ambulances, and a new echelon — the clearing hospital —
was introduced to facilitate the rapid evacuation of wounded,
which was to be the great feature of the new system. Motor
transport, though proposed in 1908, was only introduced on a
very meagre scale, sufficient for peace purposes. The Army
Nursing Service was put on a firm basis. Under the
auspices of an Army Medical Board, of which eminent
civilian specialists were members, sanitation, measures for
prevention of disease, inoculation, and the provision of
pure water, received special attention. To keep the
medical service in touch with the General Staff, officers of
the Royal Army Medical Corps were appointed to special
1 They will be found described in detail in " History of the Great
War, Medical Services, General History," and are therefore enumerated
very briefly here.
THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 7
sections of the Directorates of Military Operations and
Military Training. The medical service of the Territorial
Force was organized similarly to that of the Regular Army,
and large provision made for the formation of hospitals in
time of war and the organization of voluntary aid.
The Militia was renamed Special Reserve, to indicate
what it had long been in practice — a depot for feeding the
Regular Army. This was a reversion to the policy of
Castlereagh, who had also turned the Old Militia (as it was
called) into a recruit depot. This Old Militia consisted
almost entirely of substitutes hired to take the place of
balloted men, who when they had thus joined were offered
a bounty to enlist in the Line and refill the ranks of
Wellington's army in the Peninsula.
The Expeditionary Force
The Regular Army, or First Line, was reorganized
into an expeditionary force consisting of six divisions of
all arms and one cavalry division. Each of the six divi-
sions comprised three infantry brigades, or twelve battalions
altogether, with divisional mounted troops, artillery,
engineers, signal service, supply and transport train, and
field ambulances. The total war establishment of each
division was thus raised to some 18,000 of all ranks and
descriptions, of whom 12,000 were infantry, with 24
machine guns, and 4,000 artillery, with seventy-six guns
(fifty-four 18-pdrs. ; eighteen 4-5-inch howitzers ; and
four 60-pdrs.). The Cavalry Division comprised four
brigades of three regiments each, and cavalry divisional
troops, consisting of artillery, engineers, signal service
and medical units. The strength was some 9000 of all
ranks and 10,000 horses, with twenty guns (13-pdrs.)
and twenty-four machine guns. Although the nucleus
of one corps staff was maintained in time of. peace, at
Aldershot, and corps had been formed at manoeuvres, it
was not originally intended to have any intermediate
echelon between the General Headquarters of the Ex-
peditionary Force and the six divisions. The decision
to form corps was — in order to conform to French organi-
zation— made immediately on the formal appointment
on mobilization of Field-Marshal Sir John French as
Commander-in-Chief. Thus it happened that two out
of the three corps staffs had to be improvised ; and even
in the divisional staffs the Peace Establishment allowed for
8 INTRODUCTION
only two out of the six officers given in the War Establish-
ment. None the less, this new organization was a great
step forward in the preparation of the army for war.
The Second Line
The Yeomanry became the second line of cavalry, and
was reorganized into fourteen brigades.
The Volunteers were treated according to the precedent
of Castlereagh, who had invited them to convert themselves
into Local Militia, on pain of disbandment. So, too, Mr.
Haldane bade them either become Territorial troops or
cease to exist. Mr. Haldane further reverted to the old
policy of decentralization, and entrusted the raising and
administration of the Territorial Force to the County
Lieutenancies, renamed Territorial Associations, under the
Presidency of the Lords Lieutenant. The only difference
between the two statesmen was that Castlereagh insisted
upon compulsory personal service, under the ballot, for the
Local Militia, whereas Mr. Haldane did not — or rather,
in the prevailing temper of Parliament, could not — do the
same for the Territorial Force. This force, whose establish-
ment was something over 300,000 strong, was organized
upon exactly the same lines as the Regular Army. Its
units were grouped into fourteen divisions, commanded by
major-generals of the Regular Army with small Regular
staffs.
The old Militia Garrison Artillery was replaced by
Territorial Coast Artillery. The field artillery of Terri-
torial divisions was armed with 15-pounder guns converted
into quick-firers, and 5-inch howitzers used in the South
African War ; its heavy artillery consisted of 4-7-inch guns.
So much for the reorganization of the Territorial Forces
on paper. Unfortunately, before 1914, both Special
Reserve and Territorial troops sank so far below their
establishment as to cause some anxiety at headquarters ;
but it was not doubted that many old Territorials would
rejoin the force at the approach of danger ; and this con-
fidence proved to be well justified. It is true that it was
not anticipated that the Territorials would be ready for the
field in less than six months ; but they had had at least
some training ; and, since their organization was identical
with that of the First Line, they could be employed to
reinforce the Regular Army, either by units or by complete
divisions, as they became ready.
THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 9
It had been Mr. Haldane's intention to make the County
Associations the medium for indefinite expansion of the
forces in case of need. The rough plans for such expansion
were actually blocked out, some of the Associations possess-
ing, in whole or in part, the machinery for carrying the
p^an into effect. But the scheme had not yet received
statutory sanction, and had not even been worked out in
detaJ Meanwhile, the County Associations justified Mr.
Haldai e's faith in them, and their zeal and ability were of
the utmost value to the War Office and the country.
Training
The first textbook issued after the South African War
for the instruction of the army was " Combined Training,"
dated 1902, written by the late Colonel G. F. R. Hender-
son. This, in 1905, became Part I. of "Field Service
Regulations." In 1909 the book was superseded by the
issue of " Field Service Regulations — Part I. (Operations),"
and " Part II. (Organization and Administration) " was
published for the first time. These manuals dealt with the
general principles governing the employment of the army
in war.
Individual training — that is, the physical training,
including route marching, bayonet fighting, musketry,
signalling, scouting, and generally the education of the
individual in his duties and the use of his arms — was
carried on during the winter ; this gave place in the spring
to the training by units, first of squadrons, companies and
batteries, next of cavalry regiments, infantry battalions
and artillery brigades ; next of cavalry and infantry
brigades, first alone and then in conjunction with other
arms ; and next of divisions ; the whole culminating in
inter-divisional exercises and army manoeuvres.
The great feature of the training for the attack and
counter-attack was combination of fire and movement.
Ground was gained as the enemy was approached by rushes
of portions of a battalion, company or platoon, under cover
of the fire of the remainder and of the artillery. By this
procedure, a strong firing line was built up some 200 yards
from the enemy ; when fire superiority had been attained
an assault was delivered. An attacking force was divided
into firing line and supports, with local reserves, and the
advance was often made in parallel lines in extended order ;
but the form was essentially elastic and adapted to the
10 INTRODUCTION
ground, with the definite objects of maintaining control,
utilizing such cover as was available, and presenting as
difficult a target as possible to the enemy.1
Mobilization was regularly practised. Every winter
certain units were brought up to war establishment in the
prescribed manner, the reservists and horses required to
complete them being represented by men and animals f^om
other units. In 1910 one of the two Aldershot divisions
was mobilized at the expense of the other and by volant eers
from the 1st Class Army Reserve, and so was abK to take
part in the manoeuvres at war numbers. Not on*y fighting
units, but also such branches as the Ordnance and the
Postal Service were represented at manoeuvres, and their
work was carried on under conditions approximating to
those of active service.
All these reforms were pushed forward under the in-
evitable disadvantages which have ever hampered the
British Army. Recruits were dribbling in at all tinier of
the year. Trained instructors were being withdrawn for
attachment to the auxiliary forces, and drafts of trained
men were constantly leaving their battalions during the
autumn and winter for India. The commanders, again,
could never tell whether their next campaign might not be
fought in the snows of the Himalayas, the swamps and
bush of Africa or the deserts of Egypt — a campaign in
Europe hardly entered into their calculations. It was
practically impossible for the General Staff to keep abreast
of the detailed information required as to possible theatres
of war. Nevertheless, British regimental officers, to use
their own expression, " carried on," although confronted
with two changes uncongenial to many of the older men
among them : the cavalry was trained to an increasing
extent in the work of mounted infantry, and was armed
with a rifle instead of a carbine ; and the Regular infantry
battalions were organized into four companies instead of
eight.
In every respect the Expeditionary Force of 1914 was
incomparably the best trained, best organized, and best
1 The soundness of the principle of the combination of fire and move-
ment was abundantly proved during the war ; but, as experience was
gained, it was found that there was no role for " supports " of the kind
laid down in the pre-war manuals ; reinforcing a line already stopped
by casualties merely meant increasing losses without corresponding gain ;
and it became apparent that the proper employment of " local reserves "
was to exploit local successes, and to fill defensively gaps in an attacking
line that had been brought to a standstill.
THE NATIONAL RESERVE n
equipped British Army that ever went forth to war.1
Except in the matter of co-operation between aeroplanes
and artillery, and use of machine guns, its training would
stand comparison in all respects with that of the Germans.2
Where it fell short of our enemies was first and foremost
in numbers ; so that, though not " contemptible," it was
almost negligible in comparison with continental armies
even of the smaller States.3 In heavy guns and howitzers,
high-explosive shell, trench mortars, hand-grenades,4 and
much of the subsidiary material required for siege and
trench warfare, it was almost wholly deficient. Further,
no steps had been taken to instruct the army in a know-
ledge of the probable theatre of war or of the German
army, except by the publication of a handbook of the army
and of annual reports on manoeuvres and military changes.
Exactly the same, however, was done in the case of the
armies of all foreign States. The study of German military
organization and methods was specifically forbidden at
war games, staff tours, and intelligence classes, which would
have provided the best opportunities for such instruction.
The National Reserve
The last of the preparations for defence that requires
mention here is the formation of the National Reserve,
initiated by private enterprise in August 1910 with the
approval of the Secretary of State for War and the Army
Council. Its object was to register and organize all officers
1 For the Order of Battle and organization of the British Expeditionary
Force, see Appendices 1 and 2.
2 The German General Staff in 1912 considered it an " ebenbiirtiger
Gegner " — man for man as good as their own. (Von Kuhl, " Der deutsche
Generalstab," p. 87.)
3 The following, which is translated from the German Admiralty
Staff's " Der Krieg zur See 1914-1918 : Nordsee," Bd. i. p. 82, is of
interest in this connection :
" The Supreme Command made no demands whatever on the Navy to
stop or delay the British transports. On the contrary, it seemed not to
place much value on the action of the efficient (wertvoll) but numerically
weak Expeditionary Corps. In any case, when at the beginning of the
war Frigate-Captain Heydel of the Operations Section was sent by the
Admiralty to inquire if the Army laid stress on the interruption of the
transport of troops, the Chief of the General Staff personally replied that
the Navy should not allow the operations that it would otherwise carry
out to be interfered with on this account ; it would even be of advantage
if the Armies in the West could settle with the 160,000 English at the
same time as the French and Belgians. His point of view was shared by
many during the favourable commencement of the offensive in the West.
4 There was a service hand-grenade, but it was a complicated one, with
a long shaft, that proved unsuitable in trench warfare ; it cost £!':!: 3.
12 INTRODUCTION
and men who had served in and left any of the military or
naval forces of the Crown, with a view to increasing the
military strength of the country in the event of imminent
national danger. The National Reserve was divided into
two classes : I one to reinforce existing units of the
Regular Army, and the other to fill up vacancies in the
Territorial Force, to strengthen garrisons, guard vulner-
able points, or perform any other necessary military duties
either as specialists or fighting men. By 1914, the National
Reserve numbered about 350,000. On mobilization many
of the members rejoined military and naval service ; the
remainder formed eventually the nucleus of the Royal
Defence Corps.
Imperial Military Forces
In 1907 there was a conference of Dominion Premiers
in London, and the opportunity was seized to make the
General Staff an Imperial one. Britain offered to train
officers of the Overseas Dominions at the Staff Colleges,
and to send out staff officers of her own as servants of the
Dominion Governments. It was urged that there should
be in all the forces of the Empire uniformity of armament
and organization. The Dominions cordially welcomed
these proposals. The Imperial General Staff was formed
and unity of organization was established. The Dominions
reserved to themselves the right of deciding whether to
participate with their forces in the event of hostilities
outside their own territories.
The Indian Forces
In India, the reorganization of the army on modern
lines into nine divisions, six cavalry brigades and a certain
number of independent brigades by Lord Kitchener in
1903, was designed to meet the Russian menace and make
India independent of assistance from overseas for .twelve
months. As a consequence of the Anglo-Russian Agree-
ment in 1907, and the state of Indian finances, this re-
organization was never completed. The " Army in India
Committee " of 1912-13 recommended that the field army
should consist of seven divisions, five cavalry brigades
and certain army troops, a force sufficient to deal with
Afghanistan and the mountain tribes combined, till rein-
1 See " National Reserve Regulations," issued with Special Army
Order, March 7, 1913.
THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE 13
forcements could arrive. This was the authorized Field
Army when war broke out in 1914, but even this had not
been provided with all its mobilization equipment. No
troops were maintained for the specific purpose of war
outside the Indian sphere. Not till August 1913 was the
Government of India invited to consider the extent to
which India would be prepared to co-operate with the
Imperial Forces in the event of a serious war between
Britain and an European enemy. It was agreed that
the Army Council might count upon two — possibly three —
divisions and one cavalry brigade. Actually in 1914,
as will be seen, two infantry divisions and two cavalry
divisions were sent to France, a division to the Persian
Gulf, the equivalent of the infantry of two divisions to
Egypt, besides minor detachments, and all but eight
battalions of British infantry were withdrawn from India,
their places being filled by British Territorial troops.
But no measures were taken to make India the Eastern
military base of the British Empire by the provision of
arsenals and the development of the industrial resources
of the country for war purposes, except in certain minor
items.1
The Committee of Imperial Defence
The supreme direction of war in England, which
originally lay in the sovereign, and was actually exercised
by William III., passed after that monarch's death to the
principal Ministers, and has remained with the Cabinet, or
a group within the Cabinet, ever since. Up to 1904, no
precedent had ever been set for the formation of a Council
of War or of any standing advisory body for the Cabinet
in naval and military matters in view of the outbreak
of war.
In 1895, however, a Defence Committee of the Cabinet
was formed which, after some changes in 1902, was finally
turned by Mr. Balfour in 1904 into the Committee of
Imperial Defence. It was then placed under the direct
control of the Prime Minister ; and a Secretariat was pro-
vided to record its deliberations and decisions, to collect
information, to outline plans necessary to meet certain
contingencies, and to ensure continuity of policy.
Much good work was done by the Committee in various
1 Field artillery ammunition and rifles in small quantities, small-arm
ammunition, certain vehicles, boots, saddles, harness.
14 INTRODUCTION
directions. Full measures were thought out in 1909 for
counteracting any hostile system of espionage and sabotage,
the Official Secrets Act being amended in 1911 to give the
Government greater powers. An amendment of the Army
Act in 1909 also gave authority to billet troops in time of
emergency. Lastly, the essential steps to be taken im-
mediately upon the outbreak of war were all of them
studied exhaustively, and the distribution of the con-
sequent duties among the various departments, and among
even individual officials, was arranged in the minutest
detail, so that there should be no delay and no confusion.
The results of these preparations, and the regulations
finally laid down, were embodied in a " War-book," and
all essential documents were prepared beforehand, so that
they might be signed instantly, the very room in which
the signature should take place being fixed, and a plan
showing its exact position attached to the documents.
Altogether, Britain never yet entered upon any war
with anything approaching such forwardness and fore-
thought in the preparation of the scanty military resources
at the disposal of the War Office. The Committee of
Imperial Defence was still, however, only an advisory body
without administrative or executive functions.
From 1911 onward the French and British Staffs had
worked out in detail a scheme for the landing of the Ex-
peditionary Force in France, and for its concentration in
the area Maubeuge — Le Cateau — Hirson, but, though there
was an " obligation of honour," there was no definite
undertaking to send the whole or any part of this force
to any particular point, or, in fact, anywhere at all.
FRANCE
(See Sketch 1 ; Maps 1 & 2)
For France the problem of defence against her eastern
neighbour was a very difficult one. The frontier had no
natural protection, and the population of France was not
only smaller than Germany's, but steadily sinking lower
in comparison. She first sought to assist the solution of
the problem by creating great fortified regions along her
borders, alternating with selected gaps. Thus, from the
Swiss frontier to Epinal there were roughly forty miles of
fortification ; from Epinal to Toul a space of forty miles
THE FRENCH ARMY 15
—the well-known Trouee de Charmes — was left undefended ;
from Toul to Verdun was another forty miles of fortifica-
tion ; and from Verdun to the Belgian frontier another
gap of thirty miles. In second line were the second-class
fortresses of Besan£on, Dijon, Langres, Rheims, and Laon ;
and in rear of them again the entrenched camps of Lyons
and Paris. There were no modern fortifications on the
Franco-Belgian frontier, but La Fere, Maubeuge, and Lille
were defended by old-fashioned detached forts.
The steadily aggressive attitude of Germany justified
the uneasiness of France. In 1887 Germany formed a
Triple Alliance with Austria and Italy. In 1890 France
responded by an Alliance with Russia. In 1891 Germany
emphasized her hostile bearing by renewing the Triple
Alliance ; and in 1899 she rejected the Tsar's proposal for
a limitation of armaments. In 1905, 1911, and 1912 she
made important additions to her army, raising its strength
to twenty-five active corps, as against the fifteen with which
she had taken the field in 1870 ; and behind these twenty-
five she had nearly an equal number of Reserve corps.1 On
30th June 1913 the total number of men with the colours
in peace was raised from 711,000 to 856,000 ; 2 this not
only made the army the readier for an attaque brusquee,
so much dreaded by the French, but assured a substantial
corresponding increase in the effectives of reserve forma-
tions.
France could only reply by reimposing the term of
three years with the colours, which in 1905 she had reduced
to two years. This signified an augmentation of 220,000
men to her peace strength. But, even so, France had at
the outbreak of war, roughly speaking, only three millions
and a half of trained men, whereas Germany had over four
millions ; 3 and, moreover, Germany's Reserve formations
were more completely organized than those of the
French.
The French Army in peace was composed of ten cavalry
divisions ; twenty-one army corps, each corps area also
1 On 2nd August 1914 Germany mobilized 14 Reserve corps, 4 Reserve
divisions and 3 Reserve brigades ; on 16th August the formation of 6 new
Reserve corps and 1 new Reserve division was ordered.
2 See p. 21.
3 The figure given since the war by various German authorities is
3,891,000. They attempt to show France had more by including the
coloured troops in her colonies, but even with these the total French
mobilizable strength was only 3,683,000 (Pedoya's "Commission de
1'Armee," p. 203, etc.).
16 INTRODUCTION
furnishing in war a Reserve division * and certain Territorial
brigades ; and a Colonial Corps.
On mobilization, according to the plan in force in
1914,2 the forces formed five Armies, with seven divisions
of cavalry, and a cavalry corps of three divisions. The
Reserve divisions were grouped into pairs or threes, and
allotted either to Armies or defences, or kept at the disposal
of General Headquarters.8
The zones of concentration selected in peace for
Map 2. the five Armies were, commencing as usual on the
right :
First Army (General Dubail) — Region of Epinal.
Second Army (General de Castelnau) — Region of Nancy.
Third Army (General Ruffey) — Region of Verdun.
Fifth Army (General Lanrezac) — Between Verdun (exclusive)
and Mezieres, with a detachment east of the Meuse.
Fourth Army (General de Langle de Gary) — In general reserve
in region Sainte Menehould — Commercy.
On either flank was a group of Reserve divisions :
On the right — a group of four Reserve divisions — Region
of Belfort.
On the left — a group of three Reserve divisions (General
Valabregue) — Vervins.
The French Staff in choosing the areas of concentration
were in face of the following facts. At Metz there was an
immense entrenched camp touching the frontier, and con-
nected by four main lines of railway with the heart of
Germany. From this a sudden blow — the attaque brusquee
— could be easily struck with all the force of perfect
organization ; and it was imperative to take measures to
parry it. On the other hand, the German school of strategy
favoured envelopment from one or both flanks. This in a
war with France signified, indeed, violation either of
Belgian or of Swiss neutrality, or of both ; but Germany
was not likely to be squeamish about such matters. Such
violation might not go beyond a peaceable passage of
troops across a corner of the neutral territory, yet still
might suffice for the aggressor's purpose of turning a
flank.
1 The Reserve divisions were numbered by adding 50 to the army
corps number up to the 71st : thus the I. Corps area provided the 51st
Reserve division. The XIX. Corps was in Algeria.
2 Known as No. 17 ; the text is given in Appendix 9.
3 For the Order of Battle and organization of the French Armies see
Appendices 3 and 4.
THE FRENCH PLAN 17
To meet menaces so different in kind as direct attack
in the centre and envelopment on the flanks, the French
General Staff decided to take the offensive and to con-
centrate facing the Eastern frontier, trusting to fortifica-
tions and to covering troops to gain sufficient time to
move the mass of the army elsewhere if required. It was
intended to attack as soon as possible with all forces
united : the First and Second Armies south of Metz, and
the Fifth north of it ; the Third Army was to connect
these two main attacks and arrange for the investment of
Metz as they progressed. The employment of the Fourth
Army depended on the action of the enemy ; if the Germans
moved into Luxembourg and Belgium, it was to co-operate
with the Fifth Army ; if the enemy merely covered the
common frontier, it was to go to the support of the right
attack. A detachment of the First Army (one corps
and one cavalry division) was detailed in the plan to
carry out a special operation on the extreme right in
Alsace, with the object of holding any enemy forces
which might attempt to advance on the western slopes
of the Vosges, and of assisting in the removal of that
part of the population which had remained faithful to
France. It was hoped by the general offensive move-
ment to dislocate the plans of the enemy and wrest the
initiative from him.
No provision, it will be noticed, was made to meet an
envelopment carried out through Belgium west of the
Meuse, nor to cover the gap between the western flank of
the Fifth Army and the sea, in which there were only local
Territorial troops and a few old fortresses incapable of
offering serious resistance to any invader. The informa-
tion at the disposal of the French General Staff appeared
to indicate that the Germans would attack from Metz, and
had not sufficient troops to extend their front west of the
Meuse. Beyond arranging for an alternative concentration
of the Fourth and Fifth Armies should the enemy enter
Luxembourg and Belgium, there was no preparation
against a wide enveloping movement.
On mobilization, General Joffre, vice-president du Con-
seil superieur de la guerre et chef de I'lStat Major General,
was appointed Commandant en Chef of the French Armies,
with General Belin as Chief of the Staff.
The approximate strength of the Armies (with the
Reserve divisions on the flanks included in the totals of
the nearest Army) was, in round numbers, after certain
VOL. i c
18 INTRODUCTION
exchanges had taken place (viz. the transfer of two corps
and two Reserve divisions from Fifth Army to Fourth, of
one corps from Second to Fifth, etc.) : — 1
First Army . . 256,000 men
Second Army . . 200,000 „
Third Army . . 168,000 „
Fourth Army . . 193,000 „
Fifth Army . . 254,000 „
1,071,000 men
BELGIUM2
(See Sketch 1 ; Map 2)
In 1914 the Belgian Army consisted of a Field Army
organized in six divisions and a cavalry division, and
fortress troops which formed the garrisons of Antwerp,
Lie*ge and Namur. Antwerp was the great fortress of
Belgium, the final refuge and rallying point of her forces
and population in case of invasion by a powerful enemy.
Its defences originally consisted of a strong enceinte, i.e.
a continuous inner ring of fortification, and a girdle of
forts, some two miles from the town, finished in 1868.
Though a second girdle of forts and redoubts outside the
first had been gradually added from 1882 onwards, the line
was incomplete, there were several gaps and intervals in
it, and it was on the average only some eight miles from
the town, an altogether insufficient distance under modern
conditions. Nor was the construction of the forts, although
improvements were in progress, capable of resisting modern
heavy artillery ; and notwithstanding that the guns and
flanking weapons were protected by armour, the fact that
they were inside the forts, which were conspicuously upstand-
ing, and not in well concealed batteries outside, made them
easy targets. The same remarks as regards construction
apply to the defences of Liege and Namur ; these fortresses
were " barrier forts and bridgeheads " on the Meuse ;
1 See footnote, p. 39.
8 The details of the operations of the Belgian Army are taken from
the official account : " L' Action de PArmee Beige. Periode du 31 juillet
au 31 decembre 1914," which has since been translated as " Military
" Operations of Belgium. Report compiled by the Belgian General Staff
" for the period July 31st to December 31st, 1914" (London, Collingridge,
Is. net). For the Order of Battle see Appendix 5.
THE BELGIAN ARMY 19
they constituted the first line of Belgium's resistance, and
were designed to guard the approaches into Belgium from
the east and south-east, and hinder any enemy from cross-
ing the Meuse either from France into Germany or Ger-
many into France. They were never intended to be
defended a entrance and depended on field troops for the
defence of the intervals between the forts. At Huy on
the Meuse between Namur and Liege there was an ancient
fort, which at best might secure sufficient time for the
destruction of the railway bridges and tunnel there.
The reorganization of the Belgian Army authorized by
the Government in 1912, had barely begun to take effect. In
accordance with this a force of 350,000 men was to be formed :
150,000 for the Field Army, 130,000 for the fortress garri-
sons, and 70,000 for reserve and auxiliary troops. But
these numbers would not in the ordinary course have been
available until 1926. Actually in August 1914 only
117,000 could be mobilized for the Field Army, and a
smaller proportion for the other categories.
The six divisions were stationed in peace so that at
short notice they could quickly confront any enemy, were
he Germany, France, Great Britain or Holland : —
1st Division around Ghent,
2nd Division, Antwerp,
3rd Division around Liege,
4th Division, Namur and Charleroi,
5th Division around Mons,
6th Division, Brussels,
Cavalry Division, Brussels.
Thus the 1st Division faced England ; the 3rd, Germany ;
the 4th and 5th, France ; and they were intended to act
as general advanced guards as occasion arose and gain
time for the movements of the other divisions to the
threatened area.
On the ordinary peace footing only part of the recruit
contingent was with the colours, so that in case of danger
of war, the Belgian Army had first to recall men on un-
limited leave, in order to raise its forces to " reinforced
peace establishment," the ordinary strength of the units of
the Continental Powers, and then to complete the numbers
by mobilizing reservists. Thus not only was Belgium
normally less ready than most nations, but she was in the
throes of reorganization, and could not put into the field
even as many men as the British Regular Army.
20 INTRODUCTION
GERMANY1
(See Plate 1)
From 1815 to 1860, the Prussian Army had practically
remained stationary in numbers, with a peace strength of
150,000 men formed in eight Army Corps, maintained by
a yearly contingent of 40,000 recruits, who served three
years with the colours. One of the first acts of Wilhelm I.
on coming to the throne in January 1860 was, in opposition
to the wishes of his Legislature, to raise the annual con-
tingent to 63,000, and the peace strength to 215,000.
From thence onwards there was a steady increase of the
military forces.
The war of 1866 made Prussia head of the North
German Confederation, whilst Hesse-Darmstadt, Wiirt-
temburg, Bavaria and Baden were bound to place their
armies at the disposal of Prussia in time of war. In 1870,
in addition to her original eight corps, she was able after
arrangements with the other States to put into the field
the Guard, IX., X. (Hanoverian), XI., and XII. (Saxon),
and /. and II. Bavarian Corps, and eventually the XIII.
(Wurttemburg) and XIV. (Baden), with a war-strength of
roughly 950,000.
The formation of the German Empire in 1871 made
expansion still easier, for by the Constitution one per cent
of the population could be in training under arms. The
peace strengths sanctioned (which did not include officers
and one-year volunteers) were : —
1874 . . . 401,659
1881 . . . 427,274
1887 . . . 468,409
1890 . . . 486,983 (20 corps)
1893 . . . 479,229 and 77,864 N.C.O.'s (and two
years' service introduced for
all, except for horserartillery
and cavalry)
1899 . . . 495,500 (exclusive of N.C.O.'s)
1911 . . . 509,839 (exclusive of N.C.O.'s ; gradu-
ally reached from 1905 on-
wards)
1912 . . . 544,211 (exclusive of N.C.O.'s)
1913 . . . 640,782 „ „ „
1 For the Order of Battle and organization of the German Forces see
Appendices 6 and 7.
THE GERMAN ARMY 21
In 1914, adding 36,000 officers, 110,000 N.C.O.'s, 18,000
one-year volunteers and 25,000 supernumerary recruits,
the total number with the colours was about 850,000.
The approximate mobilizable strength was, in round
figures : —
Trained officers and men . . . 4,300,000
Partially trained ..... 100,000
Untrained ...... 5,500,000
9,900,000
The Army was organized into 25 Active army corps Plate i.
(50 divisions)— the Guard, I. to XXI., and I., //., III.
Bavarian ; and in each army corps district organization
was provided to form certain Reserve divisions (32 J,1
Ersatz divisions (7), Landwehr brigades and regiments
(equivalent to 16 divisions), from the supernumeraries in
the depots. There were also 11 cavalry divisions.
The plan on which this great force would be used on
the Eastern and Western fronts could only be surmised.
It will, so far as it is known, be given later 2 after the
opening moves of the campaign have been developed and
described.
COMPOSITION OF GERMAN FORMATIONS
Service in the German Army was divided into : —
service in the Active (or Standing) Army (two years,
but three in the cavalry and horse artillery) ; service
in the Reserve (five years, but four in the cavalry and
horse artillery) ; service in the Landwehr (eleven years).
The Landsturm included youths between 17 and 20, too
young for service in the Army, and trained and untrained
men between 39 and 45, who were thus over the ordinary
military age.
The original Reserve corps which took part in the August
offensive were formed mainly of Reserve men super-
numerary to the requirements of the Active Army, with
some Landwehr ; but the Guard Reserve Corps contained
an active division, and others, e.g. the V '., VI., VII. and
IX., each contained an active brigade, as the active corps
of these numbers had each in peace time an extra brigade ;
and others had similarly an active regiment. Soon after
1 See footnote, p. 15. 2 See p. 33. '
22 INTRODUCTION
declaration of war, additional Reserve divisions and corps
were built up of volunteers (mainly youths under full
military age and men not yet called up, etc.), with a sub-
stantial nucleus of about 25 per cent of trained men of
the older classes.1
In peace the Ersatz Reserve consisted of men fit and
liable for military service, but not called up for training
because they were supernumerary to the annual con-
tingents, or for family reasons, or on account of minor
defects, or because they were temporarily unfit. It was
originally intended to provide men to fill up the ranks
of the Active Army and form its depots on mobilization.
In 1914, however, with the help of fully-trained super-
numerary officers, N.C.O.'s and men of the Reserve and
Landwehr, it was formed into units, brigades and divisions.
The Landwehr units were formed of men who had com-
pleted seven years with the Active Army and Reserve, and
were under 39 years of age.
As the war went on, the significance of the various
classifications largely disappeared, and Active, Ersatz,
Reserve and Landwehr divisions contained men of all
categories.
i " Ypres 1914," p. 5.
CHAPTER I
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
(See Sketch 1 ; Map 2)
THE story of the negotiations and of the diplomatic corre-
spondence and conversations which took place after the
assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria
and his Consort at Serajevo on the 28th June 1914 and
before the outbreak of war, is available in an official
narrative.1 In this the efforts of the British Government
1 " The Outbreak of the War 1914-1918 : A Narrative based mainly
on British Official Documents," by Professor Sir Charles Oman. Published
by H.M. Stationery Office, Price 2s. 6d.
Since this book was written, some further information with regard to
the Potsdam Conference of the 5th and 6th July 1914 has been published in
" Stenographische Berichte uber die offentlichen Verhandlungen des Unter-
" suchungsausschusses der verfassunggebenden deutschen National ver-
" sammlung," the shorthand reports of the Commission ordered by the
German National Assembly to take evidence on matters affecting critical
periods of the war. One of the terms of reference was : " It is to be
" ascertained what political and military proceedings took place in Berlin
" or Potsdam on the 5th and 6th July 1914."
In the evidence there given, General von Falkenhayn states that the
Kaiser, on the afternoon of the 5th, warned him that the Army should be
ready for all emergencies. Admiral Capelle and Admiral Behnke, tempor-
ary Chief of the Staff, Admiralty, were similarly warned ; these two
officers then arranged to make such " intellectual preparations " (intel-
lektuele Vorbereitungen) as were possible without arousing suspicion.
Admiral Behnke then describes what was done : — the mobilization orders,
etc., were carefully gone through and got ready, steps were taken for the
immediate preparation of ships and auxiliary vessels, all ships filled up
with fuel, the movements of ships were arranged in accordance with the
situation, etc.
No evidence of the exact military measures taken was asked for or
given at the Commission. An article in the "Revue Militaire Generate"
of September 1919, however, gives a large number of extracts from captured
German diaries and interrogations of prisoners which tend to shew that
mobilization orders were issued secretly some days before the 31st July ; men
on leave were recalled, the brigades on the frontiers intended for the surprise
of Liege were brought up to war strength by the recall of reservists, and
Landsturm battalions were formed on 31st July to replace active troops in
guarding the frontier, railways, etc. There would thus seem no room for
doubt that in a variety of ways Germany gained a most valuable start
of several days on her opponents.
23
24 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
27-31 July to bring about mediation and their determination to take
1914. no step that would assist to precipitate war are clearly
explained. It is therefore unnecessary here to allude to
diplomatic events, except to show how the military pre-
parations were affected by them.
On the 27th July, the British Government judged the
situation to be sufficiently serious to warrant them in
countermanding the dispersal, then in progress, of the
Home Fleets at the end of the exercises at sea which had
followed a test mobilization. At 5 P.M. on the 28th, the
First Fleet was ordered to proceed to its preliminary war
station in the North ; * on the 29th, the Government
further, at 2 P.M., ordered the precautionary measures
arranged by the General Staff to meet an immediate
prospect of war, to be put in force. These affected the
Regular troops only, and included the recall of officers
and men on leave and furlough, and the manning of the
coast defences.
The Belgian Government decided to place the Army
upon its " reinforced peace footing." 2
On the same day, the 29th, the British Ambassador
at Berlin was asked by the Chancellor to give assurance
of England's neutrality if Russia should attack Austria
and an European conflagration ensued. To this signifi-
cant enquiry Sir Edward Grey, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, responded on the 30th by a refusal to entertain
the proposal. Russia on that day issued orders for the
mobilization of her four Southern Armies; and Germany
threatened that she would mobilize unless Russia ceased.
News was also received of the declaration of war by
Austria-Hungary against Serbia and of the bombardment
of Belgrade.
On the 31st July, Austria and Russia decreed the full
mobilization of their forces, whereupon Germany made
a formal proclamation of " imminent danger of war "
(drohende Kriegsgefahr), which meant practically the in-
troduction of Martial Law and the suspension of the usual
civil rights, and permitted the calling to the colours of six
classes of the Reserve ; at the same time she presented an
ultimatum to the effect that, unless Russia ceased mobiliza-
tion within twelve hours, she herself would mobilize upon
both frontiers. Significantly enough, Turkey also ordered
1 The naval precautions taken will be found fully described in " The
History of the War : Naval Operations," vol. i., by Sir Julian Corbett.
2 See p. 19.
FRANCE AND GERMANY MOBILIZE 25
mobilization upon this day.1 Sir Edward Grey, mean- 1 Aug.
while, sent an identic request to Germany and France
to enquire whether they would respect Belgian neutrality.
On the 31st July France answered with an unequivocal
affirmative. Germany, however, sent only an evasive
reply ; and on the 1st August both France and Germany
ordered general mobilization.
The beginning of mobilization in France raised a serious
question for Great Britain. There was, it is true, no
definite agreement nor understanding that she should send
assistance to France, and the British Government was free
to decide, untrammelled, for peace or war. But a scheme
had been elaborated, in the event of certain contingencies,
between the General Staffs of the two countries ; and an
essential point in this scheme was that the first movement
of the British advanced parties, stores and so forth, should
begin on the first day of mobilization. Assuming this coin-
cidence of movement and mobilization, it was reckoned
that six divisions — or four, if six could not be spared —
one cavalry division and one cavalry brigade could be
transported from Great Britain to concentration areas
between Avesnes and Le Cateau, and would be ready to
advance from them on the sixteenth day after the order for
mobilization had been issued.
That the British mobilization, if it should take place at
all, would be later than the French was now obvious. The
British General Staff therefore suggested that measures
might be taken to ensure that, if mobilization should come
after all, movement to France of the advanced parties,
which could be warned at once, should be simultaneous
with the issue of the order for it. Another important
measure was the guarding of the lines of railway to the
ports of embarkation. This duty had been assigned to
certain units of the Territorial Force ; but these were
about to proceed to camp for their annual training ; and,
unless the orders for that training were cancelled, there
might be delay in the despatch of the Expeditionary Force.
The Government considered, however, that the counter-
manding of the orders for Territorial training would be
construed as not less menacing than the order for mobiliza-
tion itself ; and they shrank from any measure which might
seem to extinguish the last hope of peace.
At 12 noon on the 1st August, the German ultimatum
to Russia expired, and a general conflagration became in-
1 The " 1st day of mobilization" was the 3rd August. •
26 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
2 Aug. evitable.1 The Cabinet at 2 P.M. on the 2nd cancelled the
1914. orders for Territorial training and at 6 P.M. those for the
manoeuvres of the Army, but still issued no orders for
mobilization. The Royal Navy was quite ready for active
service ; and the French Ambassador was assured that,
if the German Fleet should enter the North Sea or the
Channel with hostile designs against France, the British
Fleet would give France its protection. Beyond this con-
ditional promise of naval intervention the Cabinet would
not go without consulting Parliament. Parliament was
consulted on the following day, the 3rd August ; but in
the meanwhile a most momentous event had occurred.
Sketch 1. At seven o'clock in the evening of the 2nd the German
Map 2. Minister at Brussels had presented a Note to the Belgian
Government, requesting a reply within twelve hours. This
Note had been drawn up by the Great General Staff as early
as 26th July, and despatched under seal to the German
Minister at Brussels on the 29th, with orders that it was
not to be opened pending further instructions. It set forth
that the German Government had certain intelligence of the
intention of the French forces to march on the Meuse by
Givet and Namur, and, in view of this attack, requested
free and unresisted ingress for the German troops into
Belgian territory. The Belgian Government replied that
they would repel any attempt either of France or Germany
upon Belgium ; and meanwhile declined the help of France
against any German encroachment until they should have
made formal appeal to the Powers, Prussia among them,
that had guaranteed Belgian neutrality. Faithful to
the obligations imposed upon her by treaty, Belgium had
already on the 1st August ordered her forces to be mobilized,
and was preparing to resist violation of her territory from
any quarter whatsoever.
Other important events on the 2nd August were that
German troops crossed the Polish frontier, broke also into
France at four different points, and entered the territory
of Luxembourg.2
Sir Edward Grey had no accurate information as to the
1 The German declaration of war was delivered by the Ambassador at
Petrograd, Count Pourtales, at 7 P.M. on the 1st August ; he at the same
time demanded his passports (Kautsky's "Die deutsche Dokumente zum
Kriegsausbruch," vol. iii. pp. 50 and 83, which is confirmed by the Russian
Orange Book).
2 By the treaty of 1867 Prussia guaranteed the perpetual neutrality of
Luxembourg ; by the Convention of 1902 Germany re-insured the neutrality
and stipulated that the railways in the Grand Duchy which she exploited
should not be used for the transport of her troops.
GERMANY DECLARES WAR ON FRANCE 27
exact nature of the German ultimatum to Belgium when he 3 Aug.
met the House of Commons on the 3rd August. He was 1914-
aware, however, of the crude fact that an ultimatum had
been tendered, and, whilst coming down to the House, he
had been informed that King Albert had telegraphed to
King George invoking England's diplomatic intervention
to safeguard the integrity of Belgium. He presented, in
due order, the course of action he had pursued and the
motives dictating it. The House of Commons, as it
followed him, applauded his decision not to commit the
country to armed intervention on account of the Serbian
quarrel, but approved the conditional promise of the Fleet's
aid to France, and grew enthusiastic when it heard that
England would be true to her engagements to uphold the
integrity of Belgium.
No resolution followed upon the speech of the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs. After the adjournment which
followed it, towards 7 P.M., he was able to read to the
House full information, received from the Belgian Legation,
of the German Note that had been presented in Brussels.
It left no doubt that a German attack was about to take
place, if indeed it had not begun.
The immediate measures taken were to announce that
a moratorium would be proclaimed and that the Govern-
ment would undertake the responsibility of maritime
insurance. The Territorial Force was embodied and the
Naval Reserves were called out. It was now clear that our
mobilization must take place at least three days later than
the French, and that even so movement could not be
simultaneous with it. The Government, however, reckoned
that by this delay they had gained more than they had lost
by securing the unanimity, or approximate unanimity, of
the nation and the benevolence of neutrals.
On the 3rd August, at 6.45 P.M., Germany declared war
on France, making alleged violation of her frontier by
patrols and of her territory by aviators a pretext.1 Italy,
though a member of the Triple Alliance, declared that
she would maintain her neutrality in the impending
struggle.
Meanwhile Germany, being unhampered by moral con-
siderations, completed her arrangements for the invasion
of Belgium. On the morning of the 4th August, she
declared war on Belgium, and two of her cavalry divisions
1 These allegations have since been admitted to have been false. See
M. Poincare's " The Origins of the War," pp. 3 and 4.
28 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
4-6 Aug. passed the frontier ; and in the afternoon the heads of
1914. infantry columns also entered Belgium.
Early in the afternoon of the 4th August Sir Edward
Grey telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Berlin
instructing him to ask for his passports if no satis-
factory answer were given regarding the observation of
Belgium's neutrality by 12 midnight (11 P.M. Greenwich
mean time). At 4' P.M. the British Government gave
orders for the mobilization of the Army. At 12.15 A.M.
on the morning of the 5th August, the Foreign Office issued
the following statement :
44 Owing to the summary rejection by the German Govern-
" ment of the request made by His Majesty's Government for
" assurances that the neutrality of Belgium will be respected,
" His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin has received his passports
" and His Majesty's Government have declared to the German
" Government that a state of war exists between Great Britain
" and Germany as from 11 P.M. on the 4th August."
On the 5th and 6th August, two meetings, attended
by the principal Ministers, including Lord Kitchener, who
became Secretary of State for War on the 6th, and by the
leading members of the Staffs of the Navy and Army of
Britain, were assembled to consider the conduct of the war.
The exact state of affairs at the moment was that Great
Britain, France and Russia were at war with Germany ;
that Belgium had been wantonly attacked but was making
a better defence than had been expected ; that Austria was
at war with Serbia only ; and that Italy was neutral. The
main military questions to be decided were the employment
and disposition of the Expeditionary Force, questions
which were complicated by the delay in mobilization. It
was determined first that the Force, less the 4th and 6th
Divisions, should embark for the continent. In order to
reduce the chance of a German landing in force interfering
with this move, the Secretary of State decided that the 18th
Infantry Brigade of the 6th Division, then at Lichfield,
should move to Edinburgh, and two infantry brigades of
the 4th Division should proceed to Cromer and York, in
each case accompanied by some artillery. The llth
Infantry Brigade of the 4th Division was already at
Colchester. Five cyclist battalions and eventually the
Yeomanry Mounted Division were also sent to the East
coast. The rest of the 6th Division was to remain in
Ireland.
Then came the final decision as to the destination
THE BRITISH PLANS 29
of the Expeditionary Force. In view of the attack on 6 Aug.
Belgium, had the British contingent been of a size adequate 1914<
for independent operations of a substantial character,
there would have been much to be said in favour of making
Antwerp the base of its military operations ; but as it
was so small, and as Antwerp, owing to part of the Schelde
being Dutch territorial waters, would have to be reached
overland after disembarkation at Ostend and other ports,
and operations in the north might involve separation
from the French, the suggestion was not followed. There
remained the area, already considered with the French,
namely, that around Le Cateau and Avesnes. Certain
military opinion, however, was against a concentration
of the British forces in any area in advance of Amiens.
Finally, after discussion of the expansion of the army,
it was agreed to leave the decision with our Allies, the
French ; 1 and the council broke up after passing three
resolutions, namely — First, to embark ultimately five,
but for the present only four of the divisions and the
Cavalry Division of the Expeditionary Force, to commence
on the 9th ; Secondly, to bring home the Imperial troops
from South Africa ; Thirdly, to transport two Indian
divisions to Egypt, but no further, and to urge the
Government of India to send a division to capture Dar es
Salaam in German East Africa.
To Field - Marshal Sir John French, who had been
selected to command the Expeditionary Force, special
instructions as to his co-operation with the French were
issued by the Secretary of State for War.2
Lieut. -General Sir Douglas Haig was appointed to com-
mand the I. Corps ; Lieut.-General Sir James Grierson, the
II. Corps ; Lieut.-General W. P. Pulteney, the III. Corps ;
and Major-General E. Allenby, the Cavalry Division. The
six divisions were to be commanded by Major-Generals
S. H. Lomax, C. C. Munro, H. I. W. Hamilton, T. D'O.
Snow, Sir C. Fergusson and J. L. Keir.
1 According to Marechal Joffre's official report to a Parliamentary
Commission d'Enquete : " The directions for concentration did not
mention the place eventually reserved for the British Army. . . . Our
military arrangements with England had in fact a character which was
both secret and contingent (tventuel), and made it improper to mention
them in such a document. ... In the event of its arrival, its employment
was looked for at the place which should be logically reserved for it, on the
left of the line of the French Armies, which it would thus prolong." " La
Preparation de la Guerre et la conduite des operations." Par Le Marechal
Joffre, p. 21.
2 Appendix 8.
30 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
PROGRESS OF EVENTS
ENGLAND
(See Sketch 1 ; Maps 1 & 2)
4 Aug. At 4 P.M. on the 4th August, as already stated, the order
1914. for mobilization of the Expeditionary and Territorial Forces
was issued by the British Government. As a matter of
fact, mobilization occurred at an extremely awkward
moment, for the 3rd August had been Bank Holiday and,
as usually is the case in the middle of summer, Territorial
units were in the act of moving to various camps for their
annual training when the orders cancelling it arrived.
Hence arose the question whether the existing time-tables
for concentration should stand, or whether the movements
by railway should be postponed. The Cabinet decided for
a short postponement, and gave orders, as already men-
tioned, that the embarkation of the Expeditionary Force
should not begin until the 9th, and for the present to
hold back the 4th and 6th Divisions. Meantime the
mobilization of the various units proceeded with the
smoothness which had been anticipated. In all essentials
everything went " according to plan " ; and even the
task of collecting 120,000 horses was accomplished within
twelve days. Embarkation was conducted upon the
principle that every train-load should be a complete unit
or subdivision of a unit, so that upon arrival in France
after its passage, it should be self-contained, possessing
transport enough to go straight into a rest-camp or into
another train. The ports of embarkation were as follows :
Great Britain
Southampton — for all troops.
Avonmouth — motor transport and petrol.
Newhaven — stores and supplies.
Liverpool — frozen meat and motor transport.
Glasgow — a few details.
Ireland
Dublin!
Cork If or the 5th and 6th Divisions.
Belfast]
The ships were also divided into classes : (1) personnel
EVENTS IN BELGIUM 31
ships ; (2) horse and vehicle ships ; (3) motor transport 4 Aug.
ships ; (4) store ships. 1914.
The ports of disembarkation in France were : Havre, sketch i.
Rouen and Boulogne. Map 2.
In the five days of greatest activity 1,800 special trains
were run in Great Britain and Ireland ; on the busiest day
of all, eighty trains, containing the equivalent of a division,
were run into Southampton Docks ; the daily average of
ships despatched was thirteen, with an average daily tonnage
of about 52,000 tons gross. At first the transports were
despatched singly as they were ready, both by day and by
night, for, as yet, there was no menace by German sub-
marines, and the measures taken by the Royal Navy
gave absolute security.1 Everything went regularly and
smoothly, and the official programme was carried out to
the letter ; but there was little margin to spare.
BELGIUM
Meanwhile the situation in Belgium and on the French
frontier was developing rapidly. When during the night
of the 3rd/4th August, it became clear that the Germans
intended to advance through Belgium, with or without
permission, the Belgian Staff at once took the measures
necessary for the defence of their country's neutrality
against Germany. The 3rd Division, supported by Map i.
the fortifications of Liege, was to check the German
advance ; and, under cover of the 3rd Division, the 1st,
2nd, 5th, and 6th Divisions were to move to the line
of the river Gette, the Cavalry Division and detach-
ments from Li6ge and Namur screening the movement.
This position covered a considerable part of Belgium,
Brussels and the communications with Antwerp. The
concentration began on the 4th August, and by the
morning of the 6th the Belgian Army was in position
two marches west of Liege, in the area Tirlemont
(1st Division), Perwez (5th Division), Louvain (2nd
Division), and Wavre (6th Division).
On the morning of the 4th, when German cavalry
crossed the Belgian frontier and moved upon Vise, north
of Liege, it found the bridge over the Meuse broken, and
the western bank held by Belgian troops. Two regiments
1 See " Naval Operations," i. p. 72 et seq., and also footnote 3, p.
11 above.
32 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
5 Aug. were then pushed northward to Lixhe (3 miles north of
1914. Vise), where they crossed the river by a ford. The
Belgians, finding their left threatened, thereupon fell back
on Liege. By evening the heads of six small German
columns of all arms which had crossed the frontier were
nearly two miles into Belgium. Further concentrations
were also reported to the south ; and it became evident
that a very large army threatened invasion along the lines
of advance guarded by the fortress of Liege and by the
3rd Division.
LIEGE
(See Sketches 1 & 2 ; Maps 1, 2, & 5)
On the 5th August, the Germans, having bridged the
Meuse at Lixhe, pushed forward patrols to Tongres (about
ten miles N.N.W. of Liege) ; and the commander-in-chief of
the invading troops, General von Emmich, demanded free
passage through Liege. This being at once refused, he
attempted to seize the place by a coup de main. His troops
consisted of six infantry brigades (said to be at peace
strength) provided by the III., IV., VI., X., and XI.
Corps, each with a squadron of cavalry, a battery of
artillery, a battalion of J tiger (Rifles), and cyclists attached
to it. Two of the six batteries had field guns, and the other
four, field howitzers. Besides this force, General von
Emmich had at his disposal two heavy mortar batteries,
and General von der Marwitz's Cavalry Corps, comprising
the 2nd, 4th, and 9th Cavalry Divisions.1
After an unsuccessful attempt to kidnap the Com-
mandant of Liege, General von Emmich gave orders for a
night attack. His general plan was to make a demonstra-
tion against the forts with a few companies, and to send
the six brigades through the intervals between them
to secure the town and citadel, and then to ;fall upon
the forts from the rear. This attack was delivered soon
after nightfall in five columns ; two from the north and
north-east ; one, the central column, from the east ; and
two from the south. The first two columns, for the most
part, lost their way, and fell back after suffering heavy
losses, though one battalion penetrated into Liege and was
there captured. Of the two southern columns, one halted,
having casualties so severe as to forbid further progress,
and the other was seized with panic, the men firing upon
1 " Luttich-Namur."
SKETCH 2.
LIEGE
33
each other. The central column met with serious resist- 5-17 Aug.
ance, the brigadier and the commander of the leading 1914-
regiment being killed. It was on the point of falling back
when Major-General Ludendorff, who, as Deputy Chief of
the General Staff of the Second Army, was with General
von Emmich watching the operations, came up and, taking
command, pushed on. He was specially interested, for he
had planned these very operations in peace when Chief of
the Operations Section of the Great General Staff. After
giving his men a rest, he renewed the attack in the forenoon
of the 6th, and advanced until his leading troops were
within a mile of Liege. Though unsupported by the other
columns, he decided to make a dash for the citadel, and on
advancing found practically no opposition. The Belgian
Staff, anticipating that the 3rd Division might be sur-
rounded, had withdrawn it to the Gette ; so the Germans
found themselves in possession of the town of Liege.
The true siege of the fortress then began. Von der
Marwitz's Cavalry Corps worked round to the western side
of the defences, and the German artillery shelled the forts.
On the 12th, 42-cm. howitzers were brought up, and the
last of the forts fell at 8.30 A.M. on the 16th. General Leman,
the gallant commandant, was taken unconscious from
under a heap of wreckage and made prisoner. He had
nobly done his duty, and by delaying the German advance
had rendered transcendent service to the cause of Belgium's
Allies.1
Meanwhile, on the 10th, German cavalry and Jager 2
1 The time gained to the Allies would appear to have been about four or
five days. According to von Kluck (pp. 10-19), his three leading corps
were on the line Kermpt — Stevort — Gorssum, forty miles (say three
marches) west of Aix La Chapelle, on the night of the 17th. They had
begun to arrive in the concentration area north-east of Aix on the 7th.
Had Liege offered no opposition and had they at once marched off into
Belgium, there seems no reason why the //., ///. and IV. Corps should
not have reached the above line on the 10th, and completed concentration
there on the 12th or 13th — four or five days earlier than was the case.
The six composite brigades and cavalry corps which attacked Liege were
available to cover the concentration. Even on the 10th August the German
Supreme Command hoped to commence the advance on the 13th, five
days earlier than was possible (v. Billow, pp. 11, 12). According to post-war
German publications however, e.g. " Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg "
by Foerster, the German time-table made the armies reach the line Thion-
ville — Sedan — Mons, on the 22nd day of mobilization (23rd August), Sketch 1.
and they were actually slightly ahead of it. Belgian opinion is that
at least four days were gained (" Bulletin Beige des Sciences Militaires,"
Sept. 1921).
. a It must always be borne in mind that a German cavalry division
is a mixed force of all arms, with two or more Jager (Rifle) battalions
included. (See Plate 1.)
VOL. I D
34 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
12-20 Aug. appeared before the line of the Gette, and gradually ex-
1914> tended north as far as Hasselt (18 miles north-east of
Sketches Tirlemont) and Diest (12 miles north of Tirlemont). On
& 2- the 12th six German cavalry regiments, with three horse-
,2, batterjes an(j two J tiger battalions attacked the line of the
Gette at Haelen, a little to the south-east of Diest, and
made some progress, but were ultimately driven back by
the Belgians, with appreciable loss, after ten hours of
sharp fighting.
German troops, however, continued to pour into Bel-
gium, and by the 17th the space between the Meuse, the
Demer and the Gette was occupied by them in strength,
in spite of the fact that the Belgian Army, assisted by the
Garde Civique, had systematically obstructed the roads
and destroyed the bridges. The right flank of the line of
the Gette was already threatened, and columns to support
the turning movement were passing the Meuse at Huy,
where the bridge, blown up by the Belgians, had been re-
paired. On the 18th, the Germans again attacked and
carried Haelen, and also entered Tirlemont. They then
fell upon the front and left flank of the Belgian 1st Division,
and only by hard fighting were held at bay. The Gette
position was now evidently in imminent danger. It was
certain that the German //., IV. and IX. Corps, covered
by the £nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions were opposite the
Belgian left between Diest and Tirlemont ; whilst the
Guard, X. and VII. Corps were marching against the
Belgian right on a front from Jodoigne (7 miles S.S.W.
of Tirlemont) to Namur. It was also known that the
Active corps were being followed by Reserve formations,
namely, in the First Army, by the ///., IV. and IX.
Reserve Corps ; in the Second Army by the Guard, VII.
and X. Reserve Corps ; and in the Third Army by the
XII. Reserve Corps. The French and the British, as will be
seen, were neither of them yet at hand to give assistance ;
and it was hopeless for the Belgians to think of contending
against odds of four or five to one. Accordingly, on the
evening of the 18th, the five Belgian divisions were skilfully
drawn off from the Gette north-westward to Antwerp, and
on the 20th entered the lines of that fortress without
being seriously molested. There, on the flank of the Ger-
mans if they advanced westward, and in their rear if they
should turn southward, the Belgian Army remained — an
effective menace to the enemy.1
1 According to von Hausen, the commander of the Third Army (" Maine-
NAMUR 35
NAMUR
(Map 5)
Further to the south, about Namur, where the 4th 5-23 Aug.
Belgian Division was stationed, German cavalry patrols 1914-
were in touch with the Belgian cavalry to the north of the
fortress on the 5th August, and to the south-east of it on
the 7th. But it was not until nearly a fortnight later that
the main bodies of the enemy approached ; and meanwhile,
on the 19th, the garrison had been joined by the 8th Belgian
Infantry Brigade which, finding itself completely isolated
at Huy, had blown up the bridge over the Meuse there and
fallen back on Namur. On that day the Guard Reserve
Corps of the German Second Army appeared on the north
of the fortress, and the XI. Corps, consisting of the 22nd
and 38th Divisions, of the Third Army, on the south-east,
the whole under the command of General von Gallwitz.
With these troops was a large proportion of heavy artillery,
including four batteries of Austrian 30-5 -cm. mortars and
one of Krupp's 42-cm. howitzers.
On the 20th August, the Germans drove in the Belgian
outposts, and on the 21st opened fire on the eastern and
south-eastern forts. The Belgian commandant was power-
less either to keep these monster howitzers at a distance or
to silence them by counter-batteries. Before evening two of
the principal forts had been very seriously damaged ; and
within another twenty-four hours both were practically
destroyed. Two Belgian counter-attacks on the 22nd August
failed ; and by the evening of the 23rd the northern and
eastern fronts had been laid bare, and five out of the whole
circle of nine forts were in ruins. At midnight the garrison
withdrew south-westward into France, whence it later
rejoined the main Belgian Army at Antwerp.
Thus for eighteen days the Belgians had faced the
German invasion, delaying the hostile advance during a
schlacht," p. 244, footnote), the HI. Reserve Corps and IX. Reserve Corps
were originally detailed to push forward to the coast " direction Calais,"
but this order was cancelled when the Belgian Army went into Antwerp,
and both corps were sent to watch it. Later, in early September, the
XV. Corps was detained near Brussels on account of a sortie being expected
from Antwerp. These three corps were absent from the battle of the
Marne, though the IX. Reserve and XV. Corps reached the Aisne in time
to oppose the Allied crossing. There were further employed at the siege :
the 4th Ersatz Division (sent from the Sixth Army), the 1st Ersatz Reserve
Division, a Matrosen Division, the 26th and S7th Landwehr Brigades,
besides heavy artillery and engineers.
36 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
2-12 Aug. most critical period, and gaining time which was of price-
1914. iess vajue t0 the Allies. In addition to this great strategic
advantage, the fact that the first German operations
against fortresses, conducted under the conditions obtain-
ing in modern warfare, were so rapidly successful gave
warning to the French to readjust their conceptions of the
defensive value of their fortified front, and reorganize it on
lines calculated to counter the effect of bombardment by
heavy howitzers.
THE OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH1
(See Maps 1, 2, & 5)
On the 2nd August, the day of the presentation to
Belgium of the German ultimatum, the French Commander-
in- Chief decided to use "the alternative concentration
areas " for the Fourth and Fifth Armies, so as to inter-
polate the former in the general line, and extend the left
wing further towards the north.
Map i. On the 3rd, General Sordet's Cavalry Corps began
to move forward east of Mezieres, and on the 5th it
was ordered, with the consent of King Albert, to enter
Belgium to ascertain the direction of advance of the enemy
and to delay his columns. General Sordet crossed the
frontier on the 6th and moved first towards Neufchateau
(36 miles east of Mezieres). Then, striking north, he
eventually arrived within nine miles of Liege ; but, finding
that the Belgian field troops had been withdrawn from the
area of the fortress, he retired in the direction of the Meuse.
Valuable information was obtained by him as to the
enemy's movements from an officer who was captured on
the 9th, but otherwise the intelligence gained in the
strategic reconnaissance was negative, and it did not
achieve its secondary object of delaying the enemy's
advance ; for, owing to the resistance of Liege, no important
columns of German troops had at the time entered the
area explored.
To assist the Belgian Army and support the cavalry,
the I. Corps of the French Fifth Army was sent forward on
the 12th August from Mezieres northwards " to oppose any
1 Taken mainly from General Joffre's statement to the Parliamentary
Commission d'Enquete ; Defense du bassin de Briey ; the very lucid com-
mentary on this Commission, by its rapporteur, M. Fernand Engerand,
entitled "La Bataille de la Frontiere"; and the official publication
" Quatre Mois de Guerre : Rapport sur Fensemble des operations du 2 aout
au 2 decembre 1914."
OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH 37
attempts of the enemy to cross the Meuse between Givet and 6-15 Aug.
Namur." On the 15th, in conjunction with General 1914-
Mangin's 8th Infantry Brigade (specially detailed to sup-
port the Cavalry Corps), it repulsed an attempt of
von Richthofen's Cavalry Corps (Guard and 5th Cavalry
Divisions) to cross near Dinant.
Between the 6th and 8th August, it became certain that
an enemy force containing units belonging to five different
army corps was operating against Liege ; but the main
group of the German Armies appeared to the French
General Staff to be around Metz in front of Thionville and
Luxembourg. The enemy was thus, it was thought, in a
position either to advance westwards if Liege fell, or if
Liege held out to wheel southwards, pivoting on Metz. A
decision was therefore made by General JoSre, and com-
municated to the French Armies on the 8th August,1 to the
effect that his intention was to bring the Germans to battle
with all his forces united as in the original plan, with his
right extended to the Rhine. If necessary, the left of the
line would be held back, so as to avoid the premature
engagement of one of the Armies before the others could
come to its assistance. If, however, the enemy's right
were delayed in front of Liege, or turned southwards, the
left would be advanced. As the concentration would not
be finished until the 18th, it was still too early to give
detailed orders ; but the instructions provided for the
Armies gaining ground as soon as they were ready to
move.
Meantime in Alsace, " to facilitate the attack of the
main Armies," the small offensive — outlined in the original
plan — was commenced on the extreme right by a detach-
ment of the First Army, consisting of the VII. Corps
and 8th Cavalry Division. This detachment crossed the
frontier on the 6th August. After its advanced guard had
reached Mulhausen, it found itself in the presence of
superior forces, and was withdrawn. On the 14th the
offensive was renewed with a stronger force, called the
Army of Alsace, consisting of the VII. Corps, the Alpine
and three Reserve divisions, under General Pau. On the
same date the First and Second Armies began their forward
movement across the frontier. For the Armies on the left
only certain precautions were ordered. But during the
afternoon of the 15th, news came from the Belgian
Army that 200,000 Germans were crossing the Meuse
1 In Instruction Gtntrale No. 1, dated 8th August 1914, 7 A.M.
38 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
15-16 Aug. below Vise, and from the I. Corps of the attack at
1914. Dinant; the Grand Quartier General (G.Q.G.) in con-
sequence ordered the III. and X. Corps of the Fifth
Army to join the I. Corps. General Lanrezac was further
directed to hand his II. Corps and group of Reserve
divisions to the Fourth Army, in compensation for which
there were sent to him two recently arrived African
divisions and the XVIII. Corps, originally in the Second
Army, from the General Reserve. The Fourth Army then
occupied the ground vacated by the Fifth, and the
Third took over the objectives lately assigned to the
Fourth. The duty of masking Metz was given to a new
force, the Army of Lorraine, composed of three Reserve
divisions from the Third Army and three others sent up for
the purpose ; General Maunoury, who had originally been
on the Italian frontier, was given command of it. There
was thus a general taking of ground to the left.
General Joffre's general plan of operations now began
to take definite shape as cumulative evidence showed that
the main German advance was in progress through Belgium.
Map 2. The situation as it presented itself to him on the 16th
August was as follows :
" In the north, seven or eight German army corps and four
" cavalry divisions are endeavouring to pass westwards between
" Givet and Brussels, and even beyond these points."
In the centre between Bastogne and Thionville there were
thought to be six or seven army corps, and two or three
cavalry divisions. South of Metz, the Germans appeared
to be on the defensive.
His intention now was to make the principal attack
with the Third and Fourth Armies through Luxembourg
and Belgian Luxembourg, so as to strike at the flank and
communications of the enemy forces which had crossed the
Meuse between Namur and the Dutch frontier, and if
possible attack them before they could deploy for battle
by wheeling south. To support this offensive the First
and Second Armies were to make only a secondary attack
between Metz and the Vosges, for the purpose of holding
the enemy, who seemed to be gradually shifting westwards,
and who otherwise might be able to take in flank the
French Armies attacking in Luxembourg. Lastly, the
left wing, consisting of the Fifth Army, the British Army
when it should arrive, and the Belgian Army, was to move
up so as to hold in check any German forces that might
OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH 39
advance from the Meuse, and so gain sufficient time to allow 20 Aug.
the attack of the Third and Fourth Armies to become 1914-
effective. In order to give weight to the attack, the Third
and Fourth Armies were considerably strengthened.1
In brief, General Joffre's first object was to break the
enemy's centre, and then he intended to fall with all
available forces on the right or western wing of the German
Armies.
The general advance was to take place on the 21st.
The positions on the morning of the 20th indicate the
preliminary movements which had been made for the
purpose. They were :
The Army of Alsace had reached Mulhausen.
The First and Second Armies were across the frontier in front
of Luneville and Nancy, from near Sarrebourg to Delme,
about thirty-six miles north-west of Sarrebourg.
The Army of Lorraine observed Metz.
The Third and Fourth Armies were close up to the Belgian
frontier, astride the river Chiers, from near Longwy to
Sedan, ready to cross the river Semoy. MaP 5-
The Fifth Army was disposed :
The I. Corps and 8th Infantry Brigade on the Meuse,
near Dinant, facing east, with
The 51st Reserve Division marching up from the south
to act as a link between the French Fourth and Fifth
Armies.
The X. and III. Corps, each with an African division
attached to it, lay along the Sambre near Charleroi,
facing north.
The XVIII. Corps was echeloned to the left rear on
the line Gozee — Thuin (6 miles and 9 miles south-west
of Charleroi).
General Valabregue's two remaining Reserve divisions
were on the left of the XVIII. Corps and north-east of
Maubeuge, in the gap into which General Joffre intended
the British Army should move up.
1 To make the changes clear, they are enumerated together here :
The Third Army was reinforced by one Reserve division, and then by
two more.
The Fourth Army took over from the Fifth Army : II. Corps ; XI.
Corps ; 52nd and 60th Reserve Divisions (leaving it the 51st) ; a cavalr
division ; and the Moroccan Division from the IX. Corps of the Second
Army.
The Fifth Army, to make up for this, received the 37th and 38th
Divisions from Africa ; the XVIII. Corps from the Second Army ; and
General Valabregue's Group of three Reserve divisions. So that the corps
it now contained were the I., III., X., and XVIII., with the 37th Division
added to the III. and the 38th to the X.
40 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
20-21 Aug. Further to the west and beyond the space to be occupied
1914. by the British, were three Territorial divisions under
General d'Amade, the 84th near Douai, the 82nd near
Arras, and the 81st between Hazebrouck and St.
Omer.
It will be observed that the front of the Fifth Army
under General Lanrezac along the Meuse and Sambre
formed a salient, at the apex of which was the Belgian
fortress of Namur, on which by the evening of the 20th
the Germans were closing. Consequently, any failure of
his right to hold its ground on the Meuse would place his
centre and left in a very dangerous situation, and render
them liable to be cut off.
On the 20th, however, before the general advance had
begun, misfortunes had already overtaken the French.
" The First and Second Armies, tired by several days of
marching and fighting, came up against strongly organized
positions, armed with powerful artillery, whose fire was
admirably prepared and corrected by aeroplanes." After
being violently counter-attacked, the Second Army was
compelled to retire and the First had to conform to its
movements. The actions in which they were engaged
are known as the battles of Sarrebourg and Mor Range
(25 miles north-west of Sarrebourg).1
On the 21st August, in spite of this reverse to the right
wing, the Third and Fourth Armies crossed the frontier and
advanced from ten to fifteen miles into the difficult
Ardennes country, hilly, wooded, and with marshy bottoms.
They were then met by the Armies of the German Crown
Prince and Duke Albert of Wiirttemberg, numerically
slightly superior to them,2 and, after fighting the actions
known as the battles of Virton and the Semoy 3 were com-
pelled to fall back towards the Meuse. The attempt to
break in the German centre before the right wing could
1 It may be added here that an attempted pursuit of the Second Army
by the Germans received a serious check on the 25th, for, in spite of the
reverse, the French First Army returned to the offensive and struck them
in flank. After some indecisive fighting, the situation of the French
First and Second Armies became stabilized on a line in France, just inside
the frontier.
2 French. German.
Third Army . . . 168,000 Fifth Army . . . 200,000
Fourth Army . . . 193,000 Fourth Army . . . 180,000
361,000 380,000
3 Longwy and Neuf chateau in German accounts.
OPERATIONS OF THE GERMANS 41
deliver its blow against the Allied left wing had thus failed, IT Aug.
owing to the facts that the enemy forces in the Ardennes 1914t
were stronger than had been anticipated and part were
deployed behind positions ready to receive the attack ;
thanks however to a premature enveloping attack attempted
by the German Crown Prince the reverse was less serious
than it might otherwise have been.
As regards the French Fifth Army, General Lanrezac
had considered it inadvisable to advance simultaneously
with the Armies on his right. He preferred to wait until
his reinforcements should have arrived, which would not
be until the 23rd ; *• until the Fourth Army should have
cleared the gorges of the Semoy and shortened by its ad-
vance the eastern face of the salient which the front of the
Fifth Army presented to the enemy ; and until the British
Army should similarly have come up on his left. As will
presently be seen, Sir John French's force on the 21st was
approaching the line of the Mons — Conde Canal. The
general situation in which it was about to play its part may
be thus summarized : —
The French First and Second Armies were retiring after
the battles of Sarrebourg and Morhange ;
The Third and Fourth " had failed, and the reverse seemed
serious " ;
The Fifth Army was in a salient about to be attacked by
two German Armies ;
Namur was on the point of falling (the last fort surrendered
on the 25th) ; and
The Belgian Army had been driven into Antwerp.
OPERATIONS OF THE GERMANS 2
(See Sketch 1 ; Maps 1, 2, & 5)
Leaving only three Active corps and three Reserve
divisions, assisted by a cavalry division, one Ersatz 'division
and Landwehr formations, some 250,000 men in all, on her
Eastern frontier, where she had the co-operation of the
Austro-Hungarian Army, and the IX. Reserve Corps (until
the 23rd August) and Landwehr formations in Schleswig
to guard against a possible landing, Germany had assembled
1 See p. 38.
2 This summary of the early German operations is compiled from the
authorities now available : von Bulow, von Kluck, von Hausen, von Kuhl,
General Staff Monographs, etc.
42 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
17 Aug. on her Western frontier seven Armies,1 with Generaloberst
1914. von Moltke as Chief of the General Staff and practically
Sketch i. in command.
Maps i By the evening of the 17th August 2 these Armies were
concentrated, ready to move, on a long front extending
from the fortress of Strasbourg to the Dutch frontier north
of Liege. This front ran through Sarrebourg, Metz and
Thionville ; 3 up the centre of the Duchy of Luxembourg
(the neutrality of which had been violated on the 2nd
August), to Liege ; and to the north - west of this
fortress, where the northernmost German Army, von
Kluck's, was deployed facing the Belgians on the Gette.
In order to reach the far side of the neutral barrier
formed by the projecting peninsula of Dutch Limbourg,
behind which it had been assembled, it had defiled in
three columns through Aix La Chapelle. The Supreme
Command Orders directed the Armies of von Kluck
(First) and von Biilow (Second), acting together under
the latter general,4 to deal with the Belgian Army, to
force it away from Antwerp and to reach the line Namur —
Brussels. The First Army was to detail a detachment to
mask Antwerp, and provide against a British landing on
the coast by holding back its right. Von Hausen's (Third)
Army was to gain the line of the Meuse from Givet to
Namur. Namur was to be attacked and taken as soon as
possible by the left of the Second and the right of the Third
Armies. Meanwhile, the Fourth and Fifth Armies were to
conform so that the whole five Armies on the right might
carry out a gigantic wheel, first on to the line Thionville —
Brussels, and then forward in a south-westerly direction,
Thionville still remaining the pivot.
1 For Order of Battle, see Appendices 6 and 7.
Approximate numbers were, excluding higher cavalry formations :
First Army ..... 320,000 men
Second Army . . . . 260,000
Third Army 180,000
Fourth Army .... 180,000
Fifth Army 200,000
Sixth Army 220,000
Seventh Army .... 125,000
1,485,000
A French calculation in "La Revue Militaire Generate ' for January
1920 gives 1,440,000.
2 See " Liittich-Namur," p. 67.
3 The continuous fortifications round and connecting these two places
form the so-called Moselle Position.
4 The order of the 17th August which placed von Kluck under von
Biilow was cancelled on the 27th, but reissued on the 10th September.
THE GERMAN PLAN 43
The strategical conception dominating the initial de-
ployment of the German Armies on the Western front and
the invasion of Belgium and France has, during 1919-
1920, been disclosed by the publications of several German
General Staff officers,1 and their statements are confirmed
by the order issued on 5th September by the German
Supreme Command.2
The strategic objective was to outflank the French by
the west and drive them eastwards against the Swiss
frontier. On completion of the deployment, the Sixth and
Seventh Armies, under the senior army commander, Crown
Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, were to advance against the
Moselle, below Frouard (5 miles north-north-west of
Nancy), and the Meurthe ; they were to hold fast the
French forces (the First and Second Armies) assembled
there, and prevent any of them from being transferred to
the left wing to oppose the main German advance. If
attacked seriously, Prince Rupprecht was to retire to a
prepared position flanked by Strasbourg and Metz.3
Meanwhile, the great wheel on Thionville was to be
continued. By the 22nd day of mobilization (23rd August)
it was expected that the five Armies on the right would
have reached the line Ghent — Mons — Sedan — Thionville ;
by the 31st day (1st September) the line Amiens — La F£re—
Rethel — Thionville.4 Whilst the other Armies held their
ground — the Second Army digging in on the line of the Oise
or Oise — Aisne and thus covering Paris on the north side —
the First Army, with all its original fourteen divisions,5 was
to sweep over the lower Seine,6 past the west of Paris and
round the south. It was to be followed by Ersatz divisions,
detailed to complete the investment of the fortress. When
they were in position, the First Army, reinforced by the
Sixth Army and by every division that could be spared
from the other Armies, was to advance eastwards and drive
the French against their Moselle fortresses, the Jura and
1 E.g. von Kuhl, Foerster, Tappen, Baumgarten-Crusius.
2 See Baumgarten-Crusius's " Die Marneschlacht, 1914," p. 73.
3 The subsequent advance of the German Sixth and Seventh Armies,
which resulted in a double envelopment being attempted, was not, we are
told, originally intended. It was only permitted in consequence of the
initial success of those Armies against the French, and the difficulties of
sending troops from them to the right flank as planned, owing to the
damage done to the Belgian railways (Tappen, pp. 13-15).
4 This was accomplished in spite of the Belgian resistance, if we accept
the time-table published in Germany since the war.
5 Four (///. R. and IX. R. Corps) had to be left to invest Antwerp.
6 The order to advance to the lower Seine was actually given to the
First Army, in spite of its reduced numbers, on the 27th August. •
44
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
Switzerland. The same plan was to be pursued if the
enemy abandoned the Oise, and withdrew behind the
Marne and the Seine. To give sufficient weight to the blow
which was to crush the Allies' left, roll up the line from the
westward and, in conjunction with the advance of the
Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies, push the entire line of
battle south-east towards neutral territory, five of the ten
cavalry divisions and twenty-six out of the total of the
whole seventy -two divisions on the Western front were
allotted to the two Armies under General von Billow.1
In order that the merits of the plan may be judged
it may be added here in anticipation of the narrative,
that the part of it which involved swinging round the
west of Paris was abandoned on the evening of the 30th
August. On that date the First Army turned south-east
to exploit the supposed success of the Second Army at
Guise.2 The Supreme Command on the morning of the
31st gave its approval of this movement. It was already
beginning to find that it had not sufficient troops to carry
out the original plan. There was a fifty 'mile interval
between the Fourth and Second Armies that the Third was
not strong enough to fill, and the First and Second Armies
had not only suffered very heavily in battle with the
French Fifth Army and the B.E.F., but they and the Third
Army had been compelled to make substantial detachments :
thus the First and Second Armies left the ///. Reserve
and IX. Reserve Corps (four divisions) to observe the
Belgian Army in Antwerp ; the Guard Reserve Corps (two
divisions) to invest Namur, with the assistance of the XI.
Corps (two divisions) of the Third Army (both the XI. and
Guard Reserve Corps went later from Namur to Russia) ; and
the VII. Reserve Corps (two divisions) to besiege Maubeuge ;
besides minor detachments, such as a division of the XII.
Reserve Corps at Givet, a brigade of the IV. Reserve Corps
in Brussels, a brigade of the VII. Corps at Maubeuge.
Thus the striking wing, the three Armies on the right,
1 The density of the different German Armies on the original front on
the 17th August is of interest :
First Army front 18 miles, about 18,000 men per mile.
Second 20 13,000
Third 15 12,000
Fourth 30 6,000
Fifth 40 5,000
Sixth 70 3,100
Seventh 35 3,500
2 Kluck, p. 76, says it was at the suggestion of von Billow ; Biilow,
p. 42, makes out that von Kluck did it on his own initiative.
THE GERMAN PLAN 45
was reduced from thirty-four to less than twenty-five
divisions.
The scope of the plan was far too wide for the forces
available ; for had the French defended Lille, La Fere and
Rheims, as might have been expected, still further detach-
ments must have been left behind. Further, insufficient
allowance appears to have been made for casualties, or, at
any rate, for such heavy losses as the Germans suffered,
since no reinforcements from the depots reached the Western
Armies until the 14th September.1 The plan was strategic-
ally bad, for it was out of proportion to the means available.
This appears to have been recognized by Ludendorff when
head of the Operations Section of the Prussian Great
General Staff in 1912, for he put forward a demand for six
divisions to be added to the Army.2
Thus von Moltke no doubt gladly accepted, for tactical
purposes, the solution offered by the inward wheel of the
First Army, and evolved a reduced plan in which the outer
flank should pass east instead of west of Paris. On the 3rd
September an order was accordingly issued to the First and
Second Armies to force the whole French Army away from
Paris in a south-easterly direction towards the Swiss
frontier.3 How this plan fared will be narrated in due
course.
It may be noted that in the original plan, dated 1905,
drawn up by Graf Schlieffen, von Moltke's predecessor,
fifty-three divisions were allotted to the five Armies,
First to Fifth, for the great wheel ; in 1914 there were
fifty-five. Of the nine new divisions which became
available in the interval, eight were allotted to the Sixth
and Seventh Armies to ensure the inviolability of the
Reichsland, whilst only one was added to the right wing,
which however also received one division originally allotted
to the Russian frontier.4
Comparing now the initial plans of the two belligerents,
we see what had happened as regards the main French
attacks : that made by the Armies of Dubail and Castelnau
on the 14th August south of Metz found the German Sixth
and Seventh Armies on the defensive, in strong positions.
The general strategic advantage remained with the Germans :
their 345,000 men, including the detachments in Upper
1 Zwehl, p. 73 ; elsewhere the 20th September is given.
2 Ludendorff, " Urkunden," p. 59.
3 Baumgarten-Crusius, p. 66. This order is further explained by
another of the 4th, Kluck, p. 97.
4 Kuhl, pp. 178-180, Foerster, pp. 13, 17-18.
46 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
Alsace, contained about 456,000 French. The offensive
of the Armies of Ruffey and de Langle de Gary north of
Thionville, commencing on the 21st August, encountered
the German Fourth and Fifth Armies, which had begun on
the 17th to wheel forward to the line Thionville — Givet.
Thus two Armies met two Armies of about equal strength.
Maps. The result of the above operations was, practically,
equilibrium, but it left three German Armies, von Hausen's,
von Billow's and von Kluck's, comprising in all thirty-four
divisions, free to deal with Lanrezac's Army, the tiny
British Army of four divisions, and the almost equally
small Belgian Army of six divisions — thirty-four divisions
against twenty, with a frontier destitute of natural ob-
stacles, guarded only by obsolete fortresses, and the
shortest and most direct road to Paris in front of them.
The first step in the German plan had therefore been
successful, as regards its objectives ; the line laid down for
the first stage of the wheel on Thionville had been reached,
and Liege and Namur had been taken ; it was unsuccessful
only in that the Belgian Army had not been forced away
from Antwerp, which it entered, after rear-guard fighting,
on the 20th. Surprise has sometimes been expressed
that the Germans did not push at least detachments to the
Channel ports in August 1914, when there was no force
available to oppose them except some Territorial units.
It would appear that they did intend to do so, but the
necessity of investing the Belgian Army in Antwerp
absorbed the two corps, ///. Reserve and IX. Reserve,
which had been selected for this purpose ; 1 and when the
opening phase of the campaign was going so nearly accord-
ing to plan, and there seemed a certainty of winning the
war in a few days by a defeat of the French in a super-
Sedan in the open field, it would have been strategically
unjustifiable to divert a single man to seize a section of
the coast, which, like Italy after the battle of Austerlitz,
must have yielded to the invaders without serious conflict
directly the main decision had fallen.
THE BRITISH ENTRY INTO FRANCE
(See Sketches 1 & 3 ; Maps 2 & 3)
12 Aug. On the 12th August, the Commander-in-Chief, retain-
Sfcet(J l- ing only a small party of his immediate staff with him,
JNlup 2i.
1 See footnote, p. 34.
SKETCH 3.
a
• 1
K!
ARRIVAL OF THE B.E.F. IN FRANCE 47
despatched General Headquarters from London to South- 14-17 Aug.
ampton. They crossed to Havre on the 14th, and pro- 1914-
ceeded by rail early on the 16th, reaching Le Cateau late
that night.
On the 14th August, Sir John French himself, with his
party, left London. He arrived at Amiens soon after
9 P.M. An hour later, General Valabregue's chief staff
officer came to report that his group, the 53rd and 69th
Reserve Divisions, was entrenching south of the Oise
between Vervins and Hirson, as a second line to the French
left.
On the following days, 15th, 16th and 17th August,
the Commander-in-Chief proceeded to visit, in succession,
the French Minister of War at Paris, General Joffre at
the Grand Quartier General at Vitry le Fran£ois, and
General Lanrezac at Fifth Army Headquarters at Rethel.
From them he learned in some detail the disposition of the
French forces in the angle formed by the Sambre and the
Meuse, south-west of Namur. General Lanrezac's Army
was then rapidly concentrating in the area south of
Charier oi : the I. Corps, on the right, being already massed
between Namur and Givet ; the head of the III. Corps was
at Philippe ville, and that of the X. Corps at Bohain, midway
between St. Quentin and Le Cateau. The XVIII. Corps
was expected to begin arriving in the area between Bohain
and Avesnes on the 18th and 19th. General Valabregue's
divisions were in position, as already stated above, south of
Avesnes. General Sordet's Cavalry Corps was advancing
again, this time north-east, from Charleroi and, if driven
back, would pass to the left of the British Army. The task
of that Army was to move northward and form the extreme
left of the French advance.
Throughout this period, that is to say between the
12th and 17th August, the British troops had been passing
across the Channel and disembarking on French soil.
All was ready for their reception, and the welcome given
to them by the inhabitants was enthusiastic. On the
14th and the following days the troops began to move
up by train to the areas of concentration, which were Sketch 3.
arranged so that the army was assembled in a pear-shaped
area between Maubeuge and Le Cateau, about twenty-five
miles long from north-east to south-west, and averaging
ten miles wide. The cavalry was at the north-eastern end,
ready to join hands with the French Fifth Army.
In detail, the areas were : MaP 3-
48 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
17-20 Aug. Cavalry : East of Maubeuge, Jeumont, Damousies, Cousolre.
Divisional Headquarters, Aibes.
II. Corps : East of Landrecies. Headquarters, Landrecies.
3rd Division : Marbaix, Taisnieres, Noyelles.
5th Division : Maroilles, Landrecies, Ors.
I. Corps : East of Bohain. Headquarters, Wassigny.
1st Division : Boue, Esqueheries, Leschelles.
2nd Division : Grougis, Mennevret, Hannappes.
The;Royal Flying Corps, taking the field in war for the first
time, assembled four squadrons, with 105 officers, 755 other
ranks, and 63 aeroplanes at the aerodrome of Maubeuge ; it also
formed an aircraft park at Amiens.
The concentration was virtually complete on the 20th.
One sad incident marred the progress to the scene of action,
namely the death of Lieutenant-General Sir James Grierson,
commanding the II. Corps, who expired suddenly in the
train on the morning of the 17th. Sir John French asked
that Sir Herbert Plumer might take General Grierson' s
place ; but the Secretary of State for War decided to send
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.
On the 19th August, G.H.Q. was informed that the 4th
Division would be despatched from England immediately ;
and it was settled that the 2/Royal Welch Fusiliers,
I/Scottish Rifles, I/Middlesex and 2/Argyll and Suther-
land Highlanders, which had been employed on the
Lines of Communication, should be formed into the 19th
Infantry Brigade. On the same day the Flying Corps
carried out its first reconnaissances from Maubeuge north-
ward towards Brussels, and north-west over Tournai
and Courtrai. No large bodies of troops were seen ; and
on the 20th the British cavalry was pushed forward as far
as Binche on the north without encountering any enemy.
But an aerial reconnaissance that day observed a column
of troops stretching through Louvain as far as the eye
could reach. This was a column of the German First
Army. Diverting one of his corps (the ///. Reserve),
followed later by the IX. Reserve Corps and the equivalent
of five divisions,1 to mask the Belgian forces in Antwerp,
von Kluck was pressing westward with the remainder of
the First Army. On this day, the 20th, his troops entered
Brussels. It was a fateful day in many respects, for during
its course the main Belgian Army retired into Antwerp,
the Germans approached within decisive range of Namur,
and General Joffre gave his orders for the general advance.
1 See footnote, p. 34.
ADVANCE OF THE B.E.F. TO MONS 49
In this great movement, the outline of which has 20 Aug.
already been given,1 the British were to advance on the 1914-
left of the Fifth Army north-east, by way of Soignies, in
the general direction of Nivelles. If von Kluck wheeled
southward from Brussels, it was not anticipated that his
right would extend much beyond Mons. Therefore, if the
British were in line about this place, they would be ready,
when once General Lanrezac had passed the Sambre, to
wheel eastward and envelop the right of the Germans.
To make this envelopment the more certain, General
Sordet's Cavalry Corps, which had on this day fallen back
across the Sambre to Fontaine 1'Eveque (midway between
Charleroi and Binche), was directed to take position beyond
the left of the British. Still further to the west, the three
French Territorial divisions, under the command of General
d'Amade, were to push gradually forward.2
THE BRITISH ADVANCE
(See Sketch 3 ; Maps 2, 3, & 5)
The initiative seemed to be passing into the hands of Sketch 3.
the Germans, and it was urgent to ascertain by aerial and Maps 2
other reconnaissance what use, if any, they were making of 3*
it. Meanwhile, in pursuance of General Joffre's plan,
G.H.Q. on the evening of the 20th issued orders3 for a
movement northward during the three ensuing days.
An attached march table gave the approximate positions
to be reached each day. The general effect of these
orders when executed would be that on the 23rd August
the Army would be aligned on a front, roughly facing
north-east, from Estinne au Mont (near Binche) on the
south-east to Lens, eight miles north of Mons, on the north-
west, with the Cavalry Division on the left, while the 5th
Cavalry Brigade, having covered the right flank during
the movement, would find itself finally in advance of the
right front. The daily moves were to be as follows :
The 5th Cavalry Brigade was to proceed on the 21st
to the neighbourhood of Binche, the right of the line, and
there remain ; the Cavalry Division, moving on the left
of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, was to march level with it on the
21st, and on the 22nd proceed to Lens, the left of the line,
1 See p. 38.
2 For further information as regards General d'Amade's Force, see p.
108.
3 Appendix 10.
VOL. I E
50 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
where it would halt astride the road that connects Mons and
Ath. Covered by the cavalry, the rest of the Army was
to advance.1
On the 21st the II. Corps to the line Goegnies — Bavai ; the
I. Corps to the line Avesnes — Landrecies.
On the 22nd the II. Corps north-westward to the line from
Moris westward to Thulin ; the I. Corps north-eastward to the
line Hautmont — Hargnies.
On the 23rd the II. Corps was to wheel eastwards, the two
divisions being one in rear of the other, with its front east of
Mons between Spiennes and St. Denis ; the I. Corps was to
incline north-eastward and come up on the right of the II., on
a line from Estinne au Mont westward to Harmignies (im-
mediately south-east of Spiennes).
The morning of the 21st broke thick and misty, render-
ing aerial reconnaissance impossible until the afternoon.
The cavalry moved northwards early, and after reaching
Villers St. Ghislain (six miles south-east of Mons) heard
that German cavalry was in force five miles to the north-
ward ; a patrol which entered Mons found a similar report
current there. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, after crossing
the Conde Canal east of Mons, took up a line upon both
banks from Maurage to Obourg. Patrols of the 9th
Lancers and 4th Dragoon Guards sighted German patrols
in the vicinity of the two bridges east of Mons, those of
Nimy and Obourg ; but contact was not established.
Information from peasants, however, pointed to the move-
ment of considerable forces southward from Soignies (ten
miles north-east of Mons).
The II. Corps followed the cavalry to a line level with
and west of Maubeuge, the 3rd Division, on the right, to
the line Bettignies — Feignies — La Longueville, and the 5th
Division, on the left, to the line Houdain — St. Waast —
Gommegnies. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reached Bavai
from England at 4 P.M. and took over command of the
II. Corps. The outposts of the 9th Infantry Brigade on
this evening overlooked the old battlefield of Malplaquet,
and were found by the Lincolnshire Regiment which,
together with the Royal Scots Fusiliers, had fought in the
action under Marlborough, two hundred years before.
The I. Corps simultaneously moved up to the line from
Avesnes to Landrecies, about ten miles behind the front
of the II., the 1st Division on the right, and the 2nd on
1 The positions of troops are always given from right to left, unless
otherwise stated.
ADVANCE OF THE B.E.F. TO MONS 51
the left. The day was sultry and many of the reservists 21 Aug.
suffered in consequence ; a considerable number were still l^u.
feeling the effects of inoculation, and all found the hard
irregular surface of the cobbled roads extremely trying to
march on. In the afternoon the weather cleared and
the Flying Corps was able to carry out reconnaissances.
It reported a large body of cavalry with some infantry Map 5.
and guns south-east of Nivelles. This intelligence was
confirmed, and the formation identified as the German
9th Cavalry Division, by a British intelligence officer who
was in Nivelles when the division entered, but escaped by
motor. The presence of two more cavalry divisions was
ascertained, one of which, the 2nd, had been pushed far to
the westward, and had reached the line Ghent — Audenarde,
being evidently intended to explore the area as far as the
sea. The other German cavalry division, supposed to be
the 4th, was between Charleroi and Seneffe.1 These three
cavalry divisions formed the German //. Cavalry Corps
under General von der Mar wit z.2 The main German line
was reported as extending south-east from Grammont,
through Enghien, Nivelles, Genappes and Sombreffe to
Charleroi. It is now known that from right to left — that
is to say from north-west to south-east — the order of the
German corps was IV. (with II. echeloned behind it),
///., IX., VII., X., and Guard Corps, with four Reserve
corps in rear of them. The Allied High Command was
correctly informed as to the actual number of German
corps in Belgium; but it could only, of course, forecast
the scope of the movement in progress : part of von
Kluck's cavalry at least, and possibly some of his infantry
had begun a wheel south-westwards from Brussels.
Whether he intended to continue in that direction or
sweep further westwards, it was as yet impossible to judge
on the available information. On the British right,
General Lanrezac's Army was in contact with infantry of
the German Second Army along the whole line' of the
Sambre on either side of Charleroi, from Tamines to Pont
a Celles, so that hard fighting in that quarter on the
morrow was almost certain. There seemed every chance
that it might spread further to the west.
At 2.45 P.M. G.H.Q. ordered the cavalry to close the
1 According to von Kluck, p. 35, it was near Enghien. The identifica-
tion of the other cavalry divisions was correct.
2 The corps, after concentrating near Ath, was sent north-westwards
towards the coast.
52 THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
line between the French left and Mons : the 5th Cavalry
Brigade to take up a line from the left of General Sordet's
Cavalry Corps at Fontaine 1'fiveque to Peronnes, in front
of Binche, and the Cavalry Division to prolong that line
to the Canal at Boussoit (five miles east of Mons) with
another brigade, the 3rd. Thence patrols were to be
pushed out north and north-east. Operation orders, issued
from G.H.Q. shortly before midnight,1 directed that the
march table issued on the 20th should hold good for the
22nd, with two modifications. The outposts of the II.
Corps, instead of having their right on Mons, were now to
hold an angle with Mons in the apex — that is from Givry
north-westward to Nimy and thence westward along the
canal to Pommeroeul ; and as soon as they had taken this
over, the Cavalry Division was to move westward to a
position in echelon behind the left, in the area comprised
within the triangle Thulin — Quievrain — Baisieux, with
outposts along the line of the Canal from the left of the
II. Corps to Conde". The intention still was that the British
Army should take the offensive.
1 Appendices 11 and 12.
CHAPTER II
22ND AUGUST 1914
FIRST CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY
(See Sketch 3 ; Maps 2, 3, 5, & 6)
AT dawn on the 22nd August C Squadron of the 4th Maps 2
Dragoon Guards (2nd Cavalry Brigade) pushed out two & 3-
officer's patrols from Obourg, on the Canal, north towards
Soignies ; one of these found a German piquet on the road,
fired on it, and drove it off. This was apparently the
first shot of the war fired by the British on the continent.
Later a troop of the same squadron advanced to meet a
body of German cavalry which was moving south along
the road from Soignies towards Mons, turned it back near
Casteau, and pursued it until checked by fire.1 The 4th
killed three or four of the enemy and captured three more,
who proved to belong to the Jfih Cuirassiers of the 9th
Cavalry Division. Further to the east, the 3rd Cavalry
Brigade found all clear for two miles north of the Canal
within the triangle Gottignies — Roeulx — Houdeng ; but
here again the peasants reported the enemy to be in strength
to the north, at Soignies and north of La Louviere (eleven
miles east of Mons). Still further east patrols of the
5th Cavalry Brigade early found contact with the enemy
in the direction of La Louviere and reported German
troops of all arms to be advancing from the north, and
the French to be retiring across the Sambre. General
Sordet's 3rd Cavalry Division passed through the British
5th Cavalry Brigade soon after, on its march westward ;
but it was not until nearly 10 A.M. that a German detach-
ment of all arms 2 came in contact with two squadrons of
the Scots Greys (5th Cavalry Brigade), which were holding
the bridges over the Samme at Binche and Peronnes,
1 German accounts also record this as the first contact. " Mons," p. 17.
2 Apparently of the 13th Division. See p. 61.
53
54 OPERATIONS OF 22ND AUGUST
facing east. The enemy made little effort to force the
passage, though he shelled the Greys heavily but ineffec-
tively, and kept up a fairly accurate rifle fire. The 3rd
Cavalry Brigade, in support of the 5th, remained about
Bray, two miles in rear, whence D and E Batteries R.H.A.
fired a few shells. At 2 P.M. the Greys slowly drew off,
having apparently, by sheer superiority of marksmanship,
inflicted some thirty or forty casualties at the cost of a
single officer wounded. A troop of the 16th Lancers,
which had been sent to their support, gave chase to a
hostile patrol on the way, and came suddenly upon a
party of Jdger on the hill immediately to west of Peronnes.
The troop rode straight over the Jdger, charged through
them again on the return journey, at a cost of only one
man wounded and three horses killed, and then left them
to E Battery R.H.A., which had unlimbered to cover
its return. Altogether, the cavalry was heartened by its
work on this day, being satisfied that it was superior to
the German horsemen, both mounted and dismounted,
both with rifle and with sword.
The cumulative effect on the British cavalry com-
manders of the encounters during the day was the con-
viction that German infantry in great force was in close
support of the German cavalry. They had made reports
in that sense on the previous day, and they were now more
than ever confirmed in their opinion. Aerial reconnais-
sance during the forenoon did not tend to shake this view.
One aviator landing at Beaumont (about twelve miles east
of Maubeuge) to take in petrol, learned from General de
Mas-Latrie, the commander of the French XVIII. Corps,
that General Sordet, on his march westwards to the left
flank of the Allied Armies, had on the 21st encountered
German infantry north of the Sambre Canal, and had been
compelled to fall back. This accounted for his movement
southward to Binche. Later, another British aeroplane
(which returned to the aerodrome at 1.10 P.M.) reported
the northern part of Charleroi and many other towns
and villages near it to be in flames, and on its return
westward was fired at by an infantry brigade between Ath
and Enghien. A third aeroplane had a similar experience,
the observer being wounded. The sum total of these
observations was to the effect that brigades of German
infantry, probably amounting to a corps in all, filled the
roads south of Grammont, that a cavalry division was at
Soignies, and that the general front of this corps and
ADVANCE OF THE B.E.F. 55
cavalry division extended, facing south-west, from Lessines 22 Aug.
to Soignies,1 no part of them being west of the Dendre 1914-
Canal, excepting a party of mounted troops which had
been seen at Peruwelz, immediately to the north of Conde.
Their further advance, if the direction was maintained!
would bring their left (east) flank to Mons.
ADVANCE OF THE I. AND II. CORPS
Meantime, the British I. and II. Corps were advancing. Maps 3
In view of the situation, both corps started an hour and a & 5-
half before the time that had been originally ordered. The
1st Division, moving at 4 A.M., reached its selected halting
places — north and south-west of Maubeuge — at Bettignies,
St. Remi Mai Bati, Limont Fontaine, between 3 and 5 P.M.
But shortly before 3.30 P.M. Sir Douglas Haig received
orders for the I. Corps to continue its advance. The
result of the morning's reconnaissances had shown G.H.Q.
that, if the Cavalry Division were withdrawn, as already
ordered, to the left of the line, the 5th Cavalry Brigade
would be too weak to cover the large gap between the
right of the II. Corps and the left of the French XVIII.
Corps on the Sambre, and that consequently the I. Corps
must be hurried up to its support. Accordingly, between
5 and 7 P.M. the 1st Division resumed its march, but did
not reach its billets until far into the night, the 2nd and
3rd Infantry Brigades entering Villers Sire Nicole and
Croix lez Rouveroy, some eight to ten miles south-west of
Binche, between 9 and 10 P.M., whilst the 1st (Guards)
Brigade on the right did not arrive at Grand Reng until
2 to 3 A.M. on the 23rd. This was a long march, which
tried the troops severely.
About noon the 2nd Division, which had started at
5 A.M., halted in depth at La Longueville, Hargnies, and
Pont sur Sambre, which lie on a north and south road
passing west of Maubeuge. Its head was thus some six
miles south-west of the rear of the 1st Division. The 2nd
Division also received orders to resume its march ; but
the orders were cancelled, since the German advance had
apparently ended for the day, and there was no immediate
necessity to make such a call on the troops.
The whole movement of the I. Corps was covered on
1 According to von Kluck the troops in question were, commencing
on the west : IV. Corps, III. Corps and 9th Cavalry Division.
56 OPERATIONS OF 22ND AUGUST
the west by a flank guard of the Divisional Cavalry, which
traversed the Forest of Mormal.
Sketch 3. Meanwhile, in the II. Corps, the 3rd Division moved
Map 6. off at 7 A.M., and the 5th, in three columns, at 6 A.M. ; the
former reached its billets around Mons, in the area Nimy —
Ghlin — Frameries — Spiennes, at about 1 P.M., and the
latter, on its left, the line of the Mons Canal from Jemappes
westward to Bois de Boussu, one or two hours later. The
troops again suffered much from the cobbled roads, and
the march, though not long, was extremely trying. The
first outpost line taken up by the 3rd Division, consequent
upon the reports of the engagement of the 5th Cavalry
Brigade, was from Givry north-west to the edge of
Mons. Later in the afternoon, however, the line was
thrown forward in a wide sweep eastwards, through Villers
St. Ghislain, St. Symphorien, the bridge at Obourg, and the
bridge at Lock 5, to Nimy. The 8th Infantry Brigade
took the right of this line, the 9th the left, and the 7th
was in reserve some five miles in rear at Frameries and
Ciply — the village around which Marlborough's army had
bivouacked on the night before the battle of Malplaquet.
On the left of the 3rd Division, the 13th Infantry Brigade
of the 5th Division occupied the line of the Canal from
Mariette to Les Herbieres, and the 14th Infantry Brigade
from Les Herbieres to Pommeroeul. The total front round
Mons held by the II. Corps was over twenty miles.
Thus the two corps were approximately in the positions
assigned to them in G.H.Q. orders of the 20th August. The
I. Corps was only a short distance from its intended
position ; but the cavalry was now about to move due
west, and a wheel of the II. Corps to the north-east up to
Lens had still to take place. For the moment the line of
the Mons Canal, now held by the outposts of the II. Corps,
was the left of the British front, and with the I. Corps'
front formed a salient angle, not a straight line.
A huge belt of woodland extended along the whole
length of the front north of the Canal, capable of screening
the approach of the enemy to within two miles, or even
less, of the British piquet line. Around Mons itself the
Canal forms a pronounced salient (the " Mons Salient " as
it will be called), which was ill-adapted to prolonged and
serious defence. On appreciating the situation, 3rd Divi-
sion Headquarters, which had been warned of the possi-
bility of an attack by German advanced guards, decided
that in this quarter the outposts should not be reinforced
SITUATION AT NIGHTFALL 57
in case of attack, and ordered the preparation of second 22 Aug.
line positions in rear, which will presently be described. 1914-
Meanwhile, as the II. Corps came up, it became possible
gradually to collect the Cavalry Division. Originally it
had been intended that the division should move westward
at noon, but this, in view of the German menace about
Binche, had been considered inadvisable. At 4 P.M., how-
ever, General Allenby gave the order to withdraw west-
ward. The main body of the 5th Cavalry Brigade remained
near Estinne au Mont (south-west of Binche), leaving the
Scots Greys in position at Estinne au Val, a couple of
miles to the north-west. At 6.30 P.M. this brigade, having
first put the bridges over the Samme into a state of defence,
went into billets between Binche and Merbes Ste. Marie.
As the Cavalry Division drew off, it was followed by a
German airship. After a most painful march westward
behind the II. Corps, along some fourteen miles of cobbled
street through the dreary squalor of an interminable
mining village, it reached its billets at Elouges, Quievrain
and Baisieux, on the left of the Army, between midnight
and 3 A.M. of the 23rd.
THE SITUATION AT NIGHTFALL
In the course of the afternoon the Flying Corps made Maps 3
further reconnaissances towards Charleroi, and ascertained & 5<
that at least two German army corps 1 — one of them the
Guard Corps — and the Guard Cavalry Division, were
attacking the French Fifth Army on the line of the Sambre.
In the evening, the observers returned with very grave
news, which was confirmed by the British liaison officer
with General Lanrezac and by an officer of the Fifth Army
Headquarters sent by that general. The French centre
had been driven back, and the French X. Corps had retired
to the line St. Gerard (13 miles E.S.E. of Charleroi)—
Biesme — Gerpinnes, from five to ten miles south of the
river ; the French III. Corps had likewise fallen back
nearly the same distance,, to a line from Gerpinnes west-
ward to Jamioulx ; the XVIII. Corps on the left, however,
remained in its original position, still echeloned to the
rear, between Marbaix and Thuin. General Sordet had
moved southward from Binche, and was halting his Cavalry
Corps for the night at Bersillies 1'Abbaye (9 miles south
of Binche), striking well to the rear of the British Army
1 Guard and A'. Corps (see Biilow).
58 OPERATIONS OF 22ND AUGUST
before moving west. General Valabregue's two Reserve
divisions were near Avesnes, twenty-five miles south of
Mons, preparing to march north-east towards Beaumont —
Cousolre, in rear of the gap between the Allied Armies.1
The British on the Mons Canal, therefore, were some nine
miles ahead of the main French line ; and the 1st Division,
when it came up to its destination about Grand Reng,
would be fully nine miles from the left flank of the French
XVIII. Corps. To fill the gap there were no troops avail-
able, except the 5th Cavalry Brigade and Valabregue's two
Reserve divisions ; unless we include Sordet's cavalry,
which was still in the neighbourhood, though moving fast
away from it. Further, nine miles of the British line
from the Mons Salient to Rouveroy (9 miles south-east
of Mons), was held only by the 8th Infantry Brigade.
The enemy's main bodies were now reported at various
points within dangerous proximity. Twenty thousand
men of all arms, presumed to be part of the German
VII. Corps, were known to be moving southward from
Luttre, about eight miles north of Charleroi. Thirty
thousand more (supposed to be the IV. or the ///. Corps,
but actually the VII.) were reported about Nivelles,
and the IX. Corps was bivouacking for the night south-
east of Soignies.2 Yet another large body of all arms,
reckoned to be another corps, the //., was moving west
through Ladeuse, about five miles south of Ath. Further,
the German 9th Cavalry Division had been identified, with
its head at Peruwelz, and other cavalry, probably divi-
sional, was known to be north of Mons. The inhabitants
of Les Herbieres informed the Scottish Borderers that
twelve Uhlans had ridden into their village on the 21st,
and that some two hundred Germans were close at hand.
Finally an air report was brought into Maubeuge, and at
once taken personally to G.H.Q. by Brigadier-General Sir
David Henderson, that a long column, estimated at a
corps, was moving westward on the Brussels — Ninove
road, and at the latter town had turned south-west towards
Grammont. This was later identified as the German //.
Corps of the First Army. There were also signs of a strong
1 See Note on the movements of General Valabregue's Group at end of
Chapter V.
2 Von Kluck and von Billow had corps in the positions stated, but the
British reports, good though they were, did not on this occasion identify
all the corps exactly, thus Kluck' s map shows the VII. Corps of the Second
Army marching through Nivelles ; the III. and IV. were between Soignies
and Ath.
SITUATION AT NIGHTFALL 59
force moving down the great chaussee on Soignies ; it was 22 Aug.
endeavouring to hide itself from observation by making
use of the trees that bordered the road.
As the situation disclosed itself, the British Commander-
in-Chief, whilst still hoping that offensive action might be
possible, began to realize the necessity, in view of the
isolated position of his force, of being prepared for any
kind of move, either in advance or retreat. The air report
that a corps was moving on the road Brussels — Ninove—
Grammont seemed to give warning of a very ambitious
enveloping movement to the south-west. In any case
von Kluck's advance made it impossible to expect that
the British would be able to reach Soignies without opposi-
tion. On the evening of the 22nd Sir John French held
a conference at Le Cateau, at which the Chief of the
General Staff, Sir Archibald Murray, and the G.S.O.
in charge of Intelligence, Colonel G. M. W. Macdonogh,
were present, with the Brigadier - Generals, G.S. of the
I. and II. Corps, and the G.S.O. 1 of the Cavalry Division.
The position of the Germans as it was then known was
explained and discussed. At the close, the Commander-
in-Chief announced his decision that, owing to the retreat
of the French Fifth Army, the British offensive would not
take place. To a request of General Lanrezac, brought by
a staff officer about 11 P.M., that the English should attack
the flank of the German columns which were pressing him
back from the Sambre, Sir John French felt that it was
impossible to accede ; but he agreed to remain in his
position on the canal for twenty-four hours. At the
suggestion of the II. Corps, he ordered the I. Corps to
take over by 6 A.M. on the 23rd the portion of the outpost
line of the II. Corps which lay east of Mons. Accordingly
the 2nd Division which, as we have seen, had remained in
its original billets, moved forward at 3 A.M. on the 23rd,
but was too late to relieve the II. Corps before fighting
commenced.
GERMAN UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE POSITION OF
THE B.E.F. ON 23RD AUGUST 1914
From the many sources of information now available,
it would appear that the fog of war on the German side,
in spite of superiority in aircraft, was very much more
intense than on the British.
In the first place, von Kluck laboured under • the
60 OPERATIONS OF 22ND AUGUST
misapprehension l that the B.E.F. had landed at Ostend,
Dunkirk and Calais. The Great General Staff had expected
that it would do so ; 2 but the measures taken by the
French to prevent espionage were so good that no informa-
tion as to the real landing-places reached the Germans.
Thus their accounts say : 3 "As regards the arrival of this
" Force [the B.E.F.], the information was unreliable, and as
" regards its line of advance, there was none whatever.
" Even a message from the Supreme Command dated
" 20th August, which arrived at First Army Headquarters
" on the evening of the 21st, ran : ' Disembarkation of the
" ' English at Boulogne and their employment from direction
" ' of Lille must be reckoned with. The opinion here, how-
" * ever, is that large disembarkations have not yet taken
" ' place. . . .' It was only on the 22nd August that an
" English cavalry squadron was heard of at Casteau, 6 miles
" north-east of Mons,4 and an aeroplane of the English 5th
" Flying Squadron which had gone up from Maubeuge was
" shot down. The presence of the English on our front
" was thus established, although nothing as regards their
" strength."
What is more convincing perhaps than even this state-
ment is the opening paragraph of von Kluck's operation
orders for the 23rd August,5 issued at Hal at 8.30 P.M. on
the 22nd ; all that he could tell his corps commanders was :
" A squadron of British cavalry was encountered to-day
" at Casteau, north-east of Mons, and a British aeroplane,
" coming from Maubeuge, was shot down near Enghien."
Von Kluck's uncertainty, however, was still great, and he
was so obsessed with the idea that the British would appear
on his flank that on 23rd August, the actual day of the battle
of Mons, hearing that troops were detraining at Tournai,
he halted his Army for two hours — 8.30 to 10.30 A.M. — and
prepared to wheel westwards. In von Kluck's own words :
" A report reached Army Headquarters that a detrainment
" of troops had been in progress at Tournai since the
" previous day. It seemed therefore not unlikely that strong
" British forces were being sent forward through Lille.
1 Kluck, p. 33. • Kuhl, Generalstab, p. 91.
8 Von Zwehl writing in the Militar Wochenblatt, Nos. 35, 36, 37 and
38 of September 1919, in an article entitled " The Operations of Field
Marshal French against the First Army and the VII. Reserve Corps"
Kluck, p. 34, and Biilow, p. 21, also give the Supreme Command me
the
4 This belonged to the 4th Dragoon Guards, as mentioned at
beginning of Chapter II.
6 Kluck, p. 34.
POSITION OF B.E.F. UNKNOWN TO GERMANS 61
" The heads of the advanced guards of the corps were 22 Aug.
"therefore halted on the road Leuze — Mons — Binche to 1914-.
" enable preparations to be made for the Army to wheel
" westwards. . . . Eventually, however, it was reported
" that only a French infantry brigade was at Toumai, and
" that it was retiring on Lille. The Army, therefore, con-
" tinued to advance."
The German General Staff monograph " Mons " adds
that by the detrainment at Tournai " the still unsolved
" question as to where the British principal forces would be
" met was made yet more difficult to answer. In relation to
" the landing-places of the British, their detrainment near
" Lille was not unlikely." It continues that, in the course
of the forenoon, information as to the presence of the
B.E.F. on the Canal became more and more definite.
" A captured private letter announced the presence of a
" strong British Army south of Mons. The nearest division
" of the Second Army, the 13th Division, reported that a
" British cavalry brigade had been driven from Pe"ronnes
" in a south-westerly direction.1 ... In the early morning,
" aeroplane reconnaissance had given no results in conse-
" quence of the prevailing fog."
On the arrival of the 2nd Battalion of the 12th Grenadier
Regiment (III. Corps), at Baudour, 2 miles north of the
Mons Canal, about noon on the 23rd August, the cavalry
reported2 that there was no enemy within fifty miles,
and shortly afterwards two Hussars, covered with blood,
galloped past shouting that the enemy had occupied the
line of the Canal in front. A third limped past, dragging
his blood-stained saddle, and reported " in front, in the
village, there they are ! "
The German General Staff account states that " recon-
" noitring parties were unable to reach the bridges [of the
" Canal]. Whenever they tried to penetrate between the
" numerous widely scattered farms . . . they were received
" with fire from invisible riflemen." It was thus in complete
ignorance of the strength of the British that von Kluck
advanced to the Canal ; as he says, there " might have
been only cavalry " in front of him.3
1 It was two squadrons of the Royal Scots Greys. See p. 53.
2 " Bloem," p. 116.
3 Just as von Biilow on the 22nd August at Charleroi thought that he
was only opposed by cavalry and weak infantry detachments when he had
the French Fifth Army in front of him. Biilow, pp. 21, 22.
CHAPTER III
THE BATTLE OF MONS
DESCRIPTION OF THE GROUND
(See Sketches 2 & 3 ; Maps 5, 6, & 7)
Map 6. THE ground on which the British Army had taken up its
position is a narrow belt of coalfield which extends roughly
for rather more than twenty miles westwards from Maurage
(six miles east of Mons) along the Mons Canal, and has an
average breadth, from the Canal southward, of two miles.
South of this belt the country gradually rises to a great
tract of rolling chalk downs, cut into by many streams and
with numerous outlying spurs. Every inch of this territory
has in bygone days seen the passage of British armies;
and name after name is found upon British colours, or is
familiar in British military history.
On the ground occupied by the I. Corps — that is to say,
roughly from Givry northward to Spiennes, thence west-
ward almost to Paturages and thence southward again to
Quevy le Petit — the chalk comes to the surface ; and
there is even a little outcrop of it within the salient or loop
of the Canal around Mons. This small area is cut up by
wire fences, market gardens, and the other artificial
features which form the outskirts of a provincial town ;
and it is noteworthy that across this tangle of enclosures
no fewer than seven different roads diverge from Mons
north-east and north-west to as many bridges. At the
base of the salient the ground rises gradually from north
to south, for fifteen hundred to two thousand yards, till
it culminates in three well-marked features. The first of
these is Mount Erebus, a round hill immediately to the
south of Mons ; the second is a great whale-backed hump,
about a thousand yards long from north to south, very
steep upon every side, except the eastern, and crowned by
62
BRITISH DISPOSITIONS 63
two summits, Mont Panisel on the north and Bois la Haut 23 Aug.
on the south, the whole called by the latter name. The 1914-
third is the height known as Hill 93, which lies south-
east of Bois la Haut and is divided from it by a shallow
valley. This last hill was of considerable tactical import-
ance, since from it and from Bois La Haut observation and
cross-fire could be brought to bear upon the ground east-
ward about St. Symphorien. But Bois la Haut was in
parts thickly wooded, and consequently from its northern
end, where there were hospital buildings, there was little
field of fire.
West of Mons the line of the Canal is straight, and the
actual borders are clear ; the ground on both sides of it
is cut up by a network of artificial water-courses, chequered
by osier-beds, for a breadth of a mile or more. But the
opening up of the coal-measures has turned much of the
country immediately south of this watery land into the
hideous confusion of a mining district. The space occupied
by the II. Corps in particular, within the quadrangle
Mons — Frameries — Dour — Boussu, is practically one huge
unsightly village, traversed by a vast number of devious
cobbled roads which lead from no particular starting-point
to no particular destination, and broken by pit-heads and
colossal slag-heaps, often over a hundred feet high. It is,
in fact, a close and blind country, such as no army had yet
been called upon to fight in against a civilised enemy in a
great campaign.
THE BRITISH DISPOSITIONS
At 5.30 A.M., the Corps and Cavalry Division com-
manders met the Commander-in-Chief in the Chateau at
Sars la Bruyere, when orders were issued for the outpost
line to be strengthened, and for the bridges over the Mons
Canal to be prepared for demolition. The conference over,
the Field-Marshal, at 9.15 A.M. proceeded to Valenciennes.
The 19th Infantry Brigade had just detrained there and
was marching to occupy the left flank of the outpost line
on the Canal. This would thus extend nearly to Conde,
where it was understood from a French Staff officer that
Territorial troops would take it up.1 The local situation,
therefore, seemed satisfactory. For the rest, there was
intelligence of fighting between German cavalry and French
1 The 84th Territorial Division subsequently arrived.
64 MONS
Territorial infantry about Tournai, though no information
as to its results.
Sketch 3. In describing the general disposition of the troops it
Map 7. must be remembered that, as the Army had halted whilst
in the course of wheeling or forming to face towards
Nivelles, the front of the I. Corps was already turned north-
eastward, whereas the II., upon the wheeling flank, still
mainly faced to the north. The general front, therefore,
formed an obtuse angle, the I. Corps being on the right half
of the south-eastern arm, and the II. Corps round the apex
and along the western arm. The south-eastern arm from
Peissant to Mons was about ten miles long, and the arm
along the Canal from Mons to Conde*, seventeen miles. The
I. Corps was extended, roughly speaking, from the Sambre
to the Haine ; the 1st Division being on the right, with
the 3rd Infantry Brigade in front between Peissant and
Haulchin (about four miles) ; the 1st (Guards) Brigade in
rear of its right at Grand Reng and Vieux Reng ; and the
2nd Infantry Brigade in rear of its left at Villers Sire Nicole
and Rouveroy. The 2nd Division was on its way to take up
the line on the left of the 1st Division from Haulchin to
Harmignies (another four miles), and meanwhile the vacant
place was filled by the 5th Cavalry Brigade. The ground
in front of the right of the outpost line of the 3rd Division
was commanded by the great bluff of Bois la Haut. This
hill was reconnoitred for occupation by the batteries of the
XL. Brigade R.F.A., which were billeted immediately
behind it at Mesvin, and was secured at night by sending
forward the 2/Royal Irish Regiment, of the 8th Infantry
Brigade, to connect with the I. Corps at Harmignies, and
hold the villages of Villers St. Ghislain and St. Symphorien.
The 1 /Gordon Highlanders and 2/Royal Scots of the
8th Infantry Brigade were in position near the Harmignies
road from Hill 93 to the north-east corner of Bois la Haut.
The front from Bois la Haut northwards to the apex of
the Mons Salient, two miles, was held as an outpost line by
the 4/Middlesex. Rough entrenchments had been thrown
up by them during the afternoon of the 22nd, but were
still unfinished when darkness fell. On the left of the
4/Middlesex, the 9th Infantry Brigade held the line of the
Canal from the Nimy bridges on the western face of the
Mons Salient, as far as the bridge of Mariette, six miles,
with the 4/Royal Fusiliers, 1 /Royal Scots Fusiliers and
1 /Fifth Fusiliers. The remaining battalion, the 1 /Lincoln-
shire, was a mile south-west of Mons at Cuesmes. The 7th
BRITISH DISPOSITIONS 65
Infantry Brigade was in reserve about Ciply, two miles 23 Aug.
south of Mons. The rest of the artillery of the 3rd Division 1914>
was mostly held for the present in reserve — XXIII. Brigade
R.F.A. north of Ciply, and XLII. R.F.A., together with
the 48th Heavy Battery, at Nouvelles (1J miles east of
Ciply). The XXX. Howitzer Brigade was still on its way
from Valenciennes.
Passing westward to the 5th Division, the 13th Infantry
Brigade was posted, with a three-mile front, on the left of the
9th, the 1 /Royal West Kent covering the bridges that span
the Canal immediately east of St. Ghislain, with four guns of
the 120th Field Battery in close support on the tow-path.
On the left of the West Kents, who had dug themselves
excellent trenches by the railway bridge, the 2/Scottish
Borderers, with the machine guns of the 2/ Yorkshire Light
Infantry, occupied the Canal up to, but not including, the
railway bridge at Les Herbieres, with one company en-
trenched on the road north of that bridge. The two remain-
ing battalions of the 13th Infantry Brigade were held in
reserve in St. Ghislain, in rear of the centre of the brigade
front.
On the left of the 13th Infantry Brigade, the 14th
occupied the line of the Canal from the railway bridge of
Les Herbieres westward to Pommeroeul road bridge, a
front of 2j miles. The I/East Surrey were on the right,
holding the railway bridge itself, with one company pushed
across to the north bank. From the foot bridge south of
La Hamaide, the 1 /Cornwall Light Infantry prolonged the
front to Pommeroeul bridge. Here again a platoon, together
with the machine-gun section, was sent across the Canal to
form a bridgehead upon the north bank. The machine guns
were posted to sweep the straight length of road towards
Ville Pommeroeul ; but a clear view northward was
obstructed by rolling stock on the railway, which crosses
the road about a mile to north of the Canal. As the Haine
stream, which was unfordable and had few bridges, passed
about a mile behind this part of the line, the Cornwall Light
Infantry had orders to hold the Canal as an advanced
position only, and to retire when necessary to a second
position, which the 15th Infantry Brigade was directed to
prepare behind the Haine. The 2 /Suffolk and 2 /Man-
chester, the remaining battalions of the 14th Infantry
Brigade, were in reserve. The 15th Infantry Brigade was
divided, part preparing a position on the Haine, with the
rest in reserve further to the rear near Dour. From
VOL. I F
66 MONS
Pommeroeul westward the 4th Cavalry Brigade was re-
sponsible for the two remaining crossing-places east of
Conde, at Lock 5 and St. Aybert, until the 19th Infantry
Brigade should come up, and these two points were accord-
ingly occupied by the Carabiniers. All troops were
warned to expect an attack early next morning.
The selection of positions along the part of the line held
by the 5th Division was a matter of the greatest difficulty,
the ground being a wilderness of deep ditches, straggling
buildings, casual roads and tracks, and high slag-heaps.
These last seemed to offer points of vantage, which were
generally found to be non-existent when their summits had
been explored, as they were commanded by some other
slag-heap ; while certain of them, which seemed to promise
all that could be desired, were found to be so hot that men
could not stand on them. The artillery was more em-
barrassed even than the infantry : the officers had great
difficulty in finding suitable positions for batteries or even
for single guns, and were equally at a loss to discover good
observation posts. The general policy .followed was to
push batteries or sections of batteries up to the infantry
for close defence, and to keep the mass of the artillery, and
particularly the heavy battery, on the left, where the guns
could coverall open ground in anticipation of a turning move-
ment round that flank. Altogether, the ground was such
as to baffle the most skilful and sanguine of gunners on
the British side. Fortunately, on the enemy side, the con-
ditions were almost identical ; and, except on the east,
where the ground was more open, the Germans could make
little use of their tremendous superiority of numbers ; for
they were about to match eight divisions against four, and
actually in the infantry fight six against two extended
along a front of 13 miles. In fact, the line of the II. Corps
was so thin that it was little better than an outpost line, a
chain of small groups, lying on the Canal bank, almost in-
visible, as is shown in a photograph taken by a machine-
gun officer during the battle from his flanking gun. Not
without good reason was provision made for a retrenchment
across the rear of the Salient and for occupying a position
in rear of the Canal, roughly Frameries — Wasmes — Dour,
should a strong attack develop.
FIRST CONTACT 67
THE FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH THE ENEMY
(a) The Salient
The morning of Sunday the 23rd broke in mist and rain, 23 Aug.
which, about 10 A.M., cleared off and gave place to fair 1914-
weather. Church bells rang, and the inhabitants of the sketches
villages near the Canal were seen in their best attire going 2 & 3 ;
to worship as if war was utterly distant from them. Trains ¥^Lps 5
were running towards Mons crowded with the usual
holiday makers. The mounted troops of both armies were
however early astir. Those of the British 1st and 2nd
Divisions, reconnoitring east of Mons towards the bridges
of Binche, Bray, Havre and Obourg, soon encountered
small parties of the enemy. Near Obourg they were
pressed back, and at 6 A.M. the German cavalry exchanged
shots with the 4/Middlesex. About the same time, other
parties of German horse approached the Royal Fusiliers
in the apex of the Salient, and two officers of the Ger-
man 3rd Hussars, the corps cavalry of the ///. Corps,
were made prisoners. Another patrol, towards Nimy,
came in sight of the Scots Fusiliers, who killed one man,
and identified his uniform as that of the cavalry regiment
of the IX. Corps. Further west, two German patrols were
caught in ambush, near Ville Pommeroeul between 6.30 and
7 A.M., and two prisoners were taken, the one a Dragoon,
the other a Hussar ; this indicated the presence of two
more regiments, both of the German 9th Cavalry Division.
The mounted troops of the British 5th Division crossed
the Canal near the posts of the Scottish Borderers and of
the West Kents ; and both battalions pushed a reserve
company forward to secure their retreat. That of the
West Kents, A Company, advanced to the road-junction
south of the village of Tertre ; and that of the Scottish
Borderers to a pond about half a mile north of Les Herbieres
road bridge. Each side was feeling for the other in ex-
pectation of the coming shock.
There could be little doubt where the first blow would
fall. The Germans were completing a wheel from east to
south ; and immediately opposite to the eastern, or stand-
ing flank of von Kluck's Army lay the Mons Salient.
Before 9 A.M. German guns were in position on the high
ground north of the Canal, and very soon shells were
bursting thickly along the whole line of the Middlesex and
the Royal Fusiliers, One German battery commander
68 MONS
boldly unlimbered his guns in the open, and began firing
at a range of 1,500 yards ; but he was speedily compelled to
shift his ground by the machine guns of the Middlesex.
By 9 A.M. German infantry was pressing on to engage
the Middlesex about Obourg and, as the hostile movement
from north-east to south-west developed itself, troops,
all apparently of the IX. Corps, gradually spread around
the entire curve of the Salient from Obourg to Nimy.
By 10 A.M. the company in Obourg was heavily engaged
and, indeed, hard pressed ; and, shortly afterwards, the
machine-gun section of the Royal Irish joined that of the
Middlesex. Meanwhile, the Royal Fusiliers were cease-
lessly shooting down Germans, who at first came on in
heavy masses, but, being caught by the rapid fire of the
Fusiliers in front and by the machine guns of the Middlesex
and Royal Irish in flank, soon abandoned this costly method
of attack. They then began working across the front in
small parties, in order to form for a fresh effort under
cover of the woods. The British troops in the Salient had
orders to make " a stubborn resistance " ; the Middlesex
and the Royal Fusiliers, therefore, defended themselves
with tenacity, and until past 11 A.M. were still holding their
original positions.
(b) The Canal West of Mons
Meanwhile, as the southward wheel of von Kluck's
Army progressed, the attack gradually spread westward
along the line of the Canal. The right of the German IX.
Corps did not appear to extend beyond Nimy ; x and it was
not until 11 A.M. that the ///. Corps, which was next to
the right of it, came into action about the bridge of
Jemappes, 2 miles west of Mons. German shells fell in
Jemappes itself, in rear of the Scots Fusiliers ; but the
infantry almost simultaneously advanced in heavy lines.
The forward post of the Scots Fusiliers north of the Canal
was thereupon withdrawn, and, as the Germans came
nearer, they were met by a fire of rifles and machine guns
which effectually checked their progress. After a pause they
came on again, taking shelter behind the northern bank
of the Canal, and actually closed to within 200 yards of the
bridge at Lock 2, west of Jemappes, but were compelled
by the accuracy of the British fire once more to fall back.2
1 This is now known to be correct (see Sketch 3 in " Mons ").
2 Hauptniann (Professor) Heubner, of the 20th Infantry Regiment,
5th Division, III. Corps, who witnessed the attack at Jemappes, in his
FIRST CONTACT 69
At Marietta, 3 \ miles west of Mons, still in the 9th 23 Aug.
Infantry Brigade area, German shells found the bridge 1914-
immediately, and a column of infantry in fours came swing-
ing down a country road immediately east of it. It was
promptly stopped by the fire of a small party, under a
corporal, which occupied a house in the angle between
this road and the waterway. The enemy then tried an
advance down the main road ; but this had been obstructed
by a wire entanglement immediately north and west of the
bridge, and by a barricade immediately south of it ; and
the Fifth Fusiliers were well and skilfully disposed, under
good shelter, on both flanks of the road, both in advance
and in rear of the bridge. Under a withering fire from
three sides, the Germans pressed on to the wire, only to
be brought to a standstill there, and then driven back with
heavy loss.
They now brought up two field guns within half a mile
of the Canal, and opened fire with high-explosive shell upon
the defenders of the bridge ; not without effect, for a shell
bursting in the occupied house on the east side of the road
killed the whole of the little garrison. But, instead of
grey-coated soldiers, a number of little Belgian girls came
down the road, and the Fifth Fusiliers naturally ceased
their fire.1 Thereupon, the Germans swarmed forward
and, flooding over to the western side of the main road,
were able to establish themselves within 200 yards of the
Canal, whence they could bring an oblique fire to bear upon
the defenders of the barricade. The advanced party of the
Fifth on the north side of the bridge was then withdrawn ;
but the Germans were still far from being masters of the
passage of the Canal at Mariette ; and the Fifth Fusiliers
for the present held their own with no great difficulty and
without serious loss.
Further to the left in front of St. Ghislain, A Com-
pany of the West Kents, at the cross roads south of Tertre,
which was in support of the 5th Divisional Mounted Troops,
, was warned by the cyclists of the advance of the enemy in
book " Unter Emmich vor Liittich, Unter Kluck vor Paris," pp. 69 and 74,
speaks of the " numerous wounded " of the regiment which attempted
to storm the railway and factory ; and at the end of the day says " that
they [the English], in any case, fought bravely and obstinately is proved
by the heavy losses that our German troops suffered here."
1 Evidence of Captain B. T. St. John, commanding the company of
I the Fifth Fusiliers which held Mariette Bridge. It is not suggested that
the enemy drove them deliberately in front of him. In many cases
inhabitants were caught between the two hostile lines.
70 MONS
force. This company had found a fair field of fire ; but the
line of retreat to the Canal was difficult, the ground being
cut up by many deep ditches and barbed wire fences. As
far as time permitted, passages were cut through the
wire, so that during its retirement the company might not
mask the fire of the main body on the Canal ; but the
preparations were scarcely completed before a small party
of the cyclists came at top speed down the road from
Tertre and reported that the Germans had brought up guns
to drive them from the village. The leading German
infantry regiment, the Brandenburg Grenadiers of the 5th
Division of the ///. Corps, had, in fact, moved southward
upon Tertre from Baudour, and the Fusilier battalion,
which was at its head, had encountered considerable re-
sistance from the cyclists. Five minutes after this alarm
had reached the West Kent company (that is to say at
about 11.10 A.M.), this Fusilier battalion debouched from
Tertre and moved southward, the bulk of the men being in
massed formation on the eastern side of the road to St.
Ghislain, with parties in extended order upon either flank.
They were met by a shattering fire of rifles and machine
guns, and were seen to suffer heavily. The commander of
the German regiment then made a regular attack with the
support of artillery, deploying his two remaining battalions
to the right and left of the Fusiliers. By the German
account, the Brandenburgers suffered some loss in the village
of Tertre from the British artillery, presumably from the
guns of the 120th Battery on the Canal. Meanwhile the
company commander received a message from the divisional
cavalry, a squadron of the 19th Hussars, which had gone
out in the direction of Hautrage, north-west of Tertre,
asking him to cover its retirement ; and accordingly he
clung to his position, while three German battalions, a
German battery and a German machine-gun company all
came into action against him. The pressure soon became
so strong that he began gradually to withdraw by succession
of platoons, the men behaving with the greatest .steadiness
and firing with great effect as the enemy came within
closer range. The rearmost platoon, in fact, fought its
way out with the Germans within a hundred yards of it in
front and upon both flanks. Eventually about half of the
company rejoined their comrades on the Canal, the re-
mainder having been killed or wounded, and left, in-
evitably, to fall into the enemy's hands. This latter was
the fate of the company commander, Captain Lister,
FIRST CONTACT 71
and of one of his subalterns ; but his men had made a 23 Aug.
magnificent fight and inflicted far heavier losses than they 1914-
received.
Having cleared this advanced party out of their way,
the Brandenburg Grenadiers, covered now by the fire of
four or five field batteries, swarmed forward over the maze
of wire fences and boggy dykes against the main positions
of the West Kents and the Scottish Borderers on the Canal.
The four guns of the British 120th Battery were soon
compelled to withdraw, apparently about noon ; * though,
later on, the remaining section found a position upon a
slag-heap, further to the south and east, and came into
action with considerable effect. But the positions of the
British infantry were so well chosen and concealed that
the German artillery failed to discover them, and hence
the progress of the German infantry was both slow and
costly. In any case, the attack upon the bridge of St.
Ghislain was stopped while still three hundred yards dis-
tant from the Canal by the accurate fire of the West Kents
and the machine guns of the Yorkshire Light Infantry,
and the half company of the Scottish Borderers, on the
left of the bridge, who all alike had excellent targets, and
took advantage of them to the full, with little loss to
themselves. The Germans imagined that they were
everywhere opposed by machine guns only, not realizing
the intensity of British rapid fire.2
Meanwhile in the 13th Infantry Brigade area, towards
noon, the attack spread westward to the bridges of Les
Herbieres, where the 52nd Infantry Regiment contrived,
with great skill, to pass men by driblets over the road
into the reedy marshes alongside the Canal, and even to
send one or two machine guns with them. Reinforcements
of the 2/Duke of Wellington's and 2/Yorkshire Light
1 See p. 65.
2 A full and dramatic account of the attack of the Brandenburg
Grenadier Regiment is given in " Vormarsch," by Walter Bloem, the
novelist, who was, as a reserve officer, commanding one of the companies.
He states that he lost all five of his company officers and half his men.
The battalion commander said to him in the evening, *' You are my sole
and only support . . . you are the only company commander left in the
battalion . . . the battalion is a mere wreck, my proud, beautiful
battalion ! " And the regiment was " shot down, smashed up — only a
handful left." Bloem adds, " Our first battle is a heavy, unheard of heavy,
defeat, and against the English, the English we laughed at." The regi-
ment was withdrawn a quarter of a mile as soon as it was dark, and spent
an anxious night, for, as the colonel said, " if the English have the slight-
est suspicion of our condition, and counter-attack, they will simply run
over us,"
72 MONS
Infantry were called up about 2 P.M. in closer support of
the Scottish Borderers, and the former suffered a few
casualties from shell fire, but their services were not re-
quired, for the German attack had already come to a
standstill.
At the railway bridge of Les Herbieres the Germans—
of the 6th Division of the ///. Corps — began by bringing a
machine gun into action in a house about half a mile from
the barricade put up by the East Surreys (14th Infantry
Brigade). This was instantly silenced by one of the East
Surreys' machine guns ; the enemy, thereupon, searched
all the houses round the railway bridge with shell, in the
hope of locating it. Then the Germans tried to push
forward in small columns, which were stopped short by
rifle and machine-gun fire, which also dispersed a group of
German staff officers a thousand yards away and further
to the east. The enemy then plied the East Surreys'
defences with shrapnel and machine-gun fire for half an
hour, causing no casualties, but disabling one machine
gun ; after which, about 1.30 P.M., he attacked with two
battalions of the 52nd in mass, advancing across the open at
a range of six hundred yards. Such a target was all that
the British could wish for ; another company of the East
Surreys had by this time joined the one astride the embank-
ment ; and three platoons of the Suffolks had also come up
to cover their left flank, and their rapid rifle fire, combined
with long bursts at selected objects from the remaining
machine gun at the barricade, mowed down large numbers
of the enemy and scattered the rest. At this point,
therefore, the Germans were decisively repulsed with
very heavy loss, and with trifling casualties to the East
Surreys.
Thus far, to a point 7 miles west of Mons, the German
attack had spread during the forenoon and the early after-
noon ; the infantry of the ///. Corps did not extend
further westward, while that of the IV. Corps had not yet
had time to complete its wheel to the south, so that the
I/Cornwall L.I. at Pommeroeul had not yet come into
action.
FRONT OF THE I. CORPS
Map 7. Throughout the forenoon and the early afternoon,
that is to say, until 2 P.M., all had remained quiet opposite
the I. Corps, which it will be remembered faced north-
east. Between 11 A.M. and 12.30 P.M. the 2nd Division
I. CORPS 73
had reached its destination, and the 6th Infantry Brigade 23 Aug.
took position on the left of the corps between Vellereille 19i4.
le Sec and Harmignies, with the 4th (Guards) Brigade in
rear of it about Harveng, and the 5th still further to the
rear at Genly and Bougnies. The 3rd and 6th Infantry
Brigades therefore now held the front of the I. Corps.
About 2 P.M. German guns at some point between Binche
and Bray, 3£ miles to the north-east, opened fire upon the
ridge of Haulchin, against the left of the 3rd Infantry
Brigade ; and about half an hour later German cavalry x
was seen moving across the British front north-west from
Bray towards St. Symphorien. The 22nd and 70th Field
Batteries, which were unlimbered about Vellereille le Sec,
were able to shell these parties with good effect, but in return
were heavily shelled by batteries which they were unable
to locate. The 4th (Guards) Brigade was pushed forward
to extend the line of the 6th from Harmignies north-west
along the road to Mons ; and various battalions, coming
under artillery fire in the course of the afternoon, suffered
a few casualties. But heavy firing could be heard to the
north about Mons ; and about 3 P.M. a message from
Major-General Hubert Hamilton reported a serious attack
on the 3rd Division, and asked for assistance. Though the
situation on the right of the I. Corps was not yet clear, for
the Germans were still shelling the 3rd Infantry Brigade
severely, General Haig directed that two battalions of the
4th (Guards) Brigade should take over the defence of Hill
93 from the 3rd Division, and thus afford it some relief.
The news brought in by the 1st and 2nd Divisional Cavalry
at 3 P.M., that the French east of the I. Corps had been
obliged to fall back a little, might well cause some anxiety ;
but the more pressing danger lay on the left of the I. Corps
in the vicinity of Mons. In every other sector of the line
the British were holding their own with ease, and were
punishing all attempts to force the passage of the Canal
with considerable severity ; but in the Salient, the weakest
and most critical point of the line, the situation was not
equally satisfactory.
PROGRESS OF THE FIGHT IN THE SALIENT
We left the 4/Middlesex of the 8th Infantry Brigade, Map 7.
and the 4/Royal Fusiliers of the 9th between 11 A.M. and
noon stubbornly contesting every inch of ground from
1 Now known to be the 16th Dragoons (see " Mons "). .
74 MONS
Obourg to Nimy, north-east of Mons. Brigadier-General
B. Doran (8th Infantry Brigade) had early given orders to
the 2/Royal Irish, whose companies had covered the ground
in front of Hill 93 and Bois la Haut during the night,
to assemble north of the latter hill, and by noon the entire
battalion was collected there. Just about that time, the
Middlesex at Obourg, finding that the Germans were getting
in rear of them, began to fall back westward through
the Bois d'Havre, the wood just south of Obourg.
Simultaneously the Germans began to shell the main line
of the 8th Infantry Brigade, south-east of Mons, with
shrapnel, but very inaccurately, for they could not see
the position of the Royal Scots along the Harmignies —
Mons road, and the majority of the Gordon Highlanders
were hidden from view. Their infantry then advanced
by rushes obliquely across the front of these two battalions,
heading for Hill 93 and offering excellent targets. The
rifles of both battalions were soon effectively employed,
whilst the machine guns of the Royal Scots, thrown
slightly forward in a quarry about the centre of the line,
poured in a deadly enfilade fire. The 49th Battery also
contributed to the enemy's discomfiture by firing shrapnel
from Bois la Haut. To be brief, in this quarter the
enemy was brought to a standstill three hundred yards
from the British trenches.
Within the Salient the conditions were very different.
The Germans shortly after noon succeeded in passing
the Canal west of Obourg, and in reaching the railway ;
then, taught by hard experience, they abandoned massed
formation and advanced in extended order. At 12.30 P.M.
the Royal Irish were ordered to reinforce the Middlesex
and, moving off under heavy fire of artillery and machine
guns in the direction of Hill 62, deployed on the left of
the Middlesex. It was nearly 1.30 P.M. before they reached
their position, for they were always under a storm of
German shells, without any support from the British
artillery. Anything in the nature of a local .counter-
attack to relieve the Middlesex was out of the question,
owing to wire fences and other obstacles. Far from gaining
ground, the Royal Irish could only just hold their own.
They now shifted their machine guns, which had previously
been massed with those of the Middlesex, to the extreme
right of their own front. They had not long been there
when a body of Uhlans debouched from a wood about six
hundred yards east of them, and was instantly met by
THE SALIENT 75
fire from both rifles and machine guns. The German 23 Aug.
horsemen turned about but, as they retired, were caught 1914-
in flank by the fire of some of the Middlesex falling back
from Obourg. This, however, though satisfactory, was
but a trifling incident. The IX. Corps was attacking in
earnest ; and it was for the Royal Irish and the Middlesex
to maintain a " stubborn resistance."
The situation of these two battalions was precarious
in the extreme, for they were not, as were the Royal Scots,
in a well concealed position which the German artillery
could not exactly locate, and with a good field of fire before
them. On the contrary, their ground was under good
observation from the heights on the north of the Canal ;
and the German batteries,1 having complete ascendancy,
kept them under heavy fire. Under the protection of this
fire, the German infantry slowly gained ground by sheer
weight of numbers, but not without loss. Shortly after
2 P.M. the machine-gun section of the Royal Irish tried
to come into action on the road about three hundred
yards north of Bois la Haut, but one gun was at once
disabled and had to be abandoned. Returning to the
original position, the remaining gun again came into
action, but called down upon itself a concentrated fire
of guns and machine guns, which disabled it immediately
and killed or wounded every man of the section. The
machine guns of the Middlesex were also in trouble, for
the Germans had brought up at least six of these weapons
against them, and the officer in command of the section
had been wounded, though he still remained in charge
of his men. By 3.15 P.M. the German infantry, in great
force, was within a furlong of the Royal Irish and working
round both flanks ; and then, after consultation with
Colonel Hull of the Middlesex, Major St. Leger who was
in command decided to withdraw the Royal Irish some
fifteen hundred yards southward to the northern slopes
of Bois la Haut. The right of their line moved first ;
meanwhile the remainder were collected into two bodies :
one by Colonel Hull on the northern slopes of the hill,
and the other at its north-eastern corner. The latter
helped greatly to cover the retreat, which was conducted
methodically and in good order ; and the battalion finally
rallied on the left of the left company of the Gordons
whose line now extended almost to the cross roads north
1 Of the 18th Division between St. Denis and Masieres, 3 miles north-
east of Mons.
76 MONS
of Bois la Haut, the time being then about 4 P.M. The
shelling was still very heavy, and the cross roads them-
selves were swept by machine guns from the east, though
some buildings at that point and the ground west of
the cross roads gave some protection from bullets. A
section of the 49th Battery unlimbered on the left of
the Royal Irish and, though greatly exposed, gave them
some support.
The Middlesex fell back about the same time as the
Royal Irish, between them and the 9th Infantry Brigade
in Mons, though, being more widely extended, they were
less easily re-formed. One company, on leaving the Bois
d'Havre, which lies south of Obourg, entered the deserted
rifle pits of the Royal Irish and there for a time stood
fast. But the retreat of both battalions was facilitated
by the fate of the first German attack upon the hill of
Bois la Haut itself. This attack was opened by about
a company of German infantry, which, with scouts in
front of it, emerged gradually from a wood against the
left centre company of the Gordons. The Highlanders
allowed the scouts to advance and held their fire until
greater numbers appeared ; then they opened rapid fire
at five hundred yards' range, and in a few minutes stopped
the attack with heavy loss. Thereby a short respite was
gained, which enabled the retiring battalions to settle
down in their new positions.
Meanwhile, at 2 P.M. the Royal Fusiliers, in obedience
to Brigadier-General Shaw's (9th Infantry Brigade) orders,
withdrew southwards from Nimy, the supporting companies
covering the retirement of the advanced companies with
peacetime precision. Their losses did not greatly exceed
one hundred; and after re-forming in Mons the battalion
moved southward again to Ciply.1 The Lincolnshire had
been employed since noon in barricading the three roads
that lead from Mons to the south, but the Germans did
not follow the Royal Fusiliers very closely ; and when they
at last tried to debouch by the main road from Mons,
they were met by a destructive fire from the Lincolnshire
at the barricade and by a few shells from the 109th
Battery at close range. Unable to make any progress,
they turned westward, leaving the Lincolnshire to retire
1 Lieut. M. J. Dease (who died of wounds) and Private S. F. Godley
of the 4/Royal Fusiliers were awarded the Victoria Cross for the manner
in which they fought the machine guns. All the men of two crews were
killed or wounded.
THE CANAL LINE WEST OF MONS 77
at their leisure by Mesvin upon Nouvelles, 3 miles south 23 Aug.
of Mons. 1914.
THE LINE OF THE MONS CANAL WEST OF THE
SALIENT
About 3 P.M. the Scots Fusiliers (9th Infantry Brigade) Map 7.
likewise fell back by order, through Jemappes upon
Frameries, 3 miles from the Canal ; but here, since the
bridge had not been destroyed, the Germans followed hard
after, and there was sharp righting along the road and
among the slag-heaps north of Frameries. Some of the
Fusiliers, firing from the houses, used their weapons with
special effect ; but two companies, which were entangled
among the slag-heaps, suffered much from machine guns
which the Germans had instantly brought forward, and
for a time were in serious difficulties, the ground being
most unfavourable either for defence or for the co-
operation of artillery. About 4 P.M., however, the two
supporting companies of the Fifth Fusiliers, the left of
the 9th Infantry Brigade, whose orders to retire from
Mariette had reached them rather late, struck in from
the west upon the flank of the Germans, and, after some
fighting, enabled the Scots Fusiliers to extricate them-
selves and to re-form within the village. The German
guns were sufficiently far advanced to shell the position
of the South Lancashire (7th Infantry Brigade), a mile
north of Frameries, but only one or two small parties of
infantry approached it. The forward companies of the
Fifth Fusiliers meanwhile stuck to their position on the
Canal, in spite of the command to retire, in order to cover
the Engineers who were preparing the bridge of Mariette
for destruction. Despite the extraordinary coolness and
gallantry of Captain Wright,1 who swung himself forward,
hand over hand, under the bridge to connect the charges,
the work could not be effected, though he made a second
attempt after being wounded in the head. It was riot until
5 P.M. that the withdrawal of the Sappers, after collecting
all their gear, permitted these two companies of the Fifth
to retire towards Frameries ; but the Germans made no
effort to press them and, in fact, did not immediately
cross the bridge.
1 The late Captain T. Wright, R.E., received the Victoria Cross for this
service. Lance-Corporal C. A. Jarvis, 57th Field Company, R.E., also
received it for working 1J hours under heavy fire and successfully firing
the charges at Jemappes bridge.
78 MONS
Further to the left, the 13th Infantry Brigade still
held its position on the Canal, though the fire of the German
artillery steadily increased in the course of the afternoon.
The enemy, in fact, pushed forward three batteries to
within twelve hundred yards of the Canal about St. Ghislain,
and smothered the 13th Infantry Brigade with shells, but
did remarkably little damage. Indeed, it was not until
the Germans, about 6 P.M., brought up guns within close
range and destroyed the barricade over Les Herbieres road
bridge that the Scottish Borderers withdrew to the southern
bank, the 17th Field Co. R.E. blowing up the bridge
behind them. The railway bridge was blown up at the
same time ; and this was the signal for the destruction
of the road bridge near La Hamaide, further west, covered
by the East Surreys (14th Infantry Brigade), who there-
upon withdrew their advanced parties north of the Canal.
The battalion then retired by alternate companies to the
position ordered near Thulin, south of the Haine. Never-
theless in this quarter, the Germans were unable to make
the slightest progress, and, indeed, at dusk the West
Kents were still holding their position north of the Canal.1
On the left of the East Surreys the Cornwall Light
Infantry were left wholly undisturbed until 4.45 P.M. when
a mass of German cavalry coming down the road from
Ville Pommeroeul was driven back headlong by machine-
gun and rapid rifle fire. Immediately afterwards, the
advanced parties were recalled to the southern bank of the
Canal ; the bridge was then blown up by the 59th Field Co.
R.E., and all fell back across the Haine to the second
position.
On the extreme left, the 19th Infantry Brigade relieved
the Cavalry Division between 2 and 3 P.M., the I/Middlesex
and the Cameronians taking up the line to Conde. Soon
after 5 P.M. an attack was made upon Lock 5, when
the enemy contrived to mount a machine gun in a house
commanding the buildings. The lock bridge was therefore
blown up, but the I/Middlesex, though they abandoned
the buildings, continued to hold their own without difficulty
and with trifling loss.
THE SALIENT
Map 7. Such, therefore, was the condition of affairs west of the
Salient whilst the 2/Royal Irish and 4/Middlesex were
1 See footnote 2, p. 71.
THE SALIENT 79
defending their second position north of Bois la Haut ; the 23
facts most important to them were, that the Germans, in con- 1914
sequence of the retirement " by order " of the 9th Infantry
Brigade, were defiling through Mons, though checked
for a time at its southern border, and had nearly reached
Frameries, 3 miles south-west of the town. About 5 P.M.
the main body of the Royal Irish was again forced to retire.
By that time those of the Middlesex who had occupied the
rifle pits of the Royal Irish were overwhelmed by the
attacking swarms of Germans, many of their rifles being
so much clogged with sand as to be useless. Then came
the turn of their machine-gun section which, with the water
boiling furiously in the jackets of the guns, fired away its
last rounds of ammunition into the masses of the enemy,
and was then overpowered. Having no other position in
rear that offered any field of fire, the main body of the
Royal Irish re-formed west of the northern end of Bois la
Haut, their withdrawal being assisted by the left company
of the Gordons. Here the 4/Middlesex passed through
them and, taking the first road to the westward, marched
towards Hyon (J mile west of Bois la Haut) on their way
to Nouvelles, their place in the second position. The Royal
Irish started back along the same road, but had not
proceeded far before they found the enemy ahead of
them little more than a hundred yards away. Cramped
between the steep slope of Bois la Haut and a tangle of
buildings on the other side of the road, deployment was
impossible ; and the battalion was obliged to turn north-
ward and to work round the hill to its south-eastern angle.
Here the guns of the 6th Battery, expecting an attack
every minute, were disposed in a semi-circle, and the Royal
Irish, together with a platoon of the Gordons which was
acting as escort to the battery, entrenched themselves
about the guns, facing north, west, and south. The enemy
followed them up, but, being in no great strength, did not
venture to attack.
Meanwhile, the 23rd Battery had received orders to
retire from the summit of Bois la Haut, and selected as
its route a sunken lane leading due south into the main
road to Hyon. Proceeding that way, the head of the
battery had reached a point within a hundred yards of
the main Hyon road, when the leading teams and drivers
were all shot down by German infantry, who had come
through Mons and were hidden behind a barricade at right
angles to the end of the lane. The gunners went forward
80 MONS
to engage the enemy with rifles, and, being joined by the
battery escort of the Gordon Highlanders, drove the
Germans back into Hyon with some loss. The enemy's
barricade was then occupied, and a second barricade thrown
up a little east of it ; some adjoining buildings were placed
in a state of defence ; and, while all ranks gave themselves
to the task of clearing the lane, the major in command of
the battery went off to find Brigadier-General B. Doran
(8th Infantry Brigade). Although the light had now begun
to fail, the 23rd Battery was still in an unenviable situa-
tion. Moreover, the Germans seemed bent upon pinning
the 8th Infantry Brigade to its ground, for between 7 and
8 P.M. they launched a general attack, without any pre-
liminary bombardment, against the whole front of the
Gordons and Royal Scots along the Harmignies — Mons
road. The attenuated line of the Royal Scots had since
4 P.M. been reinforced by two companies of the Irish Rifles
from the 7th Infantry Brigade, and the entire front blazed
into a burst of rapid fire, which cut the Germans down by
scores and brought them instantly to a complete stand-
still.1 The enemy then drew off, but some of them assemb-
ling about the cross roads north-east of Bois la Haut, were
dispersed anew by the fire of the little party of the Royal
Irish installed there. Still, the general situation of the
8th Infantry Brigade was insecure ; the enemy, as he had
just demonstrated, was in force on its front, and in its rear
parties had penetrated through Mons as far as Hyon.
THE SITUATION AT NIGHTFALL
Map 7. For the better understanding of the general position of
the British, it will be as well to review their line from the
Salient westward, as it stood at nightfall. Of the 3rd
Division, the position of the 8th Infantry Brigade has just
been described ; it was the apex of the new front. The
7th and 9th Infantry Brigades were entrenched on its left
between Nouvelles and Frameries three miles from the
Canal ; and the guns had been withdrawn from Erebus to
the vicinity of Frameries for the night. Of the 5th Divi-
sion, on the left of the 3rd, in the 13th Infantry Brigade
the West Kents were still in their position on the Canal,
with orders to retire three miles south-east to Wasmes at
midnight. They had lost little more than a hundred men ;
1 The 75th Regiment lost 5 officers and 376 men in this attack. See
" Mons," pp. 33, 34.
SITUATION AT NIGHTFALL 81
and from five to six hundred yards to their front the 23 Aug.
Brandenburg Grenadiers, who had suffered heavy loss, had 1914.
entrenched themselves in the marshy meadows on the
north bank. On the left of the West Kents, the Scottish
Borderers had just withdrawn their advanced companies
from the north of the Canal, and had repulsed, with great
slaughter, an attempt of the Germans to debouch in mass
from a wood opposite the left of their main line. The
bridges over the Canal on their front had been blown up,
and the Scottish Borderers were also preparing to march
to Wasmes, some of the Yorkshire Light Infantry coming
forward to cover the movement. There was no sign of
any pursuit by the Germans, though the demolished bridge
was not impassable for an enterprising enemy. Opposite
Les Herbieres the East Surreys and the remainder of the
14th Infantry Brigade had joined, or were in the act of
joining, the Cornwall Light Infantry in the second position
south of the Haine. Here the enemy, after suffering
severely while passing the Canal from the machine guns
of the Cornwall Light Infantry and the Manchesters, was
firing away an immense amount of ammunition with very
little result. On the extreme left, the 19th Infantry
Brigade was still in position on the bank of the Canal.
Thus it will be observed that there was no uniformity
of movement from the outpost line on the Canal to the
main position in rear ; the characteristic obstinacy of the
British infantry, which has always fought on without much
regard to what was happening in other parts of the field,
was thus early made manifest, in spite of the efforts of
the Staff to co-ordinate the withdrawal. The 13th In-
fantry Brigade did not attempt to retire until night,
though the brigades to the right and left of it fell back in
the afternoon. The 19th Infantry Brigade also stood fast.
As a result of the retirement of the two divisions from the
outpost line on the Canal to the position south of Mons,
the left of the 3rd Division remained as heretofore on the
road between Frameries and Cuesmes, but the right of the
5th Division extended no further than to the road from
Quaregnon to Paturages ; and between the inner flanks of
the divisions there was a gap, almost entirely covered by
houses, of some two miles. This gap had been foreseen
by II. Corps Headquarters, and more than one message
passed early in the afternoon between it and G.H.Q. and
the Staff of the I. Corps with reference to using the 5th
Infantry Brigade to fill it, as this brigade was close at hand
VOL. i G
82 MONS
in reserve near Genly, in rear of Frameries. As a first
measure, General Smith-Dorrien ordered the 1/Bedfords
from the 15th Infantry Brigade to Paturages, and, later
on, three battalions of the 5th Infantry Brigade arrived
from the I. Corps, in compliance with his request. Two
battalions of the 4th (Guards) Brigade had moved up late
in the evening to Hill 93, and were in touch with the Royal
Scots, thus completing the junction between I. and II.
Corps. The only thing that still remained in doubt was
the fate of part of the 8th Infantry Brigade and the artillery
with it. At 9 P.M. orders were issued by Brigadier-General
B. Doran to fall back to the new position at Nouvelles.
The party of the Royal Irish at the cross-roads, having
clung to their little stronghold till 10 P.M., joined the
Gordons, bringing with them one of the battalion machine
guns, which had been repaired from the wreck of the other.
The 6th Battery guns were man-handled to the foot of
Bois la Haut ; and the teams were then hooked in, and
two temporarily abandoned 18-pdrs. were also brought
away. These guns and the Royal Irish were the first to
move off, about 11 P.M., and meanwhile the 23rd Battery
had been working hard to clear the lane and extricate its
guns. Soon after dark a strong German patrol was
driven off, with loss, from the barricade ; and by 10 P.M.
the road was free and the battery ready to march.
Shortly afterwards the battery commander returned, having
walked through some German troops, and by his orders the
battery drove off as noiselessly as possible — the Germans
being within three hundred yards of it — eastward to the
Beaumont road and thence, by Spiennes, to Nouvelles.
At midnight the Gordon Highlanders marched off, the
Royal Scots opening fire to drown the tramp of men and
the clatter of vehicles ; and the 23rd Battery overtook
them on their way. The Royal Scots then withdrew,
company by company, and before 3 A.M. on the 24th the
whole of the 8th Infantry Brigade, together with the three
batteries attached to it, was safe in Nouvelles. The
casualties of the Royal Scots and Gordons had been
trifling ; but those of the Royal Irish and of the 4/Middle-
sex exceeded three hundred and four hundred, respectively.
Altogether, the British commanders were not ill-
satisfied with the day's work. The unsatisfactory position
on the Canal had been imposed upon them fortuitously;
but it had been held for a sufficient time, and had
been evacuated, without great difficulty or disaster, in
SITUATION AT NIGHTFALL 83
favour of a second position only a mile or two in rear. 23 Aug.
The men, too, were in high spirits, for they had met superior 1914(-
numbers of the most highly renowned army in the world
and had given a good account of themselves. The
casualties of the British amounted to just over sixteen
hundred of all ranks, killed, wounded and missing. The
whole of these, except forty, were sustained by the II.
Corps, and practically half of them by two battalions of
the 8th Infantry Brigade in the Salient.1 The only loss of
artillery was that of two guns of the 120th Battery, which
could not be removed from their exposed position on the
Canal at St. Ghislain.
The general result of the action was that the German
advance was delayed a whole day. Von Kluck's orders
for the 23rd August directed the ///. and IV. Corps to
" occupy the rising ground on the southern side of the
Canal," whilst the IX. Corps was to advance via Mons to
the north and north-western front of Maubeuge. The
positions prescribed for the 23rd were actually the limits
of advance on the 24th, as will be seen.
A German general has summed the action up in these
words : 2
"The German First Army was so near to Field Marshal
French that there was some rear-guard fighting on and south of
the canal, particularly near Mons. This only slightly delayed
the English retirement, but cost the Germans some losses."
Judged by the units whose casualties are now known, the
losses must have been very heavy. And this is confirmed
by the behaviour of the Germans as it grew dusk. The
success in the Salient against the 8th Infantry Brigade
was not exploited. No enemy appeared elsewhere either
to take advantage of the gaps that presented themselves
in the British line or to embarrass the retirement. As at
the close of a manoeuvre day, German bugles, to the
astonishment of the British troops near the Canal, were
heard to sound the " cease fire," repeating it along the
line unit by unit, and then, after some little singing at one
place, all was quiet. But the enemy showed his nervous-
ness and fear of a night attack by the constant discharge
1 It may be of interest to note that the strength of the 3rd and 5th
Divisions, those principally engaged at Mons, was just under 36,000 ; the
strength of the British Army at the battle of Waterloo was 31,585 (Welling-
ton Despatches, xii. pp. 485-7).
2 Lieut.-General von Zwehl in " Militar Wochenblatt " No. 36, of
September 1919. For the German formations in action at Mons see later in
this Chapter.
84 MONS
of illuminating flares, which the British soldier then saw
for the first time.
Sketch s. There was no real anxiety at G.H.Q., therefore, except
Maps 3 as regards events further east. During the day the
& 5* Flying Corps had reported fighting about Charleroi, two
powerful German columns moving south-westward from
Charleroi and from Luttre, and a heavy engagement at
Thuin, the left of the French Fifth Army. Another report,
which came to hand soon after 5 P.M., stated that Tournai
appeared to be in the enemy's hands, and that a long
column of all arms was moving southward through Ladeuze
(13 miles west of Soignies), Grosage and Neufmaison
towards Ville Pommeroeul.1 The conclusion to which
this intelligence tended was, that the enemy would prob-
ably continue to develop his attack during the night and
upon the following day. At 8.40 P.M. this conclusion was
embodied in a message from Sir John French to the II.
Corps : "I will stand the attack on the ground now
" occupied by the troops. You will therefore strengthen
" your position by every possible means during the night."
Further information, however, which arrived from
French Headquarters during the evening and just before
midnight, led the British Commander-in- Chief to decide
that his position in advance of the general line was stra-
tegically untenable, and that an immediate retirement was
necessary. He thereby escaped, to use the enemy's words,
a " veritable wasps' nest " 2 and his action fell in with the
wishes of General Joffre, official notification of which
reached him next day shortly after 1 P.M. in two messages.
The first message was to the effect that the French
commander had decided that his Fifth Army should man-
oeuvre in retreat and rest its left on the fortress of Mau-
beuge, and its right on the wooded massif of the Ardennes,
remaining in liaison with the British Expeditionary Force
by means of cavalry. The second pointed out the desira-
bility of delaying the advance of the enemy between
Maubeuge — Valenciennes, and gave Cambrai as the general
direction of retirement for the British if the enemy should
appear in superior force, with their right on Le Cateau,
and their left on the water line Denain — Bouchain — Arleux.
G.H.Q. informed General Joffre that the British Force
was falling back slowly to the position Maubeuge — Valen-
ciennes, and that, if driven from this, it would act in
accordance with his wishes.
1 The German IV. Corps. ~ Lieut.-General von Zwehl.
GERMAN ACCOUNT 85
The reason for these messages was sufficiently cogent. 23 Aug.
As a result of his operations on the 23rd, General de Langle 1»14-
de Gary had ordered a general retirement of the French
Fourth Army on the 24th to the line Montmedy — Sedan —
Mezieres, that is, the line of the Chiers and Meuse. In
consequence of the failure of the Fourth Army to get
forward, General Lanrezac's right flank on the Meuse was
not only exposed to the attack of, but was actually attacked
by, the German Third Army from the east, whilst the Ger-
man Second Army advanced against his main force near
Charleroi from the north ; on the night of the 23rd/24th he
therefore ordered the French Fifth Army to commence
retiring before daybreak south of the general line Givet —
Phillippeville — Beaumont — Maubeuge, with its left, the
XVIII. Corps, about Solre le Chateau, 22 miles south-
east of Mons. General Valabregue, hearing of the attack
on the XVIII. Corps near Thuin on the 23rd, had
assembled his Reserve divisions that night near Cousolre,
10 miles due east of Maubeuge. There was therefore not
only a considerable gap between the Allied forces, but the
French were preparing a retirement that might increase it.
THE GERMAN ACCOUNT OF MONS
The monograph " Die Schlacht bei Mons," published
by the German General Staff at the end of 1919, gives a
very clear account of the fight, with excellent maps showing
the attacks of the different corps. According to this, sketch 3.
3J divisions (the 17th, 18th, 6th and part of 5th) of the Map 5.
First Army attacked the British 3rd Division, and 2J
(part of 5th, the 7th and 8th) the British 5th Division.
The IX. Corps (17th and 18th Divisions) attacked south-
west towards Mons on the front Villers Ghislain — Nimy. On
its right came the ///. Corps (6th and 5th Divisions) against
Jemappes and Les Herbieres and, further west, as far as
Lock No. 5, the IV. Corps (7th and 8th Divisions). At
nightfall the VII. Corps of the Second Army, on the left of
the IX., had got no further than Binche, and the //. Corps,
on the right of the IV., was some 15 miles north of Conde,
still marching southwards heading for that town, with the
II. Cavalry Corps on its right facing westwards towards
Tour coing — Roubaix — Lille .
It was part of the 17th Division Artillery (six batteries)
behind Villers Ghislain, and possibly some of the VII. Corps
Artillery, covered by the 16ih Dragoons and a Fusilier
86 MONS
battalion, which fired on the I. Corps as related in the
narrative.
The German account is frank enough ; it states : " Well
" entrenched and completely hidden, the enemy opened a
"murderous fire . . . the casualties increased . . . the
"rushes became shorter, and finally the whole advance
"stopped .... with bloody losses, the attack gradually
" came to an end." As soon as it got dark the Germans
gladly stopped.
In the 17th Division the 75th (Bremen) Regiment lost
5 officers and 376 men in one attack.1 This division made
no attempt to advance after dusk fell.
In the 18th Division at the beginning of darkness the
brigades dug in on the line they had reached, and bivouacked.
The 6th Division got across the Canal, but towards
7 P.M. all attempts to advance failed, and the division went
into bivouac. " Fighting posts, pushed a few hundred
yards out, protected the tired troops."
The 5th Division failed to get across the Canal. One
of its regiments, the 12th Brandenburg Grenadiers, whose
attack on the West Kents has been referred to, had lost "25
officers and far more than 500 N.C.O.'s and men," when
"the summer night settled on the blood-stained battle-
" field and with its shade gave a protecting curtain against
" the hostile fire." It was this division whose singing was
heard : to cheer themselves, the men sang " Deutschland
iiber alles."
The IV. Corps did not cross the Canal during the battle.
Some patrols managed to get over after midnight, but
" up to 9 P.M. the enemy fire was as strong as ever."
Von Kluck, according to the General Staff account,
" after the stubborn defence of the enemy, especially
" opposite the ///. Corps, expected that the British would
" offer energetic resistance again next day on the high ground
"south of Mons. He therefore resolved to continue the
" attack next day enveloping the left flank, with the inten-
" tion of cutting off the enemy's retreat to the west." 2 The
II. Cavalry Corps was ordered south to assist. Von Kluck,
in his version of his orders, adds " The attack will be so
directed as to force the enemy into Maubeuge."
1 See p. 80.
2 Kuhl, " Marne," p. 70, confirms this.
CHAPTER IV
THE RETREAT FROM MONS AND THE ACTION OF ELOUGES
THE SITUATION OF THE BRITISH AT DAWN
ON THE 24TH AUGUST 1914
(See Sketch 3 ; Maps 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, & 8)
THE night of the 23rd/24th August passed without serious Sketch 3.
disturbance of any kind from the enemy ; and at dawn on M*PS 6
the 24th the Army occupied a line facing roughly north-
east, seventeen miles long, with the centre some three
miles south of Mons. The exact positions from right to
left were : —
I. CORPS :
1st Division
5th Cavalry Brigade
2nd Division :
6th Infantry Brigade
4th do.
5th do.
2 /Conn aught Rangers
II. CORPS :
3rd Division :
8th Infantry Brigade
7th do.
9th do.
5th Division :
I/Bedford (15th I.B.)
13th Infantry Brigade
I/Dorset (15th I.E.)
14th Infantry Brigade
15th do.
(less two battalions)
19th Infantry Brigade .
Cavalry Division .
. Grand Reng, Rouveroy, Givry.
. Givry.
. Harmignies.
. Harveng.
. Paturages.
. Bougnies.
. Nouvelles.
• Ciply.
. Framenes.
. Paturages.
IWasmes.
. Hornu — Bois de Boussu.
. Champ des Sarts — Hornu.
(Thulin, filouges, Audregnies,
\ Quievrain.
87
88 MONS
It must be remembered that the bulk of the Army had
been subjected to great fatigue. The 1st Division, though
scarcely engaged, had been hurried into its place by a forced
march during the night of the 22nd/23rd and had been
under arms for eighteen hours before it could billet or
bivouac. Of the II. Corps, the 8th Infantry Brigade had
been fighting all day, and the greater part of it got no rest
until the early morning of the 24th. The 9th Infantry
Brigade could not get into billets at Frameries until late.
The 13th Infantry Brigade did not reach its assigned
position much before daylight on the 24th, and the 14th
Infantry Brigade was little earlier. The 15th Infantry
Brigade fared better, though it did not settle down until
midnight. The 19th Infantry Brigade had only just
left the train at Valenciennes, when it was hurried up to
take over a section of the outpost line. Altogether, the
circumstances were very trying for the reservists, who
formed 60 per cent, of the infantry, and were for the most
part still out of condition.
Map «. Shortly after 11 P.M. on the 23rd the senior General Staff
officers of the I. and II. Corps and the Cavalry Division,
in view of a possible retirement, had been summoned to
General Headquarters at Le Cateau. There about 1 A.M.
the Chief of the General Staff explained that it was the in-
tention of Sir John French to make a general retreat south-
wards of about eight miles to an east and west line, pre-
viously reconnoitred, from La Longueville (five miles west
of Maubeuge) westward through Bavai and four miles
beyond it to the hamlet of La Boiserette,1 a front of
about seven miles. He instructed the General Staff
officers that the corps were to retire in mutual co-operation,
the actual order of retirement to be settled by the two
corps commanders in consultation. Brigadier - General
Forestier - Walker left immediately for II. Corps Head-
quarters, thirty-five miles off, by motor car ; but the I.
Corps was in telegraphic communication with G.H.Q., and
Brigadier-General J. E. Gough could therefore send off a
message at once, which reached General Haig about 2 A.M.
He was able to give the additional information that the I.
Corps was to cover the retirement of the II., the cavalry
simultaneously making a demonstration, and that the
roads through Maubeuge were not open to the British.
G.H.Q. further suggested that the left of the I. Corps
should receive particular attention, and that the line from
1 Misspelt La Bois Crette on some maps.
RETREAT OF THE I. CORPS 89
Bonnet (six miles north of Maubeuge) westwards to 24 Aug.
Blaregnies should be firmly established before the British 1914>
left was withdrawn. Actually, it was mid-day before the
corps commanders found opportunity to meet and arrange
how these suggestions should be put into practice.
THE RETREAT OF THE I. CORPS
In the meantime, however, to carry out the orders the Map o
I. Corps detailed a special rear guard, composed of the
5th Cavalry Brigade, J Battery, the XXXVI. and XLI.
Brigades R.F.A., and the 4th (Guards) Brigade, under the
command of Brigadier-General Home, R.A., of the corps
staff. It was to concentrate at Bonnet and make an
offensive demonstration at daybreak, so as to delay the
enemy's leading troops whilst the 1st and 2nd Divisions
fell back.
To save time, General Haig motored to 1st and 2nd
Divisional Headquarters and in person issued orders for
them to retire by two roads on Feignies and Bavai. The
main body of the 1st Division marched off at 4 A.M., un-
molested, except by a little ineffective shelling, and by a
few small bodies of cavalry, which were roughly handled
by the infantry and the artillery. The 2nd Division
followed at 4.45 A.M. and was equally undisturbed. Even
the rear guard was not really troubled : x the 4th (Guards)
Brigade retired by successive echelons from Harveng and
Bougnies to a position two miles back between Quevy le
Petit and Genly, pursued by heavy but ineffectual bursts
of shrapnel. The 5th Cavalry Brigade covered the ground
on the left of the Guards from Vellereille le Sec westward,
through Harmignies and Nouvelles, to Ciply, under similar
ineffective shelling ; there was no real pressure from the
enemy. Here, for the present, we will leave the rear
guard.
The main bodies of the divisions reached their destina-
tions at Feignies, La Longueville and Bavai between 9
and 10 P.M., with no further mishap than the loss of tools
and other articles which had been unloaded by the regi-
mental transport and could not be re-loaded in time. None
the less, the men were extremely fatigued ; they had had
little rest for over sixty hours ; the country was close and
cramped, and the day had been exceedingly hot ; there had
1 As will be seen in the account of the German operations on the 24th,
no orders were issued for pursuit in this part of the field till 8 A.M.
90 MONS
been constant deployments and labour at entrenching —
inseparable from a retreat ; so that the men suffered greatly
from weariness and want of sleep. Yet one battalion
commander records on this date : - :t We had marched
" 59 miles in the last 64 hours, beginning the march in
" the middle of an entirely sleepless night and getting only
" 8 hours altogether during the other two nights. Many
" men could hardly put one leg before another, yet they all
" marched in singing. The other battalions of the brigade
" did not arrive till long after dark, but they also marched
" in singing."
THE RETREAT OF THE II. CORPS
Maps 3, 6, The comparative ease with which the I. Corps was able
& 7 to withdraw was far from reassuring, for it might indicate
that the Germans intended to make a decisive turning
effort further west, as, indeed, was their plan ; and soon
after 6 A.M. an aeroplane which had been sent out at
dawn brought information that was not calculated to
diminish the anxiety of the Commander-in-Chief : — A
column, from five to ten miles long, had been seen at
4.30 A.M. moving south from Leuze towards Peruwelz,
having changed direction, at Leuze, off the road that runs
westward from Ath to Tournai. This could hardly mean
anything less than a German division ; x and the line of
march from Peruwelz to Conde would carry it to the west
of the extreme western flank of the British Army. Nothing,
however, was known of this at 4 A.M. at the commencement
of the British retreat ; and the first movements of the II.
Corps were naturally made in complete ignorance of it.
General Smith-Dorrien, in pursuance of the Commander-
in-Chief's original orders, had made his dispositions before
dawn to withstand another German attack on the ground on
which his corps had spent the night. These dispositions
proved of advantage for gaining time when the instructions
to retire arrived ; for, before the II. Corps could retreat,
it was imperative that the roads should be cleared of all
transport and impedimenta, and the orders to that effect
did not filter down to the brigades of the 3rd Division
before 4.30 A.M. Meanwhile, before dawn, the Germans
had already opened a heavy bombardment against the
right of the II. Corps ; and within an hour the fire extended
westwards along the whole length of the line, and by
1 It was the //. Corps (see " Mons," Sketch 2).
RETREAT OF THE II. CORPS 91
5.15 A.M. a general infantry attack was rapidly developing. 24 Aug.
At 5.30 A.M. the commander of the 3rd Division became 1914-
aware that the main body of the I. Corps was retiring, and
sent a staff officer to reconnoitre a second position further
to the south. Half an hour later he despatched orders to
the 8th Infantry Brigade, the right of his line, to withdraw
from Nouvelles.1
Beyond the shelling, which did no damage, the 8th
Infantry Brigade had been little troubled ; the German
infantry did not show itself at all ; and at 8 A.M. the
brigade began its march southward upon Genly. The
7th Infantry Brigade about Ciply, and the 9th Infantry
Brigade at Frameries, when they began to move in their
turn, did not escape quite so easily. The Germans were
evidently bent upon holding them to their ground for a
time, and about 6 A.M. launched their infantry in dense
waves to the attack. They were thrown back with
heavy loss by the South Lancashire and the Lincolnshire
Regiments, who formed the rear guards of these two
brigades; the 109th Battery also found excellent tar-
gets in the masses of the enemy visible behind the
1 The following message from the II. Corps to the 5th Division gives a
good idea of the situation about 7 A.M. :
To 5th Division. From II. Corps.
G. 313. 24th [August 1914].
First Corps are retiring from their line Peissant — Haulchin — Har-
mignies to positions at Villers Sire Nicole and Quevy le Petit aaa Sixth
Infantry Brigade moving to position about cross roads one mile west of
Harveng aaa All these positions are to cover retirement of Third Division
when that becomes necessary aaa Fifth Cavalry Brigade to Harveng
with detachment and battery at Harmignies aaa Third Division right
flank will probably fall back to Harveng early aaa When Third Division
is forced to retire or ordered to retire it will take up position about Sars la
Bruyere aaa Your retirement will have to be more or less simultaneous
and you should at once send to reconnoitre a position if possible about
Blaugies and Montignies sur Roc or where you can find it aaa Your roads
of retirement will be those described to Colonel Romer [General Staff of
5th Division] and in addition that through Blaugies and Erquennes to
Hergies but not through second I of Pissotiau [that is west of the Blaugies
— Erquennes — Hergies road] which belongs to Third Division aaa If
you feel yourself sufficiently strong where you are you might send a brigade
or less back to your next position to prepare it aaa We cannot tell when
Third Division will have to retire to Sars la Bruyere but hope that it will
at least not be for two or three hours.
G. F. W. [FORESTIER- WALKER],
E.G.
7.15 A.M.
Copy handed to Col. Maurice [G.S. 3rd Division].
One by tel.
One by officer.
92 MONS
front line. About 9 A.M. the 9th Infantry Brigade fell
back, in perfect order, through the town of Frameries,
where there was some sharp fighting before the troops got
clear of the streets, and marched southward upon Sars la
Bruyere. The 7th Infantry Brigade held on for a little
longer, and the South Lancashire were enfiladed by machine
guns from the slag-heaps about Frameries, and lost between
two and three hundred men before this brigade also was
withdrawn towards Genly. The Germans made no attempt
to press them ; indeed, they handled the 3rd Division on
this day with singular respect. It had, in fact, though it
was not appreciated at the time, inflicted on them very
heavy losses.
THE GERMAN ACCOUNT OF FRAMERIES
The German accounts of the fighting at Frameries
are so greatly to the credit of the British Expeditionary
Force, that they are worth recording here.
The attack on the Lincolnshire and South Lancashire
was made by a whole German division — the 6th of the
///. Corps. There is a detailed account of the action by
Hauptmann von Brandis of the 24th (Brandenburg) Regi-
ment.1 He says : —
" Our artillery is to prepare the assault. ... A con-
" tinuous stream of gun and howitzer shell thunders out,
" hurtling and howling over our heads, and bursting in dust
" and smoke on the edge of the village [Frameries]. No
" human beings could possibly live there. At 7 A.M. six
"companies of the regiment advance to the attack. We
" remain impatiently in reserve. ... If we thought that
" the English had been shelled enough to be storm-ripe, we
" were fairly mistaken. They met us with well-aimed fire."
His company was then sent up to reinforce. As it
reached the firing line, the men shout " Vorwarts " expect-
ing to carry it with them, but no one rose. " There were
" only dead and wounded to be seen. Tommy seems to have
"waited for the moment of the assault. He had carefully
" studied our training manuals, and suddenly, when we were
" well in the open, he turned his machine guns on." It was
only however rapid rifle fire. The assault failing, the village
was shelled again, and the attack renewed with larger
forces. Eventually the Germans entered Frameries and
found no defenders there.
1 In his book " Die Sturmer von Douaumont."
RETREAT OF THE II. CORPS 93
" Up to all the tricks of the trade from their experience 24 Aug.
" of small wars, the English veterans brilliantly understood 1914
" how to slip off at the last moment." Of the casualties
he says : " Our battalion alone lost three company com-
"manders, and, besides, every second officer and every
" third man."
Captain Liebenow of the 64th Infantry Regiment, of
the same brigade as von Brandis, states *• that his battalion
at Frameries lost " the adjutant, every fourth man and,
" of three companies, every lieutenant."
Captain Heubner, of the 20th Infantry Regiment,2
states : " many of our companies had heavy losses in the
"attack on Frameries. ... As on the previous day, the
" English again vanished without leaving a trace (spurlos)"
THE FIGHTING ON THE LEFT FLANK OF THE
II. CORPS
It was in the section immediately to the west of Frameries Maps o
that trouble was first experienced. The right of the 5th * 7>
Division at Paturages, in the midst of the sea of mining
villages, was held by three battalions of the 5th Infantry
Brigade, and one, the Bedfords, of the 15th. The German
guns opened their bombardment before dawn, and con-
tinued it steadily for some four hours, though to little
purpose. The enemy infantry meanwhile fell upon a
company of the Bedfords near Paturages, and a very lively
fight followed without definite result. Meanwhile, further
to the west, the Dorsets (15th Infantry Brigade, but
detached with the 13th) were well entrenched along the
railway to the north-west of Wasmes, with two guns of the
121st Battery dug in near their extreme left. Still further
to the left, in the 13th Infantry Brigade, the 2/ Yorkshire
Light Infantry was coming into position with the 37th
Howitzer Battery level with it. The 2/Duke of Welling-
ton's, which was shortly to relieve the I/Dorset, and the
1 /Royal West Kent were in Wasmes ; the 2/Scottish
Borderers was on the left at Champ des Sarts. The I/Norfolk
and 1 /Cheshire of the 15th Infantry Brigade, together with
the 119th Battery, were ordered to Dour (two miles south-
west) as divisional reserve. The XXVII. Brigade R.F.A.3
1 In a letter to " The Times Literary Supplement," 4th September
1918.
2 In his book " Unter Emmich vor Liittich, Unter Kluck vor Paris."
3 Less the 119th Battery.
94 MONS
was about Champ des Sarts ; the VIII. Howitzer Brigade
(less the 37th Battery) to the right and in advance of
it ; and the XXVIII. Brigade R.F.A. was to the left of
it, to the north of Dour.
In this section of the line the enemy began operations
at dawn by bombarding the northern edge of St. Ghislain
for two hours, after which he pushed his patrols forward
and ascertained that the place had been evacuated by the
British.1 The infantry2 then crossed the Canal by some
of the foot-bridges still left standing ; and a battalion and
a half, hastening through the deserted streets, deployed
from the southern edge of Hornu, the next village, opposite
Champ des Sarts. The two advanced guns of the 121st
Battery, which had opened fire, were quickly compelled
to retire by the enemy's machine guns ; but the Dor sets
and the 37th Battery brought the German advance to an
abrupt standstill with considerable loss.
At 9 A.M. the three battalions of the 5th Infantry
Brigade on the right of the 5th Division at Paturages, in
accordance with their orders from the I. Corps, began to
withdraw by Culot and Eugies southward upon Sars la
Bruyere. Roused at 4 A.M. the Worcestershire and the
H.L.I, had dug in on the front line, whilst the Oxfords
entrenched a position in rear to cover retirement. Though
under shell fire not one of them had fired a shot nor seen a
German, but their retirement at once brought trouble upon
the denuded right flank of the II. Corps, where stood the
Bedfords. A detachment of the Dorsets filled the vacant
place for the moment, and the resistance was for the time
maintained ; the Germans were evidently less concerned
to drive the British back than to hold them to their ground.
None the less, they were not content to be checked at
the exits of Hornu. Again and again they tried to de-
bouch, but without success, the 37th Battery working great
havoc among them. It seems that the Germans must have
lost heavily, for the Brandenburg Grenadiers^ though ex-
hausted and thinned by the engagement of the previous
day, were hastily called up to reinforce the firing line.3
1 Writing of the advance through St. Ghislain on the 24th, Hauptmann
Bloem (p. 153) writes : " Truly, our artillery shot famously this night and
this morning " ; and he says that the town looked " as if it had been
visited by a whirlwind."
2 gth Division.
8 Of the approach to Hornu, Hauptmann Bloem says (p. 156) that his
battalion was fired on by gun and rifles whilst it was in column of march,
and the regimental adjutant brought him the order : " The 52nd in front
are heavily engaged and require reinforcement at any cost. Haste is
RETREAT OF THE II. CORPS 95
Meanwhile, the German artillery had for some time been 24 Aug.
shelling Wasmes furiously, causing some loss in the 13th 1914<
Infantry Brigade both to the Duke's and to the West Kents ;
but the former, as has been told, had been withdrawn to
relieve the Dorsets, and shortly afterwards two companies
of the West Kents were also shifted eastwards to fill a gap
between the Duke's and the Yorkshire Light Infantry. The
German guns then turned with fury upon the British
batteries, and the XXVII. Brigade R.F.A. at Champ des
Sarts was compelled to withdraw under heavy fire. But
here, once again, the enemy did not seriously press the
attack of his infantry ; he had already lost too heavily.
On the front of the 14th Infantry Brigade, on the left
of the 13th, all was quiet. Still further to the west, the
19th Infantry Brigade had received orders from G.H.Q. at
midnight to fall back to Elouges, six miles south-east, and
at 2 A.M. it began its march upon that village by Hensies
and Quievrain. At the same hour, the French 84th
Territorial Division evacuated Conde and commenced its
retirement towards Cambrai. At dawn the Cavalry
Division, which was in rear of the left, began to move ;
General Allenby, finding that the Germans were in great
strength on his left, decided to withdraw some distance,
and sent a message to Sir Charles Fergusson to that
effect ; but, on hearing from him that the 5th Division was
to hold its ground, agreed to cover its left flank. A Map 8.
squadron of the 9th Lancers, feeling its way forward to
Thulin, the left of the II. Corps, found the enemy at the
northern edge of the town and engaged him. Meanwhile,
the 2nd Cavalry Brigade had taken up a position south of
the main highway to Valenciennes and astride the road
from Thulin to Elouges ; the 1st Cavalry Brigade was on
the railway to its left ; the 3rd to the left rear of the 1st
near a sugar factory about a thousand yards south-east of
Quievrain, and the 4th at Sebourg, about five miles further
south. There they remained until the 19th Infantry
Brigade had been withdrawn, when it passed under
imperative." Bloem cannot believe his observer when he reports " Herr
Hauptmann, the enemy is retiring." " What — what do you say — the
enemy is retiring. You mean he is advancing." . . . "In the thick
masses everybody rushes forward, Grenadiers and Fusiliers, men of all
companies mixed up ... we jump into the English trenches. . . .
Suddenly something awful happens." They are immediately heavily
shelled by their own artillery.
No casualties for Bloem's regiment for this action can be found in the
official lists for 1914.
96 MONS
General Allenby's command, and was halted at Baisieux,
two miles south-west of Elouges, to the vicinity of which
the 1st Cavalry Brigade also retired. Meanwhile, the
advanced squadron of the 9th Lancers was disputing the
advance of the Germans from Thulin, and inflicting some
loss upon them, though all the time falling back upon its
main body. About 6 A.M. German guns opened fire upon
that main body from the neighbourhood of Thulin, and
about 7 A.M. German infantry and artillery — of the 7th
Division of the IV. Corps — were seen moving westward
along the highway to Valenciennes. One party turning
southward, came down the road towards Elouges in column
of route, and, after suffering severely from the rifles of the
18th Hussars and 9th Lancers upon either side of it,
deployed and advanced upon a wide front.
Thereupon, General Allenby, ordering the road Elouges
— Audregnies — Angre — Roisin (five miles south of Elouges)
to be left open for the retreat of the 5th Division, began
about 9 A.M. to withdraw his troops slowly southward.
Though he had sent three officers, one of them in a motor
car, to ascertain whether the 5th Division had begun its
retirement, not one of these messengers had yet returned.
Accordingly, he made his dispositions for retreat with due
precautions for the safety of the left flank of the Army.
The 19th Infantry Brigade was directed to fall back and
take up a position at Rombies (three miles south-west of
Baisieux and about seven south of Conde), and then the
Cavalry Division began to withdraw, by successive
brigades, in the same direction. In order to delay the
enemy's advance to the utmost, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade,
which formed the rear guard, utilized the sunken roads,
mineral railways and slag-heaps that broke up the ground
between the Mons — Valenciennes road on the north and the
villages of Elouges and Audregnies on the south. It was
supported by L Battery R.H.A., which was in position in
the middle of the area behind the railway between Elouges
and Quievrain. It was very heavily shelled as it retired,
but fortunately little harm was done, and there was no
real pressure from the enemy. By 11.30 A.M. the very
last parties had come in, and the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was
moving through Audregnies upon Angre, the 18th Hussars
bringing up the rear.
9 A.M. TO 2 P.M. 97
I. CORPS REAR GUARD AND SRD DIVISION
9 A.M. to 1 P.M.
So much for the first moves of the great retreat. The 24 Aug.
succeeding hours of the 24th August likewise passed with- 1914-
out serious trouble on the right of the Army. General Maps 6
Home's rear guard had, as related,1 taken up a position on & 7-
a front of three miles facing north-east, with its right on
the road from Mons to Maubeuge, about a mile north of
Bonnet, with its left near Genly. About 10.30 A.M. the
8th Infantry Brigade came in on its western flank. The
7th Infantry Brigade, assembling at Genly from Ciply and
Nouvelles, passed through the 8th on its way to Blaregnies,
where it — or, at any rate, some part of it — halted and
faced about. About 11 A.M. the 5th Infantry Brigade2
likewise joined the 8th on the western side, forming up in
depth from Eugies to Sars la Bruyere. The 9th Infantry
Brigade made its way, as indeed, from the direction of the
roads, was inevitable, to the same point ; and there the
3rd Division, together with General Home's rear guard,
waited until far into the afternoon. There was no pressure
whatever upon them. Indeed, at 11 A.M. General Home
reported that the special responsibility of his rear guard
was at an end, and that he proposed to return his troops to
their divisions. But, soon after 1 P.M., a message came in
to the I. Corps Headquarters from the II. Corps that the
retreat of the 5th Division on the left was delayed, and
that meanwhile the 3rd Division would stand fast. Sir
Douglas Haig directed his rear guard to conform with the
movements of the 3rd Division ; it therefore remained in
its position, little troubled or threatened, but stationary.
We will now turn westward again and see what had delayed
the retirement of the 5th Division.
STH DIVISION
9 A.M. to 2 P.M.
We left the Dorsets and Bedfords at Paturages cover- Maps o
ing the right of the 13th Infantry Brigade, which was & 7-
engaging the enemy issuing from the southern exits of
Hornu. After the withdrawal of the 5th Infantry Brigade
1 See p. 89.
2 That is to say, the three battalions which had been at Paturages.
The remaining battalion (2/Connaught Rangers) was with the 4th (Guards)
Brigade.
VOL. I H
98 MONS
on their right, it was evident that these two battalions
could not maintain themselves in such a position for long,
and at 10.30 A.M. Brigadier-General Count Gleichen began
the somewhat awkward operation of withdrawing them
westward through Paturages. It was none too soon. The
first line transport of the Dorsets, retiring by La Bouverie
on its way to Blaugies, six miles north of Bavai, was
caught in an ambush by the Germans,1 but managed to
extricate itself with little loss ; and at 11 A.M. the Bed-
fords on the right (south of the railway line from Wasmes
to Frameries), and the Dorsets on the left began their
movement south-west across the rear of the 13th Infantry
Brigade, towards Petit Wasmes and Warquignies. They
had some sharp fighting, in which British marksmanship
seems to have told its usual tale, before they could clear
themselves from the streets ; part of the Bedfords, acting
as escort to the divisional artillery, struck due south from
Warquignies, and made their way to St. Waast les
Bavay.2 The remainder marched to Athis, west of
Blaugies, and the bulk of the Dorsets to Blaugies itself,
where both halted, the time being about 2 P.M.
Meanwhile, about 11 A.M., Sir Charles Fergusson
received a message from the II. Corps, giving him dis-
cretion to fall back as soon as the troops on his right had
retired ; finding that they had already gone and that the
enemy was working round his right flank, he proceeded to
follow their example. The 13th Infantry Brigade was
holding its own with no great difficulty, though the enemy
was shelling the 2/Duke of Wellington's on the right and
inflicting considerable loss ; he was however doing little
mischief to the 2/ Yorkshire Light Infantry, and still re-
frained from any serious infantry attack. The 14th
Infantry Brigade, on the left of the 13th, was left in com-
parative quiet ; the 2/Manchester, part of which had been
moved up to the left of the Yorkshire Light Infantry,
alone being under heavy artillery fire. This brigade began
the withdrawal by successive battalions, with little inter-
ference from the enemy, and formed up at Blaugies to
cover the retreat of the 13th Infantry Brigade. The latter
was allowed to fall back without serious trouble. The
VIII. Howitzer Brigade withdrew at once; the XXVIII.
Brigade R.F.A. left a section of each battery behind to
1 Part of the 20th Regiment of the 6th Division, it appears, had pressed
on (see " Mons "), between Frameries and Paturages.
2 On some maps St. Waast la Vallee, two miles west of Bavai.
ELOUGES 99
support the infantry rear guards ; and the operations 24 Aug.
seem to have proceeded with little or no interference from 1914-
the German infantry. One German battery did, indeed,
come into action in the open at three thousand yards'
range, but was quickly silenced. Only in one quarter does
the German infantry appear to have advanced in earnest.
By some mishap, the order to retreat did not reach the
2/Duke's, which accordingly remained in position, with
a battery of the XXVII. Brigade R.F.A. close to it.
About 11.30 A.M., exactly the time when the order should
have affected the Duke's, the Germans suddenly con-
centrated a tremendous fire upon this battery from guns
which they had brought up to close range. A sharp fight
followed during the next hour and a half, and it was
only the rifles of the infantry that saved the British
battery. About 1 P.M. the Germans debouched in thick
skirmishing formation followed by dense masses from the
Boussu — Quievrain road on the left front of the British
battalion, but were greeted by such a rain of bullets from
rifles and machine guns at 800 yards, and such a salute
from the battery that they stopped dead. Under cover of
this final stroke, the guns limbered up and the battalion
withdrew south-west into Dour. The Duke's had suffered
heavily, their casualties reaching nearly four hundred
of all ranks, but they had driven back six battalions.1
By 2 P.M. the 13th and 14th Infantry Brigades were
assembled at Warquignies and Blaugies, respectively,
ready to continue their retreat to their places in the new
position : St. Waast (2 miles west of Bavai) and Eth
(4 miles west and a little north of St. Waast).
THE FLANK GUARD ACTION AT ELOUGES
But the 5th Division was not destined to march so far Map 8.
to the south-west as Eth. Hardly had the 13th and 14th
Infantry Brigades begun their retreat, when Sir Charles
Fergusson became aware that the withdrawal of the
cavalry and 19th Infantry Brigade had been premature,
and that his left flank was seriously threatened by German
forces of considerable strength advancing due south
between Tliulin and Conde.2 At 11.45 A.M. he sent an
urgent message to the Cavalry Division to come to his
1 66th and 26th Regiments of the 7th Division (see " Mons," Sketch 5).
It should be recalled that a German infantry regiment contained three
battalions.
2 The whole IV. Corps.
100 MONS
assistance, and at the same time placed the 1/Norfolks
and I/Cheshire, together with the 119th Battery, all of
which were still in reserve near Divisional Headquarters
at Dour, under the command of Colonel Ballard of the
Norfolk Regiment. The first orders given to this officer
were to advance north and counter-attack. Accordingly,
he moved his troops northward for half a mile till a staff
officer came up and directed them to be moved westward
into position along the Elouges — Audregnies — Angre road,
down which, as we have seen, the rear guard of the Cavalry
Division had already retired. Thither, accordingly, they
marched. Meanwhile, General Allenby had received
General Fergusson's message about noon, and responded
instantly by sending back the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades
to the vicinity of Audregnies, which brought them within
a couple of miles of Colonel Ballard. The 18th Hussars,
who had just quitted their position of the forenoon,
returned ; L Battery came up next at a rapid trot, and
halted just to the west of Elouges ; whilst the 9th
Lancers formed up by the road immediately to north
of that village, with the 4th Dragoon Guards in rear.
Simultaneously, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, which was
nearing Rombies, faced about and, hastening back,
occupied a position on the ridge immediately west of
Audregnies.
The scene of the action which was about to take place
is an irregular parallelogram, bounded on the north by
the great highway from Mons to Valenciennes, on the east
by the Elouges rivulet, on the south by the road from
Elouges to Audregnies, and on the west by the valley of
the Honnelle : a space, roughly speaking, about three
thousand yards from north to south, by five thousand from
east to west. From south to north the ground forms a
perfect natural glacis, at this time covered with corn-
stooks. Across the parallelogram runs the railway from
Elouges to QuieVrain, for the most part sunk in cutting
and bordered upon each side by a quickset hedge. About
a thousand yards to the south, a mineral railway runs
parallel with it for about half its length, and then comes
to an abrupt end in a group of cottages. More or less
parallel to the Honnelle, the old Roman Road, famous under
the name of the Chaussee Brunehaut, runs straight as an
arrow north-west from Audregnies, cutting the great
highway about a thousand yards east of Quievrain. Upon
this road, about a mile and a quarter north of Audregnies,
fiLOUGES 101
stood a sugar-factory, and, immediately to the east of it, 24 Aug.
a cluster of high slag-heaps. 1914.
It was now about 12.30 P.M. Colonel Ballard's force
was just taking up its ground, facing nearly west, the
Norfolks on the right, with their right resting on the rail-
way from Elouges to Quievrain, and the Cheshire on the
left, carrying the line to the northern outskirts of
Audregnies, and securing touch with the cavalry. All
had, so far, been comparatively quiet, when a sudden
burst of fire, both of guns and rifles, from the north-west,
gave warning that the Germans were opening their attack.
It developed in two distinct columns, one from Quievrain,
the other from the Bois de Deduit and Baisieux south-east
upon Audregnies. General de Lisle (2nd Cavalry Brigade),
galloping to the 9th Lancers, instructed the commanding
officer to deliver, if necessary, a mounted attack northwards
in order to take the German advance in flank ; whilst
L Battery, finding no suitable forward position near,
wheeled about and galloped south, coming into action
behind the railway just to the east of Audregnies.
Colonel Campbell ordered the 9th Lancers to advance,
which they did in column of squadrons at the gallop, with
two troops of the 4th Dragoon Guards echeloned to their
left rear. Crossing the sunken road from Baisieux to
Elouges at a point where it ran level with the ground, they
galloped on, speared a couple of German scouts near the
road, and caught sight of a few more taking cover among
the corn-stooks ; then, their advance checked by the fire
of nine batteries, they hesitated. Some dismounted by the
sugar-factory, others swept round to the right and back
towards Audregnies, and a great number, retiring along
the mineral railway towards Elouges, rallied there upon
the 18th Hussars. Simultaneously, a squadron of the 4th
Dragoon Guards galloped down a narrow lane towards
Baisieux, in order to seize a house at the end of it, and thus
to cover a further advance upon Quievrain. As it went it
was shattered by heavy fire of rifles and shrapnel and,
though the cottage was eventually reached and held, the
effort led to no result.
The advance of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade seems to have
produced some moral effect in delaying the progress of
the German attack, and so gained time for Colonel Ballard's
flank guard to settle down, not, indeed, in entrenchments—
for there was not a moment to spare for digging — but in
fair natural cover. Probably it made matters easier also
102 MONS
for the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, which was now in position
further south about Angre, with its machine guns firing
down the valley on Baisieux, supported by the 1st Cavalry
Brigade and covered by the guns of D and E Batteries in
rear. About 12.45 P.M. the action became serious, with
obvious signs of an enveloping movement. The Germans
had at least seven batteries in action about a mile north
of the Valenciennes road towards the hamlet of La Croix,
and, under the protection of their shells, the main body of
their infantry — apparently a division of the IV. Corps1 —
closed up on to the advanced guards and strove to carry
the advance further. Solid masses emerged from Quievrain
and from a small wood at its north-eastern corner; and
dense columns came streaming down the three broad rides
that led from the Bois de Deduit, midway between Quie-
vrain and Baisieux, into the open. L Battery now had the
chance for which every gunner prays ; no sooner did the
Germans show themselves than it opened upon them with
shrapnel, bursting its shells low, with an accuracy which
literally mowed down the advancing masses. In vain they
ran back to cover, rallied and endeavoured to press forward.
In vain four German batteries, three firing shrapnel and
one high explosive, strove to silence the exasperating guns
which were arresting the progress of the infantry. Their
shrapnel burst high and scattered harmless bullets, while
their high-explosive, with the exception of one shell which
caused ten casualties, fell wide and did no damage. L
Battery was not to be silenced, and forbade, under heavy
penalty, any hostile advance from Quievrain.
Colonel Ballard's infantry, likewise, seemed secure with
a perfect natural glacis before it ; and the 119th Battery,
which was in position south of Elouges, not less so. The
fire of the German artillery was heavy, but its shell, for
the most part, went over. The 119th Battery answered
the German guns with considerable effect ; and the
Norfolks found excellent targets in the German infantry,
who strove to swarm out of Quievrain, while the Cheshire
brought both rifles and machine guns to bear with great
execution upon the masses that were endeavouring to
debouch from the Bois de Deduit. The 3rd Cavalry
Brigade, which was spared all artillery fire, likewise held
its own successfully south of the infantry, before Baisieux,
and, with the help of D and E Batteries, effectually barred
1 All four regiments, twelve battalions, of the 8th Division were
engaged ("Mons").
ELOUGES 103
the way against the Germans at that point. The baffled 24 Aug.
enemy then tried a movement still further to the south 1914°
by Marchipont, but was stopped by the 5th Dragoon
Guards, who had come up, from the 1st Cavalry Brigade,
on the left of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade. Everywhere the
Germans were checked. The first effort of von Kluck's
enveloping movement was, in fact, completely and victori-
ously foiled.
There were, however, disquieting signs of a still wider
turning movement further to the west about Quarouble
(three miles south-west of Quievrain), where a mass of
German infantry, thought to be the flank guard of an
army corps1 could be seen moving steadily to the south.
Accordingly, shortly after (about 2.30 P.M.) Colonel Ballard
gave the order to retire.
RESUMPTION OF THE RETREAT
About the same hour the troops to the eastward Maps 3
were also set in motion to resume the retreat. The 3rd & «•
Division marched from Genly — Sars la Bruyere for Bavai
en route for the villages to the south-west of that town ;
General Home's rear guard, on its right, moved last of all,
not until about 4.30 P.M. The main body of the 5th Divi-
sion struck south from Blaugies through Athis upon Bavai
and St. Waast, its place in the selected position ; and
the Cavalry Division also prepared to withdraw, the 1st
Cavalry Brigade moving up to Onnezies to cover the first
rearward bound of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade to Angre. Map 8.
Meanwhile, the effect of the advance of the Germans 2 to
the east of Colonel Ballard's flank guard was beginning
to be felt, and the 119th Battery, between the fire of the
three German batteries, and of a machine gun at much
closer range, was suffering considerably. One section, the
first that had come into action, fired at the hostile infantry
until it was within eight hundred yards, and then, with-
drew. The four remaining guns were brought off by the
battery commander, Major Alexander, one at a time, with
the help of a party of the 9th Lancers.3 The Norfolks
1 Actually the three battalions of the 36th Regiment of the IV. Corps.
2 The 7th Division of the IV. Corps.
3 Major Alexander received the V.C. for " handling his battery against
" overwhelming odds with such conspicuous success that all his guns were
" saved, notwithstanding that they had to be withdrawn by hand by him-
" self and three other men." Captain Francis Grenfell, 9th Lancers, also
received the V.C. on this day for gallantry in action and for assisting to
save the guns of the 119th Battery.
104 MONS
then fell back in two parties under a continuous hail of
shrapnel bullets, leaving a hundred of their wounded
behind them at Elouges. Most unfortunately, both the
second in command and the adjutant were wounded at
this critical moment, and thus one platoon in an advanced
position received no orders to retire.
Colonel Ballard sent to the Cheshire three separate
messages to fall back, not one of which reached them.
The major of L Battery also received no orders, but seeing
no sign of the Norfolks and having fired away nearly the
whole of his ammunition, was meditating withdrawal when
the brigade-major of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade arrived and
directed him to bring his battery out of action. The guns
were thereupon run down close under the screen of the
railway hedge ; the limbers were brought up one "by one
at a gallop from Audregnies ; and the battery limbered up
and got away without further mishap. The party of the
4th Dragoon Guards in the house by the lane then retired
also ; and they, together with L Battery and the main
body of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, moved off south-west-
ward upon Ruesnes. The Cavalry Division had mean-
while fallen back towards St. Waast and Wargnies, the
4th Cavalry Brigade being further to the west between
Saultain and Jenlain.
The Cheshire, together with a small party of the
Norfolks, were thus left alone. The commanding officer
of the former was unaware of the general retreat of the
Army, so that he was at a loss to know what was expected
of him. The Germans were now pressing forward rapidly
upon both flanks, and about 4 P.M., while making disposi-
tions to meet the movement, he was disabled by three
wounds. Shortly before this, part of the reserve company
of the Cheshire at Audregnies had been ordered by a
staff officer to fall back, and, after vainly striving to rejoin
the fighting line (which was rightly forbidden) made its
way to Athis. Meanwhile, as the Germans came closer,
the main body of the Cheshire fell back to the Audregnies
road, where they were fired on by two machine guns
placed in a dip in the ground, a couple of hundred yards
away. These were promptly silenced by the machine
guns of the Cheshire, a little party of whom charged
forward with the bayonet to dislodge the enemy from this
point of vantage. The Germans turned at the sight of
them, and during this short respite the opportunity
was taken to draw off a small part of the battalion across
SUMMARY 105
country to Audregnies wood, which they reached under 24 Aug.
heavy fire, thence making their way to Athis. Then 1914-
the Germans, seeing how few were their assailants, returned
to the attack, and there was nothing left for the remainder
of the Cheshire, a mere handful though they were, but
to fight to the last. They had still ammunition and could
keep up rapid fire, and though by this time separated into
at least three groups, they continued to defend them-
selves desperately until nearly 7 P.M. Then at last, sur-
rounded and overwhelmed on all sides, they laid down
their arms. Of the main body on the Audregnies road,
only forty remained unwounded. Their captors were the
72nd Infantry Regiment, belonging to the German IV.
Corps.
The troubles of the small party that had escaped were
not ended on the battlefield. The enemy broke in
from Dour during their retreat, and cut off a few of
them ; and at Athis only one hundred of them could be
assembled. The indefatigable gunners of the 5th Divi-
sional Artillery came into action along the line Blaugies —
Athis — Montignies, and again further to the south at
Houdain, enabling the survivors of the flank guard to
reach their bivouac at St. Waast at 9 P.M., utterly worn
by hunger, fatigue and hard fighting, but still un-
vanquished. They had held off the pursuit of a whole
German corps from the main body of the 5th Division, but
at heavy cost. The 119th Battery had lost thirty officers
and men ; the Norfolks over two hundred and fifty officers
and men ; whilst of the Cheshire, who in the morning
had mustered nearly a thousand, only two officers and
two hundred men answered their names at St. Waast.
The total losses on the 24th August were greater than
on the 23rd, and amounted to roughly 250 in the Cavalry
Division, 100 in the I. Corps, 550 in the 3rd Division,
1650 in the 5th Division and 40 in the 19th Infantry
Brigade.
SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE
24TH AUGUST
Thus ended the first day of the retreat. All circum-
stances considered, although the casualties were consider-
able, the operations had been remarkably successful.
The 5th Division had, indeed, been called upon not only
to defend six miles of front, but also, with the help of the
106 MONS
cavalry and of the 19th Infantry Brigade, to parry von
Kluck's enveloping attack ; but it had triumphantly
accomplished its task. The flanking battalions to the
east and west had, it is true, suffered much, but only one
had been actually overwhelmed, not a single gun had been
lost, and the enemy had been very severely punished.
Our troops were still confident that, when on anything
like equal terms, they were more than a match for
their opponents ; the one trouble that really oppressed
them was want of sleep. Long after nightfall the
battalions of the 3rd Division were passing the cross roads
in Bavai, the men stumbling along more like ghosts than
living soldiers, unconscious of everything about them, but
still moving under the magic impulse of discipline and
regimental pride. Marching, they were hardly awake ;
halted, whether sitting or standing, they were instantly
asleep. And these men on the eastern flank of the corps
had done little fighting and endured little pressure during
the day. Even worse was it on the western flank, where
cavalry and infantry had had hard fighting from dawn
till dusk, and many a man had been for over twenty-four
hours without sleep or food. And this, it must be borne
in mind, was only the beginning of the retreat.
Map 3. The general disposition of the Army on the night of the
24th/25th, on a line east to west through Bavai, was as
follows :
5th Cavalry Brigade . . . Feignies.
I. Corps :
1st Division .... Feignies, La Longueville.
2nd Division .... Bavai.
II. Corps :
5th Division .... Bavai, St. Waast.
3rd Division . . . .St. Waast, Amfroipret,
Bermeries.
Cavalry Division } . .St. Waast, Wargnies,1
19th Infantry Brigade/ . . Jenlain, Saultain.
It will be observed that in the course of the day's march,
the 3rd and 5th Divisions had changed places, the latter
being now on the right and the former on the left of the
II. Corps. This manoeuvre was intentional and carried
out in accordance with orders issued for the purpose. The
1 The 2nd Cavalry Brigade was much broken up. Headquarters, with
L Battery, £ squadron of 4th Dragoon Guards, l£ squadrons of 9th Lancers,
and one squadron of 18th Hussars, were at Ruesnes.
GERMAN MOVEMENTS 107
whole Army was inclining westward, in order to clear 24 Aug.
Maubeuge, and since the 3rd Division was able to begin 1914-
its retirement considerably before the 5th, it could without
difficulty proceed to the westward of Bavai, and thus
shorten the retreat of the 5th Division by permitting it to
fall back due south instead of south-west, and so to drop
into its place on the right of the II. Corps. This movement,
not only eased the immediate task of the 5th Division, but
relieved it from its difficult position upon the threatened
western flank ; it was carried out without any collision, in
fact without the divisions seeing each other.
GERMAN MOVEMENTS ON THE 24TH AUGUST 1914
The German accounts of the 24th August are somewhat Maps 3
meagre ; all that von Kluck has to say about the day is : & 6*
" After heavy fighting, the leading troops reached a line
" (west to east) Onain — Elouges — Dour — Genly — Harveng.
" The British force, estimated at from two to three divisions,
" was driven back towards a line Curgies — Bavai."
He does not explain why his attempt at envelopment
failed, why such a very short advance — only three and a
half miles from the Canal — was made, or why his corps
halted in the middle of the afternoon. His staff officer,
von Kuhl,1 states frankly " the enemy put up a lively resist-
ance with rear guards so that we only advanced slowly."
Von Kluck adds : " After the severe opposition offered by the
" British Army in the two-days battle Mons — St. Ghislain,
" a further and even stronger defence was to be expected on
" the line Valenciennes — Bavai — Maubeuge " and he then
quotes four pages from Sir John French's Despatch.
The German General Staff monograph, " Mons " gives
a few details — some of which have been noticed in foot-
notes— and explains the absence of the IX. Corps from
the fighting. The orders for its advance were not issued
until about 8 A.M., and immediately afterwards " an
" aviator brought news from which it appeared that the
" enemy had left only weak infantry and artillery on the line
" Ciply — Nouvelles — Givry, that numerous small columns
" were in retreat to the south and south-west, and that the
" enemy's artillery was in lively action with our own. At
" 9 A.M. the enemy's fire ceased, and the advancing infantry
" encountered no more resistance, as the enemy had appar-
" ently marched off in great haste."
1 Kuhl's " Marne," p. 72.
108 MONS
Nothing therefore could have been more successful than
the withdrawal of the I. Corps and 3rd Division. The
heavy losses inflicted on the Germans on the 23rd had not
been without important results.
The sketch maps in the monograph show that in the
German ///. Corps the 6th Division attacked Frameries
and Paturages, and the 5th Division Hornu and Boussu.
Towards 5 P.M. this corps halted for the night.
In the IV. Corps, the 7th Division moved through
Thulin towards Elouges and the 8th, swinging west-
wards, came through Quievrain and Quievrechain towards
Audregnies and Angre, and thus, as related, struck the 5th
Division flank guard. They halted in the afternoon : the
7th Division near Elouges and the 8th at Baisieux and
northwards. No details of the fighting are given in the
German account, but it is mentioned that the " British
resistance was quickly broken." This statement is not
borne out by time and space : it is sufficient commentary
on it to remark that through a long summer's day, these
two divisions made an average advance of only three miles.
Map 5. On the 24th the German //. Corps only reached Conde ;
the //. Cavalry Corps during the same day was moving
southwards through Tournai, so that fortunately neither
of these formations came in contact with the Allied forces.
Von Kluck's orders for the 25th, issued at 8 P.M., were :
" Enemy's main position is believed to be Bavai — Valen-
" ciennes. The First Army will attack it with envelopment
" of the left flank, //. Cavalry Corps against the enemy's
" rear." *
NOTE
THE OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH TROOPS ON THE BRITISH
LEFT BETWEEN 20TH AND 24TH AUGUST.
(Authorities : Palat, Hanotaux, Dauzet, Bujac, etc.)
Maps 2 G.Q.G. instructions to General d'Amade, who took up his head-
& 3- quarters at Arras on 18th August 1914, were : " To establish a
" barrier between Dunkerque and Maubeuge, in order to protect the
" railway communications from possible raids by enemy cavalry."
He was also to extend the inundations of the Scarpe, the Escaut
and the Rhonelle by opening the canal sluices, and to occupy the
old forts of Maulde, Flines, Curgies, Conde and Le Quesnoy.
In accordance with these instructions General d'Amade, on the
20th August, disposed his three Territorial divisions (" de campagne "
i Kuhl's " Marne," p. 72.
MOVEMENTS OF D'AMADE'S GROUP 109
— i.e. excluding the Territorial divisions " de place," such as the 18-24 Aug.
34th Territorial Division at Lille) as follows : — 1914. °
81st from the sea to the Lys ; Map 5,
82nd from the Lys to the Scarpe ;
84th from the Scarpe to the Sam ore.
The main line of defence for the 84th was : northern edge of Bois Map 3.
1'Eveque (north-east of Le Cateau) — Solesmes — Villers en Cauchies
— Estrun — Sensee Canal; its advanced line being Maubeuge —
Mecquignies — Wargnies — Valenciennes — junction of Escaut and
Scarpe.
On the 22nd, on the advance of the British Army west of Mau-
beuge, the 84th Division closed in on its left about Valenciennes,
clearing the British front, and advanced to Conde. It then formed
along the Schelde from Conde north-westwards to Maulde.
On the night of the 22nd/23rd the 88th Territorial Division left
Choisy le Roi, near Paris, in twenty-two trains, and detrained on
the morning of the 23rd at Seclin and Templeuve, near Lille.
It was then ordered to march at once towards Cysoing (8 miles Map 2.
south-east of Lille) and then to retake Tournai, which some German
cavalry had entered on the 22nd.1 The main body of the division
reached Cysoing early on the 24th, and at 9 A.M. was suddenly
subjected to a heavy artillery fire from about Tournai. As the
division had no artillery with it, it eventually retired towards
Templeuve and Arras, after delaying the enemy some hours.
After the German attack at Mons on the 23rd, General d'Amade Map 3.
reconstructed his line. At 2 A.M. (24th) the 84th Division
retired from Conde through Valenciennes towards Cambrai and
Marquion. During the morning of the 24th, the rear guard of the
division in position near Fresnes (two miles south of Conde) was
attacked and badly shaken. On the 25th, as will be seen, the
division, still on the left of the British, was attacked when near
Haspres and became disorganized.
Lille was evacuated on the 24th by order of the Ministry of Map 2.
War,2 and the 82nd Division took up the line La Bassee — Corbehem.
The 81st Division conformed to this and was allocated the area
between Aire and the sea. Thus, a barrier between the British
left and the sea was still maintained.
1 This cavalry patrol left again within a few hours.
2 For an account of this incident see General Percin's " Lille."
CHAPTER V
THE RETREAT CONTINUED :
DAWN TILL DUSK, 25TH AUGUST 1914
ORDERS FOR THE 25ra AUGUST
(See Sketch 3 ; Maps 2, 3, 9, 10 & 13)
Sketch 3. AFTER a visit to the I. Corps and to General Sordet at
Maps. Avesnes, Sir John French, on his return to G.H.Q. at
Bavai in the afternoon of the 24th August, received
information of the retreat of the French Third and Fourth
Armies and the continuation of the retirement of the
Fifth. The XVIII. Corps of the Fifth Army, immediately
to the right of the British, had been attacked early, and
had fallen back in good order to a line from Solre le Chateau
(about ten miles south-east of Maubeuge) south-eastward
to Clairfayte. Valabregue's Group of two Reserve divi-
sions had also fallen back south of Maubeuge.1
As to the western flank, the Field-Marshal had been
informed that two French Reserve divisions, the 61st
and 62nd (General Ebener's Group), had been sent from
Paris to Arras to reinforce General d'Amade, who would
thus have six divisions — some 80,000 men, without counting
the garrison of Lille, 25,000 — to hold a line, some 70 miles
long, through Douai, Bethune and Aire to the sea. What
enemy forces were before d'Amade was still unknown ;
but German troops — presumably part of the IV. Corps—
had been actually seen marching south between Valen-
Map 2. ciennes and Bavai ; and the Flying Corps in the evening
reported that a large column of two divisions, in all prob-
ability the German II. Corps, moving west from Ath
and Grammont, had wheeled southward at 10 A.M. at
Lahamaide (5 miles north-west of Ath) and Ladeuze
1 For the movements of this group, the nearest French troops on the
right of the B.E.F., see Note at end of the chapter, p. 122.
110
DIFFICULTIES OF THE RETIREMENT 111
(4 miles south of Ath) ; also that at 4.40 P.M. one of 25 Aug.
these divisions had halted at Ligne (3 miles west of Ath) 1914-
to allow the other to pass it; and cavalry was known
to be as far west as Tournai. The British Staff was
informed that Cambrai had been entrenched, and would
be held by the French, while to the west of Cambrai the
strong line of the Sensee would be occupied. From the
small numbers available and the nature of the troops, it
could not be hoped that they would keep off for very
long any serious German pressure upon the British western
flank.
The British Commander - in - Chief judged from the
method and direction of the German attacks on the 24th
that von Kluck was endeavouring not only to turn the
left flank of the British force, but to press it back on to
the old fortress of Maubeuge,1 which lay to its right rear,
offering asylum just as Metz had presented its shelter to
the French in 1870 during the battle of Gravelotte. He
was not, however, inclined to be thus tempted, and, as the
left of the French XVIII. Corps was already ten miles
in rear of the British right, decided to continue the retreat
on the 25th some fifteen miles further, to a position in the
neighbourhood of Le Cateau.
The routes for this retirement of the British Force Map 3.
presented some difficulty. Bavai is the crossing place of
two ancient highways, the Chausee Brunehaut, running
from • south-east to north-west, and another, known as
the Roman Road, running from south-west to north-east ;
in the southern angle enclosed between them lies the Forest
of Mormal. This was then a compact and well-cared-
for block of woodland, mostly oak and beech, with an
extreme length of nine miles and an average breadth of
from three to four. On its western side the Roman Road
forms its boundary for some seven miles ; from east to
west several fair roads, one main road and a railway cross
it ; and, in addition, the Bavai — Pont sur Sambre and
the Englefontaine — Landrecies roads run respectively
just north and south of it ; but there is no road through
it from north to south : the numerous forest tracks shown Map 10.
on the map were narrow and unmetalled, or at best
had only a thin layer of unrolled stones. With the
uncorrected maps then at the disposal of the British Force,
1 This was actually the case. Von Kluck's orders for the 24th ran —
" The attack is to be so carried out that the enemy will be thrown back on
" Maubeuge and his retreat to the west cut off " (Kluck, p. 45).
112 THE RETREAT
a commander might well hesitate before involving his
columns, with an enemy on their heels, in so large and
blind a mass of trees.1 Just east of the Forest runs the
Sambre, with many loops and windings, with a general
course south-west to north-east, but without, as might
have been expected, a main road following the line of its
valley : the Maubeuge — Leval — Landrecies road, the
nearest to the river, was from half to two miles east of it.
Consequently, if the river were crossed (as circumstances
dictated that it must be crossed by the I. Corps as close
to Maubeuge as possible), it must be recrossed before that
corps could be re-united with the II.
The situation presented to the British Commander-in-
Chief was, through the mere accident of topography, most
embarrassing. To pass the whole of his Army to the
west of the Forest would mean, practically, a flank march
across the front of an enemy greatly superior in numbers
and already threatening his western flank ; to pass entirely
to the east of it was impossible owing to the proximity of
the French. Sir Douglas Haig was communicated with
on the subject of avoiding the Forest, and at 5.45 P.M.
on the 24th he wrote to the Commander-in Chief that he
would be able to march at 5 A.M. on the 25th along the
roads near the Sambre, and therefore could leave the
Roman Road to the II. Corps. He added that his march
would bring the head of his corps as far as Landrecies.
The Commander-in-Chief decided therefore to divide
the British Force, and send the I. Corps east and the
II. Corps west of the Forest, and at 8.25 P.M. issued orders
for the retirement, with a notification that the exact
Maps 3 positions to be occupied at Le Cateau would be pointed
& 13. out on the ground.2 The movement was to be com-
menced so that all rear guards would be clear of the Bavai
— Eth road by 5.30 A.M. on the 25th. In the G.H.Q.
operation orders the Roman Road, Bavai — Montay (just
north-west of Le Cateau) was made the boundary between
the I. and II. Corps and assigned to the II. Corps ; so
that the I. Corps was responsible for the Forest of Mormal.
1 The leading German corps avoided crossing the Forest from north to
south. The III. Corps sent advanced guards by two of the transverse
roads from west to east to secure the eastern edge ; and the IV. Corps
also sent a column from west to east by the road south of the Forest to
Landrecies, as will be seen. The IX. Corps crossed it with infinite pre-
cautions by the main road from Berlaimont from east to west, two days
after the battle of Le Cateau. The next corps to the east, the X. Reserve
(at Etreux on the 27th), with Richthofen's Cavalry Corps, moved well to the
east of the Forest. 2 Appendix 13.
OPERATION ORDERS 113
The various orders for moving the Force south-west- 25 Aug.
wards may be summarized as follows : 1914.
I. Corps : to move in two columns, and billet in villages on the
route.
1st Division : to cross the Sambre at Hautmont and proceed
thence southward by Limont Fontaine, Ecuelin and
Monceau to Dompierre and villages beyond.
2nd Division : to cross the Sambre at Pont sur Sambre and
Berlaimont, and billet in the area from Leval south-west
to Landrecies.
5th Cavalry Brigade (attached I. Corps) : to cover the above
movements, follow the march of the 2nd Division and
billet in the area from Leval northward to Bachant.
II. Corps : to fall back west of the Forest of Mormal to the line
Le Cateau — Caudry — Haucourt, by three roads. Further
details are given below.
Cavalry Division (with 19th Infantry Brigade attached) :
Two brigades, with II. Corps Cavalry attached, under a
special commander, to cover the retreat of the II. Corps ;
two brigades, with the 19th Infantry Brigade, under
G.O.C. Cavalry Division, to guard the western flank.
In the course of the 22nd/23rd the 4th Division, having
been relieved of its duties on the east coast of Great
Britain by Yeomanry Mounted Brigades, Territorial
cyclists and other units, had crossed the Channel to the
ports of Havre, Rouen and Boulogne, and by the 24th
eleven battalions of infantry and one brigade of artillery,
the bulk of the combatants, had arrived by train at Le
Cateau and the neighbouring stations. They were ordered
to move forward and occupy a position at Solesmes to
assist the retirement of the II. Corps. Major - General
Snow subsequently received orders to withdraw when the
time came to the left of the II. Corps on the Le Cateau
position.
MOVEMENTS ON THE 25TH AUGUST
THE I. CORPS
In the right centre the 5th Cavalry Brigade, in the Maps 3
early hours of the 25th, took over the outposts of the & !3.
2nd Division from La Longueville to Bavai, which had
been attacked, though not in force. A troop was sent
out eastwards to gain touch with the outposts of the 1st
Division, and it ascertained that the French 53rd Reserve
VOL. I I
114 THE RETREAT
Division was retiring upon Hatitmont, the very place
selected for the 1st Division to cross the Sambre. From
Feignies to Hautmont the 1st Division was confined to a
single, narrow, high-banked, dusty road, and when the
river had been passed at the allotted bridge the French
53rd Reserve Division shared with it the road from Haut-
mont to Dompierre and Marbaix.1 The weather was
extremely hot, and the march, broken as it was by constant
checks owing to the number of troops on the road, was
greatly distressing to soldiers already much worn by fatigue
and want of sleep. Otherwise the column was little dis-
turbed, except by occasional bullets from German patrols,
Map 9. and the division reached its billets, in a line of villages
west of Avesnes : — the 1st (Guards) Brigade at Dompierre,
the 2nd at Marbaix, which was shared with the French
53rd Reserve Division, and the 3rd at Le Grand Fayt.
The 2nd Division, moving to Noyelles — Maroilles—
Landrecies, south of the Forest of Mormal, on the west of
the 1st, had a better road from La Longueville to its bridges
at Berlaimont and Pont sur Sambre ; the rear guard,
supplied by the 6th Infantry Brigade, was only followed
by dismounted cavalry and was little pressed. But it too
had trouble, for Maroilles was the supply re-filling point
of the French 53rd and 69th Reserve Divisions ; and
no one could tell the British Staff which roads the
supply columns would use after re-filling. Moreover, the
tail of General Sordet's Cavalry Corps was using the road
from Maroilles to Landrecies on its way to Le Cateau,
and this meant further congestion. However, the 4th
(Guards) Brigade duly reached Landrecies about 4 P.M. ;
and the 6th Infantry Brigade reached Maroilles about
6 P.M. ; the 5th was detained till evening to guard the
?assages of the Sambre from Pont sur Sambre to Sassegnies
west of Leval) until it could be relieved by French troops,
and did not reach Noyelles till midnight.
Sir Douglas Haig soon after 2 P.M. had established his
headquarters at Landrecies ; here a message despatched
1 General Palat, in an article entitled " Le Mar6chal French et le
General Lanrezac " in the " Anglo-French Review," November 1919,
stated that the mistake was the I. Corps' and that it got on the roads
assigned to the Reserve division ; but no allotment of roads as between
the British and the French can be traced before a memorandum dated 10 A.M.
on the 26th. Similar mishaps as regards allotment of roads between
Armies occurred on the German side, according to General Baumgarten-
Crusius in his " Marneschlacht," due to there being no intermediate
commander between Supreme Headquarters and the Armies, as there was
later on in the war.
THE II. CORPS 115
from G.H.Q. soon after 3 P.M. reached him informing him 25 Aug.
that the II. Corps was occupying the Le Cateau posi-
tion from Caudry to Inchy, including, temporarily, the
I. Corps' part of Inchy, and asked him when he would
be able to take up the line from Inchy south-eastward to
St. Benin (If miles south of Le Cateau). His answer was
urgently requested, since the orders for the 26th depended
upon it.
General Haig realized that the situation was serious,
for, about noon, the Flying Corps had reported German
columns to be closing on Bavai. Meantime, his chief
General Staff officer, Brigadier-General J. E. Gough, had
gone to G.H.Q. and returned with instructions, in accord-
ance with which he ordered the march of the I. Corps
to be resumed at 2 A.M. on the 26th : that of the 1st
Division to St. Martin (5 miles south of Le Cateau),
the 2nd to Bazuel (2 miles south-east of Le Cateau),
the whole movement to be covered by the 5th Cavalry
Brigade. Orders, issued at 7.30 P.M. by G.H.Q., were,
however, received subsequently, and they directed that
the retirement was to be continued a little further and
that the I. Corps was to go on to Bussigny (7 miles
south-west of Le Cateau).1 The reason of the change was
that in view of the reports received of the further retire-
ment of the French on his right and of the strength of
the enemy on his own immediate front, Sir John French
had decided that he could not stand on the Le Cateau
position, but must continue the retreat on St. Quentin
and Noyon.
THE II. CORPS
The II. Corps had made every preparation for a very Maps 3
early start on the 25th in its retirement south-west from & 13-
Bavai to the Le Cateau position ; but owing to the passage
of General Sordet's Cavalry Corps from east to west
across its line of retreat, the roads to the south were
blocked, and there was much difficulty in getting the
whole of the transport into motion by midnight, the
hour fixed in orders. The process was not, in fact, ac-
complished without the delay of a full hour, with the
result that the fighting troops were also that much behind
their time. The 5th Division was allotted the Roman
Road, immediately west of the Forest of Mormal ; the
1 Appendix 14.
116 THE RETREAT
14th Infantry Brigade formed its rear guard. The 3rd
Division was to march on the west of the 5th Division
on two roads as follows :
9th Infantry Brigade via Gommegnies (three miles north-
east of Le Quesnoy) — Salesches — Vendegies au Bois ;
8th Infantry Brigade via Wargnies le Petit — Le Quesnoy
— Salesches — Viesly ; followed by the
7th Infantry Brigade as rear guard.
The 19th Infantry Brigade and the Cavalry Division were
to move still further west by Villers Pol, Ruesnes, Vertain,
Romeries and Solesmes, thus passing a couple of miles
west of Le Quesnoy ; their function was to cover the
rear and protect the western flank of the II. Corps.
It will be remembered that the 4th Division had been
ordered to occupy a position in the vicinity of Solesmes to
assist the retirement of the II. Corps, though not actually
under its orders. The division accordingly marched
northward from its detraining stations at 1 A.M. to carry
out the role assigned to it.
The main body of the 5th Division moved off at 3 A.M.,
but the rear guard was obliged to push some way north-
ward towards Bellignies (3 miles north-west of Bavai),
to cover the withdrawal of its guns from St. Waast through
Bavai: a flank march, though short, across the enemy's
front, which the nature of the country made inevitable.
There was a brush with German troops about Breaugies
(just south of Bellignies) and a second encounter near
Bavai, where the guns of the XV. Brigade R.F.A. came
into action with good effect. By 6.30 A.M. — just one hour
late — the bulk of the rear guard had crossed the road
Bavai — Eth, when, dropping into the Roman Road, it
was no further troubled ; the Germans followed it up
at no great distance, but never pressed the pursuit.
Further to the west, the main body of the 3rd Division
moved off at 5 A.M., the rear guard taking up a line from
the Roman Road westward through Bermeries to Wargnies
le Petit, where its left was in touch with General Allenby's
command. The ground on the west flank of the British,
over which the Cavalry Division was working, is cut into
a series of ridges by four streams, which flow in a north-
westerly direction into the Upper Schelde between Bouchain
and Cambrai. Across this ground from north-east to
south-west runs the straight line of the Bavai — Cambrai
road, and from north to south the Valenciennes — Solesmes
RETIREMENT OF THE II. CORPS 117
— Le Cateau road. The 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades 25 Aug.
were extended from Wargnies beyond Jenlain, with the 1914-
3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades to their left rear between
Maresches and Preseau, all on the first ridge ; and the
19th Infantry Brigade, again to the left rear, on the next
ridge between Sepmeries and Querenaing.
The operations which now ensued on the west flank
may be summarized as a running fight during which the
Germans closed in, following the II. Corps and Cavalry
Division, so that at night their advanced troops were
practically in contact with the British.
The 7th Infantry Brigade, the rear guard of the 3rd
Division, began its retirement upon Le Quesnoy without
seeing any sign of the enemy ; and a reconnaissance pushed
north-west to Famars, on the outskirts of Valenciennes,
could also find nothing of him. On the other hand, bodies
of French Territorial troops, belonging to General d' Amade's
84th Territorial Division, originally at Conde, were met
retreating southward from Valenciennes, which indicated
the evacuation of that town, and the prospect of increasing
pressure from the enemy on the west. Reports from the
Flying Corps pointed to the same conclusion : the head
of a very large column — apparently a corps (the IV.) —
had been seen at Quievrechain (5 miles north-east of
Valenciennes) at 7.30 A.M. Another column of cavalry
and guns, three miles in length (evidently two regiments,
part of the //. Corps), was moving south from Somain
(12 miles west of Valenciennes), and its head had reached
Bouchain (11 miles south-west of Valenciennes) at 6 A.M.
Lastly, between 9 and 10 A.M. Divisional Cavalry reported
that parties of the enemy, presumably cavalry, were on
the road between Haspres and Saulzoir (9 miles south
by west of Valenciennes), and that they had passed along
the main road from Valenciennes to Cambrai and struck
south from the neighbourhood of Denain. It appears
that the British cavalry was barely in contact with the
enemy at the outset ; but the menace to the western
flank of the force and to the retreating French Terri-
torials caused the 3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades to be
sent westwards to Querenaing and beyond it to Verchain,
thus covering the second ridge already referred to. The
1st Cavalry Brigade also moved north of them in the same
direction, through Artres (4 miles south of Valenciennes)
where it was heavily, though ineffectively, shelled.
At the same time, the 19th Infantry Brigade was moved
118 THE RETREAT
by General Allenby south-west over the third ridge to
Haussy in the valley south of it. At Querenaing French
gendarmes reported the information that large German
forces were moving south-east from Bouchain, and this
news was confirmed by the sound of heavy firing about
Avesnes le Sec (south-west of the last-named village), and
only four miles from the 19th Infantry Brigade. The
16th Lancers were therefore sent, about noon, to Haspres
and Saulzoir to help the French Territorials ; but from
Saulzoir they were driven back by artillery fire and with-
drew south-eastwards to rejoin the 3rd Cavalry Brigade.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, left alone in the north,
had fallen back southward, not very hard pressed, first to
a line between Villers Pol and Le Quesnoy, and then, in
succession, to Ruesnes, Capelle sur Ecaillon and Vertain,
east of the 19th Infantry Brigade.
The 4th Division had been in position since 5 A.M.
immediately to the south of Solesmes : the llth Infantry
Brigade on the right, on the spur to the south-east of the
town ; the 10th Infantry Brigade on the left, near the
farm of Fontaine au Tertre (two miles south-west of
Solesmes) ; and the 12th Infantry Brigade, in reserve, in
rear at Viesly. It was of the utmost importance that
Solesmes should be strongly held, for upon it the principal
highways from the north-east, north and north-west, all
converged ; and, soon after noon, a huge mass of British
transport was struggling to pass through it by roads
which were already seriously congested by a crowd of
refugees. These, with every kind of vehicle from six-
horse farm wagons to perambulators, everywhere delayed
the marching troops, and made it impossible for motor
cars carrying Staff officers to pass the columns.
The further operations of the cavalry had all the char-
acteristics of a prolonged rear-guard action.1 Eventually
1 General Allenby's opponents on this day, von der Marwitz's Cavalry
Corps, spent the night of the 24th/25th : — 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions
at Marchiennes (16 miles north of Cambrai and about the same distance
from the British flank), and the 4th Cavalry Division at Orchies (4 miles
north of Marchiennes). The corps orders for the 25th were for " an
overtaking pursuit," and the divisions were given as their respective
objectives the three towns lying to the south-west, one behind the other :
Le Cateau, Solesmes and Haspres. This line of march brought them in
on the flank of the British, but too late to be effective. It is claimed
that charges were made against the French Territorials ; but, except
for " a street fight " in Haspres, about 3 P.M., " after which the 9th Cavalry
Division spent the night there," the 11. Cavalry Corps, according to
the German records, employed only artillery fire against the British
(" Deutsche Kavallerie," pp. 51-55).
RETIREMENT OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION 119
the 1st, 3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades under increasing 25 Aug.
shell fire from the enemy, fell back along the third of 1014-
the ridges between the Selle and the Harpies. The
French 84th Territorial Division was found retreating
southward across this ridge, and liaison was arranged with
it ; but the pressure upon the British cavalry seemed at
one time so heavy that the 19th Infantry Brigade was
brought up on to the ridge from Haussy and deployed, in
order to relieve it. The Germans, however, were held
back with no great difficulty ; and the 19th Infantry
Brigade, between 2 and 3 P.M., resumed its way south-
ward to Solesmes, while the bulk of the cavalry and horse
artillery, having for the time-being shaken off the enemy,
was collected and massed to the east of Vertain (3
miles north-east of Solesmes). Here, between 3 and 4
P.M., they were suddenly assailed by a storm of German
shells from the north-east as well as from the north ; and
the division, being cramped for space, moved across
country by brigades and still smaller bodies, after detailing
rear guards to cover the passage of the infantry through
Vertain and Solesmes. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade drew off
south-east, leaving behind the greater part of the 4th
Hussars, with instructions to gain touch with the I. Corps ;
part of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, including its head-
quarters, took the same route ; the 1st Cavalry Brigade
fell back to the high ground immediately south-east of
Solesmes, and the 4th, with other portions of the Cavalry
Division, remained in the vicinity of that town.
Meanwhile, the rear guard of the 3rd Division (7th
Infantry Brigade) was gradually coming in from Le
Quesnoy to Solesmes, and by 5.45 P.M. its head had
reached the point where the roads from Romeries, Vertain
and Vendegies meet immediately to the north of Solesmes.
There the I/Wiltshire and 2/South Lancashire halted and
deployed, whilst the 3/Worcestershire occupied a covering
position to the south of Solesmes between the 10th and
llth Infantry Brigades. The 2/Irish Rifles and a section
of the 41st Battery, the rear party of the rear guard,
having been warned of strong German forces moving
on Le Quesnoy, were following the rest of the 7th
Infantry Brigade slowly and with every precaution, and
at this time were at Pont a Pierres, on the main road, a
couple of miles to the north-east of Romeries. The 19th
Infantry Brigade about the same time was passing west of
Solesmes, through St. Python, and began to make its way
120 THE RETREAT
up the Selle Valley by Briastre and Neuvilly towards Le
Cateau. The 4th Cavalry Brigade, together with the
detachments of other mounted troops near Solesmes that
had joined it, fell back by St. Python south-west upon
Viesly, soon after the Wiltshire and South Lancashire (7th
Infantry Brigade) had been deployed. By 6 P.M., or soon
after, these two battalions were the only troops north of
Solesmes, whilst the 4th Division still held its original
position on the high ground to the south of that town,
with orders from G.H.Q. to cover the retirement of the
Map 9. 3rd Division, Cavalry Division and 19th Infantry Brigade.
The stifling heat of the day had about 5 P.M. given
place to a thunderstorm ; the light began to fail very
early and the rain streamed down in torrents. Through
this downpour, between 6 and 7 P.M., the remainder of
the 3rd Division, drenched to the skin, hungry and weary,
marched into their billets on the Le Cateau position: the
8th Infantry Brigade to Audencourt and the 9th to Inchy.
The main body of the 5th Division came in earlier,
between 3 and 5 P.M., on the right of the 3rd : the 13th
Infantry Brigade between Le Cateau and Troisvilles, and
the 15th to Troisvilles, west of it. The march along the
Roman Road had been most trying, for the sun beat
fiercely upon the interminable length of the straight,
white, dusty road, and under the tall trees of the Forest
of Mormal there was not a breath of air to relieve the
stifling heat. The 13th Infantry Brigade was delayed for
some time just outside Le Cateau to allow six regiments
and a cyclist battalion of General Sordet's Cavalry Corps
to pass over the railway bridge on their way westward.
As soon as the rear guard, the 14th Infantry Brigade,
which had been little troubled, came in between 5.30 and
6.30 P.M., the Cornwall Light Infantry and half of the East
Surreys 1 were sent to the east of Le Cateau to establish
connection with the I. Corps, while the Suffolks and the
Manchesters were diverted a little westward to the other
side of the Selle valley astride the Roman Road just north
of Montay. Here, with two batteries of the XXVIII.
Brigade R.F.A., they entrenched in order to keep the
Germans at a distance upon that side.
As darkness began to close in, the 7th Infantry Brigade,
1 The two remaining companies under Major Tew had been mis-
directed on the evening of the 24th, and had spent the night at Eth, from
which place they marched by Ruesnes, Vertain and Solesmes to Viesly,
where they arrived between 5 and 6 P.M.
GERMAN MOVEMENTS 121
the 4th Division, and half of the Cavalry Division were 25 Aug.
still engaged, or in position to engage, with the enemy near 1914-
Solesmes ; the 19th Infantry Brigade and the remainder
of the Cavalry Division were still far from their halting
places for the night ; the 5th Division and part of the
3rd Division had, however, reached their destinations on
the Le Cateau position. From front and left flank, the
Germans appeared to be closing in, but at a respectful
distance without affording the British the satisfaction of
seeing the results of their good shooting. It would indeed
have alleviated the fatigue of the men, tired out as they
were with deployments upon rear-guard positions which
were never attacked, had they had more fighting ; but the
Germans never really came within rifle shot and rarely
gave even the guns a target.
MOVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN FIRST AND SECOND
ARMIES FROM 23RD TO 25TH AUGUST 1914
Until the 27th August inclusive, the German First and Map 3.
Second Armies were both under the orders of von Billow,
the commander of the Second Army, and they appear to
have had no other directions from Supreme Headquarters
than those issued on the 18th August :
" The First and Second Armies, combined under the
" command of Generaloberst von Biilow, will have their
" advanced guards across the Brussels — Namur railway by
" the 20th August, when they will wheel southwards "
that is they were to continue the great wheel pivoting on
Thionville laid down in the initial directions.1
On the 23rd August, after the battles of Charier oi 2 and
Mons, von Biilow, in his instructions for the 24th, directed
the First Army to continue the attack on the British and
" to send the IX. Corps round the west side of Maubeuge
" as soon as possible, with the //. Corps in echelon behind
" it, in order to envelop the left flank of the French Fifth
" Army." This, he says, could not be carried out because
the British offered " renewed " resistance on the 24th.
The German Second Army, with von Richthofen's Cavalry
Corps, continuing the pursuit of the French Fifth Army
on that day, reached in the evening an east and west line
between Dinant and Maubeuge, and detailed the VII.
Corps, the right of its line, to watch the south-eastern side
of the French fortress. Von der Marwitz's Cavalry Corps
1 Kluck, p. 9. 2 See p. 85.
122 THE RETREAT
was sent towards Tournai and Denain " to attack the British
left flank."
On the 25th, the First Army was to continue the
attack against the British, enveloping their left wing;
" but the enemy, by a cleverly executed retirement,
" evaded the First Army, in spite of the latter's brilliant
" marching performances." *
The Second Army continued the pursuit of the French,
but in a south-westerly direction, so that at night the
heads of its four corps were roughly on a south-east and
north-west line passing through Solre le Chateau. Mau-
beuge was invested by the VII. Corps on the south-east
and by the IX. Corps (of the First Army) on the north-
west—
" Strong portions of the 14th Division were, if possible,
" to advance round the south of Maubeuge against the rear
" of the British, in the direction of Aulnoye "
and
" the /. Cavalry Corps was also ordered to push forward in
" a westerly direction via Aulnoye to hinder the retreat of
" the British."
But neither infantry nor cavalry got within a march of
Aulnoye and, in any case, the British were six miles south
of that place on the evening of the 25th August.
Thus it was that on this day the British were not in
contact with the German Second Army ; of their collision
with the First Army the next chapter will tell.
On the same day General von Gallwitz, who was in
charge of the siege of Namur (with the Guard Reserve and
XI. Corps, the inner flank corps of the Second and Third
Armies), was able to report that, except for a few forts on
the south-west front, the fortress was in his hands. So
that there was every prospect of these corps becoming
available in the near future.
NOTE
MOVEMENTS OF GENERAL VALABREGUE'S GROUP OF RESERVE
DIVISIONS OF THE FRENCH FlFTH ARMY, IMMEDIATELY ON
THE RIGHT OF THE B.E.F.
The following were the movements of General Valabregue's
Group, 21st-25th August, as given in General Palat's " La Grande
1 The movements of the First Army are described further on p. 130
et seq.
MOVEMENTS OF VALABRfiGUE'S GROUP 123
Guerre sur le Front Occidental," vol. iii. pp. 801-2, 818, 826. They 22-25 Aug.
are of interest, as this group was the nearest' French formation of all 1914.
arms on the right of the British Forces.
On the 22nd August, General Valabregue still had his head- Map 3.
quarters at Avesnes (10 miles south of Maubeuge). On the evening
of the 21st, the 69th Reserve Division commenced a movement north-
east on Beaumont and Cousolre (13 miles and 10 miles east of Mau-
beuge, respectively). On the 22nd at 9 P.M. the group received
orders not to go so far east, but to march northwards towards the
Sambre, so as to have its left on the fortress of Maubeuge, and its
right on the road Solre sur Sambre — Beaumont, facing north-east.
Its march was much impeded by the crowds of refugees on the roads.
On the 23rd the orders to the group were slightly changed : it
was to go further northwards and prevent the passage of the Sambre
near Solre sur Sambre ; for this purpose it was to take up a
position south of the river between Montignies and the Bois de
Jeumont, 69th Reserve Division on the right, 53rd Reserve Division
on the left, headquarters at Solre le Chateau (10 miles south-east
of Maubeuge). These orders were in course of execution, when
news came of the attack on the British at Mons. Towards 5 P.M.
it also became known that the left flank of the French XVIII. Corps
had been attacked near Thuin, and that it was necessary to support
it. The 69th Reserve Division was then ordered north-eastwards
towards Thirimont — Bousignies (both two miles to the north of
Beaumont) and the 53rd, on its left, towards Cousolre, the result of
which was to widen the gap between the Group Valabregue and the
British Expeditionary Force.
On the 24th, after an engagement in which the 53rd Reserve
Division took part, the Group Valabregue retired, moving past the
east and south fronts of Maubeuge. On the 25th it continued its
retreat by Dompierre to the north-west of Avesnes. It was thus
abreast of and in touch with the British, in fact, as already related,
it came into collision on the roads with the I. Corps, and the 53rd
Reserve Division, as will appear later, supported that corps when
attacked at Maroilles.
CHAPTER VI
THE RETREAT CONTINUED :
EVENING AND NIGHT OF THE 25TH/26TH AUGUST 1914
(See Sketch 3 ; Maps 3, 9, & 10)
MAROILLES AND LANDRECIES
Sketch 3 WITH the fall of dusk in the I. Corps area, stories brought
Map 9 by refugees began to circulate in the villages, in which the
British were settling down, of the approach of the Germans
to Maroilles and Landrecies, near which places lay the two
main passages over the Sambre at the southern end of
the Forest of Mormal. Sir Douglas Haig had taken every
precaution against a hostile attack from the Forest upon
his western flank during his retreat : the bridge over the
Sambre, which lies to the north-west of Maroilles and
carries the road from Le Quesnoy south-eastward through
the Forest by Locquignol to Maroilles, was guarded by a
troop of the 15th Hussars. Another troop watched a lock
bridge some two miles farther down the river. Infantry
was to relieve the cavalry at night : at Maroilles the
passages of the Sambre were to be held by the 6th Infantry
Brigade ; and those near Landrecies by the 4th (Guards)
Brigade. On the right of the I. Corps were General
Valabregue's Reserve divisions. From all reports, the
enemy was not within striking distance,1 and so little were
the rumours believed that an officer of the 15th Hussars
was denied permission by the local civil authorities to
destroy some wooden buildings, which obstructed his view
near Maroilles Bridge, on the ground that no Germans
were anywhere near him. Suddenly, about 5.30 P.M.,
there was a panic amongst the inhabitants of Landrecies,
caused by cries that the Germans were upon them. The
1 According to the statements of German officers, the enemy seems to
have been equally unaware of our presence at Landrecies and Maroilles
see footnote 1, p. 126).
124
MAROILLES AND LANDRECIES 125
troops promptly got under arms, and two companies of 25 Aug.
the 3/Coldstream took post at the road- junction near the 1914-
railway about half a mile to the north-west of the town,
and mounted patrols were sent out, but without finding
any enemy. At Maroilles half an hour later (about 6 P.M.)
German patrols 1 engaged the two detachments of the 15th
Hussars, but were easily held at bay for an hour, when the
assailants of the road bridge brought up a field gun and,
creeping forward under cover of the very buildings which
the British officer had wished to destroy, compelled the
troop to fall back. As it retired towards Maroilles, it was
met by a company of the 1 /Royal Berkshire which was
coming up in relief. The infantry took post by the Rue
des Juifs about a mile to the south-east of the bridge. The
Germans challenging in French succeeded in enticing a
British officer forward and making a prisoner of him ; but
they made no further advance and presently retired.
In Maroilles itself there was for a time such a congestion
of supply lorries and of refugees with their vehicles, that the
three remaining companies of the Royal Berkshire could
only march off after considerable delay to the support of the
company at the Rue des Juifs. When these companies at
last came up, they found that the enemy had retired, and
accordingly pushed on to recover the lost bridge. The
only access to this, however, was by a causeway over
marshy ground, and the enemy having barricaded the
bridge and put his field gun into position, the Royal Berk-
shire failed to drive him from it. After suffering a total
loss of over sixty men, it was decided to make no further
attempt to recapture the bridge until daylight ; they were
therefore obliged to content themselves with forbidding
advance along the causeway.
Meanwhile at Landrecies there had also been fighting.
The patrols returned with the report that all was clear and
the 4th (Guards) Brigade was confirmed in its belief that
the first alarm at 5.30 P.M. had been a false one. • The
exodus of inhabitants, however, still continued, and subse-
quent events proved that the rumour was true. It seems
that the advanced guard of the German IV. Corps 2 — an
1 The force that came to Maroilles was the 48th Infantry Regiment of
the 5th Division, III. Corps, the advanced guard of the 5th Division (see
footnote 4, p. 131).
2 Kuhl, " Marne," p. 73, definitely states that the troops which " en-
countered resistance " at Landrecies belonged to the IV. Corps. The
original report that it was part of the IX. Corps appears to have been due
to an identification received by wireless from the Eiffel Tower, Paris. For
the German movements on the 25th see pp. 130-32 below.
126 THE RETREAT
infantry brigade (the 14th) with a battery — had marched
from Le Quesnoy past the south of the Forest towards
Landrecies for the purpose of billeting there, entirely
ignorant of the presence of the British. On discovering the
town was occupied, the vanguard crept along the hedges
and corn-stooks, and entrenched themselves parallel to
the road not five hundred yards from the line of the two
advanced companies of the 3/Coldstream. They even loop-
holed a garden wall still closer to those companies. At
7.30 P.M. No. 3 Company of the 3/Coldstream was on piquet,
on the road, with a machine gun upon each flank, and wire
entanglements a short distance ahead. Wheels and horses
were heard approaching along the road ; * and the sentry
challenged. The challenge was answered in French ; a
body of men loomed through the darkness, and the officer
in command advanced to question them. He was answered
always in French, but in the course of the parley the
supposed Frenchmen edged themselves up closer to the
piquet, and then, suddenly and without the slightest
warning, lowered their bayonets and charged. In the
first moment of surprise, they knocked down the officer,
seized the right-hand machine gun and dragged it away
ten yards, but a few seconds later they were swept away
by a volley from the piquet, and the machine gun was
recovered.
The piquet was at once reinforced ; and the rest of the
4th (Guards) Brigade turned out, the 2/Grenadiers coming
up to the support of the Coldstream along the road from
the railway northwards. Charge after charge was made by
the enemy without gaining any advantage, and at 8.30 P.M.
German artillery opened fire upon the town and upon the
piquet. This fire was accurate, but the German infantry-
men shot far too high and accomplished little, until, having
by means of incendiary bombs set light to some straw-
stacks in a farmyard close to the British, they apparently
realized for the first time, by the light of the flames, that
their way was barred only by a single thin line.2 There-
upon they tried, but unsuccessfully, to enfilade the Guards.
The engagement went on until past midnight when a
1 This, according to the story of a German general who was present,
was the regimental transport which was ordered to trot past the column
to get to the billets.
2 Lance- Corporal G. H. Wyatt, 3rd Coldstream Guards, dashed at and
extinguished the burning straw, though the enemy was only 25 yards
distant. For this and a further act of bravery at Villers Cottlrets on 1st
September, he received the Victoria Cross.
SOLESMES 127
howitzer of the 60th Battery was brought up by hand 25 Aug.
within close range and with its third round silenced the 1914-
German guns. This seems to have decided the issue ; and
the enemy drew off. The losses of the 3/Coldstream were
one hundred and twenty ; those of the Germans, according
to their official casualty lists, were 127.1 By about 4 A.M.
on the 26th, all was again quiet on the line of the I. Corps.
But, as it was impossible in the dark to discover the
scope of the attack, the information sent back to G.H.Q.
from the I. Corps was somewhat alarming. It stated at
1.35 A.M. that the situation was very critical, and at 3.50
A.M., it was suggested that the troops near Le Cateau should
assist by advancing straight on Landrecies. Although the
situation was soon restored and better news sent, all this,
and the uncertainty as to what the Forest of Mormal
might conceal, tended to confirm the view of G.H.Q. that
the continuation of the retirement was the proper course.
THE II. CORPS. THE REAR-GUARD ACTION OF
SOLESMES
The labours of the II. Corps lasted to as late an hour Map 9
on the night of the 25th/26th as those of the I. Corps. All
through the evening the stream of transport flowed slowly
and uneasily through Solesmes, and shortly before dark the
Germans closed more resolutely on the South Lancashire
and Wiltshire (7th Infantry Brigade), the rear guard of
the 3rd Division before that town, and brought their
artillery up to close range, though pushing forward only
small bodies of infantry. They did not, however, really
press hard and, when darkness fell, went into bivouac.
This enabled the two battalions to be withdrawn, much
scattered, indeed, and with the loss of several small detach-
1 The following information was obtained from Berlin in 1921 :
The German forces involved in the fighting at Landrecies consisted
of the 14th Infantry Brigade (Major-General von Oven) of the IV. Corps,
containing the 27th and 165th Infantry Regiments, one squadron 10th
Hussars, and the 4th Field Artillery Regiment. Of these the 165th Infantry
Regiment and three batteries were only employed in the later stages of the
fight.
Casualties : 27th Inf. Rgt. — 1 officer, 32 men killed,
4 officers, 65 men wounded ;
165th Inf. Rgt. — 3 men wounded,
2 men missing ;
10th Hussars — 1 man wounded ;
4th Field Artillery Rgt. — 3 officers and 16 men killed ;
total casualties, 127.
See also footnote 1, p. 132.
128 THE RETREAT
ments cut off by the enemy, but without further mishap.1
The 4th Division meanwhile stood fast on the heights im-
mediately south of Solesmes, while the mass of transport
and troops disentangled itself on the roads leading south and
south-east upon Caudry and Le Cateau. The 3rd Cavalry
Brigade, with the headquarters and portions of the 2nd,
pushed through the congested streets of Le Cateau on to
Catillon, where it halted for the night between 10 and 11
P.M. The 1st Cavalry Brigade bivouacked in the fields
south of Le Cateau, with the exception of the 5th Dragoon
Guards, who retired after dark to Inchy and thence shortly
before midnight to Troisvilles, west of Le Cateau, their
horses utterly exhausted. The 19th Infantry Brigade,
together with two companies of the Scots Fusiliers which
had lost connection with the rear guard of the 9th Infantry
Brigade, marched into Le Cateau at 10 P.M. and bivouacked
in the central square and at the goods station. The bulk
of the 7th Infantry Brigade retired to Caudry, but the Irish
Rifles and the 41st Battery, the last party of the rear guard,
only reached Le Cateau about 10 P.M., when finding they
could not rejoin their brigades direct, owing to the rapid
advance of the enemy, they passed southward to Reumont,
where they bivouacked at 2 A.M. on the 26th. At least
one detachment of the Wiltshire, having with some diffi-
culty avoided capture, also found its way into Le Cateau
in the early hours of the 26th. The masses of troops,
guns and transport at dusk and for many hours after-
wards pressing through the northern entrance to the town
created extraordinary congestion. The British alone would
have sufficed to crowd it, and besides the British a con-
siderable body of French Chasseurs 2 marched in from
Valenciennes. The mile of road from Montay to Le Cateau
falls very steeply and becomes a defile, and here infantry,
cavalry, guns and wagons, in places three abreast, were
jammed together in what seemed irremediable confusion.
1 Both infantry brigades of the German 8th Division (IV. Corps) and
the 4th Cavalry Division had casualties at Solesmes on 25th • August (see
"Schlachten und Gefechte").
The action seems to have been regarded as a serious one by the Germans,
for the official name of " The Battle of Solesmes and Le Cateau " is given
to the fighting on 25th/27th August 1914. Von Kluck states : " The
" IV. Corps was able to attack the British troops at Solesmes, but they did
" not evacuate the village until after nightfall, after putting up an obstinate
" resistance." So unexpected was this that v. Kluck himself arrived
in the town during the fight, having selected it as his night quarters.
2 The narrative of Colonel H. L. James, 2/Manchester, is the authority
for this statement.
THE 4TH DIVISION 129
Had the Germans pushed on, even with a small force 25 Aug.
supported by guns, they might have done terrible damage, 1914-
for one or two shells would have sufficed to produce a
complete block on the road ; the rear parties of the
Suffolks and Manchesters (14th Infantry Brigade), rear
guard of the 5th Division, had been withdrawn at dusk, and
there would have been nothing to stop an enterprising
enemy. But the Germans were no less weary than the
British, and they had also gained sufficient experience of
British rapid fire to make them cautious. They had gone
into bivouac here as at Solesmes ; and though at dusk they
were in force only five miles away,1 they left the British
free to disentangle themselves at their leisure. The process
was long and tedious, and until a late hour Viesly was as
hopelessly blocked as Solesmes had been.
Though the 4th Division had been unmolested since
dusk, except by one or two cavalry patrols which were
quickly driven off, it was not free to begin to move off until
9 P.M. During its detention near Solesmes the remainder
of its Divisional Artillery, except the Heavy Battery, had
been detraining, and the 2/Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
which had not come up with the 12th Infantry Brigade,
arrived at Ligny, where it took over guard of the divisional
transport. In view of the flank march that the division
would later have to make to its new position on the left of
the Le Cateau line, two companies of this battalion were
in the afternoon sent as a western flank guard to occupy
Bevillers and Beauvois. A hasty reconnaissance of the Map 10.
new ground was made by Brigadier-General Haldane, and
he selected a good reverse-slope position, or, as it was then
called, " back position," covering Haucourt.
At 5 P.M. 4th Division warning orders for the march to
and occupation of the position were issued.2 A G.H.Q.
alteration, sent out at 6.40 P.M., reduced the length of front
to be held, and made it from Fontaine au Pire to Wambaix,
that is to say about three miles. The orders directed that
the llth and 12th Infantry Brigades should hold the front
line, with the 10th in reserve at Haucourt, whilst the
artillery should assemble at Ligny.
The artillery (with the exception of the XXXII.
Brigade, which was with the rear guard) arrived fairly early
1 This would appear to be part of the IV. Corps which spent the night
at Bousies and adjoining villages, with the main body of the ///. behind
it at Jolimetz and beyond.
2 Appendix 15.
VOL. I K
130 THE RETREAT
in the evening ; the 12th Infantry Brigade moved off from
the heights above Solesmes soon after 9 P.M. ; the llth, an
hour later ; and the 10th Infantry Brigade, which could
not move until the 3rd Division got clear of Briastre, at
midnight. As the three brigades marched off south-west
rain was falling heavily and the darkness was only relieved
on the northern horizon by the red glow of villages fired by
the enemy. Meantime, instructions from G.H.Q., received
in the afternoon, intimated that the retirement would
probably be continued at 7 A.M. next morning, but it was
on the position above defined that the troops of the 4th
Division stood when the first shots were fired in the early
morning of the 26th.
The head of General Sordet's Cavalry Corps had passed
through Ligny, behind the Le Cateau position, in the course
of the day, and the corps bivouacked for the night near
Walincourt. The end of his long march and his arrival on
the western flank of the British was, perhaps, the one cheer-
ful feature in a gloomy situation.
THE MOVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN FIRST ARMY ON
THE 25TH AUGUST 1914
Map 3. Von Kluck's book and the special sketch-map for the
25th/26th August which he has provided make it perfectly
clear how there came to be collisions between the British
and the Germans at Maroilles, Landrecies and Solesmes on
the night of the 25th/26th.
On the evening of the 24th August he issued opera-
tion orders in the expectation that the British Army would
accept battle on the line Maubeuge — Bavai — Valenciennes,
making his plans for a " Cannae " on a small scale. His
IX. Corps was to attack against Bavai, that is against
General Haig, and guard against any interference from
Maubeuge; the III. Corps against St. Vaast — Wargnies, that
is against General Smith-Dorrien ; the IV. Corps was to
envelop the British western flank ; and the II. Cavalry
Corps was to work round in rear of the British and cut
off their retreat " westwards." With the //. Corps only a
march in rear and close to Conde, and the IV. Reserve Corps
following on, " the envelopment of the British Army, pro-
vided it stood, seemed certain."
The First Army Staff appears to have been considerably
misled by air reports. Those of the evening of the 24th
and early morning of the 25th gave " the impression of a
GERMAN MOVEMENTS 131
general retreat on Maubeuge " : *• — columns were converg- 25 Aug.
ing on Bavai, and the roads from Le Quesnoy to the south 1914-
and south-west, as well as the main roads through the Forest
of Mormal were reported clear of troops. At 7.15 A.M. orders
were sent out by motor car for the //., ///. and IV. Corps
to wheel southwards on Aulnoye, Landrecies and Le Cateau,
and the //. Cavalry Corps to advance to the area north-
west of Guise. " It was hoped to cut off the British and
then turn against the left flank of the French."
At 9 A.M., however, the " surprising air report " arrived
that long columns were moving from Bavai on Le Cateau
by the Roman Road and that numerous small columns were
crossing the Selle, north and south of Solesmes. "The
" enemy was marching in an almost opposite direction to
" what was supposed earlier in the morning." Fresh orders
were rapidly sent out to attack the British and prevent their
further retreat : — The //. Cavalry Corps was to head them
off, the ///. Corps to make its right (west) column stronger,
the IV. Corps to march with its right wing on Solesmes —
Le Cateau, with the II. Corps west of it. The IX.
Corps was to continue opposite Maubeuge covering the
movement.
In accordance with these orders, the IX. Corps wheeled
south-eastwards from Bavai and commenced investing
Maubeuge.2 The ///. Corps, passing over the old front Map 9.
of Smith-Dorrien's corps, St. Vaast — Wargnies, in two
divisional columns, pushed its advanced guards through
the Forest of Mormal south-eastwards by the two good
roads which lead to Berlaimont and Maroilles. At night
the 5th Division billeted and bivouacked in the Forest,
along the high road Maroilles — Le Quesnoy, in the area
Hachette (near the bridge over the Sambre 2 miles N.N.W.
of Maroilles) — Locquignol — Jolimetz ; 3 and the leading
troops of its advanced guard came in contact with the
1 /Royal Berkshire of the 6th Infantry Brigade, as already
related.4 The 6th Division halted north of the 5th
Division^ with half its troops on either side of the Forest : —
the llth Brigade and part of the divisional troops in the
area, west of the Forest, between Villereau — Gommegnies
1 Kuhl's " Marne," p. 73.
2 There is a good account of the investment of Maubeuge by the IX.
Corps on the 25th August, the blocking of the roads, construction of
entanglements, etc., in Tepp's " In Siegessturm nach Paris."
3 This information was obtained in Berlin in January 1922.
4 See p. 125. The III. Battalion of the 48th Infantry Regiment was in
action at Maroilles (Kaupert's "Das Infanterie-Regiment No. 48," p. 16).
132 THE RETREAT
— Amfroipret and the border of the Forest ; the 12th
Brigade and the rest of the divisional troops in the area,
east of the Forest, La Grande Carriere — Aymeries — Ber-
laimont — Sassegnies.
The IV. Corps, marching due south, also advanced in
two columns, one via Le Quesnoy and then past the south-
west boundary of the Forest of Mormal to Landrecies, and
the other via Valenciennes to Solesmes. Thus they came
in contact with the British 2nd x and 3rd Divisions. The
//. Cavalry Corps billeted four to eight miles east of
Cambrai, around Avesnes lez Aubert.
Map 3. Of the German Second Army, as already noticed, the VII.
Corps was detailed to invest the eastern side of Maubeuge.
The X. Reserve Corps was near Solre le Chateau on the
night of the 25th/26th August, and its head, together with
the /. Cavalry Corps, only reached Marbaix (roughly the
right of the British front on the night of the 25th/26th)
late on the 26th.2
Map 9. Thus it was that on the evening of the 25th, the German
II. Cavalry Corps and IV. and ///. Corps were close
enough to the British to be able to strike in force at Le
Cateau in the early morning, whilst the IV. Reserve, II.
and X. Reserve were within a march of the field, with parts
of the IX. and VII. Corps, drawn from the investment of
Maubeuge, available in case of need.
FIRST BELGIAN SORTIE FROM ANTWERP, THE 24TH, 25TH
AND 26TH AUGUST
Map 2. It is convenient to notice here that during the 24th,
25th and 26th August the Belgian Army, in order to assist
the French and British troops fighting on the Sambre and
1 The following extract from a book by Oberleutnant Dr. Lohrisch,
published in 1917, entitled " Im Siegessturm von Liittich an die Marne,"
throws a little light on Landrecies. His battalion (I. of the 27th Infantry
Regiment) marched on the 25th via Le Quesnoy to Bousies (four miles
north-west of Landrecies), where it halted for the night. He. continues —
Our advanced guard stumbled on the enemy at Landrecies, and the II.
and 111. Battalions, which were billeted at Robersart and Fontaine au
Bois (west of Bousies), and two of our companies were sent forward in the
direction of the little town. ... At 5.45 A.M. (on the 26th) the regiment
was ordered to capture Landrecies, as the tired troops sent forward the
night before, on account of difficulties caused by the darkness and ignor-
ance of the ground, had been compelled to stop their operations."
2 See von Bulow and Vogel. On the night of the 25th/26th the Guard
Cavalry Division was at Liessies (12 miles east of Marbaix), and the 2nd
Cavalry Division at Sivry, 6 miles behind it (" Deutsche Kavallerie," pp.
70, 71).
SITUATION AT MIDNIGHT 133
on the Mons Canal, made a sortie against the German 25 Aug.
corps observing Antwerp, with a view to detaining them 1914^
there, and, if possible, acting against the German com-
munications passing through Lou vain and Brussels.
On the 24th a reconnaissance was made, and on the
25th four divisions, with a fifth division and the cavalry
division in reserve, attacked southwards from Malines
towards the gap between Lou vain and Brussels. Good
progress was made, and the fight continued on the 26th,
when information from Paris of the withdrawal of the
French and British forces having been received, and also
of the intention of General Joffre to resume the offensive
at a later date, it was decided to adopt a similar course
a,nd retire into Antwerp.
As will be seen, the second Belgian sortie took place
during the Battle of the Marne.
THE SITUATION AT MIDNIGHT 25TH/26TH AUGUST
At 7.30 P.M. on the 25th August the British Commander- Map 3.
in-Chief, who had at 6 P.M. established his headquarters at
St. Quentin, issued his orders — without, of course, having the
exact information as to the enemy which has just been given
— for the retreat to be continued ten to fifteen miles to the
south-west on the morrow.1 According to these orders,
the I. Corps was to use the road from Le Cateau to Busigny
and take up its billets in the area of Busigny ; the II.
Corps was to billet about Fremont and Beaurevoir, and the
4th Division at Le Catelet. Communications from General
Joffre admitted that his attempt at the offensive had
failed, and that his intention was to retire to the line Laon
—La Fere — St. Quentin, and from this position to take the
offensive again. There seemed little time to lose. The
enemy was in touch with the British at several places, and
had considerable forces within a few miles of them. The
Germans were known to be pushing troops with all- speed
towards the western flank of the British, where General
d'Amade's six Reserve and Territorial divisions guarded
the long line to the sea. The I. Corps had already been
struck at Maroilles and at Landrecies, the II. at Solesmes ;
and it was not difficult to guess what these blows might
portend. Sir Douglas Haig's troops stood to arms all
night, losing the rest of which they were so much in need ;
and it was feared that the attack at Landrecies might mean
1 Appendix 14.
134 THE RETREAT
that the Germans were already in force across the southern
end of the Forest of Mormal, between Landrecies and the
Roman Road.1 It will be remembered that on the after-
noon of the 25th Sir Douglas Haig had issued instructions
for the I. Corps to march at 2 A.M. to the right of the Le
Cateau position.2 These orders he cancelled on receiving
those of the Field-Marshal to continue on to Busigny.
GENERAL SIR H. SMITH-DORRIEN'S DECISION
Map 9. Only a sketch would give an idea how the various
units of the II. Corps had been jostled between the barrier
of the Forest of Mormal, which edged them away to the
west, and the pressure of the enemy on the western flank,
which bore them back towards the east. To General
Smith-Dorrien the true situation did not reveal itself until
late at night. At 10.15 P.M. he too had issued orders for
the renewal of the retreat to the line prescribed by Sir
John French : the transport to start at 4 A.M. and the main
bodies at 7 A.M.3
Meantime, the divisions of his corps, acting on his
previous order, were in readiness on or near the Le Cateau
position : the 3rd Division, under orders issued at 9.42
P.M., was to stand to arms at 4 A.M. and be prepared to
occupy the sections of the position allotted in case of
attack ; and two and a half infantry brigades of the 5th
Division were bivouacking on a line across the Troisvilles —
Le Cateau roads, with the remaining two battalions posted
on the high ground north-east of Le Cateau to connect
with the I. Corps as originally arranged ; this division had
orders to stand to arms at 3.30 A.M.
G.H.Q. orders for the continuance of the retreat, and
for the Cavalry Division to cover it on the north and west,4
had not reached General Allenby at his headquarters at
Beaumont until after 11 P.M. Shortly after their receipt,
Lieut. -Colonel Ansell of the 5th Dragoon Guards came in to
report that his regiment and the 4th Division had safely
withdrawn from the high ground north of Viesly, which
overlooks Solesmes, and that the enemy was in possession
of it. As it was this high ground and the ridges abreast
of it that the cavalry must occupy to cover the initial
stages of the retirement from the Le Cateau position, and
General Allenby had not sufficient force — in fact, only
1 The German 8th Division was there, with the 5th Division in rear of it.
2 See p. 115. 3 Appendix 16. 4 Appendix 14.
GENERAL SMITH-DORRIEN'S DECISION 135
the 4th Cavalry Brigade — under his hand to recapture it, 26 Aug.
he proceeded at once to General Smith-Dorrien's head- °
quarters at Bertry. There he explained the situation, and
expressed the opinion that, the Germans being so close,
unless the troops of the II. Corps and 4th Division could
march " before daylight," the enemy would be upon them
before they could start, and it would be necessary to fight.
General Smith-Dorrien thereupon at 2 A.M. sent for General
Hubert Hamilton, commanding the 3rd Division, whose head-
quarters were close at hand, and asked him if it was possible
to get on the move during the hours of darkness. His reply
was that many units of the division were only just coming
in, and that he did not think that he could get them
formed up for retreat before 9 A.M. General Allenby
further said that his division was too much scattered and
exhausted to be able to give useful assistance in covering
the retreat next day.1 General Smith-Dorrien, after a
full discussion of the situation with Generals Allenby and
Hamilton, reluctantly came to the decision that he must
stand his ground. To do this he must ask the commanders
of the Cavalry Division and of the 4th Division to place them-
selves under his orders ; and with them and with the II. Corps
—that is to say, with the whole of the British troops in the
line from Catillon westwards — he would strike the enemy
hard, and, after he had done so, continue the retreat.
Whether he could withdraw his troops after such a
stand would depend on the pressure and weight of the
German attack. Several German cavalry divisions, and the
head of a division of the German IV. Corps were already
before him, the British I. Corps had been attacked by
another corps, and further forces were known to be hurry-
ing up. Much would obviously depend on breaking off
the action before overwhelming numbers of the enemy
became effective. To guard his flanks he had to depend
upon the weary and sorely tried Cavalry Division, with
some possibility of assistance on the western flank from
General Sordet's equally weary Cavalry Corps, and on the
eastern flank from the I. Corps, should it not be held fast
itself. Help from this quarter, however, appeared un-
likely, and indeed Sir Douglas Haig at 3.50 A.M. asked for
assistance from the II. Corps. The situation, in short,
1 The I. Corps was equally " exhausted, and could not get further in
without rest " ; and therefore could not come " further west so as to fill
the gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies." (See Sir John French's
Despatch, 7th September 1914.)
136 THE RETREAT
seemed to him one that could be saved only by desperate
measures. General Allenby promptly accepted the invita-
tion to act under his command ; General Snow of the 4th
Division there was no doubt would do likewise when the
request reached him.
A lengthy message was despatched by II. Corps at
3.30 A.M. to G.H.Q. St. Quentin, by motor car, which was
received there about 5 A.M., informing Sir John French in
detail of the decision taken. At 5 A.M. another message
was sent asking that General Sordet might be told that
the II. Corps was not retiring. The first message was
acknowledged by a reply, sent off from G.H.Q. at 5 A.M.,1
which, after giving the latest information, concluded :—
" If you can hold your ground the situation appears
" likely to improve. 4th Division must co-operate.
" French troops are taking offensive on right of I. Corps.
" Although you are given a free hand as to method this
" telegram is not intended to convey the impression that
" I am not as anxious for you to carry out the retirement
" and you must make every endeavour to do so."
Shortly after 6 A.M. Sir H. Smith-Dorrien communi-
cated further with G.H.Q. by the railway telephone ; and
G.H.Q. warned the 4th Division that the II. Corps might
not be able to continue the retirement at the time arranged
and that it was to cover Sir H. Smith - Dorrien's left
flank.
The die having been cast, it remained only for General
Smith-Dorrien to inform his subordinates. As General
Hubert Hamilton had been present at the conference, this
was easy as regards the 3rd Division ; to Sir Charles
Fergusson he went himself about 4 A.M. and whilst he was
discussing the situation the commander of the 5th Division
drew his attention to the fact that formed bodies, the rear
guard of the 3rd Division, were still coming in, dead beat.
The actual orders to stand fast, which were conveyed by
two staff officers in a motor car, reached 5th Divisional
Headquarters shortly afterwards. A staff officer was sent
to the 4th Division, but did not arrive at Haucourt until
5 A.M., only a short time before the division became
engaged. The news that came in meanwhile to II. Corps
Headquarters was not reassuring. At 2.30 A.M. General
Smith-Dorrien heard that the Germans had occupied
1 This is the hour given on the message form and in the Operations file,
but comparison with the times of other messages indicates that it must
have been later.
ARRIVAL OF THE 4TH DIVISION 137
Cambrai ; and at 3.45 A.M. that they were working round 26 Aug.
to the south of Landrecies. These details were neither of 1914'
them true ; but, true or false, they could not affect his
resolution.1
Seeing that many of the brigades had only lately come
in, it was inevitable that the divisional commanders should
have considerable difficulty in communicating the order to
stand fast to their brigadiers, owing to the uncertainty of
their whereabouts : General Shaw of the 9th Infantry
Brigade, being in Beaumont, received the order through
General Allenby at 3.30 A.M. ; the 7th and 8th Infantry
Brigades, having stood to arms at 4 A.M., were actually on
the position and improving trenches when fired on at 6 A.M.
There is no record of the order not to retire at 7 A.M. reach-
ing them. Of the 5th Division, Count Gleichen of the
15th Infantry Brigade, being nearest to Divisional Head-
quarters, heard at 5 A.M., and the other two infantry
brigadiers about 6 A.M.
THE ARRIVAL OF THE 4ra DIVISION IN ITS POSITION
We left the 4th Division marching through the darkness Map 9.
to take up its position on the extreme left of General
Smith-Dorrien's line between Fontaine au Pire and Wam-
baix, with its reserve at Haucourt.2 The first of the
troops to reach their destination, about 1 A.M., were the
headquarters and two companies of the 2/Inniskilling
which had left Ligny shortly before midnight to secure
Esnes (5 miles south-east of Cambrai). There they found
a small party of General Sordet's cavalry which had
barricaded the western approaches to the village. The
two remaining companies of the battalion, it will be
recalled, had been detached as a flank guard to Beauvois
and Bevillers (both about four miles north-east of Esnes)
on the afternoon of the 25th. Just after darkness fell,
the outposts before Bevillers were suddenly aware of a
troop of German horse, which came within thirty yards
of them before it was recognized to be hostile, and was
followed by six motor lorries full of infantry. The Innis-
killings opened rapid fire, with what effect could not be
seen, but the enemy retired in haste. The two companies
remained in their positions until 3 A.M. when, by order of
1 Actually, the French 84th Territorial Division was in occupation of
Cambrai and its northern approaches.
2 See p. 130.
138 THE RETREAT
their brigadier, they marched for Longsart (just north-
west of Haucourt). Meanwhile, the advanced guard of
the 12th Infantry Brigade — two companies of the Essex—
which had left Bethencourt at 10 P.M., reached Longsart
about 3.30 A.M., and the 2/Lancashire Fusiliers came
in a little later. Both parties entrenched themselves on
the plateau just to the north-west of the hamlet. The
1 /King's Own reached the eastern end of Haucourt shortly
after 4 A.M. and halted there, General Sordet's rear guard
riding through the village during the halt. At 4.30 A.M.
the two remaining companies of the Essex passed their
comrades on the way to Haucourt ; and towards 5 A.M.
the advanced companies of the Inniskillings also came in
to Longsart. Thus by 5 A.M. the whole of the 12th Infantry
Brigade had reached its allotted ground. During these
hours the 10th Infantry Brigade was also approaching its
position in reserve at Haucourt, hungry, wet and weary
after its hurried journey to Le Cateau by train, its equally
hurried march to Solesmes, and its heavy duties as rear
guard to the 4th Division. It had entered Caudry at the
first streak of dawn, and by 4.30 A.M. had arrived at
Haucourt, where the men threw themselves down and
slept, hoping that, being in reserve to the division, they
might have a little rest. A French cavalry patrol return-
ing shortly before 5 A.M. reported that the front was clear,
but there was no means of verifying this except by using
the horses of field officers and the Staff, for reasons which
will appear.
Meanwhile, the llth Infantry Brigade had reached
Fontaine au Pire, on the right of the 12th, at 2.45 A.M.,
and halted at its northern end. Its rear guard — two
companies of the I/Somerset Light Infantry — then passed
through it on its way to Ligny, and the 1 /Rifle Brigade
found the outposts at the northern end of Beauvois (Beau-
vois and Fontaine au Pire are actually one long straggling
village), whilst the rest of the brigade slept. At 5 A.M.
the battalions were just moving off to their place in the
line when German guns opened upon the troops to the
north of Beauvois. No enemy was to be seen except a
few cavalry ; so the 1 /Rifle Brigade occupied a position
to the north-west of the village, while detachments of
the three remaining battalions covered its northern and
north-eastern approaches. Under cover of this screen,
the main body of the brigade fell back and occupied a
line south-westward from the " Quarry (Carrieres) " (a little
THE 4TH DIVISION 139
to the south-west of Fontaine), with its left battalion, the 26 Aug.
I/Hampshire, astride the railway. 1914«
Thus, by 5 A.M. on the 26th, the infantry of the 4th
Division had to all intents occupied the positions assigned
to it for the night of the 25th/26th, although, owing to
the darkness, it had settled down on the forward instead
of the reverse slope. The artillery was not in battle
position, as the Divisional Artillery Commander was with
Divisional Headquarters and therefore expected to resume
the retirement at 7 A.M.
Though complete in field artillery and infantry, the
4th Division was as yet without its Divisional Cavalry 1
and Cyclists, Heavy Battery, Field Engineers, Signal
Company,2 Train, Ammunition Column and Field Am-
bulances. Hence there were no mounted troops to furnish
patrols or covering parties, no 60-pdrs. to mow down the
enemy before deployment as was done with such striking
effect by the Heavy Battery of the 5th Division on the
right, no engineers to superintend working parties, very
limited means of attending to wounded, no means of
removing them, and, above all, no means of controlling
from divisional headquarters the general movements of
some fifteen thousand men, extended along a front of five
miles, except by the use of mounted officers and orderlies.
The ground on which the 4th Division lay, on the left
of the British line, was a dreary boggy moor, soaked by
the rain of the previous night, and in many places churned
into deep mud by the passage of men, horses, guns and
vehicles ; and over such a surface horses, already none too
fresh, were soon exhausted by a few hard gallops.
The 4th Division had received instructions, brought by
an officer from G.H.Q. at midnight, to continue the re-
treat to Le Catelet, but the orders for the march had not
been issued to the brigades, for they were all on the move.
At 5 A.M. officers were sent out to ascertain the positions
of the troops, and the orders were ready to be despatched
1 The Divisional Cavalry (one squadron of the 19th Hussars) reached
St. Quentin by train on the morning of the 26th and marched at 4.30 A.M.
It was, however, intercepted by the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, and ordered to
join it, being formed into a composite regiment with another of its own
squadrons (Divisional Cavalry of the 5th Division), and half a squadron
of the 4th Dragoon Guards. Had it been free to march to its own division,
however, it could not have reached it in time to carry out the essential
service of reconnaissance to the front.
2 The Headquarters Section of a Divisional Signal Company contained
three cable sections with telephone equipment, motor cyclists, push
cyclists, mounted men, heliographs and other means of communication.
140 THE RETREAT
as soon as the officers reported, should the situation permit
retirement. Almost immediately after this, Captain Walcot
arrived from General Smith - Dorrien to announce his
decision to stand and request that the 4th Division would
cover his flank. General Snow agreed to do so, and at
5.30 A.M. sent messages to his brigades to take up the
positions already ordered, and to the llth Infantry Brigade
to get in touch with the 3rd Division. Shortly after this
the officers who had been to them returned reporting, to
use the words of one of them, that the infantry were
already " at it hammer and tongs."
CHAPTER VII
THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU — 26TH AUGUST :
DAWN TILL NOON
FORMATION OF THE LINE OF BATTLE
(See Sketch 3 ; Maps 10 & 11 x)
THE 26th August, the anniversary of Crecy, dawned hot Sketch 3.
and misty, with some prospect that the historic weather MaP 10-
of A.D. 1346 would be repeated, and the certainty that
in an almost similarly desperate situation, the stout
hearts of our island race would again ensure triumph over
superiority of numbers, and rob the enemy of what he
considered an easy prey.
It may be recalled that although in the first instance
it was the intention of G.H.Q. to occupy a position in the
neighbourhood of Le Cateau, a subsequent order directed
the retreat to be continued.2 It was upon the original
understanding and in expectation that the I. Corps would
1 After Map 11 had been struck off, additional information with regard
to the situation of the German forces was obtained. The following cor-
rections should therefore be made, in green, commencing on the East : —
(1) For " Advance of head of III. Corps " read " Advance of 5th
Division."
(2) The 6th Division should be shown on the Roman Road, with its
head at Forest (5,000 yards north-east of Le Cateau), " about 7 P.M."
(3) The following should be substituted for the information about the
German cavalry and Jdger : —
The 4th Cavalry Division attacking against Bethencourt from the
north ; front from about Prayelle to a little north-east of Jeune Bois.
(4) 13th and 14th Cavalry Brigades of the 9th Cavalry Division attacking
against Caudry from the north ; front Jeune Bois to south-east corner of
Beauvais.
(5) 19th Cavalry Brigade of the 9th Cavalry Division, with 3, 9, and 10
Jdger Battalions, attacking against Fontaine au Pire from north-west ;
front from southern end of Beauvais, halfway to the railway station south
of Cattenieres.
(6) 2nd Cavalry Division, with 4th and 7th Jdger Battalions^ attacking
against Longsart, from the north-west ; front from right of 9th Cavalry
Division to one mile north of Esnes.
2 See p. 115.
141
142 LE CATEAU (6 A.M. TILL NOON)
be in touch with it on the east, that the dispositions of
the troops on the ground were made by the II. Corps.
Although officers had been sent ahead to reconnoitre
the position, most of the units did not come on to it until
dark, and heavy rain interfered with the observation of
those which reached it earlier in the day. Moreover it
was difficult to identify places by the map, for the only
one then available was the French uncontoured hachured
map of the 1 : 80,000 scale, to which British officers were
not accustomed. When the troops stood to arms about
4 A.M. under orders to continue the retreat, there was
a heavy ground mist, so that, though the troops were
approximately in position, there was little opportunity, or
apparent necessity, to rectify the line and choose the best
ground to repel a determined attack by superior numbers.
The town of Le Cateau lies deep in the narrow valley
of the river Selle, surrounded on all sides by open culti-
vated country and occasional moor, with never a fence,
except in the immediate vicinity of the villages, and
hardly a tree, except along the chaussees. The river,
though small, is unfordable. The heights on the east,
crescent shaped, slightly overlook those on the west, the
highest ground of which is roughly a T in plan : the
head (the Reumont ridge), running north to south,
from Viesly to Reumont, and the stalk (the Le Cateau
position or Caudry ridge) east to west from Le Cateau to
Crevecoeur. The reverse or south side of the Caudry
ridge drops sharply to the Warnelle stream, with higher
undulating country behind it, dotted with villages and
woods, admirably suited to cover a retirement. The front
or north side is broken by a succession of long spurs running
northwards ; the western end drops to the Schelde Canal.
Except for the Selle river and the Canal with its accom-
panying stream, the country was free for the movement
of troops of all arms, and, from its open character, generally
suited to defensive action, though there were numerous
small valleys up which enterprising and well-trained
infantry could approach unseen. Beetroots and clover
covered part of the ground, but the other crops had mostly
been cut and partly harvested. Here and there were
lines of cattle, picketed Flanders fashion, in the forage
patches. Crops had been held so sacred at British
manoeuvres that there was occasionally hesitation before
troops, particularly mounted troops, would move across
them.
THE TROOPS NEAR LE CATEAU 143
The town of Le Cateau on the right of the line of the 26 Aug.
II. Corps was at 4.30 A.M. still full of British transport, 1914-
though the long columns, after protracted delay owing
to the passage of General Sordet's Cavalry Corps across
them, had for hours been pushing south-westwards along
the Roman Road. The 19th Infantry Brigade, placed
under the II. Corps by G.H.Q. orders of the previous night,
had not yet received any message postponing the retreat,
as its headquarters could not be found in the dark ; it
was delayed nearly two hours in starting by the conges-
tion in the streets, and had hardly got clear — being the
last troops to leave the town — when shortly after 6 A.M.
the first German scouts made their appearance in Le
Cateau. There was some firing, but they were easily Map 11.
kept at a distance, and the brigade eventually pursued
its march to Reumont with hardly a casualty. The I/Duke
of Cornwall's Light Infantry and half of the I/East Surrey
(14th Infantry Brigade), which had bivouacked on the
heights to the east of Le Cateau, and had likewise received
no orders to stand fast, were at this time formed up in
column of route by the railway bridge near the south-
eastern corner of the town, facing west and ready to march
off at 6.30 A.M. The remainder of the 14th Infantry
Brigade had meanwhile occupied a position immediately
to the west of Le Cateau : the Suffolks across the centre
of the spur — which for convenience may be called the
Montay Spur — which runs from the Reumont ridge north-
eastward to Montay, and the other one and a half battalions
south of them. Next to the 14th Infantry Brigade,
but separated from it by a small valley between spurs,
came the Yorkshire Light Infantry of the 13th Infantry
Brigade, with the XV. Brigade R.F.A. and the 37th
Howitzer Battery in close support on the right, and the
XXVIII. Brigade R.F.A. in close support on the left.
West of the Yorkshire Light Infantry, the Scottish
Borderers of the same brigade occupied the next ridge of
rising ground ; and west of them again, the 15th Infantry
Brigade prolonged the line to the road that leads from
Troisvilles to Inchy, with the XXVII. Brigade R.F.A. in
rear of it to the east and south-east of Troisvilles. Of
the rest of the artillery of the 5th Division, the 61st
Howitzer Battery and 108th Heavy Battery took up
positions of observation about a mile to the north of
Reumont, while the 65th Howitzer Battery unlimbered
to the south-west of Troisvilles. In reserve near Reumont
144 LE CATEAU (6 A.M. TILL NOON)
was the 19th Infantry Brigade, as orders to halt there
reached it soon after it left Le Cateau.
The battalions of the 14th Infantry Brigade which lay
west of Le Cateau did not receive their counter-orders to
stand fast until about 6 A.M., and those to the east of the
town never received them at all. Hence the 5th Division
was in a manner surprised, and compelled to accept battle
in positions which were being held with a view to slipping
away under cover of rear guards. The Suffolks in particu-
lar, who lay immediately to the west of Le Cateau, were
badly placed for a general action : there was much dead
ground on every side ; the field of fire was for the most
part limited and could nowhere be called good ; and
small valleys and sunken roads at sundry points gave
hostile infantry every opportunity of concealing their
approach. The battalion, in common with the other
troops of the 5th Division, made shift to throw up such
entrenchments as it could with its " grubbers," no better
tools being obtainable. The XXVII. R.F.A. had time
to dig in its batteries ; but the XV. Brigade for the most
part had to be content to mask its guns with corn-sheaves.
But the serious difficulties in which the 5th Division
became involved during the action of the 26th August
arose not so much from the lack of preparation of the
position, as from its belief that the I. Corps would be on
its right, and hold the high ground east of Le Cateau,
whence an enemy could rake a considerable portion of
the line. The risk that this ground would fall into German
hands had to be accepted by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien
when, late indeed but as early as in the circumstances
it was possible to come to a decision, he resolved to stand
and fight.
Passing now to the dispositions of the 3rd Division,
the 9th Infantry Brigade took up the line from Troisvilles
westward to Audencourt. The brigadier, as has been
told, had received timely notice of Sir Horace Smith-
Dorrien's intentions and, bringing his battalions early into
position, enabled them to improve some mathematically
straight trenches which had been hastily begun by French
civilians, and to dig themselves fair shelter. The XXIII.
Brigade R.F.A. was in close support on the reverse side
of the ridge, with two sections dug in on the forward
slope, one of the 107th Battery to the right front, and
one of the 108th Battery on the left rear of the Lincoln-
shire, the left of the brigade. About a thousand yards
THE 3RD DIVISION 145
to the south of these batteries was the 65th Howitzer 26 Aug.
Battery, and about five hundred yards to the west of 1914«
them the 48th Heavy Battery.
Next on the left of the 9th Infantry Brigade stood the
8th Infantry Brigade, holding Audencourt and the ground
thence westward to Caudry. This brigade also was
partly dug in, having taken in hand at dawn the work of
improving and extending some trenches made by French
civilians.
The 7th Infantry Brigade occupied Caudry and its
vicinity. The right of the position along the ridge to
the north-east of the town was held by the I/ Wiltshire ;
an enclosure near Point 129, just north of the town, by
the 2/South Lancashire and the 56th Field Co. R.E. ;
and the remainder of the line along the north and north-
western outskirts by the 3/ Worcestershire. The battalions
of the 7th Infantry Brigade were very weak, many men
having lost their way in the dark during the retirement
from Solesmes. The Irish Rifles, indeed, had not yet
rejoined, being still at Maurois with the 41st Battery.
A divisional reserve was formed of men collected from
First Line Transport, Signal Sections, etc.
Of the rest of the 3rd Divisional Artillery, the XL.
Brigade R.F.A. was in readiness south-west of Auden-
court ; two batteries of the XLII. Brigade R.F.A. at the
north-eastern corner of Caudry ; a section of I Battery
R.H.A. at the north-western corner ; and the XXX.
Howitzer Brigade just south of the buildings of Caudry
facing north-west. Speaking generally, the 3rd Division
was better posted and more fully prepared for action than
either the 5th Division on its right or the 4th on its
left, having received earlier warning of what was expected
of it.
Between Caudry and Beauvois there was a gap ; this,
however, was of no importance, since it could be swept
by crossfire from the two villages ; and at Bea.uvois
itself the rear guard of the llth Infantry Brigade was
still bickering with the advanced parties of the enemy.
Its main body, as already described, was aligned from the
east of the " Quarry " south-west towards the Warnelle
ravine ; and by this time the King's Own had crossed
the ravine from Haucourt, and was halted in mass near
the cross roads five hundred yards north-east of Longsart,
thus filling the gap between the llth and 12th Infantry
Brigades.
VOL. I L
146 LE CATEAU (6 A.M. TILL NOON)
In reserve to General Smith-Dorrien's force there were
nominally the Cavalry Division and the 19th Infantry
Brigade ; orders were issued for the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry
Brigades to proceed to Bazuel and Mazinghien (2
miles east by south and 4 miles south-east of Le Cateau
respectively), to guard the right flank ; whilst the 1st
Cavalry Brigade was to take post at Escaufourt, about
four miles south-west of Le Cateau. The 4th Cavalry
Brigade, which had moved at midnight to Inchy, fell
back to Ligny at dawn. But the orders to the cavalry
were for the most part very difficult to execute, for only
the 3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades were more or less com-
plete and concentrated, and they were at opposite ends
of the line. As it happened, however, part of the 1st and
2nd Cavalry Brigades, as well as the 3rd Brigade, were
in the vicinity of Le Cateau and thus available to cover
the gap between the I. and II. Corps.
The situation as it appeared to the Germans at night
is fully disclosed by von Kluck's operation orders issued
at 11.50 P.M. on the 25th August. In them he ordered
" the continuation of the pursuit of the beaten enemy "
in a general south-westerly direction : — His right, the //.
Corps, via Cambrai on Bapaume ; the IV. Reserve Corps
(then at Valenciennes) starting early, via Vendegies to
Cattenieres ; the IV. Corps via Caudry and Montay to
Vendhuille ; the ///. Corps via Le Cateau to Maretz.
The IX. Corps was still in rear observing the western
front of Maubeuge and protecting the Lines of Communi-
cation against sorties from it ; it was to send any troops
it could spare after the ///. Corps. Orders for the three
cavalry divisions of von der Marwitz's Corps are not given,
but von Kluck's narrative states that in the early morning
they attacked via Wambaix — Beauvois — Quievy,1 drove
the enemy south and held him until the heads of the corps
appeared. It was then his intention to envelop the
British Force on both flanks. From von Kluck's own
account, he seems to have been under a complete mis-
conception of the situation in the morning. He thought,
when it was found that the British were not retiring,
that they were holding a more or less north and south
1 The orders in " Deutsche Kavallerie," p. 55, are for the 11. Cavalry
Corps to move due south against the great Roman Road :
2nd Cavalry Division, with 4th and 7th Jdger, via Carnieres — Esnes
(practically Wambaix).
9th Cavalry Division, with 3rd, 9th and 10th Jdger, via Beauvois.
4th Cavalry Division, via Caudry (due south of Quievy).
THE RIGHT OF THE LINE 147
position (he ordered " the IV. Corps to envelop the northern ; 26 Aug.
the ///. Corps the southern flank of the position "), and 1914«
were trying " to draw off in a westerly direction " ; and
he lost sight of the I. Corps altogether. Possibly, the
extension of the British front westwards by the newly
arrived 4th Division helped to mislead him. Further,
that front at nightfall was established by contact on the
line Landrecies — Solesmes facing north - east ; and the
move of the 4th Division from Solesmes during the night,
practically in contact with the Germans, was south-west.
Possibly he thought the whole force was following the
same direction. This, of course, fitted in with his pre-
conceived idea that the British Expeditionary Force was
based on Ostend, Dunkirk and Calais.
In the German Second Army, von Biilow also issued
operation orders that " on the 26th the pursuit of the
" beaten enemy should be continued in a south-westerly
" direction with the greatest possible energy." As he had
to leave the VII. Corps to observe the eastern side of
Maubeuge, the X. Reserve Corps now became his right.
This corps only reached Marbaix on the 26th and did
not get into contact with the British until it struck the
rear guard of the I. Corps (the 1st (Guards) Brigade) at
Etreux on the 27th.
THE BATTLE
The Eight of the Line.
Very soon after 6 A.M., while the morning mist was still Map 11.
thick, the German batteries opened fire for the first time
from the vicinity of Forest (3 miles N.N.E. of Le Cateau)1
upon the troops immediately west of Le Cateau, thereby
putting a stop to entrenching except so far as it could be
carried on by the men lying down, with their " grubbers."
The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry and two companies
of the East Surreys were, as has been told, waiting in
column of route in Le Cateau, by the railway bridge in
the Faubourg de Landrecies when, at 6.30 A.M., exactly
the time that they should have moved off, heavy rifle fire
was opened upon them from the windows of the neigh-
bouring houses. Several men fell; but the detachment,
under the covering fire of the Signal Section and some of
1 These would appear to have been IV. Corps batteries, but possibly
there were some III. Corps ones.
148 LE CATEAU (6 A.M. TILL NOON)
the headquarters of the 14th Infantry Brigade, were
rapidly led back through a succession of wire fences to
the high ground above the south-eastern corner of Le
Cateau. Here the six companies formed a firing line
north and south athwart the cross roads just to the south
of the Faubourg de France. How the Germans had con-
trived to reach the south-eastern outskirts of Le Cateau
without being seen, is unknown ; 1 but the fact remains
that, when the action opened, the Germans were in the
town on the flank of the II. Corps, with every prospect
of cutting off the detachment of the 14th Infantry Brigade
which lay on the east of the town, and of pouring through
the gap between the I. and II. Corps. They lost no time,
in fact, in following up that detachment, which, however,
under cover of a counter-attack by the half-battalion of
the East Surreys, fell back south-east by successive com-
panies along the road towards Bazuel, repelling simul-
taneous attacks against its front and its right flank. A
mile from Bazuel, however, portions of the 1st Cavalry
Brigade, followed by the 3rd with D Battery, came to its
help ; and with their support the Cornwall Light Infantry
and East Surreys began to move westward to rejoin their
brigade soon after 8 A.M. The Germans, favoured by the
mist, had by this time worked up the valley of the Selle
southward from Le Cateau, for about a mile, with no
very clear idea, probably, of what was going forward,
when they were caught by this counter-attack on their
eastern flank, and for a time their progress seems to have
been arrested.
Meanwhile fresh German batteries had opened fire
from a concealed position near Rambourlieux Farm (2
miles W.N.W. of Le Cateau) against the troops between
Le Cateau and the Roman Road, now the right of the
British line, and practically enfiladed the whole of them
with most destructive effect. The British guns replied
as well as they could with nothing but the flashes to
guide them, for, though the German aeroplanes were
active in this quarter of the field, British machines were
not employed in aid of the artillery. The infantry, having
no targets as yet, was obliged to endure the bombardment
passively, though comparatively early in the day — that
is to say, soon after 8 A.M. — German skirmishers climbed
1 They had not far to come, as Bousies and villages round it, only
four miles from Le Cateau, were occupied by part of the German 7th
Division on the night of the 25th/26th ; it marched off at 5 A.M. (Lohrisch).
THE RIGHT OF THE LINE 149
to Point 150 on the summit of the Montay Spur, and 26 Aug.
began firing at the British gunners. Upon these, and also 1914-
upon a concealed German machine gun on the Cambrai
road the left company of the Suffolks opened fire ; but
there was some doubt as to the situation, for it never
occurred to any of the officers that the high ground im-
mediately to the east and west of Le Cateau would be
left open to free occupation by the enemy. Of the fight
that was going forward in the valley of the Selle they
could see nothing nor, in the roar of the battle, hear
anything either.
The Duke of Cornwall's L.I. and the East Surreys
were, as a matter of fact, pressing slowly but steadily
forward in spite of considerable opposition ; and two
companies of the former became separated from the rest
of the detachment, which was advancing westward, and
turned to the south-west upon St. Benin. Some confusion
was caused in the advance by the presence of Germans
dressed in what appeared to be khaki, which more than
once misled the British as to the action they should take
in order to rejoin their division. However, D Battery
and the southern half -battalion of the Cornwall L.I. suc-
ceeded in enfilading the German troops in the valley, and
the enemy withdrew to the eastward, to all appearances
pretty severely punished. The greater number of the
Cornwall L.I. and East Surreys then moved south-west
on Escaufourt, though one detachment, while still 500
yards short of St. Benin, turned westward, and made for
Reumont, where 5th Divisional Headquarters were estab-
lished. The bulk of the Cornwall L.I. arrived at Escau-
fourt between 11 A.M. and noon, and found that they had
cut their way through the Germans at the comparatively
small cost of two hundred casualties, and this number
in the course of the following days was reduced to one-
half by the return of missing men. The half-battalion
of the East Surreys made its way to Maurois, beyond
Reumont and the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Brigades retired
with great deliberation due south up the valley towards
St. Soupplet. The first turning movement of the Germans
on the eastern flank — attempted, it is true, in no great
strength — had thus been foiled.
During this period, however, the troubles of the troops
immediately to the west of Le Cateau were increasing.
About 10 A.M. the Germans brought guns up to the summit
of the heights east of the town, and the devoted batteries
150 LE CATEAU (6 A.M. TILL NOON)
and battalions of the British 5th Division on the high
ground between the town and the Roman Road, were
now enfiladed from both flanks. The llth Battery man-
handled two guns round to the east and replied effectively
to the German fire ; but the concentration of a superior
number of German guns, probably the artillery of the 5th
and 7th Divisions, upon the exposed batteries of the XV.
and XXVIII. Brigades R.F.A. caused considerable losses ;
salvos of shells crashed down on gun after gun in suc-
cession, but the gunners stood to their work, and the supply
of ammunition never failed. The Suffolks and Yorkshire
Light Infantry, the front line of the 14th and 13th Infantry
Brigades, were also assailed by an unceasing storm of
shrapnel and high-explosive shell, but vied with the
artillery in steadiness. At 9.45 A.M. the Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders, of the 19th Infantry Brigade,
who had been ordered forward from Reumont, arrived on
the right rear of the Suffolks; two companies dug them-
selves such cover as they were able with their " grubbers "
on the ridge, while the rest remained in the hollow to
the west of them. About 10 A.M. the firing line at last
had a target, for German battalions began to advance
in thick masses along a front of over two miles from the
valley of the Selle to Rambourlieux Farm.1 The llth
Battery, man -handling a second section round to the
right, fired upon them in the valley at pointblank range
with great execution. Before long, every officer of this
battery had fallen, and so many men that only enough
were left to work a single gun. But that single gun never
ceased firing ; and the other batteries, nearly all of which
had suffered heavily, showed the like indomitable spirit.
From Reumont also the 108th Heavy Battery burst its
sixty-pounder shells among the hostile infantry with
beautiful precision, tearing great gaps in their swarming
ranks and strewing the ground with killed and wounded.
But losses did not stop the German infantry of 1914.
The gaps were instantly filled, and the advance of the
enemy in the valley, though retarded, was not brought
to a standstill. Parties reached a little copse upon Montay
Spur, and strove to enfilade the Suffolks from the north,
but they were checked mainly by a machine gun of the York-
1 This was, no doubt, the attack of the enemy 7th Division, with the
14th Infantry Brigade on both sides of the Forest — Le Cateau road and
13th Infantry Brigade on both sides of the Forest — Montay road (see
Lohrisch).
THE RIGHT OF THE LINE 151
shire Light Infantry posted on the Roman Road. Further 26 Aug.
to the west, the Germans made less progress. From the 1914-
region of Rambourlieux Farm, profiting by past experience,
they came forward in small bodies, at wide intervals, and
taking cover behind the corn-stooks that covered the
fields ; but, though they attacked again and again, they
were driven back by the shells of the artillery. In the
zone allotted to the 37th and 52nd Batteries and the
XXVIII. Brigade R.F.A. the Germans came on in close
formation, and suffered very heavily. The first target
of the 122nd Battery was a platoon in line, with the men
shoulder to shoulder, which emerged from a fold in the
ground. The battery commander gave the order " one
round gun fire," and every man of the Germans fell. At
every subsequent effort of the enemy in this direction,
much the same scene was repeated and each gathering
line of Germans was laid low.
Nevertheless, though the machine gun of the Yorkshire
Light Infantry checked every attempt of the enemy to
approach the Suffolks in force, it was possible for small
parties of Germans to creep up into a cutting on the
Cambrai road on their flank, and to enfilade them both
with rifles and machine guns. Every attempt of these
parties to build up a firing line in advance of the cutting
was, however, foiled by the steady marksmanship of the
Suffolks and by the shells of the 52nd Battery. The
left company of this battalion had besides a very fair
field of fire over the ground to the north-east, and forbade
any hostile progress in that quarter. But the German
machine guns could be neither discovered nor silenced ;
and the Suffolks, except on their extreme left, which was
protected by an artificial bank, were falling fast under
their fire. Colonel James of the Manchesters had already
pushed forward one company and a machine gun to the
right rear of the Suffolks, prolonging their line to the
south ; and, shortly after 11 A.M., judging the position
to be critical, and being unable to find the brigadier, he
ordered two more companies of his battalion to advance
and reinforce the Suffolks. At the same time, he called
upon the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and 1 /Middle-
sex, of the 19th Infantry Brigade, to support him.
The two companies of the Manchesters accordingly
moved forward under a terrible fire of artillery, rifles and
machine guns, but, in spite of more than one check, suc-
ceeded in reaching the trenches of the Suffolks. The left
152 LE CATEAU (6 A.M. TILL NOON)
company seems to have suffered less than the other, and
on reaching the left company of the Suffolks found that
it was not needed. The remainder, who bore more to
the right, were thrown back more than once ; and eventu-
ally only a portion reached the right centre of the firing
line. Ammunition for the Suffolks' machine guns began
to fail at this point ; and it was vital to replenish it before
the enemy could further develop his attack from the east.
Major Doughty, who had succeeded to the command of
the battalion upon the fall of Colonel Brett early in the
day, with a small party managed to bring up a few
bandoliers, but he fell desperately wounded at the moment
of his arrival. Meanwhile, two half - companies of the
Highlanders from the low ground, facing once again a
storm of fire, rushed through the wreck of the llth Battery
into the right section of the trenches of the Suffolks and,
though at heavy loss, brought them at least some assistance.
It was now noon. Two German heavy guns 1 now reached
the summit of the Montay Spur and opened fire at close
range. The last gun of the llth Battery was silenced ;
and the Suffolks, together with their reinforcement of
Highlanders, were in a worse plight than ever. Neverthe-
less, after nearly six hours of incessant and overwhelming
fire, the right of the British line, which rested on Le Cateau,
still stood firm. The German infantry was steadily
increasing in numbers on their front and, despite all efforts,
was drawing steadily nearer. Their right flank was open ;
they were searched with fire from front and right and left ;
and strong columns, betokening the approach of the
German III. Corps, were closing in upon the right flank.
It mattered not : they had been ordered to stand. The
I. Corps, for whose coming they waited, might be late,
as Bliicher had been at Waterloo ; but, until it should
come, there must be no giving way. Nor did they yield
the ground until the divisional orders for retirement
reached them some hours later.
The Eight Centre of the Line.
Map 11. On the left of the Yorkshire Light Infantry, the
2/Scottish Borderers (13th Infantry Brigade) and the
Bedfords and Dorsets (15th Infantry Brigade) were for
the present hardly engaged. They saw nothing of the
1 Probably 4-2-inch field howitzers with telescope trails, enabling them
to be used for direct fire.
THE RIGHT CENTRE 153
enemy but distant columns advancing upon Inchy from 26 Aug.
the north-east, which were observed to be caught by 1914«
shell fire and forced to deploy. With the 9th Infantry
Brigade, on the left again, the situation was nearly similar.
The German guns l opened upon it soon after 6 A.M.
before the men had completed the trenches begun over-
night, but with so little effect that they were able to con-
tinue digging themselves in and, thus sheltered, suffered
trifling loss. There was no sign of any infantry attack —
no rifle fire, indeed, except that of a few skirmishers with
here and there a machine gun — and it was pretty evident
that the enemy had no idea for the present of any attack
upon this portion of the line. On the other hand, German
troops,2 working up the valley from Bethencourt and from
the wood just to the east of it towards Inchy, were heavily
shelled by the guns of the 6th Battery and of the XXIII.
Brigade R.F.A. Some small parties, nevertheless, con-
trived to make their way into Beaumont and Inchy, only
to be greeted there by the lyddite shells of the 65th
Howitzer Battery ; and all their efforts to build up a
firing line in front of the twin villages were foiled by the
deadly marksmanship of the British.
Against the line of the 8th Infantry Brigade around
Audencourt the German guns came into action rather later
than against the 9th Infantry Brigade, but the German
infantry showed itself almost immediately afterwards,
trickling down in thin lines towards the Cambrai. road,
with its machine guns clearly visible. Its advance was,
however, cautious, for three British platoons which had
been pushed out to the north of the Cambrai road were
able to rejoin the brigade without being seriously pressed ;
and it was not until about 9 A.M. that first the 4/Middlesex
to the east of Audencourt, and later the machine guns of
the Royal Scots, in the country road just to the north of
it, opened fire upon parties of Germans who had crossed
the Cambrai road. Even then the engagement in this
quarter throughout the forenoon was no more than desul-
tory. The headquarters of the brigade and the whole of
its transport were in Audencourt itself, and there seemed
no immediate menace to their security. Masses of German
infantry were indeed assembling upon the Cambrai road
under a devastating fire from the British artillery ; but
the 8th and 9th Infantry Brigades had a good field of fire,
1 Probably of the IV. Corps from near Solesmes.
2 The 4th Cavalry Division ('•' Deutsche Kavallerie," p. 63).
154 LE CATEAU (6 A.M. TILL NOON)
and there was little temptation to the enemy to waste
strength in attacking them, when immediately to their
left lay Caudry, forming a decided salient in the British
line.
Upon Caudry the German shells fell very heavily from
an early hour ; and bullets were whistling down the streets
even before the fall of the shells. Up to 6 A.M. and even
later the units of the 7th Infantry Brigade were still under
the impression that the retreat would be resumed ; but
the enemy's movements soon banished all idea of this, for
about 7 A.M. the German riflemen J moved against both
flanks of the village with vigour, pouring a very heavy fire
in particular upon the Worcesters on the left. So per-
tinacious was its onset that reinforcements were sum-
moned from the 8th Infantry Brigade ; and about 8.30
A.M. two weak companies of the Royal Irish came up and
took post in a railway cutting which skirts the eastern
flank of the village. Half an hour later, at 9 A.M., the Irish
Rifles and the 41st Battery ended their wanderings of the
night by rejoining the brigade.2 The battalion entrenched
itself about a thousand yards south of Caudry near Tron-
quoy, while the guns unlimbered to its right rear. Until
noon the 7th Infantry Brigade contained the Germans
without difficulty, and they gained little or no ground ; it
seemed probable that here, as on the rest of the British
centre, they were husbanding their strength until their
main effort against both flanks of the British should pro-
duce its effect.
The Left Wing.
Map 11. On the left wing in the 4th Division no orders had been
issued for the retirement to be continued ; those sent out
on the previous evening to occupy the Haucourt position 3
still held good and were confirmed as soon as General
Smith-Dorrien's message reached Divisional Headquarters
at 5 A.M. But, as on the right, the general action opened
with misfortune for the British. Until 6 A.M., or there-
abouts, the rear guard of the llth Infantry Brigade on
the right of the division continued exchanging shots with
the enemy to the north of Beauvois, when it gradually
withdrew, the 1 /Rifle Brigade coming in last of all and
1 The 9th Cavalry Division and three Jdger battalions (" Deutsche
Kavallerie," p. 59).
2 See p. 128. 3 See p. 129.
THE LEFT OF THE LINE 155
taking position in the hollow road which runs southward 26 Aug.
from Beauvois to Ligny. A platoon of Jdger, which was °
imprudent enough to advance in pursuit through Fontaine
au Pire, was annihilated by the accurate fire of a detach-
ment of the 1 /Hampshire ; and after that the enemy made
no further attempt to follow up the llth Infantry Brigade.1
Meanwhile, the 12th Infantry Brigade was resting on its
position on the left of the llth covering Longsart and
Esnes. French cavalry patrols, as has been told, had been
understood to report the front to be clear ; and the 4th
Division had no divisional cavalry or cyclists to verify
the French observations. The King's Own were formed
up preparatory to entrenching. Suddenly, shortly after
6 A.M., two French troopers riding towards Cattenieres
were seen to turn and gallop at the top of their speed to the
south-west; and immediately afterwards a devastating
fire of machine guns swept down upon the King's Own.
Caught in close formation, the hapless battalion was
terribly punished. The men were at once ordered to lie
down and the front rank of each platoon — all that could
safely use their rifles — opened fire at about eight hundred
yards range upon the German machine guns with imme-
diate effect. Five minutes later, however, two or three
German batteries came into the open between Wambaix
and Cattenieres Railway Station, unlimbered, and speedily
picking up the range, poured upon the unlucky King's Own
a storm of shells, which thinned their already depleted ranks
still further. Two companies of the Warwickshire from
the reserve, by direction of a staff officer, swarmed up the
hill to extricate them, but were swept back upon reaching
the crest with very heavy loss. For some twenty minutes
this storm of shells burst over the King's Own, after which
the fire of guns and machine guns slackened, and the sur-
vivors of the battalion moved away to their right into the
shelter of a country lane, running east and west, from
which they opened fire with such effect that the machine
guns were smothered. A few men from the rear of the
mass, who had sought shelter in the ravine, rallied and
rejoined their comrades ; and the King's Own, though
reduced by some four hundred casualties, recovered them-
selves with commendable quickness.
The Germans then turned their fire upon portions of
the right wing of the Lancashire Fusiliers, to the west of
1 This enemy was the 2nd Cavalry Division, with two Jager battalions
(" Deutsche Kavallerie," p. 55).
156 LE CATEAU (6 A.M. TILL NOON)
the King's Own ; and soon German mounted men came
out into the open, only to give place to a considerable body
of infantry * in the space between Wambaix and Catte-
nieres. The Lancashire Fusiliers brought their machine
guns into action ; and, though one of these became jammed
at once, the other did good execution. But the enemy,
having far greater numbers of machine guns — it was esti-
mated that they had twenty-three in this quarter of the
field alone at this time 2 — and being consequently able to
use them with greater freedom, now crept away to the left
flank qf the Lancashire Fusiliers, and enfiladed them with
deadly effect. Two companies of Inniskilling Fusiliers had
already come up from Longsart to prolong the line of the
Lancashire Fusiliers, one upon the eastern and the other
upon the western flank ; but the latter was at once en-
gaged with German dismounted cavalry. There were
signs also of the development of a hostile attack upon the
front and western flank of Esnes, where the two remaining
companies of the Inniskilling Fusiliers were already dis-
posed for defence. Against them, across a cornfield that
had recently been cut, advanced the 7th Jager, in open
order, apparently without any suspicion that a foe was
near. As soon as the Inniskillings opened fire the Germans
took cover behind the corn-stooks. But these availed
them little, and after a time they ran back, leaving forty-
seven dead in front of one of the companies when its com-
mander in the lull that ensued went out to count them.
Thus for at least an hour and a half the 12th Infantry
Brigade held its own against the &nd Cavalry Division
and two Jager battalions, backed by artillery and numerous
machine guns.
At length about 8.45 A.M. the German progress towards
Wambaix, round the left flank of the advanced line, had
gone so far that a retirement seemed to Brigadier-General
H. M. Wilson imperative. The King's Own on the right
were the first to be sent to the south side of the Warnelle
Ravine ; and, to cover this movement, two companies of
the Warwickshire (10th Infantry Brigade) were ordered to
deliver a counter-attack from Haucourt upon the ridge
to north of Longsart. The 1 /Hampshire, of the llth In-
fantry Brigade, pushed forward two platoons to protect the
1 Dismounted men of the 2nd Cavalry Division and Jager (" Deutsche
Kavallerie," p. 56).
2 Twenty-one, according to " Deutsche Kavallerie," p. 56 : — the guns
of the 4th M.G. Abteilung and two Jager battalions.
THE LEFT OF THE LINE 157
Warwickshire's right flank, seeing which a German battery 20 Aug.
moved up and unlimbered close to the railway station just 1914-
south of Cattenieres. The Hampshire men, after taking
the range, opened rapid fire at a thousand and fifty yards,
and within a minute the battery turned and galloped away
to seek shelter. This little incident, though a triumph for
British musketry, could not of course affect the main issue.
The Warwickshire again reached the crest of the ridge,
and so gained some little respite for the King's Own, but
they suffered severely from the intense fire of artillery and
machine guns and were forced to fall back. The Lanca-
shire Fusiliers were the last to go — not without difficulty,
for the Germans were within three hundred yards of them ;
they rallied on the ridge to the south. The company of
the Essex on their left had retired a little earlier ; but that
of the Inniskillings withdrew with the Lancashire Fusiliers,
with the exception of the left platoon, which remained
where it had fought, amid a circle of German dead, with
not a single man unwounded. The withdrawal of the
12th Infantry Brigade across the valley to the line Ligny —
Esnes was now practically accomplished.
Meanwhile, the artillery of the 4th Division had come
into action. At 5.30 A.M., immediately on the issue of
the divisional operation orders sent out on receipt of
General Smith-Dorrien's message, the C.R.A., Brigadier-
General Milne, ordered his brigades to reconnoitre positions :
the XXXVII. (Howitzer) and XXXII. Brigades R.F.A. to
the east of the Iris stream, and the XIV. and XXIX. to the
west of it ; and the two last at once to take up positions
of readiness south-east of Esnes. Shortly afterwards, the
Divisional Artillery came into action : the XXXII. and
XXIX. Brigades being detailed to co-operate with the llth
Infantry Brigade, and the XIV. with the 12th Infantry
Brigade.
In the XXXII., the 27th Battery unlimbered in the
open to the west of Ligny, the 134th in a covered position
immediately to the south-west of the village, with the
135th, also under cover, to the left rear of the 27th. The
brigade was brought into action as rapidly as possible, as
the llth Infantry Brigade was asking for artillery support
to divert from it some of the German gun fire to which it
was being subjected.
The XXIX. Brigade took up its position south-east of
Haucourt. Of the XIV., the 68th Battery came into action
at once just south-west of Haucourt, the 39th three-quarters
158 LE CATEAU (6 A.M. TILL NOON)
of a mile in rear, with the 88th in the valley-head to the
east of St. Aubert Farm. The XXXVII. (Howitzer) un-
limbered in the Iris valley, but did not open fire from this
position. The heavy battery, as already noted, was not
present.
The fire of the XIV. Brigade gained time for the 12th
Infantry Brigade to rally ; and now the enemy came on,
against the Lancashire Fusiliers, just as the British would
have desired, — in masses, firing from the hip.1 A burst of
rapid fire from a hastily formed line now speedily brought
the German advance to a standstill, and the Lancashire
Fusiliers took advantage of the lull to re-form on a better
position a short distance in rear. The German artillery
now redoubled its fire ; but between 9.30 and 10 A.M. the
worst of the surprise attack was over, and Brigadier-
General H. M. Wilson was able to reconstitute his line
along a front from Ligny through Haucourt to Esnes,
already occupied by part of the 10th Infantry Brigade.
Brigadier - General Haldane, warned to secure the left
flank of the division, withdrew the Seaforth Highlanders
to a ridge south and somewhat east of Esnes ; and on
this ridge the new position of the two brigades assumed
the shape almost of a semicircle, with its convex side
to the enemy. The units were very much mixed, and
it is impossible to say precisely where some of them were
placed.
By 11 A.M. the firing in this quarter of the field had died
down. The German attack, delivered by a mixed force of
cavalry, Jager, and possibly infantry, with a very powerful
backing of artillery, had been repulsed. The 12th In-
fantry Brigade had, indeed, been forced back to the south
side of the Warnelle Ravine ; and had suffered heavy
casualties, chiefly owing to the mishap to the King's Own.
The cavalry and the cyclists of the 4th Division, had they
been available, would undoubtedly have prevented this
surprise. Even as things were, the division had succeeded
in holding its own. Moreover, if the Germans hoped to
pin it to its ground, they had failed ; for there was nothing
now to prevent the 4th Division from continuing its retire-
ment if it so desired.
During this period the llth Infantry Brigade became
isolated to a certain extent, owing to the retirement of
the 12th Infantry Brigade on its left and, on its right,
by the distance which separated it from the 7th Infantry
1 These troops would appear to have been dismounted cavalry.
THE LEFT OF THE LINE 159
Brigade ; but it held on with the greatest tenacity. Its 26 Aug.
position, it may be recalled, was on the Caudry plateau 1914»
to the north of the Warnelle Ravine, astride the " Quarry "
knoll and extending thence south-west across the railway
to the edge of the plateau, its general front being towards
the north-west. Before part of this front, notably on the
northern slope of the " Quarry " knoll, there was a natural
glacis, but further to the west the field of fire was bad.
The enemy, of course, avoided the glacis, and preferred
to work round both flanks of the brigade and attack along
the line of the railway from the west and from the southern
margin of Fontaine au Pire from the north-east. But
though the Germans brought up battery after battery,
until the line of their guns extended from Wambaix to
the north of Fontaine,1 and swept the plateau with them
and with machine guns, the bombardment was not fol-
lowed by the advance of infantry in large bodies. After
a time the East Lancashire were compelled to retire
from the northern slope of the " Quarry " to a sunken
road upon the southern slope, and there they remained.
The Rifle Brigade and two companies of the Somerset
Light Infantry, on the right of the East Lancashire, also
held their ground, though heavily shelled. They were
rewarded occasionally by the sight of German infantry
striving to advance over the stubble, and seized every
opportunity of cutting them down by rapid fire.
More than once small parties of the llth Infantry
Brigade were forced out of the more exposed positions
by the rain of shrapnel ; but they always reoccupied
them, or were replaced by supports from the Warnelle
Ravine. Once the Hampshire, on the left of the line,
essayed a counter-attack, but it proved too costly. The
Germans at this point were too wise to quit their shelter ;
they had an overwhelming force of artillery ; they had
brought forward their machine guns with their wonted
skill ; and they might reasonably reckon that the llth
Infantry Brigade would soon retire and abandon the
position without bitter fighting, or, better still, cling to it
too long, and be surrounded. Here, therefore, as on the
remainder of the left wing, there was a deadlock.
So far General Smith -Dorrien had everywhere held
his ground successfully for some six hours ; and, except
1 The artillery of the IV. Reserve Corps was sent up ahead of its
infantry and no doubt had come into action to assist the Cavalry Corps
(Wirth).
160 LE CATEAU (6 A.M. TILL NOON)
immediately to the west of Le Cateau, his line was not
only unbroken but unshaken. Even there the enemy
had not immediately pressed home the advantages which
he had gained ; but the situation was rapidly grow-
ing more serious. To that critical point we must now
return.
CHAPTER VIII
THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU, 26TH AUGUST (continued)
NOON TILL 5 P.M.
(See Sketch 3 ; Maps 3, 10 & 11)
The Right of the Line.
SHORTLY after noon the situation of the Suffolks and Sketch 3.
of the batteries supporting them, on the right of the line, MaPs 10
became serious under the German enfilade fire. The 108th
Heavy Battery, in action well behind the right flank, had
silenced one troublesome group of guns near Croix ; but,
despite this good piece of shooting, the hostile artillery
still far outmatched the British.1 Reserves there were
none, except for the four battalions of the 19th Infantry
Brigade ; and of these the Cameronians and Royal Welch
Fusiliers, in view of the enemy's movement on Ligny,
had at 10 A.M. been moved away westwards to Montigny,
behind the left flank of the II. Corps ; a part of the Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders had already been thrown
into the fight ; 2 and only the remainder of this battalion,
together with the 1 /Middlesex, were available on the right.
By the brigadier's orders, two half-companies of the
Argylls, with the battalion machine guns, were now sent
up into the lane that ran over the ridge to the right rear
of the Suffolks ; and the 1 /Middlesex moved forward into
position upon the right of the Highlanders. The only
reassuring feature in the situation of the 5th Division was
that the Germans were not pushing their way up the
valley of the Selle past the right flank of the 14th Infantry
Brigade with the rapidity and vigour that might have
1 Apparently the greater part of the artillery of the German 5th, 6th
and 7th Divisions was in action against the 5th Division.
2 See p. 150.
VOL. I 161 M
162 LE CATEAU (NOON TILL 5 P.M.)
been expected. Whether the German ///. Corps had
been slow in following its advanced troops, or, as it came
upon the field, had been diverted from Le Cateau west-
ward, in support of the frontal attack on the 14th and
13th Infantry Brigades, was unknown.1 In any case, the
detachment of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders,
seeing no German troops in the valley, turned its machine
guns at long range on to the ridge east of Le Cateau. This
drew the fire of the German artillery, which put both the
machine guns out of action. But, at the moment, the
danger lay not in the east but in the north. About noon,
General Smith-Dorrien visited the 5th Divisional Head-
quarters again, and discussed with Sir Charles Fergusson
the question of holding on or retiring. As the Germans
were so near, it was thought that a counter-attack would
be necessary to disengage, and the decision to retire was,
temporarily, postponed.
Shortly before 1 P.M., Sir Charles Fergusson from his
lookout in Reumont village could see that the right of
his division was shaken and might shortly give way, and
he reported in that sense to Corps Headquarters. A
little later he added that a German division 2 was
working round his right towards Bazuel. Finally at
1.20 P.M. he suggested that unless material assistance
could be sent to him he had better begin retiring. It
seems to have been about this time that, during a lull
in the German fire, the teams of the llth Battery came
up to the guns, and got five of them away, the team of
the sixth being shot down. The teams of the 80th and
37th Batteries also came forward, and brought away five
of the guns and four of the howitzers ; another howitzer
as will be seen was recovered later on. But these three
batteries were saved only at the cost of the teams of the
52nd, of which the guns had consequently to be abandoned.
The gunners of this battery were ordered to retire, but a
few remained and managed to keep one gun in action.
Somewhat later, the teams of the 122nd Battery galloped
up through the line of the West Kents, in brigade reserve,
who stood up and cheered them loudly as they dashed be-
tween their trenches and onward down the slope towards
their guns. As they came within view of the enemy, they
were struck by a hurricane of shrapnel and of bullets from
the machine guns in the Cambrai road ; but still they went
1 For what happened to the German III. Corps, see p. 185
2 The 5th Division of the ///. Corps.
THE RIGHT OF THE LINE 163
on. The officer in charge of the teams was killed, one team 26 Aug.
shot down in a heap before the position was reached, but 1914-
two guns of the 122nd Battery were carried out without
mishap. A third was limbered up, but the horses went
down instantly. It was an extraordinary sight : a short
wild scene of galloping and falling horses, and then four
guns standing derelict, a few limbers lying about, one on
the skyline with its pole vertical, and dead men and
dead horses everywhere. It was then decided to abandon
the remainder, as also the guns of the 121st and 123rd
Batteries, which were in an even more exposed position,
the breech-blocks being first removed and the sights
smashed. Altogether, twenty -five field guns and the
howitzer were lost in this part of the field ; but, con-
sidering that the batteries were practically in the firing
line, it is astonishing that any were rescued ; and the feat
redounds to the eternal honour of the officers and men
of the 5th Divisional Artillery.
It was now about 2 P.M. At 1.40 P.M., in response to
the 1.20 P.M. message, General Smith-Dorrien had placed
his two remaining battalions, the Cameronians and the
Royal Welch Fusiliers, at Sir Charles Fergusson's disposal,
ordering them to move from Montigny to Bertry, and
asked him to hold his ground at any rate a little longer
so as to allow the preliminary movements of the retire-
ment to take effect, but to begin the withdrawal of the
5th Division as soon as he should think fit ; after which
the 3rd and 4th Divisions were to follow in succession.
Roads had previously been allotted for the retirement
to the north-west of St. Quentin, when it should take place,
as follows : —
To the 5th Division and 19th Infantry Brigade, two roads : Map 3.
(1) via Bertry — Maretz, and thence the Roman Road
to Vermand ;
(2) via Reumont — Maurois — Busigny — Bohain — Bran-
court — Joncourt — Bellenglise.
To the 3rd Division, that via Montigny — Clary — Elincourt
— Malincourt (east of the Church) — Beaurevoir — Gouy — Bony
— Hargicourt — Jeancourt.
To the 4th Division, that via Selvigny — Malincourt (west
of the Church) — Aubencheul — Ronssoy — Templeux — Roisel.
To the Cavalry, any roads west of the 4th Division.
The pressure upon the British line immediately west Map 11,
of Le Cateau now became severe, and it seemed clear that
the Germans were preparing for a great effort. Before
164 LE CATEAU (NOON TILL 5 P.M.)
the teams of the 122nd Battery advanced, three platoons
of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had twice
made gallant attempts to reach the trenches of the
Suffolks, but had been beaten back with severe loss
by artillery and machine-gun fire. They rallied under
the protection of the 59th Field Company R.E., which
fave up its trenches to them and lay down in the open,
o intense, in fact, was the machine-gun fire upon the
whole ridge to the rear of the Suffolks that the Highlanders
had to abandon the line of the road which they had taken
up, and move further down the slope towards the valley
of the Selle. Meanwhile, the German battalions were
steadily gaining ground ; in fact, as the last gun team of
the 5th Divisional Artillery was driving off, as described
two paragraphs above, they were only four hundred yards
from it, and were only kept back for a time by a party of
the Manchesters, which, with the machine-gun detach-
ment, offered so stout a resistance as to gain a few minutes'
respite. During this brief interval, Captain Reynolds of
the 37th Battery, having obtained permission to call for
volunteers, came galloping down with teams to rescue
the two howitzers which had been left on the ground.
The German infantry was then within two hundred yards,
yet by the gallantry and devotion of this little party
both howitzers were limbered up ; and though one team
was shot down before it could move, the other galloped
off with its howitzer and brought it safely away.
This episode, which gained the Victoria Cross for
Captain Reynolds and for Drivers Luke and Drain, was
the last gleam of light upon this gloomy corner of the
field.1 Between 2.30 and 2.45 P.M. the end came. The
Germans had by this time accumulated an overwhelming
force in the shelter of the Cambrai road, and they now
fell upon the Suffolks from the front, right flank and
right rear. The turning movement, however, did not at
once make itself felt, and the Suffolks and Argylls opened
rapid fire to their front with terrific effect, two officers of
the Highlanders, in particular, bringing down man after
man and counting their scores aloud as if at a competition.
The Germans kept sounding the British " Cease fire "
and gesticulating to persuade the men to surrender, but
in vain. At length a rush of the enemy from the rear
bore down all resistance ; and the Suffolks and their
Highland comrades were overwhelmed. They had for
1 Captain Reynolds was killed by gas near Ypres, 1916.
I
THE RIGHT OF THE LINE 165
nine hours been under an incessant bombardment which 26 Aug.
had pitted the whole of the ground with craters, and 1914-
they had fought to the very last, covering themselves
with undying glory.
Meanwhile orders had been issued about 2 P.M.1 by
Sir Charles Fergusson for the retirement of the 5th Division
to begin, but these do not appear to have reached any
battalion much before 3 P.M. It was comparatively easy
to communicate with brigades, but nearly impossible to
get messages to the firing line, as the fighting there was
literally hand-to-hand, and the ground in rear was swept
by shell fire. Further, the 14th Infantry Brigade was
handicapped by the loss of its Signal Section, which had
been practically destroyed in the early morning fighting
in Le Cateau. As a result no orders at all reached Lieut. -
Colonel Bond and the companies of the Yorkshire Light
Infantry in the firing line. The survivors of the Man-
chesters (14th) and Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
(19th) drifted back towards Reumont; and meanwhile the
right of the Yorkshire Light Infantry, which faced east-
wards, was heavily engaged with German infantry advancing
over the ridge which the Suffolks had held. First two
battalions in dense masses swept over the crest and down
the beetroot-field on its western slopes. The K.O. Y.L.I. —
five platoons with two machine guns — allowed them to
move well down the slope and then opened rapid fire,
which drove the enemy back with heavy loss to the reverse
side of the ridge. Meanwhile, the Duke of Wellington's
and West Rents (13th Infantry Brigade) had begun to
retire from the left rear of the Yorkshire Light Infantry, as
did also the East Surreys, conforming to the movement
of the West Kents ; whilst the Scottish Borderers (13th)
on the other flank of the brigade were also beginning to
fall back. When, therefore, shortly after their first
advance, the Germans reappeared on the crest of the
ridge, they could outflank the right of the Yorkshire Light
Infantry. This they proceeded to do, progressing slowly
and warily, after the lesson that they had received, and
throwing out troops wide to the south-east so as com-
pletely to envelop the K.O.Y.L.I.'s right rear. The five
platoons and the machine guns once again found a good
target at five hundred yards' range and took full ad-
vantage of it ; but the Germans now pressed home their
1 No records or messages of this period are available as the 5th Divi-
sional Headquarters' wagon was hit and blown up in Reumont.
166 LE CATEAU (NOON TILL 5 P.M.)
attack on the main front of the battalion from the Cambrai
road, and on its left flank from the ground vacated by
the Scottish Borderers. Although the left, by sheer
marksmanship, was able to prevent the enemy from plant-
ing machine guns on the last-named point, it could not
prevent its occupation by increasing numbers of the enemy
who at once opened a destructive enfilade fire. A desperate
effort was made to reinforce this flank, but nearly every
man sent forward was shot down ; and the enemy now
set himself systematically to roll up the attenuated line
of the Yorkshiremen from left to right. In spite of
the gallant efforts of Major Yate,1 who commanded the
firing line, the end came soon afterwards; the company
with him had lost over sixty men killed outright and
many wounded, and the other companies had suffered
equally ; and when about 3.30 P.M. the final rush of the
enemy took place, the survivors were overpowered and
made prisoners. That night the 2/K.O. Y.L.I, mustered
only 8 officers and 320 rank and file, but it had held up
the Germans at the only point where they penetrated into
the British position, and thus gave the rest of the 5th
Division a clear start of the enemy in their retirement.
Whilst the advance of the enemy through the gap
immediately to the west of Le Cateau had been thus
delayed by a single battalion, the progress of his out-
flanking movement to the east of the town was also
checked. Two half-companies of the Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, it will be remembered, had moved down
the western slope of the valley of the Selle ; here the
59th Field Company Royal Engineers had joined them ;
and in the course of time, half the 1 /Middlesex, with two
companies of the 1 /Scots Fusiliers (from the reserve of
the 9th Infantry Brigade) prolonged the line to the right.
Towards 3 P.M. German troops 2 were seen advancing west-
wards over the spur on the eastern side of the valley ;
whereupon the Highlanders and the machine guns of the
Middlesex opened fire at twelve hundred yards' range,
and effectually turned them back. Thus the Germans
were held for a time both to the east and west of
Le Cateau ; and General Smith-Dorrien's dispositions,
now in progress, to cover the retreat on this side had
1 Major Yate was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross. He was
found with his skull smashed in by persons unknown during an attempt
to escape from Germany.
2 III. Corps.
THE RIGHT OF THE LINE 167
ample time to take effect. The long valley that runs up 26 Aug.
fj-om Le Cateau southwards to Honnechy had been since 1914>
9 A.M. under the observation of the 1st Cavalry Brigade
and E Battery, posted between Escaufourt and Honnechy,
these troops having retired to that position, where they
found L Battery in action, at the close of their first engage-
ment with the enemy about Bazuel. At 1.15 P.M. the Corn-
wall Light Infantry, and the two companies of the East
Surreys that were with them, were ordered from the reserve
of the 5th Division l to Honnechy ; about 2 P.M. the 2/Royal
Welch Fusiliers and I/Scottish Rifles of the 19th Infantry
Brigade, Sir Horace's only corps reserve, now at the
disposal of the 5th Division, were directed to march from
Bertry, and to post themselves on the left of the Duke of
Cornwall's at Maurois ; and the 1 /Norfolk were sent back
from the " Tree " on the Sunken Road to Reumont.
Lastly, a section of the 108th Heavy Battery was ordered
to take up a position near Honnechy ; and, though one
gun was unfortunately upset in a ditch and had to be
abandoned, the other safely reached the place assigned to
it. By 3 P.M., or very little later, the whole of these
troops were in position behind the right flank ; and it
only remained to be seen how vigorously the enemy would
follow up his success. At 3.47 P.M. the II. Corps reported
to G.H.Q. by a telegram, received at 3.50 P.M., that the
retirement had begun.
Towards 3.30 P.M. the Germans2 again showed them-
selves on the eastern side of the Selle, this time in extended
order, so that the rifles and machine guns of the party of
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had not the same
chance against them as before. But, as they advanced,
they were met by the shells of E and L Batteries, and,
after working their way south for a time, took shelter
under cover of the railway embankment, and there came
to a temporary standstill. The 1 /Middlesex on the High-
landers' right now withdrew up the valley of the Selle
towards Reumont ; and the latter, being warned that the
Germans were crossing the Roman Road in their left rear,
fell back to the spur which runs south-west from Reumont,
where they found a mixed body of Manchesters and other
units deployed, and took up position alongside them. The
Germans had by this time — about 4.30 P.M. — brought up
guns to engage the British batteries near Escaufourt and
were again advancing up the valley of the Selle ; but their
1 See p. 147 et seq. 2 III. Corps.
168 LE CATEAU (NOON TILL 5 P.M.)
losses were heavy and their progress slow. An aeroplane
detected the position of E and L Batteries, but the German
fire does not appear to have done any great damage. There
was no sign of German cavalry hurrying forward in masses
to the pursuit ; and there seemed to be a good prospect
that darkness would fall before the enemy could close
with the rear guards retiring from the valley of the Selle.1
Immediately to the west of Le Cateau in the 13th
Infantry Brigade area, the enemy equally failed to press
his advantage ; the shells of the 61st Howitzer Battery
and 108th Heavy Battery constantly broke up the German
infantry when it tried to reassemble and re-form. The
2/Duke of Wellington's was certainly heavily shelled as
it retired, but suffered little harm, though the battalion
became widely scattered. The West Kents fell back slowly
and methodically, and their rear guard saw nothing to
shoot at except a German company which showed itself
for a few minutes passing eastward through the abandoned
guns of the XV. Brigade R.F.A. more than a thousand
yards away. Between 4.30 and 5 P.M. this rear guard
retired in extended order without molestation even by
artillery. The Scottish Borderers withdrew in the same
way, though the order to retire unfortunately did not
reach the greater part of one company, which was sur-
rounded and captured. Near the " Tree " on the Sunken
Road at least one company halted for the best part of an
hour, and fired with great effect upon German infantry
nine hundred yards to its right. Between 4.15 and 5 P.M.
the battalion fell back by successive companies to Trois-
villes, and then turned to cover the retreat of the 15th
Infantry Brigade which was falling back in perfect order.
Thus on the right of the line, the most critical point of
all, things had not gone altogether ill in the first and most
difficult stage of the retreat.
NOON TO 5 P.M. : THE RIGHT CENTRE OF THE LINE
Map 11. Until a little past noon the Bedfords and Dorsets in
the firing line of the 15th Infantry Brigade, on the left
of the 5th Division, saw little or nothing of the enemy,
except at a distance ; and even then they could perceive
only small parties on the Cambrai road (which at this
1 No orders for pursuit were issued by von Kluck until 8.13 P.M.,
and these directed the line Esnes — Caudry — Reumont to be crossed at
4 A.M. next day.
THE RIGHT OF THE LINE 169
point offered no shelter to the enemy) attempting to 26 Aug
bring machine guns into position. These were promptly 1914
engaged and smothered by the fire of the Dorsets' machine
guns before they could come into action. Later on the
German infantry showed itself in front in greater force,
but was so hotly received by the Bedfords and Dorsets,
as well as by the batteries of the XXVII. Brigade R.F.A.
that it would not venture upon a definite attack. Soon
after 3 P.M. the order to retire was received by the 15th
Infantry Brigade, and it was calmly and systematically
obeyed. The 119th Battery was withdrawn first, and
moved back to the spur just south of the " Tree " on the
Sunken Road. About 3.30 P.M. the Bedfords and Dorsets
fell back slowly in succession covered by the machine
guns of the latter, and, together with the 121st Battery,
faced about again at the south-eastern angle of Troisvilles.
No Germans had yet crossed the Cambrai road on their
front, being checked by the rifle fire, at long range, of the
right company of the Fifth Fusiliers (9th Infantry Brigade) ;
but the enemy's artillery now concentrated a very heavy
fire upon Troisvilles from the north and north-east, and,
gradually finding the range, compelled this company, as
well as the Scottish Borderers on its right, to retire once
more. The 121st Battery was only limbered up with
difficulty, but the Dorsets, well covered by their machine
guns, got back to the southern end of Troisvilles with little
loss. A German aeroplane now appeared over their heads,
dropping smoke signals, and the German gunners guided
by these put down a barrage of shrapnel on every road
and track leading to the south. The Scottish Borderers,
who had taken the road towards Reumont, were diverted
from it to the open country further west. The Dorsets
and the Bedfords broke into small parties and, passing
through the barrage with little or no damage, headed south
across country towards Maurois. Bedfords, Dorsets, Cheshire
(15th Infantry Brigade reserve) and Scottish Borderers
all entered the Roman Road near Reumont or Maurois
without the slightest pressure of German cavalry or infantry
upon their rear. Only on their right — towards Le Cateau
—had the enemy been seen in any force ; and his advance
there had been delayed as has already been described.
The withdrawal of the 5th Division from a broad and
scattered front on to a single road at right angles to it
naturally brought as a consequence a thorough mix-up
of all units — except in the case of the 15th Infantry
170 LE CATEAU (NOON TILL 5 P.M.)
Brigade, which entered it as a formed body. This state
of affairs the Staff, as will be later narrated, took steps
to remedy as soon as possible ; but the enemy was too
close for any immediate attempt at re-forming to be
made. There was, to quote one eye-witness, " confusion,
but no disorganization; disorder, but no panic"; while
another has exactly caught the scene by saying that it
reminded him of a crowd leaving a race meeting and
making its way earnestly towards a railway station.
NOON TO 5 P.M. : THE 3RD DIVISION
Map 11. On the left of the 15th Infantry Brigade in the 3rd
Division sector, the 9th was perfectly secure. The enemy
had established himself on the southern edge of Inchy,
but had been unable to advance a yard further ; and,
though Brigadier-General Shaw's battalions had had
little opportunity of using their rifles, the XXIII. Brigade
R.F.A. had inflicted very severe loss on the German infantry.
Soon after 3 P.M. the brigadier observed that the troops
on his right were retreating ; and though it was plain that
the Germans were not following them in any strength, he
was relieved when orders reached him, at 3.30 P.M., to con-
form with the movement. Pushing up the Royal Fusiliers
from the reserve to the north-western edge of Troisvilles,
he brought away nearly all his wounded, after which he
withdrew in succession the Fifth Fusiliers and the Lincoln-
shire with very trifling loss. The German skirmishers
lining the southern edge of Inchy tried hard to hinder
the movement, but were silenced by the advanced sections
of the 107th and 108th Batteries. Although the Fifth
Fusiliers, before they could reach the shelter of a hollow
near Le Fayt, had to cross a thousand yards of open
ground, the German artillery scarcely fired a round at
them. As the last party of the Lincolnshire came abreast
of the advanced section of the 108th Battery, the officer
in command, having fired off his last round of ammunition,
disabled and abandoned his guns. They and the other
advanced section had done great work, but at the cost of
four eighteen-pounders. The retreat was then continued
methodically, without pressure from the enemy, and the
battalions re-formed as soon as they reached sheltered
ground. The XXIII. Brigade R.F.A. was collected at
Bertry ; and the 9th Infantry Brigade took up a position
on the ridge between Bertry and Montigny to cover the
THE LEFT OF THE LINE 171
retreat of the rest of the 3rd Division ; its casualties 26 Aug.
hardly amounted to one hundred and eighty. 1914-
NOON TO 5 P.M. : THE STH INFANTRY BRIGADE
AND THE 4TH DIVISION
The course of events west of the 9th Infantry Brigade Map 11.
is less easy to describe. From noon onwards there was
a lull in the German fire ; and advantage was taken of
this to reinforce the troops at Caudry with half a company
of the Irish Rifles. Some of the 12th Infantry Brigade
likewise seized the opportunity to recross to the north
side of the Warnelle Ravine in order to bring in their
wounded, but they were driven back by a steady fire from
the enemy before they could collect many of them. Then
about 1.40 P.M. the German guns opened fire once more
with increased violence and in much greater numbers,1
concentrating in the first instance chiefly on Caudry,
while simultaneously German infantry advanced against
the junction of the Royal Scots and Gordon Highlanders
immediately to the north of Audencourt. They failed
however to gain any ground, being met by an accurate
fire on their front and effectively enfiladed, at a range
of six hundred yards, by the left company of the Gordons.
At Caudry itself the enemy was more successful, for by
2 P.M. the troops of the 7th Infantry Brigade were driven
from the village by the bombardment, and German infantry
was able to enter and occupy it. About the same time
masses of German infantry2 developed a strong attack
from the north-west against the half-battalion of the
Inniskilling Fusiliers which covered the western flank at
Esnes. It was met by rapid rifle and machine-gun fire,
supported shortly after by artillery. The answering
German fire was wholly ineffective, and the Inniskillings
were able to check this attack completely. Nevertheless,
the situation was not reassuring, for it was clear' that
fresh German infantry, the herald of another corps, had
come up, and that, if it failed to break in on the north
side of Esnes, it would work round to the left flank and
rear.
Meanwhile, between 2.30 and 3 P.M. the 3/Worcester-
1 Some guns of the German Jfih Reserve Corps had no doubt arrived
(see footnote 2, p. 174).
2 This was, no doubt, the advanced guard of the 7th Reserve Division,
which got up at 2 P.M. (see footnote 1, p. 174).
172 LE CATEAU (NOON TILL 5 P.M.)
shire (7th Infantry Brigade) counter-attacked at Caudry,
reoccupied the southern portion of the village and pushed
advanced posts to the north and north-east. But the
northern part of the village was not recovered, and the
Germans had already made the llth Infantry Brigade
sensible of their presence on its right flank. Brigadier-
General Hunter- Weston, naturally assuming that Caudry
had been finally lost, decided to withdraw the llth Infantry
Brigade across the Warnelle Ravine to a position before
Ligny. The guns of the 135th Battery were brought
forward and entrenched in and round Ligny for close
defence ; and then, the 1 /Rifle Brigade being left at the
" Quarry " as rear guard, the remaining battalions of
the brigade were shortly after 3 P.M. drawn off into the
low ground of the Ravine under a perfect tempest of
shrapnel. As they came into sight of the Germans again
on the slope just below Ligny, the enemy redoubled his
fire, inflicting considerable loss, and when at last the
rear guard withdrew from the " Quarry," the German
infantrymen1 sprang up from their concealed positions
and rushed forward in pursuit. Their ranks were instantly
torn and mangled by the British guns ; but they speedily
rallied and continued the advance regardless of losses,
and, before the llth Infantry Brigade could be completely
re-formed, they swarmed forward to the attack of Ligny.
Met by shrapnel and rapid fire, they turned, unable to
persist against the hail of bullets. But being reinforced,
they advanced again, only to suffer still more heavily,
for the British were now better prepared to receive them.
They fell back again, too severely punished to find heart
for a third attempt ; and the 4th Division was left in
undisputed possession of Ligny. These actions hardly
came to a complete end before 4 P.M.
It was amid such turmoil on the extreme left of the
line that shortly after 3 P.M. General Hubert Hamilton
rode down to Colonel W. D. Bird, who was with his
battalion of Irish Rifles at Troncquoy, and directed him
to take command of the 7th Infantry Brigade, since
Brigadier-General McCracken had been disabled by a shell,
and to withdraw the troops from Caudry under cover of
the Irish Rifles and two field batteries. Colonel Bird
made his dispositions accordingly ; and by 4.30 P.M. his
brigade was practically clear of the village. At that hour
1 The 3rd, 9th and lOlh Jdger and 19!h Cavalry Brigade according to
" Deutsche Kavallerie," pp. 59, 60.
THE LEFT OF THE LINE 173
the troops in Audencourt, on the east of Caudry, suddenly 26 Aug.
fell back, both artillery and infantry. The 8th Infantry
Brigade had received its instructions to retire about 3.30
P.M., but there was difficulty and delay in communicating
them to the various units, and it is certain that some of
them received none at all. The 4/Middlesex and the Royal
Scots, with the exception of a detached party of the latter on
the immediate right of the Gordons, were withdrawn without
much difficulty. The party above named, together with
the bulk of the Gordons, and two companies of the Royal
Irish, having no orders to move, remained in their positions.
Three platoons of the Gordons, however, heard of the order
to retire, and managed to get away, as also did the reserve
companies of the Royal Irish. These last were obliged to
fight hard to extricate themselves and the batteries of the
XL. Brigade R.F.A. ; l but three guns of the 6th Battery
were lost, the teams being shot down by a lucky salvo
whilst in the act of withdrawing. Two platoons of
the Royal Irish also were cut off from their main body,
but contrived to make good their retreat independently.
Meanwhile since 2.30 P.M. Audencourt had been furiously
bombarded, and the vehicles and horses of the 8th Brigade
Headquarters, and the whole of the brigade machine guns
and transport were lost. The German infantry, however,
made no attempt to advance. The 41st Battery, working
with Colonel Bird, opened fire on the crest east of Caudry,
as soon as our troops were clear of it ; but, so far as can be
gathered, there was at the time not a single German upon
this ground. Half an hour later, however, at 5 P.M. the
German infantrymen did swarm forward, toiling painfully
up a gentle slope through beetroots that reached to their
knees. Whether they expected opposition or not is hard
to say, but they were met by the rapid fire of the Gordon
Highlanders and Royal Scots, who shot them down at a
range of from four to six hundred yards with the greatest
coolness. One subaltern of the Royal Scots reckoned that
he hit thirty to forty of them himself. The Germans
were unable to gain an inch of ground ; for the best part
of an hour they swayed backwards and forwards in front
of these few isolated groups, probably exaggerating their
strength both in men and machine guns, but completely at
a loss how to clear them out of the way.
The rest of the 8th Infantry Brigade, having re-formed
1 Their adversaries were two brigades of the 9th Cavalry Division and
the whole of the 4ih (" Deutsche Kavallerie," pp. 61, 62).
174 LE CATEAU (NOON TILL 5 P.M.)
in dead ground, took the road to Montigny, and Colonel
Bird, after waiting for fully twenty minutes without seeing
a sign either of retreating British or advancing Germans,
led back the 7th Infantry Brigade soon after 5 P.M. by the
same road, without the slightest interference on the part
of the enemy.
SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION AT 5 P.M.
Map 3. Thus by 5 P.M., roughly speaking, the whole of the II.
Corps had begun its retreat and its rear guards were all in
position, and the moment had come for the 4th Division,
which was on its left, to move ; and there was no time to
lose. For, although the right of the division was for the
moment secure after the double repulse of the German
attack upon Ligny, masses of the IV. Reserve Corps 1 were
now arriving from the direction of Cattenieres — Wambaix.
Map 11. The appearance of Sordet's Cavalry in the left rear of
the 4th Division now provided a most opportune diversion.
General Smith-Dorrien had naturally counted on this co-
operation ; and General Sordet, having visited Sir John
French at 9 A.M., was fully conversant with the situation.
His corps on the night of the 24th/25th had bivouacked
near Avesnes — Dompierre, and on the 25th moved more
than thirty miles across the line of march of the B.E.F. in
order to reach its left flank. It arrived late at night in
the neighbourhood of Walincourt, about ten miles west
by south of Le Cateau, men and horses dog-tired and
soaked with rain. Of its three divisions, the 5th halted
for the night in and about Esnes, the 1st at Lesdain and
the 3rd at Le Bosquet (3 miles south-west of Esnes). The
corps moved out to the south of Cambrai on the morning
of the 26th in observation of the ground on the left rear of
the British and of the southern exits from Cambrai.
Towards 4 P.M., when the moment for effective action
seemed to have come, the corps found itself faced by
German infantry 2 from the direction of Wambaix, and its
batteries opened fire. These guns were heard by General
Smith-Dorrien about 4.30 P.M. as he was moving south
1 The 7th Reserve Division, see Hauptmann Wirth's " Von der Saale
zur Aisne." He states that the advanced guard of the division reached
the Cambrai highroad north of Cattenieres about 2 P.M., and that the
guns had been sent on ahead and were already in action. He adds
that the German " cavalry had been thrown on the defensive and several
regiments were cowering under cover behind the houses."
2 22nd Division of the IV. Reserve Corps, probably.
SITUATION AT 5 P.M. 175
from Bertry to his new headquarters at St. Quentin, and, 26 Aug.
not knowing whether the sound came from French or 1914-
German artillery, he had a bad moment ; but, galloping
up to the top of some high ground near Maretz, he was
able to satisfy himself that it could be only from French
75's.1 Further, beyond the left of the French cavalry, it
was known that troops of General d'Amade were in and
about Cambrai.2 All, therefore, seemed well, and the
British left flank secure.
1 The following further details are available as regards General Sordet's Map 3.
Cavalry Corps : The 1st Cavalry Division billeted and bivouacked for
the night of the 25th/26th around Esnes to Le Bosquet, with the 5th
on its right and the 3rd on its left. The corps moved out early after a
night spent in great discomfort in wet clothes. During the day the
divisions manoeuvred and reconnoitred ; the 1st moving back to Villers
Guislain, and then forward about 2 P.M. to within a short distance of
Cambrai, where it engaged hostile infantry (//. Corps) coming out of the
town, until 6.30 P.M., and then it retired with the 5th Cavalry Division
(whose other movements are not known) via Gouzeaucourt. (From
Extracts of War Diary of the llth Dragoon Brigade and Major Letard's
" Trois Mois au Premier Corps de Cavalerie.")
2 See Note at end of Chapter IX.
CHAPTER IX
THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU, AND THE
CONTINUATION OF THE RETREAT
5 P.M. TO NIGHTFALL
(See Sketch 3 ; Maps 3, 4, 9, 11 & 13)
The Right of the Line.
Sketch 3. THE party of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (19th
Map 11. infantry Brigade),1 together with the 59th Field Co. R.E.
and a collection of scattered men, last mentioned as being
on the right, was deployed upon the spur that runs south-
eastward from Reumont. The Royal Welch Fusiliers,
Cameronians (both of the 19th Infantry Brigade, from
Montigny), Norfolks (15th Infantry Brigade) and one sixty-
pounder of the 108th Heavy Battery, were in rear of it,
between Maurois and Honnechy. The Bays (1st Cavalry
Brigade), with E and L Batteries, were at Escaufourt,
E Battery being in action against the guns which were
endeavouring to cover the advance of the German infantry
of the III. Corps up the valley of the Selle. This infantry
now crossed the Roman Road on the Highlanders' left
front, advancing in open order with company columns in
rear, and was engaged by the party at a thousand yards'
range. The enemy made no great progress, for the party
had plenty of ammunition, and there was no immediate
reason why it should fall back. After a time, however —
about 5.30 P.M. — Lieut. -Colonel Ward of the I/Middlesex
(19th Infantry Brigade) led his own battalion (which had
been halted east of Reumont in the valley of the Selle),
and the various detachments on the spur near by, towards
Reumont and the Roman Road, detailing the Highlanders
to act as his rear guard. The whole, therefore, moved off
in succession, skirting Reumont where German shells were
1 See p. 167.
176
THE 5TH DIVISION 177
now falling thickly ; the rear guard had no sooner quitted 26 Aug.
its position than the German artillery searched the deserted 1914-
spur with a hail of shrapnel. A company and a half of
the Norfolks, sheltered in a quarry to the south-west of
Reumont, were now left as the troops nearest to the
enemy ; and about this time the cavalry and horse artillery
began to fall back slowly from Escaufourt towards Busigny
(6 miles S.S.W. of Le Cateau), leaving the passage up
the valley towards Honnechy open to the enemy. The
Norfolks opened fire at a range of about 1,800 yards on
the German infantry in extended order to the north-east,
and in due time retired to the edge of Honnechy, passing
as they went through a company of the Royal Welch
Fusiliers, which had been deployed to take over rear guard
from them.
From this point the Norfolk companies had a clearer
view of German columns, both of infantry and artillery,
advancing on the road up the valley from Le Cateau, pre-
ceded by lines of skirmishers. They engaged them at long
range, and the solitary sixty-pounder of the 108th Heavy
Battery, having no shrapnel left, opened fire with lyddite.
Major G. H. Sanders commanding the 122nd Field Battery,
having after a time followed his two remaining guns to
Reumont, collected two ammunition wagons, and un-
limbered south of the village and opened fire on the enemy
columns.
The Germans had by this time advanced up the valley
to the point where the road from Reumont to St. Souplet
intersects that from Le Cateau to Busigny ; but there, to
the great surprise of the Norfolks, they stopped and showed
themselves no more.1
It was now fully 6 P.M. A drizzling rain had just set
in, and the light was beginning to fail early. The enemy's
pursuit seemed to die away. His guns did indeed shell the
position of the Royal Welch Fusiliers ; but, instead of
heavy masses of infantry, small parties of cavalry 'now
hovered about their front, feeling their way forward and
provoking constant little bursts of fire from the British
rear guards, which in the meanwhile continued to fall
back in succession as the Roman Road gradually became
clear for them. The congestion on that road was con-
siderable, for it was packed with infantry, guns, transport
1 Von Kluck does not explain this, saying " the latter [///.] Corps,
" ordered to march on Maretz, did not get further than Honnechy on the
" 26th, so that the attempted enveloping movement failed."
VOL. I N
178 LE CATEAU (5 P.M. TO NIGHTFALL)
and ambulances of the 5th Division and the 19th Infantry
Brigade in no fixed order, just as each unit had happened
Map. 3. to strike the highway. There was some confusion, but the
men marched on steadily and in silence. A few units —
the 1 /Middlesex and a number of scattered men under
Lieut.-Colonel Moulton-Barrett of the Argyll and Suther-
land Highlanders — made their way by two parallel tracks,
east of the Roman Road, to Busigny, where the 3rd
Cavalry Brigade was in position to cover them, and thence
turned westward into the Roman Road. At 7 P.M. or a
little later, German cavalry patrols ran into parties of the
llth and 19th Hussars north of Busigny ; and men of the
former regiment were shelled while crossing the railway
near Busigny station. The Duke of Cornwall's Light
Infantry, the two companies of the East Surrey which
were with them, the Royal Welch Fusiliers and the
Cameronians, moved back steadily from position to posi-
tion and arrived at Maretz, almost without firing a shot ;
the Cameronians waited at Maretz until 9.30 P.M. without
seeing a sign of the enemy. Hostile pursuit, worthy of
the name, had ceased after 6 P.M. ; in fact contact was
practically lost as darkness fell. The whole of the 5th
Division and the 19th Infantry Brigade were now in
retreat along the Roman Road; their right flank, which
had been exposed all day, was no longer threatened.
5 P.M. TO NIGHTFALL: THE 3RD DIVISION
Map 11 The narrative left the 3rd Division in the following
situation : two companies of the Royal Irish, some of the
Royal Scots and the greater part of the Gordon High-
landers were still occupying their original ground in front
of Audencourt, having received no orders to retire, and
were successfully arresting any German advance ; the 9th
Infantry Brigade was in a covering position between
Bertry and Montigny (2 miles south of Caudry) ; and the
bulk of the 7th and 8th were in orderly retreat on Montigny.
Map 3. These two latter formations passed through the 9th
Infantry Brigade and marched away to Clary, making
south-westwards for Beaurevoir (13 miles south-west of Le
Cateau) by way of Elincourt and Malincourt. Not a
German came forward, not even a cavalry patrol, to follow
them ; and not a shell was fired at the 9th Infantry
Brigade, which at 6 P.M. became the rear guard to the 3rd
Division. Evidently the enemy was wholly occupied with
THE 3RD AND 4ra DIVISIONS 179
the detachments — not a thousand strong, all told — which 26 Aug.
had not retired from the original fighting line. At 6 P.M., 1914-
after an hour spent in vain and costly attempts to break
through the Gordons, his fire died down, but began again
twenty minutes later, as he tried to work round the right
of the Royal Scots. This was however foiled by the
oblique fire of the right company of the Gordons, across
the front of the Royal Scots ; and at 6.45 P.M. the Germans
once again concentrated a heavy bombardment upon
Audencourt. As darkness came down the firing died
away into occasional fitful bursts, but at 8.30 P.M. the
German guns once more heaped shells upon the ruins of
Audencourt, not a little to the wonder of the 3rd Division,
who, from the heights south of Clary some six miles away,
watched the projectiles bursting over its deserted position
with grim satisfaction. Thus the British centre had been
withdrawn, from under the very eyes of the Germans,
with very little difficulty and no serious loss.
5 P.M. TO NIGHTFALL : THE 4ra DIVISION
About 5 P.M. the infantry brigadiers of the 4th Division Map 11.
received their orders to retreat, the 10th Infantry Brigade
being detailed as rear guard. At that hour the German
infantry to the immediate front of the line was still
quiescent from the effects of its repulse before Ligny ;
but the volume of hostile artillery fire had continued
steadily to increase, and the turning movement round
the western flank of Esnes had been renewed and pressed
until the Inniskillings had been forced back to the western
fringe of the village. The units of the 10th and 12th
Infantry Brigades were so mixed that the transmission
of orders was exceedingly difficult ; but the sound of
General Sordet's guns about Crevecoeur (2J miles west
of Esnes) gave assurance that the division could retire
without fear of serious attack on its western flank. • The
Seaforth Highlanders, already in position behind this flank,
between Guillemin and St. Aubert Farm, had been joined
in the course of the afternoon by some platoons of the
Irish Fusiliers, and these, with the 4th Cavalry Brigade
further east near Selvigny, were thus ready to cover the
first stage of the retreat. Artillery support was also
close at hand, for, meantime, Brigadier-General Milne,
having had early warning of the intention to break off the
action, had made general arrangements for the retirement
180 LE CATEAU (5 P.M. TO NIGHTFALL)
of the artillery to a succession of covering positions.
After the heavy attack on Haucourt about 2 P.M. the
XXIX. Brigade R.F.A. had retired to a position in the
Iris valley between Caullery and Selvigny (2 miles S.S.W.
of Ligny), and the XIV. Brigade had moved back about
the same time to another one immediately north of Sel-
vigny. About 4 P.M. the 35th (Howitzer) Battery had been
ordered back behind the railway, so as to be prepared
to cover the retirement of the remainder of its brigade,
which was ready to do the same for the XXXII. Brigade,
still south-west of Ligny. At 4.30 P.M. orders were given
for the Brigade Ammunition Columns to get clear and
join the route of the main column at Walincourt (3 miles
S.S.W. of Ligny). About 5 P.M. the 31st and 55th
(Howitzer) Batteries were withdrawn to the south of
Selvigny, where the 35th Battery joined them.
It is difficult to ascertain which of the infantry were
the first to be withdrawn ; but it seems that part of the
12th Infantry Brigade, the Essex and the two forward
companies of the Inniskillings, moved off soon after 5 P.M.,
halting and facing about on the road between Selvigny
and Guillemin. The Lancashire Fusiliers, half of the
Dublin Fusiliers (10th Infantry Brigade), and part of the
King's Own appear to have started rather later, though
half of the King's Own, receiving no warning to retire,
remained in position at Haucourt. The rest of the Innis-
killings slipped away in small parties from Esnes, just as
the enemy penetrated to the western houses of the village,
and retreated upon Walincourt in good order. The enemy
smothered the road with shrapnel, but the British columns
moved on either side of it and escaped all damage.
The llth Infantry Brigade and the remainder of the
12th, much scattered, held their positions until 6 P.M. or
even later. The 135th Battery (XXXII. Brigade R.F.A.),
which was in close support of the infantry near Ligny,
was so exposed that its withdrawal seemed impossible,
and orders were actually issued that the guns should be
abandoned, but the battery commander, Major Liveing,1
decided to try and save his guns and, withdrawing them
and their wagons by hand, brought all of them (except
one wagon) safely away. To the west of Ligny the posi-
tion of the 27th Battery (XXXII. Brigade R.F.A.) was
even worse ; nevertheless, the gunners, taking advantage
of every lull, succeeded in running back four guns and
1 He was awarded the D.S.O.
THE 4TH DIVISION 181
limbers to the sunken road in rear, when increase in the 26 Aug.
German artillery fire compelled them to abandon the re- 1914-
maining two. The battery then formed up and awaited
its opportunity ; it eventually made a dash to the south-
west, and, though it was pursued by German shells, got its
four guns safely away.1
Of the llth Infantry Brigade, Lieut.-Colonel Swayne
of the Somerset Light Infantry brought away with
him what survived of two companies ; the rest of the
battalion under Major Prowse having become separated
from him remained fighting at Ligny until a late hour.
The East Lancashire withdrew in three distinct bodies,
two of which united at Clary. The main body of the
I/Rifle Brigade made its way to Selvigny and took up a
covering position there, whilst another party, with scattered
men of other regiments, came later to the same village with
the brigadier. Last of all the Hampshire retired, about
7 P.M., and overtook the rest of the brigade on its way to
Serain (4 miles south of Selvigny), where it passed the
night. Of the 10th Infantry Brigade, only the Seaforth
Highlanders and the greater part of the Irish Fusiliers
were under their brigadier's hand. Half of the Warwick-
shire and a good number of the Dublin Fusiliers were still in
Haucourt, and the remainder were dispersed in various direc-
tions, some as escort to guns, others in small isolated bodies.
As with the rest of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's force,
the enemy not only did not pursue the 4th Division, but
did very little even to embarrass the retreat. The 1 /Rifle
Brigade, the rear guard of the llth Infantry Brigade,
and the mixed party with it, finding the roads blocked
in every direction, bivouacked at Selvigny, within two
miles of the battlefield, and the Seaforths almost level
with them on the east, at Hurtevent Farm. The Map 3.
remainder were directed on through Walincourt, by way
of Malincourt — where a divisional column of march was
made up with the artillery — and Aubencheul, to Vendhuille
(2 miles north-west of Le Catelet). Von Kluck's shells,
as we have seen, followed the British as long as they were
within sight and range, and caused a few casualties, though
not many ; he also bombarded the evacuated positions
with great fury until dark ; but his cavalry and infantry
made no attempt to press on. In fact, the whole of
Smith-Dorrien's troops had done what was thought to
1 The battery commander, Major H. E. Vallentin, received the D.S.O.,
and two sergeants and five gunners, the D.C.M.
182 LE CATEAU (5 P.M. TO NIGHTFALL)
be impossible. With both flanks more or less in the air,
they had turned upon an enemy of at least twice their
strength ; had struck him hard, and had withdrawn, except
on the right front of the 5th Division, practically without
interference, with neither flank enveloped, having suffered
losses certainly severe, but, considering the circumstances,
by no means extravagant.1 The men looked upon them-
selves as victors, some indeed doubted whether they had
been in a serious action ; yet they had inflicted upon the
enemy casualties which are believed to have been out of
all proportion to their own ; and they had completely foiled
the plan of the German commander.
GERMAN ACCOUNTS OF LE CATEAU
Maps 3, 9, Very little has been published in Germany about Le
& n* Cateau, and there is no official account of the battle, as
there is of Mons and Ypres. The fighting on the 26th
August was at first almost concealed by being included
in the so-called " battle of St. Quentin." There is no
doubt that the enemy suffered very heavy losses, and
for that reason has said little about it.
In the official list of battles issued at the end of 1919,
it is called " the battle of Solesmes— Le Cateau (25th-
27th August 1914)," and the troops present are given as
///. Corps (5th and 6th Divisions), IV. Corps (7th and
8th Divisions), IV. Reserve Corps (7th Reserve and 22nd
Reserve Divisions) and //. Cavalry Corps (2nd, Jfli and 9th
Cavalry Divisions), whilst the 3rd Division of the //.
Corps is shown as engaged on the 26th at " Cambrai."
The official bulletin, issued by the Supreme Command
on the 28th August, runs as follows :
" Defeat of the English at St. Quentin. The English
" Army,2 to which three French Territorial divisions3 had
1 The total losses, after the stragglers had come in, were 7,812 men
and 38 guns, including one 60-pdr. abandoned (see note, p. 224).
A large proportion of these losses fell on the 4th Division,, which had no
Field Ambulances to remove the wounded.
General von Zwehl stated in the Militdr Wochenblatt of the 30th
September 1919 that the prisoners taken, which include wounded, were
2,600 ; and this is confirmed by von Kluck. The surprise of the King's
Own in the early morning and the capture of the 1 /Gordon Highlanders,
about to be described, added a considerable portion to the total casualties,
and might have been avoided.
2 Only three out of five divisions were present at Le Cateau.
3 Only one Territorial division — the 84th — was present. The 61st
and 62nd Reserve Divisions were west of Cambrai, but not engaged
(see p. 186).
THE GERMAN ACCOUNTS 183
" attached themselves, has been completely defeated north
" of St. Quentin, and is in full retreat through St. Quentin.1
" Several thousand prisoners, seven field batteries and a
" heavy battery fell into our hands." 2
The troops were told that 12,000 prisoners had been
taken.3
As already noticed in the text,4 von Kluck's operation
orders for the 26th, issued at Haussy, three miles north of
Solesmes, at 10.50 P.M. on the 25th, merely give instructions
for a long march in pursuit, mainly in a direction in which
there was not much to pursue. His summary of them runs :
" The First Army., from parts of which severe marches are
" demanded, will continue the pursuit of the beaten enemy.
" The //. Corps [commencing on the west] will march via
" Cambrai on Bapaume, west of the road Valenciennes — Ven-
" degies — Villers en Cauchies — Cattenieres, till it is abreast of
" Graincourt [5 miles S.W. of Cambrai].
" The IV. Reserve Corps, starting early, via Vendegies —
" Villers en Cauchies to Cattenieres.
" The IV. Corps from Solesmes and Landrecies, by two
" routes : via Caudry, and via Montay — Caullery — Walincourt,
" to Vendhuille ; the road Landrecies — Le Cateau is allotted
" to the ///. Corps.
" The ///. Corps by the Landrecies — Le Cateau road to
" Maretz.
" Orders will be issued at Solesmes at 11 A.M.
" The IX. Corps will cover the flank march of the Army
" against the west and south-west fronts of Maubeuge, and will
" send any troops not required to follow the ///. Corps via
" Berlaimont — Maroilles to Landrecies."
Although von Kluck has read Sir John French's despatch,
from which he quotes at length, he is evidently even now
labouring under considerable misapprehension as to the
dispositions of the B.E.F. and its movements. It is best
to quote his narrative :
" In the early morning Marwitz's Cavalry Corps, via
" Wambaix — Beauvois — Quievy, attacked the enemy, who
" was withdrawing in a westerly (sic) direction, drove him
" partly back towards the south, and held him fast until
" the heads of the army corps came up." This account
hardly corresponds with the long pause in the fighting and
1 Only the 5th Division, part of the Cavalry, and some stragglers came
through St. Quentin.
2 See footnote 1, p. 182, for the correct figures.
3 Bloem, p. 183. 4 See p. 129.
184 LE CATEAU (5 P.M. TO NIGHTFALL)
Captain Wirth's story of finding the regiments of the
Cavalry Corps cowering behind the shelter of houses.1
" The IV. Corps about 8 A.M. attacked strong British
" forces at Caudry — Troisvilles — Reumont, and encoun-
" tered stout resistance from the enemy, who was well-
" established in his position. The IV. Reserve Corps was to
" envelop the northern [sic] and the ///. Corps the southern
" [sic] flank of the position. The former, however, struck
" against the French at Cattenieres ; the ///. Corps,
" moving on Maretz, did not get further than Honnechy
" on the 26th. By evening the IV. Reserve Corps succeeded
" in driving its opponents back in a southerly direction
" whilst the IV. Corps overthrew the right wing of the
" British. The //. Corps defeated stronger French forces
" at Cambrai."2
Apparently von Kluck really thought that the B.E.F.
was facing east, and that if the IV. Reserve Corps drove
it southwards, i.e., off its line of retreat to Calais — Boulogne,
it would endeavour to get away to the west. This is
confirmed by the fact that when the IV. Reserve Corps
relieved Marwitz's Cavalry Corps, the latter moved west
of Cambrai, and on the 27th marched down the Cambrai
— Bapaume road to intercept any movement of the B.E.F.
westwards. The //. Corps also pushed on west-south-
west of Cambrai on the 26th, and its Jfih Division reached
Hermies, half-way to Bapaume, where it blocked any
escape to the west.
The narrative of the battle ends with the statement,
which shows that von Kluck thought the British I. Corps
and the 6th Division, still in England, were present. " The
" whole British Expeditionary Corps, six divisions, a
" cavalry division and several French Territorial divisions
" opposed the First Army. ... If the English stand on
" the 27th, the double envelopment may yet bring a great
" success."
Von Kluck reported to the Supreme Command that
he had won a victory, and not over three divisions but
nine, and thereby, it is claimed by German writers, helped
to mislead von Moltke as to the real situation.3
Relying on the retreat of the British westward being
intercepted by Marwitz's Cavalry and the //. Corps,
1 See footnote 1, p. 174.
2 This is hardly the case. See the action of the French 84th Territorial
Division at Cambrai, p. 186.
3 Tappen, p. 21. Kuhl, "Marne," p. 82.
THE FRENCH 84TH TERRITORIAL DIVISION 185
which was to march at 1 A.M., he gave the remainder of
his force a night's rest. His operation orders, issued at
8.13 P.M., directed the ///., IV., and IV. Reserve Corps
" to cross the line roughly Esnes — Caudry — Reumont at
" 4 A.M." This was the British battle front of the previous
evening, and as the action was broken off by Sir H. Smith-
Dorrien at 3.30 P.M. and all his three divisions were on the
move by 5 P.M., they had nearly twelve hours' start of
the enemy. Thus it was, the German cavalry having been
given a wrong direction, that there was no pursuit.
As there is no coherent account of the battle from the
German side, the information available with regard to
each of the German corps is given for reference in a note
at the end of the chapter.1 The action in reality took a
totally different form to what von Kluck supposed. In
general, the IV. Corps made the principal attack, with
the //. Cavalry Corps on its right, frontally, not against
a flank ; part of the III. Corps came up on the left of the
IV., and in attempting envelopment was apparently badly
mauled ; at any rate, it effected nothing. In the afternoon
the IV. Reserve Corps came up and relieved the II. Cavalry
Corps. On its right (west) the //. Corps attacked the
French 84th Territorial Division in Cambrai.
Apparently the German troops thought that the battle
would be continued on the 27th, for Hauptmann Wirth,
of the 7th Reserve Divisional Staff, expresses surprise that
the advance of the IV. Reserve Corps met with no opposition
on that day : " the British had left the battlefield during
" the night, and had gone in such haste that we did not
" succeed in catching them up again."
GENERAL D'AMADE'S FORCE ON THE BRITISH LEFT
ON THE 26TH AUGUST
The part played on the left of the British during the Maps 3
battle of Le Cateau by three of General d'Amade's divisions & 10-
has been generally overlooked in English accounts. The
full story of their operations has yet to be written, but
sufficient is known to make it certain that they accounted
for the absence of the German //. Corps. This corps
had been ordered, on the evening of the 24th, to make
a wide sweep to envelop the British left 2 and, on the 25th,
as we have seen,3 swung westwards through Denain, and
1 See pp. 200-202. 2 Kluck, p. 53.
3 See pp. 130-31.
186 LE CATEAU (5 P.M. TO NIGHTFALL)
arrived at night with the heads of its columns about nine
miles north of Cambrai and little more than that distance
from the British left ; it was, in fact, eight miles nearer
to it than the IV. Reserve Corps at Valenciennes, which
attacked the British 4th Division about 2 P.M. on the 26th.
The French 84th Territorial Division, which had been
on the left of the British at Mons, retreated with them,
and on the night of the 25th/26th, its rear guards were
opposing the passage of the Sensee Canal by the western
columns of the German //. Corps, at Bassin Rond and
Pallencourt, just south of Bouchain and some six miles
north of Cambrai.
During the 26th August the division was gradually
pushed back to Cambrai, and then westwards through
the town. To quote the words of the only available
account : l
" The defence of Cambrai was organized along its north-
" western front from the Pont d'Aire to Tilloy (both 1J
" miles north of Cambrai). . . . The attack developed on
" the morning of the 26th at Escadoeuvres (1J miles north-
" east of Cambrai on the Solesmes road). The outpost
" battalion of the 27th Territorial Regiment fell back to
" the ' Pont Rouge ' and the railway ; the 25th Territorial
" Regiment took up a position by the Schelde Canal bridge.
" The final stand was made in the suburb Saint Olle (on
" the western side of Cambrai), which the staff of the
" 84th Territorial Division left at 12.30 P.M. Captain
" Saglier, of the 27th, defended the barricade near the
" church till about 2.15 P.M."
The information with regard to the French 61st and
62nd Reserve Divisions is less explicit.2 These divisions
were railed to the front from Paris, and, on the 26th
August, detrained at Arras, twenty miles from Cambrai.
General d' Amade, whose headquarters were in Arras, having
received reports that columns of German troops were
marching southwards through Orchies towards Bouchain,
ordered the two Reserve divisions south-east towards
Cambrai, part of them by train. They got as near as
Marquion,3 six miles from Cambrai, on the afternoon of
the 26th, when they received a special order from General
Joffre ordering them to Combles and Peronne with a view
1 An article in " La Renaissance " of 25th November 1916, quoted by
Colonel Bujac in his book " La Belgique envahie " (Fournier, Paris 1916).
2 See Hanotaux, vol. 7, p. 298 ; and Palat, vol. 5, p. 134.
3 Ouy-Venazobres, " Journal d'un officier de cavalerie," p. 23.
TROOPS LEFT ON THE BATTLEFIELD 187
to the formation of the Sixth Army. They therefore 26 Aug.
turned westwards again, followed by the 84th Territorial 1914-
Division, which was later in action at Marquion with the
14th Pomeranian Regiment (4th Division of //. Corps).
Von Kluck's account claims * that the //. Corps drove
back strong French hostile forces on the 26th. But for
the presence of the three French Reserve and Territorial
formations there seems no doubt that the //. Corps would
have taken part at Le Cateau with both its divisions.
THE TROOPS LEFT ON THE BATTLEFIELD.
3RD AND 4TH DIVISIONS
There can be little doubt but that the comparative Maps 2
ease with which the first stages of the retreat were ac- & n-
complished was due to the tenacity of the units which,
having received no order to retire, clung with all their
strength to the positions they had been ordered to hold.2
The story of the Suffolks and the K.O.Y.L.I. has already
,been related ; it now remains to tell that of the isolated
detachments of the 3rd and 4th Divisions. Some time
after dark, firing having ceased, it became known to Lieut.-
Colonel Neish of the Gordons that an order had been
shouted by two staff officers to different parts of the line
for the 8th Infantry Brigade to retire, and that this order
had reached every one except the bulk of his own regiment,
the company of the Royal Scots which lay on its right
and two companies of the Royal Irish on its left. At 7.45
P.M. Brevet-Colonel William Gordon, V.C., of the Gordon
Highlanders, being the senior officer in army rank, assumed
command of the whole of these troops ; and at 9.20 P.M.
Colonel Neish sent an officer and two men to Troisvilles
to obtain orders, if possible, from the headquarters of
the 3rd Division. This officer not returning within the
allotted time of two hours — he had fallen, as a matter of
fact, into the hands of the enemy at Troisvilles — Colonel
Gordon assembled his force towards Caudry at midnight,
and at 12.30 A.M. marched off, quite undisturbed, through
Audencourt (2 miles N.N.W. of Bertry). All was quiet
in the village, and at 1.30 A.M. the head of the column
reached Montigny (1J miles west of Bertry). Here a
light was seen in a cottage, and the occupants — a man
and a woman, who were presumed to be French — reported
that early in the morning the British troops had moved
1 Kluck, p. 59. 2 See footnote, p. 190.
188 LE CATEAU (5 P.M. TO NIGHTFALL)
on Bertry and Maurois. The man was ordered to guide
the party through Montigny on to the road to Bertry,
which he did ; and at 2 A.M. the head of the column
reached the cross roads to the south-west of Bertry.
Here three shots were fired, and after a few minutes'
delay, during which the advanced guard endeavoured to
ascertain the nationality of the post, there was a heavy
outbreak of rifle fire. The men were extended, and
answered it. Orders were then given for the column to
move back along the road to Montigny. But in the dark-
ness the road south-westward to Clary was taken instead,
and the column came upon a field gun which was trained
to fire down the highway. This gun was rushed and
taken before it could be discharged, and a mounted German
officer near it was pulled off his horse, but the rear of the
column was now met by rifle fire from the south and
south-west. Once again the men were extended and
replied, but the fire from the front and rear showed them
pretty clearly that they were trapped. The head of the
column now made an effort to force its way into Bertry,
and stormed a house on the outskirts of the village, in
which were a number of German officers. The enemy,
however, was by this time thoroughly alarmed. Firing
began on all sides, and after fighting against hopeless odds
for the best part of an hour longer, Colonel Gordon's party
was overpowered. Its captors were the 66th and 72nd
Infantry Regiments (IV. Corps) which had engaged the
Suffolks and Yorkshire Light Infantry near Le Cateau.
Of the Gordon Highlanders about five hundred were taken,
but a few escaped, and a handful of them actually made
their way through the German lines to Antwerp, whence
they were sent back to England. The fortune of war
was hard upon the 1 /Gordons. For the time, they practi-
cally ceased to exist as a battalion, but by their gallant
resistance to all German attacks between 5 P.M. and dark,
they had rendered incalculable service to the 3rd Division
and to the Army at large.
Further to the west, isolated parties of many battalions
were left behind by the 4th Division about Haucourt and
Ligny. Two companies of the Dublin Fusiliers under
Major Shewan, and two of the King's Own under Major
Parker, holding fast to their trenches north and east of
Haucourt, were attacked soon after nightfall, but suc-
ceeded in beating the enemy off ; and a party of the
Dublin Fusiliers, attracted by the sound of the firing,
TROOPS LEFT ON THE BATTLEFIELD 189
moved up in time to shoot down a number of the retreat- 26 Aug.
ing Germans. Major Shewan, and Major Poole of the 1914-
Warwickshire, who had also been left behind on the east
of Haucourt with three to four hundred men of his
regiment, then consulted together as to what should be
done, since the enemy had apparently moved round both
of their flanks. Major Poole, being familiar with the
ground, undertook to lead the party southward across
country, and at 11 P.M. the march began. About the
same time Major Parker and his party of the King's Own
started southward independently, and succeeded in making
good their retreat. Major Poole, steering for Selvigny,
struck the village of Caullery. Here he was joined at dawn
of the 27th by another platoon of the Dublin Fusiliers
under Lieutenant Massy - Westropp, who had retired
at dusk from his trenches in the road between Ligny
and Haucourt and finding his retreat threatened by a
party of Germans in a farm, had promptly attacked
them, driven them away and gone on his way unmolested.
These, together with his own party and some of the Irish
Fusiliers who were with them, Major Poole later led on
in the track of the 4th Division. The Dublin Fusiliers,
however, lost touch of him in the darkness, and drifted into
Ligny at 2 A.M. on the 27th, where they made a short halt
to find food. The men dropped down on the road, and
instantly fell asleep. After a time, the march was resumed
southward upon Clary, but near the entrance to the village
they were fired on from the east and, signalling to ascertain
whether the aggressors were friend or foe (for in the dim
light there was abundant room for error), were told to
join them as quickly as possible. The column accordingly
advanced, and was at once swept by machine-gun fire
from front and flank. The men were deployed, and then
ordered to retire by small groups mutually supporting
each other. Eventually, the Dublin Fusiliers reached
Ligny with about two hundred men, comprising soldiers
from nearly every battalion of the 3rd, 4th and 5th
Divisions — and even two men of the 1st Division — who had
drifted together upon the nucleus under Major Shewan.
First they struck out south-east, but finding Germans on
every side, turned north-west, and after many wanderings
and more than one sharp engagement, finally — seventy-
eight officers and men — came through the German lines
into Boulogne. The remainder of Major Shewan's party
seems to have been killed or taken to a man.
190 THE RETREAT
On the whole, therefore, it appears that of three detach-
ments which may have numbered in all two thousand
men, about one half escaped and rejoined the Army
sooner or later. These details may be considered trivial,
but they are a testimony to the courage and resource of
the officers and men of the old army. Moreover, these
detachments had done far better work than they imagined.
Though a mere handful scattered along some eight thousand
yards of front, they had prevented the enemy for several
hours from advancing along the whole of that line. The
perpetual bombardment of vacated positions, and in
particular that of Audencourt which was repeated an
hour after dark, is plain evidence that the Germans were
exceedingly suspicious of what might be before them.
Beyond question, they had suffered very heavily — as
indeed was admitted by German officers to some of their
British prisoners — and from one cause and another they
were disinclined to take risks. That the isolation of these
British detachments was undesigned in no way detracts
from the merit of their achievement.1
THE RETREAT OF THE II. CORPS AND 4TH DIVISION
Sketch 3. While this handful of men was thus hampering the
Maps 3 German advance, the main body of General Smith-Dorrien's
force was in full retreat. The 5th Divisional Train had
started down the Roman Road very early in the day, and
two staff officers had accompanied it to keep it moving
all night, for there was fear of being overtaken by German
cavalry. The 3rd Divisional Train had followed it, cutting
in on the Roman Road from the north. Thus one serious
encumbrance was removed, but the highway was, never-
theless, choked for miles with an interminable column of
transport, with the inevitable consequence of long blocks
and frequent short checks. The bulk of the 5th Division
and of the 19th Infantry Brigade reached Estrees (15
miles from Le Cateau) between 9 P.M. and midnight, wet,
weary, hungry and longing for sleep, and were directed on
1 Hauptmann Heubner, in his book " Unter Emmich vor Luttich.
Unter Kluck vor Paris," p. 87, confirms the view stated of the effect of
the parties left behind. His battalion of the 20th Infantry Regiment,
6th Division, III. Corps, came On to the field late. He says, " in front of
" us there still swarmed a number of scattered English troops, who were
" easily able to hide in the large woods of the district, and again and again
" forced us to waste time in deployments, as we could not tell what their
" strength might be."
RETIREMENT FROM THE BATTLEFIELD 191
to the cross roads, two miles beyond. There the sorting 26 Aug.
of the troops was taken in hand, a simple process on paper, 1914-
but difficult enough in practice on a dark and dismal
night : staff officers stood at the cross roads, shouting
continuously, " transport and mounted troops straight on,
" 3rd Division infantry to right, 5th Division infantry to
" left." Then, when the men turned as directed, they
were sorted by other officers according to brigades and
battalions. By 2 A.M. on the 27th sorting was completed,
and orders were issued for a start at 4 A.M., at which time
all units of the 5th Division and the detachments from
other formations marched off in good order; some units,
of course, were very weak in numbers, as many men had
not come in. The transport and mounted troops were
sorted out south of St. Quentin, and there, well after sun-
rise next morning, a rearrangement of the column of the
5th Division was also made ; but this was a matter of
reorganizing units, not individual soldiers as had been the
case near Estrees.
About midnight, the 3rd Division, having marched
by Elincourt and Malincourt, came into Beaurevoir, north
of the 5th Division. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade with the
Bays (1st Cavalry Brigade) and 4th Dragoon Guards
(2nd Cavalry Brigade), seeing the crowd on the Roman
Road, retired east of Estrees to Brancourt, Monbrehain
and Ramicourt. The llth Hussars (1st Cavalry Brigade)
came very late into Estrees. Half of the 9th Lancers
(2nd Cavalry Brigade) withdrew a little to the south of
the 3rd Cavalry Brigade to Fresnoy, the remainder having
marched with the headquarters of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade
right across the rear of the Army from Bohain, through
Beaurevoir to Marquaix (11 miles north-west of St. Quentin).
Of the 4th Division, the 10th and 12th Infantry Brigades,
with the divisional artillery, retreated, 2 J miles west of the
3rd Division, by Malincourt and Villers Outreaux to Le
Catelet and Vendhuille, which were reached between 11 P.M.
and midnight. The llth Infantry Brigade, finding its way
blocked by the 3rd Division at Elincourt, remained there
for the night.
Everywhere, when the order to halt was given, the
men dropped down on the road, and were asleep almost
before they reached the ground. The only precautions
possible at the late hour were to push small piquets out
a few hundred yards on each side of the road. Officers
of the cavalry and artillery, themselves half dead with
192 THE RETREAT
fatigue, had to rouse their men from a semi-comatose
state to water and feed the horses, and to rouse them
once more to take the nose-bags off, taking care lest they
should fall asleep in the very act. And all this had to
be done in inky darkness under drizzling rain. After
three or four hours' halt, the order was given to resume
the march. The officers roused the sergeants, and the
men were hunted out, hustled on to their feet, hardly
conscious of what they were doing, and by some means
or other formed into a column. Then the column got
under way, drivers and troopers sleeping in their saddles,
infantry staggering half -asleep as they marched, every
man stiff with cold and weak with hunger, but, under
the miraculous power of discipline, plodding on.
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien on arrival at St. Quentin
on the evening of the 26th found that G.H.Q. had left
for Noyon. After sending off a report of the situation
in writing, he proceeded there himself by motor car, to
give personally to the Commander-in-Chief an account of
the action and its successful breaking off. He arrived
shortly after midnight and was informed that the orders,
issued by G.H.Q. in the afternoon of the 26th, for the
retirement to the St. Quentin (Crozat) Canal — Somme
line (La Fere — Ham) still held good. Earlier in the
day, before Sir John French had quitted St. Quentin,
General Joffre and General Lanrezac had visited him for
a conference. Sir John pointed out the isolated position
of the British Army, as he conceived it, and the French
Commander-in-Chief had confirmed the "directive" already
sent to British G.H.Q. In this he had stated his intention
of withdrawing to the Laon — La Fere — St. Quentin
position, and subsequently retaking the offensive, as soon
as a new Army, the Sixth, could be formed on the left
of the British. His main interest was that, in spite of
the heavy losses they had suffered, the British should
not fall out of the line. The Field-Marshal agreed to
make his retirement as deliberately as possible. .
Thus posted in the general situation, Sir H. Smith-
Dorrien returned to his Headquarters at St. Quentin.
Under his instructions, the 5th Division and the 19th
Infantry Brigade were intercepted at Bellenglise and
turned south-eastward upon St. Quentin, where supplies
awaited them, with directions to march thence upon
Ollezy (4 miles east of Ham). The 3rd Division was
to continue its march from Bellicourt and Hargicourt
SMITH-DORRIEN'S FORCE 193
upon Vermand, heading for Ham. Unfortunately its 27 Aug.
supply column had missed it and it was without rations 1914-
from the 25th until the afternoon of the 27th. The 4th
Division was to proceed via Roisel, Hancourt, Monchy
Lagache to Voyennes (4 miles west of Ham), picking up
supplies en routed
CONTINUATION OF THE RETREAT ON THE
27TH AND 28TH AUGUST
Very soon after daylight on the 27th August, troops Sketch 3.
began to pour into St. Quentin. The 1st Cavalry Brigade ^Ps 3» 4
and most of the 2nd were fed and sent a few miles south
to Grand Seraucourt, where they arrived, men and horses
completely exhausted. The duty of forming a covering
screen to the north of the town was therefore assigned to
the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, which, together with the Com-
posite Regiment of Household Cavalry, had reached a
position at Homblieres just to the east of St. Quentin at
4 A.M.
At 5 A.M. the 14th Infantry Brigade trudged into the
town, received its rations and re-formed its battalions.
Trains had already been ordered on the railway, as well
as carts and wagons on the roads, for the conveyance of
men who could march no further. The remainder of the
5th Division came in later, when the sun of a scorching
day was already high in the heavens. Stragglers and parties
from the 3rd and 4th Divisions who had drifted eastward —
no doubt because the retirement had been commenced on
the right — , contributed to an appearance of confusion
which was completely absent on the routes of those
divisions themselves and of the battalions of the 5th
Division, which marched into the town as properly formed
bodies. After a halt of an hour or two for rest and food,
the men recovered in an astonishing fashion ; and when
they resumed their march, they were no longer silent and
dogged, but cheerfully whistling and singing. The 5th
Division then pursued its way, after a halt for the re-arrange-
ment of the column, without any interference from the
enemy, and before dark was in position south of the Somme
1 An extract from the war diary of a unit of the French 1st Cavalry
Division of this date deserves quotation :
" We crossed the route of an English battalion retiring after having
" suffered very heavy losses. It moved in touching order : at the head,
" imperturbable, a party of wounded. I ordered a salute to be given to
" these brave men."
VOL. I O
194 THE RETREAT
about Ollezy, with its ranks sadly thinned, but ready again
to meet the enemy.
The 3rd Cavalry Brigade, acting as rear guard, was
equally unmolested. It was joined at 10 A.M. by that part
of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, which had marched westward
across the rear of the army on the 26th and retraced its
steps eastward at dawn on the 27th. Not until 2.30 P.M.
was there any sign of the enemy advancing south in this
quarter,1 and then the 3rd Cavalry Brigade fell back
deliberately to Itancourt (4 miles south-east of St.
Quentin), E Battery exchanging a few rounds with the
German guns before it retired. West of St. Quentin the
9th Lancers (2nd Cavalry Brigade) found contact with the
enemy near Fresnoy, but did not withdraw from that
place until 6 P.M. and then only to Savy (south-west of St.
Quentin). There they and the greater part of the 2nd
Cavalry Brigade took up their billets for the night, the
3rd Cavalry Brigade being on their right at Itancourt, and
the 1st in support at Grand Seraucourt.
Further to the west, the 3rd Division was hardly more
molested than the 5th. After turning west from Belli-
court (8 miles north by west of St. Quentin), it halted
from 9 A.M. until 1 P.M. at Hargicourt, and then continued
its way south to Villeret (2 miles south-west of Belli-
court). There a small party of German cavalry, accom-
panied by guns, made some demonstration of pursuit, but
speedily retired when greeted by a few rifle bullets from
109th Battery, having no wish to engage what seemed to
be British infantry. The division next marched to Ver-
mand, where supplies were issued about 4 P.M., and at 10
P.M. it resumed its march to Ham. The 9th Infantry
Brigade acted as rear guard throughout, having suffered
little in the battle of Le Cateau.
The 4th Division on the left was followed up rather
more closely by the German cavalry. The llth Infantry
Brigade, from Serain, moved across country to Nauroy,
just to the south-east of Bellicourt, on the morning of the
27th, and halted there at 8.30 A.M. to allow the 3rd Division
to pass. Rather more than an hour later the Corps
Cavalry of the II. Corps reported the enemy's presence in
the adjacent villages ; and before the brigade had left its
billets, German guns opened on Nauroy at a range of a
thousand yards. To cover the retirement of the brigade,
1 The enemy seen, according to Billow's Sketch Map 2, was divi-
sional cavalry of the VII. Corps, the right of his Army.
THE 4TH DIVISION 195
the brigadier ordered Colonel Jackson of the Hampshire 27 Aug.
to engage the guns. Acting on these orders, the latter 1914<
sent two parties to take up a position to the east of Nauroy
and open fire on them. After an engagement with enemy's
dismounted cavalry and cyclists, Colonel Jackson was
wounded and taken prisoner, but his men stood fast until
the retiring brigade was out of sight, and then withdrew,
eventually rejoining the brigade on the high ground beyond
the canal. The main body meanwhile had moved south-
west to Villeret, picking up en route Major Prowse's party
of the Somerset L.I. from Ligny, a party of the I/Rifle
Brigade under Captain Prittie, and other men who had
stayed late on the battlefield. Thence the llth Infantry
Brigade, "fairly all right " as it reported, marched through
Tertry, where it struck the divisional route to Voyennes.
The 10th Infantry Brigade and 4th Cavalry Brigade
(in touch with General Sordet's cavalry on the left) had
meanwhile passed on to Roisel (8 miles south-west of
Le Catelet), where both made a short halt ; the 12th
Infantry Brigade, which had gone on with the 4th Divi-
sional Artillery, deployed at Ronssoy (4 miles south-
west of Le Catelet), with the Carabiniers at Lempire to
cover it, as there were indications, from German aero-
planes flying over the division and the appearance of a
few cavalry scouts, that the enemy might be in close
pursuit. Nothing, however, happened. The 10th Infantry
Brigade then pursued its way to Hancourt, where it arrived
at 4 P.M. The 12th Infantry Brigade retired from Ronssoy
at 11 A.M., and reached Hancourt between 5.30 and 6 P.M.,
where Major Parker's party of the King's Own overtook
it. At Hancourt, by divisional orders, these two brigades
entrenched and rested, awaiting the enemy; but none
appeared. At 9.30 P.M. (all wounded and transport,
which included many requisitioned and country wagons,
having been sent off two hours earlier) the march of the
4th Division was resumed in inky darkness by Vraignes,
Monchy Lagache, and Matigny upon Voyennes. There
was not the slightest hindrance from the enemy, but men
and horses were so utterly weary that the usual hourly
halts were omitted for fear that if the whole division were
once halted and the men sat or lay down, they would never
be got moving again.
The stoppages and checks inseparable from the march
of a long column in the dark were doubly nerve-racking to
the Staff during this period ; for not only might they mean
196 THE RETREAT
that the division would be delayed and have incredible
difficulty in restarting — as men were lying on the roads
careless of whether wheels went over them or not — but also
that enemy cavalry had cut in ahead or on the flank of the
column. With strained ears the officers listened for firing,
and only breathed again when the tremor of movement
crept down the column, and they heard the glad sound of
the crunch of wheels on the road. Such was the discipline,
however, that not a single shot was fired in alarm during
this and the many other nights of marching in August and
September 1914. Parties sent on ahead blocked all side
and cross roads, so that units, even if gaps in the column
occurred, could not go astray. Measures were taken by
the interpreters l in all the villages passed through to
detect the presence of spies, generally by the simple pro-
cess of a language test. But for this precaution and the
difficulties of adjusting the foreign harness of the requisi-
tioned vehicles, officers and men for the most part might
have dreamed as they mechanically moved on that they
were back at autumn manoeuvres.
The Carabiniers remained in position about Lempire till
noon, by which time German infantry came into sight ;
but, though heavily shelled, the 4th Cavalry Brigade with-
drew unharmed to Hesbecourt, and after waiting there till
2.30 P.M. fell back westwards in rear of the 4th Division by
B ernes, Hancourt and Cartigny to Le Mesnil, thence going
south, finally crossing the Somme after nightfall and
reaching Rouy, near Voyennes, at 1 A.M. on the 28th. The
4th Division, three hours later — at 4 A.M. — began passing
the Somme valley into Voyennes, at the very spot where
Henry V. had crossed the river in his retreat northwards
on Agincourt. At Voyennes Brigadier-General Hunter-
Weston with the main body of the llth Infantry Brigade
rejoined.
Thus by dawn on the 28th, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien
had practically brought the whole of his force to the south of
the Somme, thirty-five miles from the battlefield of the 26th.
The position of the various formations was approxi-
mately as follows : —
Sketch 3. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades :
Maps 3 In a semi-circle, four miles south of St. Quentin, from
& 13- Itancourt, through Urvillers and Grand Seraucourt to
Savy.
1 A French officer or soldier was allotted to each Staff and unit as
interpreter and go-between in business with the local officials.
FAILURE OF GERMANS TO PURSUE 197
The remainder of the force was south of the Somme, 28 Aug.
with rear guards on the northern bank. 1914.
5th Division and 19th Infantry Brigade :
South-west of the cavalry brigades, at Ollezy and Eaucourt,
near where the Crozat canal meets the Somme.
3rd Division :
On the left of the 5th :
7th Infantry Brigade — Ham, on the Somme.
8th Infantry Brigade — On march to Ham from Vermand.
9th Infantry Brigade — Ham.
4th Division :
On the left of the 3rd, at Voyennes on the Somme.
4th Cavalry Brigade :
On the left of the 4th Division, at Rouy.
I. Corps and 5th Cavalry Brigade were 18 miles to the north-
eastward of the II. Corps, on the high ground south of
Guise. Their movements will be dealt with in the next
chapter.
It was tolerably evident that the German pursuit, if it
can be said ever to have been seriously begun, had been
shaken off. There were, as a matter of fact, already some
indications that von Kluck was pressing south-westward
rather than southward. General Sordet's Cavalry Corps
and the 61st and 62nd Reserve Divisions had been in
conflict with German troops about Peronne on the after-
noon of the 27th ; and British cavalry entering St. Quentin
at dawn on the 28th found no sign of the enemy. These
indications, however, came too late to be of any help to
the British Commander-in-Chief on the 27th. As regards
the German //. Corps, the most westerly of von Kluck's
Army, the reports of air reconnaissances in the early
morning, taken in conjunction with General Smith-
Dorrien's verbal report at midnight on the 26th/27th after
the battle of Le Cateau, were reassuring. The road from
Le Cateau was absolutely clear ; there were neither
British rear guards nor German advanced guards' to be
seen south of a line drawn east and west through Peronne.
But, further east, a heavy column1 had been observed
moving southward on the road between La Groise and
fitreux (12 and 6 miles, respectively, north of Guise),
besides other troops at Le Nouvion (10 miles north-east
of Guise) ; and Sir John French had as yet no clear informa-
tion to show whether these were friendly or hostile. General
Joffre, who visited him at Noyon at 11 A.M. on the 27th,
1 Von Billow's X. Reserve Corps.
198 THE RETREAT
was already preparing his counter-stroke, but, in order to
effect it, needed to fall back further than he had first
intended, to a line from Rheims to Amiens, of which
he proposed that the British should occupy the section
between Noyon and Roye (12 miles north-west of Noyon).
Maps 3 In furtherance of this plan, Sir J. French, in a message
&4- timed 8.30 P.M., directed the II. Corps, with the 19th
Infantry Brigade, to be clear of Ham by daylight on the
28th, to march to Noyon and cross to the left bank of the
Oise ; the 4th Division to cover the retirement from
ground north of the Somme ; and the Cavalry Division
to cover both the II. Corps and the 4th Division. He
added an order that all unnecessary impedimenta and all
ammunition not absolutely required should be thrown
away, so that vehicles might be available to carry
exhausted men.1
Sketch 3. After the superhuman efforts of the previous days, this
Maps 3 further retreat with hardly a moment's rest was a very
& 13* serious trial to the II. Corps, for many of its units were still
on the march when the orders to continue reached them.
At 4 A.M. on the 28th the 5th Division marched from Ollezy
for Noyon, with frequent halts, for the day was oppressively
hot. As many men as possible were carried on vehicles of
one kind or another. The 52nd Battery of the XV.
Brigade, far from being demoralized by the loss of all its
guns, had already been formed into a corps of mounted
rifles. On its way it passed Sir J. French himself, who
praised its good work and assured it that it had not
been done in vain, since the battle of Le Cateau had saved
the left flank of the French Army.2 After a short halt at
Noyon, the 5th Division moved on to Pontoise, and there
at last went into billets. The 3rd Division followed, halting
at Crissolles and Genvry, just short of Noyon, between 6
and 7 P.M. Physically it was nearly worn out after march-
ing sixty-eight miles in fifty hours, but morally its spirit
was unbroken. Last came the 4th Division, not less
exhausted than the rest. At 4 A.M. the division had
received G.H.Q. orders, issued at 8.30 P.M. the previous
evening, to occupy a position north of the Somme ; whilst
preparations to do so were being made, later orders arrived
about 6 A.M. directing it to be ready to continue the retire-
ment at 8 A.M. Leaving the 12th Infantry Brigade for a
time on the northern bank to work in combination with
the rear guard of the 3rd Division, the remainder of the
1 Appendix 17. 2 See General Joffre's message at end of Chapter.
FURTHER RETIREMENT ORDERED 199
division, which still consisted of artillery and infantry 28 Aug.
only, took up positions on the south bank of the Somme. 1914-
The retirement was continued at 1.30 P.M., the 3rd Division
having withdrawn its rear guard from Ham about an hour
earlier. The 4th Division reached its halting - places,
Bussy, Freniches and Campagne, just north of those of
the 3rd Division, shortly before midnight.
Meanwhile, of the Cavalry Division, the 3rd Brigade
had extended eastward, seeking touch with the I. Corps,
and its movements will be related in due course with those
of that corps. The 1st Cavalry Brigade, after completing
its reconnaissance at St. Quentin, fell back with great
deliberation to the Somme at Ham, whence, having crossed
the river, it moved southwards to Berlancourt. The 2nd
Cavalry Brigade likewise fell back by Douilly upon Ham,
and halted just north-east of the 4th Division at Le Plessis
and Flavy le Meldeux. Patrols of German cavalry had
been seen at Douilly, but no force of greater importance.
The 4th Cavalry Brigade, on the extreme left, withdrew
shortly before noon to Cressy, a short distance south of
Nesle and four miles north of the 4th Division, leaving
French cavalry and guns, with which it had been in touch,
to deal with enemy troops reported to be at Mesnil just
north of Nesle.
The worst trials of General Smith-Dorrien's force were
now over. Since the 23rd August, the II. Corps had
fought two general actions, besides several minor affairs,
and had marched seventy-five miles, measured on the map
by the route taken by the 3rd Division.
NOTE 1
GENERAL JOFFRE'S CONGRATULATORY TELEGRAM
Dated 27th August 1914.
Commandant en Chef des Armees Frangaises a Commandant
en Chef Armee Anglaise Noyon Oise. No. 2425.
L'Armee anglaise en n'hesitant pas a s'engager tout entiere
centre des forces tres superieures en nombre a puissamment con-
tribue a assurer la securite du flanc gauche de 1'Armee Frangaise.
Elle 1'a fait avec un devouement, une energie et une perseverance
auxquels je tiens des maintenant a rendre hommage et qui se re-
trouveront demain pour assurer le triomphe final de la cause com-
mune. L'Armee Fran£aise n'oubliera pas le service rendu ; animee
du meme esprit de sacrifice et de la meme volonte de vaincre que
1'Armee Anglaise, elle lui affirmera sa reconnaissance, dans les
prochains combats. JOFFRE.
200 LE CATEAU
NOTE 2
THE GERMAN CORPS AT THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU
IV. Corps.
According to Oberleutnant Dr. Lohrisch,1 the time of the principal
attack of the IV. Corps on the high ground west of Le Cateau was
" nearly midday " (English time 11 A.M.), but our accounts make
it a little earlier. His brigade, the 14th of the 7th Division, attacked
on both sides of the Forest — Le Cateau road, and the 13th Brigade
on both sides of the Forest — Montay road, as already pointed out,
with the 8th Division, from Solesmes, further west, near Caudry.
It would seem that there was a considerable gap between the 7th
and 8th Divisions, which accounts for the 13th, 15th and 9th British
Infantry Brigades being left in comparative peace most of the
morning.2 Soon after, the 14th Brigade was ordered " to move to
" the left and make an enveloping attack against the enemy's right
" flank."
As the brigade moved round the east of Le Cateau, it " brushed
" against the right flank of the neighbouring corps [the III.], which
" had pressed on even farther than ourselves." He goes on to state
that there was delay owing to the river Selle being unfordable.
" Meantime, the noise of battle had diminished, the enemy had
" realized the danger of envelopment and had evacuated the ridge."
So the companies " lay down by the roadside and awaited orders."
At 4 P.M. they got an order to pursue. They were then fired on
from Honnechy, and deployed, but as the ///. Corps was coming
up " from the south " [sic] at 7 P.M. they went into bivouac west
of St. Benin.
Von Kluck states that the " fighting was hottest in the area
" where the 8th Division was engaged," that is, near Inchy — Caudry,
where the British 8th and 7th Infantry Brigades stood. This is
hardly borne out by our own accounts.
III. Corps.
Both divisions of this corps pushed their advanced guards to
the eastern edge of the Forest of Mormal, to Maroilles and Aulnoye,
on the night of the 25th/26th.3
About 11 A.M. on the 26th, the commander, General von Lochow,
came upon the field and offered General Sixt von Armin, command-
ing the IV. Corps, his assistance. The latter considered that direct
support was not necessary, and that the III. Corps could help best
by continuing its advance as originally ordered via Le, Cateau on
Maretz. The III. Corps, therefore, marched on through Land-
recies ; but " its two divisions being on one road, one behind the
" other, the advance and deployment took up so much time that it
" was very late before they attacked on the left flank of the Army." 4
Doubt has been thrown on this account by information obtained
1 In " Siegessturm von Liittich an die Marne."
2 See p. 153.
3 See p. 131, and footnote 1, p. 141.
4 Kuhl's " Marne," p. 79.
THE GERMAN CORPS 201
from Berlin ; this is as follows : — " On the 26th August, the 5th 26 Aug.
4 Division (whose head was near Maroilles) marched on Maurois via 1914.
4 Carrefour de 1'Ermitage (inside the Forest of Mormal, 3 miles
4 north-west of Maroilles) — Rouge Mer (inside the Forest, 1| miles
' north-west of Landrecies) — Landrecies — Pommereuil (south) —
* Bazuel — St. Benin. 6th Division (which had one half west and
4 the other east of the Forest) marched via Jolimetz (bringing its
' eastern half back through the Forest of Mormal) into the area
' Forest — Boussies — Englefontaine — Vendegies an Bois. This
' division did not go into battle on the 26th August."
It has been noticed, under the IV. Corps, that the 14th Brigade
in its enveloping attack brushed against the flank of the ///. Corps
44 which had pressed on even farther." Why the 5th Division did so
little is something of a mystery ; it undoubtedly lost heavily, both
when in column on the road, and in its attempted flank attack, from
the fire of the Heavy Battery of the 5th Division. Why the 6th
Division, whose head was at Jolimetz, only 9 miles from Le Cateau
town, on the night of the 25th/26th took no part in the fight will
no doubt be explained later. Possibly it marched eastward as von
Kuhl seems to indicate and then back again through the Forest.
The history of the 24th (Brandenburg) Infantry Regiment, the only
unit of the 6th Division that has yet published one, has no entry
between the crossing of the French Frontier in the afternoon of
the 25th August and 10 A.M. on the 28th.
IV. Reserve Corps.
There is a better account of the doings of the IV. Reserve Corps.
Captain Wirth, attached to a Divisional Staff (his unit and a regiment
mentioned identify it as the 7th Reserve) states that the corps left
Valenciennes early and marched south-westward. At 11 A.M. news
arrived that the cavalry in front was engaged. The troops left
the road and marched along bridle-tracks and across fields to the
sound of the guns. About 2 P.M. the advanced guard reached the
Le Cateau — Cambrai high road north of Cattenieres, and found
the cavalry, 44 which has been thrown on the defensive," under
cover behind the houses. The divisional artillery had been sent
forward and was already in position. The division attacked towards
Caudry — Wambaix. Little progress was made against the 4th
Division — some infantry, however, reached Haucourt. The Staff
billeted for the night in Wambaix.
The other division of the IV. Reserve Corps, the 22nd, advanced
(according to a letter in the series " Feldpostbriefen," vol. 5) on the
right wing of the corps, and deployed about 2 P.M. north of the
Le Cateau — Cambrai road about Carnieres — Cauroir, and advanced
in the first instance against French cuirassiers, and then against
French infantry near Seranvillers. The division met with con-
siderable opposition, and was heavily shelled by French and British
artillery. There were fairly heavy casualties — the writer's platoon
lost 37 men. The French retired under cover of darkness. His
regiment bivouacked at Crevecceur.
From Valenciennes to the battlefield (Cattenieres) via Solesmes
is twenty miles. If the divisions of the IV. Reserve Corps, which
as far as Solesmes were apparently on one road, started at 3 A.M.,
the usual hour, the advanced guard took eleven hours to cover the
distance, a somewhat mediocre performance.
202 LE CATEAU
II. Corps.
The heads of the two divisions reached Avesnes le Sec and
Bouchain, 9 miles from Cambrai, on the night of the 25th/26th.
The official " Schlachten und Gefechte " states that the 3rd
Division was engaged at Cambrai on the 26th. The 4th Division
is known by contact with the French to have been west of Cambrai.
At night it reached Hermies, 10 miles south-west of Cambrai. No
doubt von der Marwitz's Cavalry Corps, having gone eastwards,
the 4th Division was acting as flank guard and watching the French
61st and 62nd Reserve Divisions, which were west of Cambrai,1
whilst the 3rd attacked Cambrai ; the corps was later pushed on to
intercept the British retreat westwards. The headquarters of the
corps at night were at Pallencourt, five miles north of Cambrai.
//. Cavalry Corps (von der Marwitz).
This corps spent the night of the 25th/26th August in villages
around Avesnes lez Aubert (6 miles N.N.E. of Cambrai). Its
orders for the 26th were to continue the pursuit due south " against
" the great Roman Road Bavai — Maretz — Nauroy." 2
44 2nd Cavalry Division, with the 4th and 7th Jager, via Carnieres
44 and Esnes against Beaurevoir.
" 9th Cavalry Division, with the 3rd, 9th and 10th Jager, via
44 Beauvois against Fremont.
44 4th Cavalry Division via Caudry against Maretz."
Thus, the "2nd Cavalry Division, with two Jager battalions,
struck the 12th Infantry Brigade ; the one brigade of the 9th
Cavalry Division and three Jager battalions, the llth Infantry Brigade,
and the 4th Cavalry Division, with the two brigades of the 9th, the
7th Infantry Brigade.
After an initial surprise, the 2nd Cavalry Division was fought to
a standstill (this is confirmed by Wirth), and retired to shelter until
relieved by the arrival of the IV. Reserve Corps.
The position of the 9th Cavalry Division soon became critical
(verdammt kritisch), but it hung on until 44 about 2 P.M., when
44 reinforcements came up [probably from the 8th Division] and
44 the artillery belaboured the enemy's position."
The 4th Cavalry Division does not claim to have done much, and
44 its losses were comparatively small. . . . Towards 11 A.M. the
44 infantry of the IV. Corps (8th Division) entered the fight, and
44 the attack was then carried forward to Bethancourt."
At dusk the II. Cavalry Corps was withdrawn and concentrated
at Naves and Cauroir, two villages a couple of miles north-east and
east of Cambrai.
1 See p. 186.
2 " Deutsche Kavallerie," pp. 55-63. A detailed account of the action
of the German cavalry at Le Cateau, extracted from this book, will be
found in the " Army Quarterly," January 1922.
CHAPTER X
OTHER EVENTS OF THE 26TH-28TH AUGUST
THE 26TH AUGUST : REAR-GUARD AFFAIR OF
LE GRAND FAYT
(See Sketches 3, 4 & 5 ; Maps 2, 3, 9, 12 & 13)
IT is now time to return to the I. Corps and see what it Sketch 3.
was doing on the morning of the 26th whilst the II. Corps M*PS 3»
was engaged at the battle of Le Cateau.
Whatever loss the Germans may have suffered in their
repulse by the Guards at Landrecies, they had succeeded in
disturbing the repose of the I. Corps and in keeping it
on the alert all night in expectation of an attack. Its
strategic position, besides, was far from satisfactory;
for the Germans appeared to be about to break in between
it and the II. Corps, and to be threatening the flank of
its retreat from the west. Soon after midnight, from
his headquarters at Le Grand Fayt, five miles from Land-
recies, Sir Douglas Haig took measures to meet the situa-
tion, and to occupy a position facing north and north-west.
The trains, after dumping supplies, were ordered off south-
ward to Etreux, carrying the men's packs in the empty
lorries. The 1st Division was ordered to take position
near Favril, a mile and a half S.S.E. of Landrecies, to
cover the withdrawal of the 2nd Division on its .right.
The 2nd Division was divided, part retiring to the right
and part to the left rear of the 1st Division, as under : —
The 5th and 6th Infantry Brigades to close in from Noyelles
and Maroilles upon Le Grand Fayt (4 miles east of Favril) ;
The 4th (Guards) Brigade to retire as soon as possible from
Landrecies on La Groise (south-west of Favril) ;
The 5th Cavalry Brigade to cover the west flank of the
corps between Ors and Catillon.
The French Reserve divisions on the right of the corps
204 THE RETREAT OF THE I. CORPS
were warned of the retirement, and a brigade, sent by
General Valabregue to gain touch with the right of the
2nd Division, occupied first the line Marbaix — Maroilles,
and subsequently the high ground between Le Grand
Fayt and Maroilles.
As matters turned out, the Germans made no attempt
to renew their attacks. The 3rd Infantry Brigade en-
trenched at Favril, and the 4th passed it, totally un-
molested, by 4.15 A.M. The 3rd Infantry Brigade was
slightly engaged later in the day, but would probably
have been left in absolute peace had not a section of
British guns, by firing at a distant column of German
infantry marching west,1 provoked retaliation and a sharp
attack by some dismounted cavalry, which resulted in a
few casualties to the 1 /Gloucestershire. At noon the 1st
(Guards) Brigade relieved the 6th Infantry Brigade near
Le Grand Fayt, enabling the latter to strike southward
through Etreux, where the 4th (Guards) Brigade had secured
the bridge leading across the Sambre to Venerolles. The
retirement of the 1st Division then began ; between 1 P.M.
and 2 P.M. the 1st (Guards) and 2nd Infantry Brigades
left Favril for Fesmy and Oisy, both to the north of Etreux.
Not one of these brigades reached its destination before
10 P.M., and the men were greatly fatigued. The 3rd
Infantry Brigade remained at Favril till 5 P.M., and then
marched straight to Oisy.
The progress of the 5th Infantry Brigade from Noyelles
to Le Grand Fayt was arrested for several hours by the
movement across its line of march south-westwards on
Guise of General Valabregue's divisions.2 About half
a mile to the south-west of Marbaix towards 1 P.M. the
transport of the main body was blocked ; and the 2/Con-
naught Rangers, who formed the rear guard, came per-
force to a halt. One company remained in rear of the
transport, and the rest of the battalion halted on the
road from Maroilles to Marbaix, a mile south of Tais-
nieres. At this point French infantry was entrenching
a position, whilst French cavalry patrols guarded the
roads in all directions. From these it was understood
that there was no enemy in the vicinity. After taking
due precaution, therefore, to watch the approaches, the
1 Part of the ///. Corps moving from Landrecies on Le Cateau. See
Kaupert's "Das Infanterie -Regiment, No. 48," pp. 16, 17.
2 Palat, vol. v. p. 160, states that the I. Corps was on roads assigned
to the Reserve divisions. The difficulty was adjusted during the night.
See p. 206 below.
LE GRAND FAYT 205
commanding officer, Colonel Abercrombie, allowed the 26 Aug.
Connaught Rangers to rest, sending word to the brigadier
that he would move on to Le Grand Fayt at 3 P.M. unless
otherwise ordered. At 3.15 P.M. French patrols came in
with the news that some two hundred Germans, with a
machine gun, were close at hand. Colonel Abercrombie
at once set out with two platoons towards Marbaix, and,
after advancing some six hundred yards, was met by
heavy fire from artillery and a machine gun. Calling
up the rest of the battalion, he deployed it south of
the road. The companies then advanced over difficult
country, of high hedges and small enclosures, under
severe fire, which however ceased after about an hour.
A messenger sent to brigade headquarters to report
the situation was unable to find them ; and between 5 and
6 P.M. the company commanders, being out of touch
with Colonel Abercrombie, began to withdraw inde-
pendently through Le Grand Fayt south-westwards upon
Barzy with such men as they could collect. At 6 P.M.
Colonel Abercrombie followed with about a hundred men,
being assured by an inhabitant that no enemy was in
Le Grand Fayt ; but, while passing through the village,
his detachment was fired upon by Germans concealed
in the houses, and comparatively few escaped. Other
parties were also cut oft, and altogether nearly three
hundred officers and men of the Connaught Rangers were
missing.1
The 5th Infantry Brigade finally went into billets at
Barzy, 5 miles north-east of the bulk of the 2nd Division.
The 5th Cavalry Brigade, which was little molested in
its duty of covering the left flank except by occasional
shells, fell back with trifling loss eight miles further to
Hannapes, on the Oise, about two miles south-west of
Etreux, not reaching its billets until far into the night.
The position of the I. Corps on the night of the 26th
was in and around Etreux ; in detail as follows :
1 Vogel gives a full account of this fight. The attackers were the 1st
Guard Cavalry Brigade and the Garde-Schulzenbataillon. He states that
French troops also took part, and about 100 of them were taken prisoners,
as well as 93 English. According to him, it was the German cavalry
which was surprised, and the Divisional Staff, which was close up to the
vanguard, was under fire. He mentions that the German cavalry fought
on foot for the first time in the war. His division billeted at Marbaix.
The German official list of battles shows that the 2nd Guard Reserve
Division of the X. Reserve Corps was also engaged at Marbaix on the 26th
August.
206 THE RETREAT OF THE I. CORPS
1st Division : Fesmy, Petit Cambresis, Oisy.
2nd Division : fitreux, Venerolles.
5th Cavalry Brigade : Hannapes.
Corps Hqrs. : 1J miles east of Hannapes.
The II. Corps and 4th Division, and remaining cavalry
brigades were 18 miles to the west, in retreat south-west-
ward to the Oise, on the front of St. Quentin — Le Catelet.
The French 53rd and 69th Reserve Divisions were to
the south-east of the I. Corps at Iron and Lavaqueresse.
27TH AUGUST : REAR- GUARD AFFAIR OF ETREUX
At 1 A.M. on the 27th the Staff of the French Fifth
Sketch 3. Army arranged with General Haig that the road through
Maps 3, Guise should be left to the British ; * and, since there was
no choice but for the whole of the I. Corps to march by
this single highway, unless part were sent by less direct
roads on the west side of the Oise, all vehicles were " double-
banked," and staff officers were sent forward to Guise to
provide for the passage of two distinct streams of traffic
through the town. The operation promised to be critical,
in view of the gap between the I. and II. Corps having
widened rather than decreased on the 26th, while to the
north and north-east the enemy was reported to be in
considerable strength. The situation was not rendered
less anxious by a false report, which was current early
in the afternoon, that he was also in great force just to
the north of St. Quentin. General Maxse's (the 1st,
Guards) Brigade was detailed as rear guard to both divi-
sions ; General Bulfin's (2nd Infantry) Brigade as a
western flank guard ; and the 2/Welch, with the 46th
Battery R.F.A., as eastern flank guard. Great stress
was laid on the importance of holding the enemy at a
distance from the high ground on the north-west between
Fesmy and Wassigny, so that he should be unable to
bombard Etreux, where supplies were to be issued to the
troops as they passed through. The 5th Cavalry Brigade
was sent well to the west on the other side of the Oise,
with instructions to follow a route, parallel to the divisions,
by Grougis, Aisonville, Noyales and Hauteville. Mean-
while, Brigadier-General Chetwode, its commander, led
it to a central position five miles to the west of Etreux,
between Mennevret and Le Petit Verly, and pushed out
patrols to the north and north-west.
1 The Reserve divisions crossed the Oise by bridges above Guise.
ETREUX 207
The corps was under way by 4 A.M., the 1st Division 27 Aug.
remaining in a covering position until the 2nd Division 1914-
had moved off. The latter reached its billets without
the slightest molestation, but the march for the 5th Infantry
Brigade from Barzy to Neuvillette (8 miles south-west of
Guise) was long ; the 2/Highland Light Infantry, in par-
ticular, having been employed in repairing the roads at
dawn, did not arrive at its halting-place until 10 P.M., after
a tramp of thirty miles. The false alarm of the enemy's
presence at St. Quentin kept the entire division in move-
ment longer than would otherwise have been necessary,
for the 4th (Guards) Brigade was sent out westward as
a flank guard, and the 6th Infantry Brigade spent the
night entrenching itself just east of the 5th, about Mont
d'Origny.
Meanwhile, until late in the afternoon, the 1st Division
remained in position, with rear and flank guards out,
waiting for the road to be clear ; but there was no
sign of serious pressure upon the line north-west of
Etreux, to which so much importance was attached. Map 12.
In General Maxse's rear guard, the 1/Coldstream were
about Oisy (2 miles north of Etreux) beyond the canal,
and the 1 /Black Watch and 1 /Scots Guards just to the
west of them, in touch with the western flank guard at
Wassigny ; the Munster Fusiliers, with two troops of the
15th Hussars and a section of the 118th Battery R.F.A.,
all under Major Charrier of the Munsters, formed the rear
party east of the Sambre Canal, and had been under arms,
facing north-east, since dawn. The general position of
this party was four miles from Etreux, and extended for
two miles, from Bergues through Fesmy to Chapeau
Rouge, where it struck the north — south road from Land-
recies to Etreux. The eastern flank guard was in position
to the south-east, on the hill south of Bergues. The
ground here falls gently westwards to the Sambre Canal,
which flows first on one side then on the other of the
Landrecies road. The country lent itself to defence, being
divided into small enclosures by thick hedges, which were
passable at certain gaps only. During the morning a
thick white mist lay upon the ground, and later there was
a thunder-storm, so that visibility was never good.
Two companies of the Munsters were about Chapeau
Rouge as screen, watching the roads that run north-west-
wards and northwards to Catillon and La Groise, and the
remainder of the rear party were half a mile to the south-east
208 THE RETREAT OF THE I. CORPS
in front of Fesmy. Later, half a company, and one troop
of the 15th Hussars, were pushed south-eastwards to
Bergues. No sign of the enemy was seen until 9 A.M.,
when a German cavalry patrol came down the road to
Chapeau Rouge from the north, halted within five hundred
yards, and fired a few shots. The Munsters made no
reply, but the Germans came no closer. There were
indications of another column of the enemy to the north-
east, moving south-westwards from Prisches upon Le
Sart straight at the centre of Major Charrier's force ; but
its advanced party had galloped back on the appearance
of a corporal of the 15th Hussars. By 9.30 A.M. all was
again quiet, and Lieut. -Colonel Morland of the 2/Welch
informed Major Charrier that he was going to withdraw
the eastern flank guard to Boue (2 miles north-east of
Etreux). General Maxse directed the Munsters to hold on to
their position until ordered or forced to retire ; and Major
Charrier sent word to the general that, the choice of the
route being left to him, he also should fall back by the
road to Boue. The best part of an hour passed away,
when, towards 10.30 A.M., German infantry came down
again from the north-east, and opened an attack on
Bergues, which a little later was extended also to Chapeau
Rouge. The Munsters being by this time entrenched,
held their own with little difficulty ; the two guns found
a target in a German column to the north-west, and all
went well.
At 11 A.M., whilst this action was in progress, the 3rd
Infantry Brigade was at last able to start southward from
Oisy ; and at the same time Colonel Morland's flank
guard also moved south upon Boue". The firing died
away, and at noon General Maxse confirmed Major Charrier's
choice of the road for his retreat, at the same time sending
to all units of the rear guard their final instructions for
retirement, the hour only being left blank. By 12.20 P.M.
the road at Etreux was reported clear of all transport ;
and a little later General Maxse despatched orders (time
1 P.M.) to every unit of the rear guard, " Retire at once."
This message, though sent by two routes, failed to reach
the Munster Fusiliers.
Meanwhile, at 12.30 P.M. or thereabouts, German
infantry developed its attack in greater strength on both
flanks, at Bergues and at Chapeau Rouge, though, as yet,
without the support of artillery. As the pressure became
heavier, in accordance with Major Charrier's orders, the
ETREUX 209
two companies at Chapeau Rouge gradually withdrew 27 Aug.
south-eastwards towards Fesmy. The men, finding good 1914-
shelter in the ditches by the side of the road, worked their
way back with very slight loss, and by shooting down
the Germans as they showed themselves at the gaps in
the hedges, forbade any close pursuit. The guns also
opened fire, first towards the north, and later to the north-
east, in which quarter the enemy was now observed to be
in greatest force. Following the Munsters up slowly, the
Germans delivered a strong attack upon Fesmy, their guns
now coming into action for the first time ; but they made
little progress. The Munsters' machine guns did very
deadly work, firing down the road from Fesmy to Le Sart ;
but although the Germans tried to mask their advance by
driving cattle down on the defenders, it was to no purpose.
At 1.15 P.M. Major Charrier sent to General Maxse this
short message : " Am holding on to position north of
" Fesmy village, being attacked by force of all arms. Get-
" ting on well. The Germans are driving cattle in front of
" them up to us for cover. We are killing plenty of them."
Thus holding his own, Major Charrier 's chief anxiety
was for his detachment at Bergues. He pushed out a
platoon to the eastward, in the hope of gaining touch with it,
but the platoon was driven back by superior numbers ; and,
in fact, the troops at Bergues were about this time forced
out of the village and compelled to retreat southward to
a farm. Here after checking German pursuit by fire and
then counter-attacking, the detachment retired westward
to the Sambre Canal, and thence down the road to Oisy.
Meanwhile, Major Charrier continued his defence of
Fesmy with great spirit ; he had now the whole of his
battalion, except the half -company at Bergues, under his
hand ; and he had need of them. So resolute was the
onset of the Germans that, in places, they approached to
within a hundred and fifty yards of the village, and a few
actually broke into it and shot down two of the artillery
wagon teams. Every one of these bold men was killed or
captured, and at 1.50 P.M. Major Charrier sent off the last
message which came through from him to General Maxse :
'' We have German wounded prisoners, who say that about
" two regiments are opposing us and some guns. They
" belong to the 15th Regiment " — that is to say, to the VII.
Corps of the German Second Army.1
1 They really belonged to the 15th Reserve Infantry Regiment of the
2nd Guard Reserve Division. The German official list of battles shows
VOL. I P
210 THE RETREAT OF THE I. CORPS
About this time — 1.45 to 2 P.M. — the 2nd Infantry
Brigade, the western flank guard, marched away from
Wassigny for Hannapes, south of fitreux, with little
hindrance ; the Northamptons, who brought up the rear,
lost only four men, and claimed on their side from forty to
fifty German troopers killed, wounded or taken prisoner.1
Thus the greater part of the 1st Division was now in motion
to the south ; the 3rd Infantry Brigade was within an hour's
march of Guise ; and there remained only the rear guard
to bring off. Major Charrier, having struck the enemy
hard, with little loss to himself, at 2.30 P.M. threw out
flank guards wide upon each side and began his retreat
upon Oisy. The movement was necessarily slow, the
flanking parties being impeded by hedges ; and it was
some time before the rearmost of the Munsters and the
two guns left Fesmy. At 3 P.M. the cyclist, who had
failed to deliver the copy of General Maxse's final order to
Major Charrier, reached the Coldstream Guards near Oisy,
and gave them their instructions to retire forthwith.
Simultaneously, the detachment of the 15th Hussars and
Munster Fusiliers from Bergues came into Oisy and took
Map 3. over the guard of the bridge there. But it was now
evident that the gap between the rear guard and the
corps was increasing rapidly : the 3rd Infantry Brigade
being by this time at Guise ; the 2nd Infantry Brigade
closing in upon Hannapes, some five miles in rear ;
whilst the 1st, at another five miles distance, was still
in position at Oisy. The 3rd Infantry Brigade was there-
fore halted at Guise, and the I/South Wales Borderers and
the XXVI. Brigade R.F.A. were sent back north about
three miles to Maison Rouge, where at 3.30 P.M. they
took up a position to cover the retreat of the 1st (Guards)
Brigade.
By that hour the Coldstream Guards, Scots Guards and
Black Watch had begun to withdraw, the northern of the
two bridges over the canal near Oisy being blown up after
the last man had crossed it ; and shortly after 4 P.M. the
rear-guard cavalry reported strong hostile columns moving
south upon La Vallee Mulatre, immediately to the west of
Wassigny. The three battalions, upon reaching the level
that the 2nd Guard Reserve Division of the X. Reserve Corps was engaged
at Fesmy on the 27th August.
1 They belonged to the 16th Uhlans, the corps cavalry of the VII. Corps,
the right of the Second Army (see Cramm's " Geschichte des Ulanen-
regiments, No. 16," p. 106).
ETREUX 211
plateau to the south of Etreux, found themselves threatened 27 Aug.
from the north and west by a German cavalry division l and 1914-
two batteries. There was a good deal of firing as they
retired over the next three miles of ground to the south-
ward, but it was confined chiefly to the artillery; for
the enemy was held at a distance without much difficulty
by the British batteries at Maison Rouge. Thus the three
battalions reached Guise with trifling loss, the 5th Cavalry
Brigade retiring parallel to them on the west. The
firing died down at dusk, and the 1st Division went into
bivouac, the 3rd Infantry Brigade at Bernot, just north of
the 2nd Division at Mont D'Origny, at 9 P.M., and the 2nd
and 1st Brigades at Hauteville and Jonqueuse, north-
east and east of Bernot, at 11 P.M. The 2/Welch of the
eastern flank guard also reached Bernot at this hour;
it had been much impeded by refugees, but beyond
suffering a good deal of sniping, had not been inter-
fered with by the enemy. The 5th Cavalry Brigade
also came into the same area for the night ; and the
detachment of 15th Hussars at Oisy marched southward
on to Mont d'Origny, which it reached at midnight. The
men were greatly fatigued by their long and trying day,
but they had been little pressed by the Germans. A
cavalry division had, indeed, appeared very late from the
north-westward, but no infantry had threatened them
from the north, and the reason for this must now be
told.
As it left Fesmy the rearmost company of the Munsters Map 12.
had become engaged with German infantry, but was able
to disengage and rejoin the main body of the battalion,
then, about 5.45 P.M., half-way to Etreux, and con-
tinue its retreat. But as it approached the village,
Germans were seen crossing the road ahead, and fire was
opened not only by German infantry from the houses on
the northern outskirts, but from a battery not more than
fifteen hundred yards away to the eastward. Then for the
first time the Munsters began to fall fast. One of the two
guns of the section of the 118th Battery was disabled, a
single shell destroying the whole team. The other gun
was promptly brought into action against the German
artillery, but over three hundred rounds had already been
fired, and ammunition was very nearly exhausted. Still
undaunted, Major Charrier pushed forward two companies
to clear the way through Etreux ; but the Germans had
1 The Guard Cavalry Division of Richthofen's Corps.
212 THE RETREAT OF THE I. CORPS
installed themselves in the trenches dug during the fore-
noon by the Black Watch, and also occupied a house,
which they had loopholed, west of the road. A house east
of the road now burst into flames, evidently giving the
signal for a converging attack from all sides upon the
Munsters. Major Charrier ordered the remaining gun to
be brought up to demolish the loopholed house, but the
range was so short that the team and detachment were
instantly shot down. A third company, which was
supporting the advance of the two companies, was then
sent to make an attack on the railway-cutting to the east
of Etreux station. In spite of enfilade fire, both of in-
fantry and artillery, the company worked up to within
seventy yards of the cutting and charged. The men
were mowed down on all sides, and only one officer
reached the hedge, with one man, who was then killed by
his side.
Meanwhile Major Charrier had led three charges against
the loopholed house, in one of which his adjutant actually
reached the building, and fired his revolver through a
loophole, only to drop stunned by a blow from falling
brick-work. These gallant efforts were all in vain. It was
now 7 p.m. The Germans attacked from south, east and
west, and, though temporarily driven back at one point by
a bayonet charge, continued to advance. Major Charrier
was shot dead alongside the deserted gun on the road ; and
so many officers had by this time fallen, that the command
devolved upon Lieutenant E. W. Gower. Collecting such
men as were left, he formed them in an orchard, facing to all
points of the compass, and continued to resist. Gradually
the Germans crowded in on them from three sides, bringing
fresh machine guns into position, and at 9.15 P.M. they
closed in also from the north, and the little band of not
more than two hundred and fifty of all ranks with ammuni-
tion almost spent, was overpowered. The Munsters had
been fighting against overwhelming odds for nearly twelve
hours, and discovered at the end that they had been
matched against at least six battalions of the 73rd and 77th
Reserve Infantry Regiments, of the 19th Reserve Division,
besides three of the 15th Regiment of the 2nd Guard Reserve
Division, all forming part of the X. Reserve Corps. Beyond
question, they arrested the enemy's pursuit in this quarter
for fully six hours, and their heroic sacrifice was not made
in vain.
SKETCH 4.
OPERATIONS, 28 AUGUST - 5 SEPTEMBER, 1<)U.
Retreat of B.E.F.
Positions at night are shown by dates.
O AMIENS
Nesleo
N.
'Ribemout
Hoye0
QAIONTDWIER
Hani
oGuiscard
Cliauuyo
la Fere
28429
°Craonne.
C,OMPIEGNEA
°CLEHMQNT
MILES 543210
Ordnance Sarvey, 1920.
THE RETREAT CONTINUED 213
SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION AT MIDNIGHT :
27TH/28TH AUGUST
I. Corps. On the high ground south- 28 Aug.
wards of Guise from Long- 1914-
champs to Mont d'Origny, with Sketch 3.
5th Cavalry Brigade. the 5th Cavalry Brigade and Maps 3
4th (Guards) Brigade west of & 13'
the river Oise about Hauteville
and Bernot.
1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry South of St. Quentin from
Brigades (portions). Itancourt to Savy.
II. Corps. Still 18 miles to the south-
westward of the I. Corps.
4th Division. Part south of the Somme from
Ham to Rouy ; the remainder
4th Cavalry Brigade. within four hours' march of the
Somme.
THE I. CORPS ON 28TH AUGUST
At dawn on the 28th, although the weather was still
extremely hot, the retreat of the I. Corps on La Fere was
resumed under more favourable conditions ; for, although
two German divisions were reported from eight to twelve
miles north of St. Quentin, the rumour that they were
actually in that town was proved to be false ; l and,
moreover, the French XVIII. Corps was now in touch with
the British on the east. The transport began to move off
at 2 A.M. In addition to a rear guard, a flank guard (under
Brigadier-General Home) consisting of the 5th Cavalry
Brigade, 5th Infantry Brigade and XXXVI. Brigade
R.F.A., was thrown out to the west ; and the rear guard,
the 2nd Infantry Brigade with a brigade of artillery and a
squadron, held the heights of Mont d'Origny during the
passage of the main body through Origny. Nothing was
seen of the enemy until shortly after noon, when a German
column of all arms appeared, working round towards the
right rear of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, and about 12.30
P.M. its guns opened fire, but with little effect.2 The
German infantry made some semblance of attack, but was
1 On the night of the 27th/28th, the German III., IV. and IV. Reserve
Corps were 6 miles from St. Quentin on a front facing south and south-
west (Kluck).
2 From von Billow's map, the column would appear to belong to the
X. Corps then, with the rest of the Second Army, moving south-westward.
Later in the day, that Army turned south.
214 THE RETREAT OF THE I. CORPS
easily held at a distance, and at 2 P.M. the last of the
British battalions marched off, covered by infantry of
Valabregue's Reserve divisions, which occupied the
position as they vacated it. The I. Corps then made its
way, always by a single highroad, towards La Fere. The
march was again most trying, for on the greater part of
the way battalions, as well as transport, were " double-
banked," and a swarm of refugees added to the con-
gestion. Thus, choked with dust, on an airless, oppressive
day, the I. Corps at last reached La Fere, crossed the Oise
southwards, and, in the course of the afternoon, reached
its billets : — the 1st Division just south of La Fere at
Fressancourt, Bertaucourt and St. Gobain ; the 2nd
Division further to the westward at Andelain, Servais and
Amigny.
It remained to be seen whether the German cavalry
would press into the gap between the I. and II. Corps,
which was still some fifteen miles wide. It will be remem-
bered that on this day the 3rd Cavalry Brigade had
been pushed eastwards by Major-General Allenby to gain
touch with the I. Corps.1 Early in the forenoon the
brigade was in position six or seven miles south of St.
Quentin, between Cerizy and Essigny, when at 10 A.M.
firing was heard to the north, which was followed shortly
afterwards by the appearance of French Territorial infantry-
men retiring south from St. Quentin through Essigny.
Learning from them that they had been surprised by
German cavalry and artillery at Bellenglise, Brigadier-
General Gough withdrew his right, the 4th Hussars, south-
wards from near Essigny to Benay, to cover their retreat.
After a time, his patrols reported a brigade of Uhlans to be
advancing on Essigny and a second column of all arms
further to the east, moving on Cerizy. About 1 P.M. an
advanced party of Uhlans was caught in ambush by the
4th Hussars about Benay and dispersed with loss, their
killed being identified as Uhlans of the Guard Cavalry
Division. The column in rear of them thereupon attempted
to work round General Gough' s eastern flank, but was
stopped by the guns of E Battery R.H.A. Thus what
seems to have been the western column of the Guard
Cavalry Division was brought, with comparative ease, to a
standstill.
1 See p. 199.
CfiRIZY 215
THE AFFAIR OF CERIZY
The eastern column of the German cavalry was more
enterprising, but no more successful. As commander of
the left flank guard of the I. Corps, Brigadier-General
Home l had sent the whole of the 5th Cavalry Brigade to
the western bank of the Oise, and, at 10.30 A.M., Sir Philip
Chetwode moved it to Moy, a village nearly abreast and
2 miles east of Cerizy, where he halted in the Oise
valley ; and leaving the Scots Greys on outpost, with the
20th Hussars in close support, on the high ground to the
north-west by La Guinguette Farm, he rested the remainder
of the brigade in Moy. About noon the enemy came into
" sight, advancing south along the main road from St.
Quentin. Upon this a squadron of the Scots Greys, with
a machine gun, was sent to occupy a copse on the eastern
side of the road a little to the north of La Guinguette Farm
(on the St. Quentin — La Fere road, J mile east of Ce*rizy),
with one troop pushed forward to a building near the road
about half a mile ahead, and a section of J Battery R.H.A.
was unlimbered about half a mile to the south-east of
the copse. The advanced troop of the Greys was driven
back by superior numbers, but all attempts of hostile
patrols to penetrate to La Guinguette were foiled by the
fire of the remainder of the squadron. At length, at
2 P.M., two squadrons of the enemy advanced in close
formation on the eastern side of the road, and, being fired
on both by the Greys and by the two guns, dismounted.
Most of their horses, terrified by the bursting shells,
galloped away, and the troopers, after discharging a few
rounds, also turned tail. Thereupon, General Chetwode
at once ordered the rest of J Battery into action and
directed the 12th Lancers, with two squadrons of the
Greys in support, to move round the enemy's eastern
flank, and the 20th Hussars to advance along the St.
Quentin road and turn them from the west. The dis-
mounted Germans meanwhile made off in all haste, but
the leading squadron, C, and the machine-gun section of
the 12th Lancers, hurrying northward, caught sight of a
body of German cavalry, about eight hundred yards away,
moving in close formation towards Moy. Attacking it
with fire, the 12th Lancers compelled the Germans to
dismount, and then stampeded their horses. The two
1 See p. 213.
216 THE RETREAT
other squadrons and J Battery now coming into action,
C squadron mounted and, led by Lieut.-Colonel Wormald,
approaching over dead ground, got within fifty yards
of the enemy and charged. Some seventy or eighty of
the Germans, who proved to be the 2nd Guard Dragoon
Regiment, were speared. The 12th Lancers lost one
officer and four men killed, and the lieutenant-colonel
and four men wounded. Further pursuit would obviously
have been imprudent, but General Chetwode remained
on his ground long enough to collect all his wounded — his
casualties did not exceed thirty — and to ascertain that
his guns had played such havoc with the German reserves
that their total losses might fairly be reckoned at three
hundred killed and wounded. Finally towards evening,
he and General Gough fell back independently, the former
to the left of the I. Corps, to Sinceny and Autreville, the
latter to rejoin the Cavalry Division, west of the Oise canal
at Frieres (6 miles W.N.W. of La Fere) and Jussy (just
north of Frieres). Though the action at La Guinguette
had been comparatively insignificant, it had very effectually
damped the ardour of the German cavalry.1
GENERAL SITUATION ON NIGHT OF 28TH/29TH AUGUST
Sketch 3. When all movements had been completed on the night
Map 13. Of the 28th/29th August, the I. Corps was south of the
Map 3. * The Chaplain of the Guard Cavalry Division, Dr. Vogel, gives the
following account of this action. After relating the march of the
division on the 28th August from La Groise via Wassigny and Bohain
to Homblieres (3 miles east of St. Quentin), which it reached at 1 P.M.,
and a fight around St. Quentin with two battalions of the French 10th
Territorial Infantry Regiment (von Kluck says that his ///. Corps was
also engaged there) which lasted until 7 P.M., he states that in the course
of this " a report came from the Dragoons that they were in a severe
action east of Urvillers [4 miles north-west of Moy whence the British
5th Cavalry Brigade had moved]. They had stumbled on what appeared
to be weak enemy infantry in the wood south-west of the village, and
had attacked with three squadrons dismounted, intending to charge with
the other three. It turned out, however, that the brigade had to deal,
not with disorganized fugitives, but with a strong detachment of the
intact Franco-British Army that had advanced from La Fere. This was
evident from the lively infantry fusilade which they received as they
approached mounted. It was not easy to get clear (Loslosung war nicht
leicht), but with the assistance of a battery, the brigade succeeded in
withdrawing behind the hill north of the wood, which was held by the
Guard Schutzenbataillon. Some British squadrons which also had deployed
' to charge were driven back by our guns, which opened at just the right
moment. The 3rd Guard Uhlans now reinforced the troops holding the
hill. A troop of the Dragoons, under Lieutenant Graf Schwerin, was
ridden over by British Hussars. The wounded, amongst whom were
men with six or seven lance wounds, and several bullet wounds, were
taken prisoner by the enemy."
GENERAL SITUATION 217
Oise and of La Fere ; the II. Corps, with the 4th Division, Night of
was north and east of Noyon, with one division south of 28
the Oise. Thus, the two wings of the Army were still
11 miles apart, the gap between them being more or
less covered by cavalry in a curve from the left of the
I. Corps to the northern end of the II. Corps. On the
right, the British were 6 miles in rear of the left of the
French Fifth Army, but on the left in touch with Sordet's
cavalry.
In greater detail, the positions of the British were : Map 3.
I. Corps :
On the northern edge of the Forest of St. Gobain and
Coucy, from Fressancourt to Amigny.
5th Cavalry Brigade : Sinceny.
II. Corps (including 4th Division and 19th Infantry Brigade
and Cavalry Division) :
1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades :
At Berlancourt, Flavy le Meldeux — Plessis, and Jussy,
respectively.
3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions :
From Freniches, south and east, through Genvry to
Pontoise.
4th Cavalry Brigade :
Cressy (3 miles south of Nesle) north-west of the 4th
Division.
From the 28th onward every day was to bring the
two wings closer to each other. Sir John French, after
meeting some of the 5th Division on the march, as has
already been told, had motored on to La Fere to see the
I. Corps, and had satisfied himself as to the good spirit
of the troops. He had also received the promise of the
6th Division from England about the middle of September
and of a complete corps from India at a later date. Other
important intelligence also reached him. The troops
of General d'Amade, together with General Sordet's
Cavalry Corps, had been seen in action between Peronne
and Bray sur Somme, but by evening it appeared that
they had been pressed back. There was good reason to
believe that German headquarters judged the British
Army to be beaten beyond hope of speedy recovery, and
were intent upon extending their enveloping movement
westwards until they could sweep all opposing forces into
their net.
General Joffre, during his visit to Sir John French
on the 27th, had mentioned the preparation of a counter-
218 THE RETREAT
stroke and the formation of a new Army on his left. The
first sign of it was seen on this day in the arrival of units
between Amiens and Ham. This Army, the Sixth, under
General Maunoury, was to be formed between the British
and General d'Amade. As a beginning, the VII. Corps,1
brought from Belfort, was detraining at Villers Bretonneux,
to the east of Amiens, and a Moroccan brigade was already
assembled further to the east.2 On the same day General
Joffre — his Western Armies being on the general line
Rheims — Amiens — ordered the French Fifth Army to take
the offensive towards St. Quentin along a line parallel
to the Oise from Guise to La Fere, hoping at best to strike
an effective blow which might check the German advance,
and at least relieve the British Army from all further
pressure.3
On the evening of the 28th August, the French Fifth
Army was disposed on the arc of a circle opposite Guise
from Vervins to Vendeuil (3 miles north of La Fere).4
It was thus in touch with, but in advance of, the British
Army. During the day, General Valabregue's Reserve
divisions, which since the night of the 25th/26th, as
already described, had marched so close to the I. Corps
as sometimes to share its roads, had had hard fighting on
the Oise bridges at Guise and in its neighbourhood, and
had withdrawn at nightfall to the left of the line of the
Fifth Army.
Sir John French issued orders at 11.30 P.M.5 for the
British to halt and rest on the 29th, but with the condition
that all formations should be withdrawn to the south of
1 14th Division and 63rd Reserve Division. The 13th Division
remained in Alsace.
2 According to von Kluck, von der Marwitz's Cavalry Corps " was
" surprised in its billets [near Peronne] by the French 61st and 62nd Reserve
" Divisions (of d'Amade's force) on the morning of the 28th. The French,
'* however, were driven from the field at Manancourt (7 miles S.W. of
" Bapaume) by parts of the II. Corps and IV. Reserve Corps.'1'' This was
the action of Mesnil (Palat, vol. v. pp. 141-2).
3 The orders, according to General Lanrezac (" Le Plan de Campagne
Fran9ais," p. 218) were verbal : " Take the offensive a fond on St. Quentin
and as soon as possible, without bothering about the English." Palat,
vol. v. p. 170, states : " The situation of the British Army, constantly
" menaced in rear and on the left flank, naturally pre-occupied the General-
" in-Chief. He judged it necessary to diminish the enemy pressure on it
** by carrying out a counter-offensive with the Fifth Army." Hanotaux,
vol. viii. p. 82, says, " Avant tout, il faut fixer, c'est-a-dire sauver, 1'armee
britannique."
4 Palat, vol. v., and Hanotaux, *' La Bataille de Guise — St. Quentin,
28-30 aout 1914 " (" Revue des Deux Mondes," September 1918).
6 Appendix 18.
LANDING OF THE ROYAL MARINES 219
a line practically east and west through Nesle and Ham, 27-28 Aug.
connecting with the French at Vendeuil. During the 1»14-
evening of the 28th, Sir Douglas Haig was asked by General
Lanrezac to co-operate in his coming offensive ; but on
informing G.H.Q. of the request, he received instruc-
tions that he was not to take part. The Field-Marshal
was anxious to withdraw his exhausted troops as soon as
possible to some safe locality for eight or ten days, where
they might rest and be re-equipped, and he accordingly
arranged with General Joffre that they should fall back
to a line a little to the south of the Aisne between Soissons
and Compiegne. The situation was complicated by the
fact that von Kluck's sweep westwards had compelled
the evacuation of the British advanced base at Amiens.
It was on this day that St. Nazaire, at the mouth of
the Loire, was first suggested to take the place of
Havre as the principal sea base of the British force in
France.
It may be mentioned here that, with the view of Map 2.
creating a diversion on the western flank to assist the
British Expeditionary Force and of supporting the Belgians,
three battalions of Royal Marine Light Infantry, under
command of Brigadier-General Sir George Aston, were
landed at Ostend on the 27th and 28th August. They
were re-embarked on the 31st.1 News of this landing
appears to have reached the German Supreme Command
on the 30th. With regard to it the head of the Operations
Branch of the German General Staff has written : 2
" At this time there was, as may be imagined, no lack
" of alarming reports at General Headquarters. Ostend
" and Antwerp took a prominent part in them. One day
" countless British troops were said to have landed at Ostend
" and to be marching on Antwerp ; on another that there
" were about to be great sorties from Antwerp. Even
" landings of Russian troops, 80,000 men, at Ostend were
" mentioned. At Ostend a great entrenched camp for the
" English was in preparation.3 . . . Though, of course,
" the security of the rear and right flank of the army re-
" quired constant attention, such, and even worse informa-
" tion, could not stop the advance of the troops."
1 For details see Sir Julian Corbett's ** Naval Operations," vol. i. pp.
92-4 and 123-4.
2 General-Leutnant Tappen, " Bis zur Marne," p. 22.
3 Brigadier-General Aston's men did commence digging.
220 THE RETREAT
MOVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN FIRST AND SECOND
ARMIES AFTER LE CATEAU
27 Aug. What became of the German First and Second Armies
1914- after the battle of Le Cateau will now be related.
Sketch 5. On the 26th August, von Billow l had issued orders
Map 3. for the continuation of the pursuit in a " sharp south-
" westerly direction ... as sufficient elbow room had to
" be obtained for the great wheel of the Third, Fourth and
* ' Fifth Armies round Verdun. ' ' ' ' After continuous fighting
with French rear guards," the /. Cavalry Corps and three
and a half corps of the Second Army 2 reached an approxi-
mate S.E. and N.W. line a little in front of Avesnes,
the cavalry and X . Reserve Corps moving to Marbaix,
where they had the fight, already related,8 with the Con-
naught Rangers ; but the Second Army took no part in
the battle of Le Cateau.
On the 27th, after Le Cateau, von Kluck, making a
late start, moved about twelve miles in a south-westerly
direction : — III. Corps via Maretz to Nauroy, IV. Corps
to Bellicourt — Vendhuille, 17. Corps, with //. Cavalry
Corps in front, to Sailly Saillisel — Fins (5 miles south-east of
Bapaume) ; and the IV. Reserve Corps followed between
the //. and IV. Corps to Roisel — Li^ramont. The only
fighting that von Kluck records is isolated encounters
of the //. Corps and cavalry with General d'Amade's
forces on the British left, at Heudecourt and west-
wards. The IX. Corps (less the 17th Division) marched
from Maubeuge via Le Cateau some five hours later
than the rest of the Army, and billeted in and about
Busigny.
The Second Army (still without the 13th Division],
reached a S.E. and N.W. line through Etreux, where the
X. Reserve Corps, on its western flank, ran into the Munster
Fusiliers.4
During the day, von Kluck was released from von
Billow's command ; he was therefore free to make a
wide turning movement to the west, instead of being
1 Billow, p. 29.
2 The ISth Division was left behind at Maubeuge, where General von
Zwehl took charge of the investment with the VII. Reserve Corps (less
13th Reserve Division on march from Namur), and the 17th Division of
the IX. Corps. The 13th Division rejoined the Second Army in the nick
of time to take part in the battle of Guise.
8 See p. 205. 4 See p. 209 et seq.
SKETCH 5.
THE GERMAN ADVANCE, 17 AUGUST -5 SEPTEMBER, 1914.
NORTH
SEA
OEssen
pDiisgeldorf
Dunkirk
<* $p Cologne
Maestricht "'-V
a^mr-i0"""*? V
GERMAN ARMIES 17 Aug.
MARCH, 18 Aug. -5 Sept.
POSITIONS, 5 Sept.
Defended Areas
FRENCH, BELGIAN J;
BRITISH ARMIES, 5 Sept. i
Ordnance Survey, 1920-
GERMAN MOVEMENTS 221
tied to the Second Army in order to assist it to tactical 28 Aug.
successes.
On the 28th, therefore, the First Army sent on cavalry
and field batteries in pursuit of d'Amade's forces, and
there was rear-guard fighting ; the remainder of the Army
moved south-west across the British front. The //I.
Corps got no further than Bellenglise — outskirts of St.
Quentin, owing to the opposition met with from French
Territorials, British cavalry and stragglers ; the heads of
the three corps on the right just reached the Somme, on a
front six miles on either side of Peronne ; the IX. Corps
was still a march behind on the left.
In the Second Army, von Biilow ordered the Guard
and X. Corps on his left (east) to stand fast and recon-
noitre, since the French Fifth Army was on their front
behind the Oise, whilst his right swung round in touch
with the First Army : —
" /. Cavalry Corps" he ordered, " will endeavour to
" attack the British in the rear, moving round the south
" of St. Quentin ; "
the VII. Corps (less 13ih Division) was to march early
to St. Quentin ; the X. Reserve Corps was to make a
short march of about six miles south-west from Etreux.
Except for the cavalry fight at La Guinguette x and the
right of the X. Reserve Corps brushing against the rear
guard at Mont d'Origny,2 all touch with the British was lost.
Von Biilow does not say what places the above-named corps
reached by evening, but he records that in the afternoon of
the 28th he received a message from von Kluck asking
him to deal with the disorganized English forces, who
appeared to be falling back on La Fere. He therefore
ordered the X. Reserve and VII. Corps (less 13th Division)
to push on westwards, towards the passages of the Somme
and the Crozat Canal near Ham and St. Simon (4 miles
east of Ham), which they reached on the 29th.
Thus the B.E.F., though at first followed by the right
of the Second Army and the left of the First9 escaped from
pressure on the 28th owing to the gap between these
Armies steadily increasing to some fourteen miles.
During the evening of the 28th an officer from O.H.L.
brought to von Biilow and von Kluck " General Directions
for the Further Conduct of Operations." 8
1 See p. 215. a See p. 213.
3 Given in extenso in von Kluck. Thus far the original plan for the
First Army to sweep west of Paris was maintained.
222 THE RETREAT
In accordance with these, the First Army and II.
Cavalry Corps were to march west of the Oise towards
the lower Seine, and the Second Army and /. Cavalry Corps
towards Paris ; at the same time, the First Army was to be
" prepared to co-operate in the fighting of the Second
" Army and be responsible for the protection of the right
" flank." As the Armies were already marching south-west,
these directions did not necessarily mean any change in
the orders to their corps.
A completely erroneous appreciation of the situation
appears to have been current at O.H.L. at this time. It
furnishes a clue to the apparently haphazard way in which
the German Armies moved, and is so extraordinary that
it is best, perhaps, to quote the words of the Chief of the
Operations Section i.1
" The French, as expected, had offered battle to prevent
" us from penetrating into France. The highly favourable
" reports that came in daily, even on the 25th August, in
" conjunction with the great victory of the Sixth and
" Seventh Armies in Lorraine on the 20th and 25th,
" aroused in Great Headquarters the belief that the great
" decisive battle in the West had been fought and con-
" eluded in our favour. Under the impression that there
" had been a ' decisive victory,' the Chief of the General
" Staff resolved on the 25th, in spite of arguments to the
" contrary, to detach forces to the East. He believed the
" moment had come when, in conformity with the great
" operations plan, a decisive victory in the West having
" been won, considerable forces could be sent to the East
" to obtain a decision there also. For this purpose six
" corps were detailed, among them the XI. Corps and
" Guard Reserve Corps (besieging Namur). . . . Only after
" the whole extent of the victory at Tannenberg became
" known was the order cancelled as regards the four corps
" to be taken from the centre and left ; one of these, the
" V. Corps of the Fifth Army, was actually awaiting
" entrainment at Thionville. On the subsequent days
" further reports of successes came in. After O.H.L. had
" issued instructions on the 26th and 27th for the continua-
" tion of the operations on the basis that great victories
" had been gained, the First Army reported on the 28th
" August that it had defeated the British Army, and that
" it was already half-way between the Belgian frontier and
" Paris. . . . The idea that the French retirement was
1 Tappen, pp. 18, 19.
THE FRENCH FIFTH ARMY 223
" according to plan was only expressed by a few solitary 28 Aug.
" individuals." 1914-
This statement may be partly designed to throw some
of the blame on the Army commanders for forwarding
misleading reports of victories, but the despatch of the
two army corps to Russia and the bringing of the V.
Corps out of the line are established facts. Nor would it
seem that the successes were unexpected. Shortly before
the war Conrad von Hotzendorf, the Chief of the Staff of
the Austro-Hungarian Army, enquired of von Moltke how
long it would be before a decision in the West would be
reached, and the latter replied : " the thirty-sixth to
fortieth day of mobilization ; " x as the 2nd August 1914
was the first day, this meant the 6th to 10th September, a
very accurate forecast.
NOTES
I. MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH FIFTH ARMY2 FROM
CHARLEROI TO GUISE
The general line of retirement of the French Fifth Army after Map 3.
Charleroi was south-westwards, its orders being to reach the line
Laon — La Fere. The movements of General Valabregue's two
Reserve divisions in contact with the British I. Corps have been
mentioned. The XVIII. Corps (35th, 26th and 38th (African)
Divisions) on their right, retired via Avesnes, and crossed the Oise
at Romery (4 miles east of Guise). The III. Corps, next on the
right (5th, 6th and 37th (African) Divisions), followed in echelon
behind the XVIII. ; it passed the French frontier on the 25th and
marched through Fourmies (10 miles south-east of Avesnes), and
crossed the Oise between Etreaupont and Ohis. The X. Corps
marched via La Capelle to Hirson, first south and then south-east,
to keep in touch with the Fourth Army, and thence to Vervins.
The I. Corps, from the right of the Army, after reaching Travaux
(7 miles south of Vervins), was brought north-west into second line
between the III. and X. Corps.
Thus, by the evening of the 28th August, the Fifth Army was
drawn up facing north and north-west behind the Oise from Veryins
practically to La Fere, in the following order : 4th Cavalry Division,
51st Reserve Division, X. Corps, III. Corps, XVIII. Corps, Vala-
bregue's Reserve divisions, with the I. Corps coming up into second
line. The German Second Army was in contact with the whole
front of the Fifth Army, and had secured a bridgehead at Guise.
1 Conrad's " Aus meiner Dienstzeit," vol. i. p. 370.
2 From Palat, vol. v., and Hanotaux in the " Revue des Deux
Mondes," 1st September 1918.
224
BRITISH LOSSES
II. BRITISH LOSSES 23RD TO 27TH AUGUST 1914
(EXCLUDING MISSING WHO RETURNED TO THEIR UNITS)
Cavalry Division
I. Corps :
1st Division
2nd Division .
II. Corps :
3rd Division
5th Division .
4th Division .
19th Infantry Brigade
1 The British losses at Waterloo were 8,458 (Wellington Despatches,
vol. xii.).
23rd. 24th.
(Mons.)
25th.
26th. 27th.
(Le Cateau.)
6
252
123
15
14
9
42
32
61
826
35
59
230
344
48
1
,185
386
17
557
1,656
*40
357
62
65
36
1,796
2,366
3,158
477
50
76
58
108
1
,638
2,606
905
8,217!
1,180
CHAPTER XI
29TH-31ST AUGUST : THE EVENTS OF THE RETREAT
CONTINUED
(See Sketches 4 & 5 ; Maps 3, 4, 14, 15 & 16)
29TH AUGUST
EXCEPT for some minor adjustments to secure the best Sketches
ground possible, in the course of which the 4th Division ^ & 5-
had moved back a little to the area Bussy — Sermaize — 14aps
Chevilly, the morning of the 29th August found the
British Expeditionary Force halted in its over -night
positions on the Oise.1 To the right front of the British
was the French Fifth Army, and to their left front the
newly -formed French Sixth Army, General Maunoury's
headquarters being at Montdidier.2 In pursuance of
General Joffre's directions, the Fifth Army attacked
towards St. Quentin. But the situation had changed since
the operation had been planned ; the advanced troops of
the German Guard and X . Corps, driving back Valabregue's
Reserve divisions which opposed them, had crossed the
Oise on the evening of the 28th. As they were rapidly
reinforced, it became necessary to stop the French main
attack, which was going well, and deal with this menace
to what was now the right flank of the Fifth Army.
The counter-offensive drove the Germans back over the
Oise, but on the left in the original direction towards St.
Quentin, no advantage was gained ; the opposing force :
1 See p. 217.
2 At this time, General Maunoury's Army consisted of the VII. Corps
(14th Division and 63rd Reserve Division), 55th Reserve Division (just
arrived from the Army of Lorraine), the 61st and 62nd Reserve Divisions
(of d'Amade's force), a Moroccan infantry brigade, two battalions of
Chasseurs des Alpes and a Provisional Cavalry Division (General Cornulier-
Luciniere's) formed from Sordet's Cavalry Corps, the rest of this corps
having gone back to Versailles to refit. The 56th Reserve Division arrived
during the evening of the 29th August.
VOL. I 225 Q
226 THE RETREAT
the X. Reserve Corps and the greater part of the VII.
Corps1 of the Second Army and the 17th Division from the
inner wing of the First Army,2 being in superior numbers.
Meanwhile the outer wing of the German First Army,
swinging south-westwards, was engaged with General
Maunoury's Army, and there was heavy fighting at
Proyart (10 miles south-west of Peronne) and Rosieres
(6 miles south of Proyart).
For the British, except the cavalry, much of the 29th
was a day of rest, devoted to repairing the wear and tear
of the strenuous days through which they had passed.
The enemy was by no means wholly inactive on the
British front. At 5 A.M. the 16th Lancers were driven out
of Jussy on the Crozat Canal by infantry and machine
guns,8 but they held their own until the bridge over the
canal had been destroyed, when they and the rest of the
3rd Cavalry Brigade fell back slowly to Chauny (6J miles
W.S.W. of La Fere). Before 8 A.M. reports came in that
German infantry and guns were crossing the Somme at
Pargny and Re"thencourt well away to the north;4 and
soon after that hour the 2nd Cavalry Brigade lying north
of Smith-Dorrien was engaged with a force of all arms 5
advancing from the direction of Ham. The brigade
retired with deliberation to Guiscard, which it reached at
11 A.M., and thence went southward. To support it, the
9th Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Division took position at
Crissoles (3 miles north of Noyon), and the 4th Division
sent a battalion to Muirancourt (2 miles north of Crissolles).
By 1 P.M. it was apparent that nothing serious was going
forward, the general trend of von Kluck's Army was still
decidedly to the west of south, and von Biilow was engaged
with the French. At 4.15 P.M., in accordance with G.H.Q.
instructions, General Smith-Dorrien issued orders for a
short withdrawal of his force, to bring all of it south of
the Oise and nearer to the I. Corps. At 6 P.M. the
Map 14. troops began their march : — the 3rd Division to Cuts, the
5th to Carlepont, and the 4th to the north of Carlepont,
leaving a rear guard of the llth Infantry Brigade north of
1 One infantry brigade and an artillery Abteilung (three batteries) were
still before Maubeuge.
a Just relieved from the investment of Maubeuge.
8 Possibly Jdger, of the /. Cavalry Corps.
4 The 18th Division according to von Kluck's map.
5 This according to Vogel was part of the Guard Cavalry Division ;
the I. Cavalry Corps was filling the gap between the First and Second
Annies.
GENERAL SITUATION 227
the Oise. All three divisions reached their destinations 29 Aug.
between 9 P.M. and midnight. The 1st and 2nd Cavalry 1914-
Brigades followed them ; and thus by midnight practically
the whole of General Smith-Dorrien's force had crossed to
the south of the Oise. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade, on its
right front, billeted for the night at Chauny, and the 4th
Cavalry Brigade five miles west of Noyon, at Dives. This
south-eastward movement of the II. Corps reduced the
gap between it and the I. Corps to seven miles.
Throughout this day the I. Corps enjoyed undisturbed
repose. During the afternoon General Joffre visited Sir
John French at Compiegne, whither G.H.Q. had moved
from Noyon on the 28th. In view of the general situation,
he was most anxious that the B.E.F. should remain in line
with the French Armies on either flank, so that he could
hold the Rheims — Amiens line, which passed through La
Fere, and attack from it.1
Sir John French, however, in view of the exertions of
the British Army, and its losses in officers and men, and
even more in material, was equally anxious to withdraw
and rest it for a few days, in order to make good defects.
He did not consider that it was in condition to attack ;
but it was not until 9 P.M.,2 after the success of the
Germans on the left of the French Fifth Army was
evident, that he issued orders for further retreat to the Sketch 5.
line Soissons — Compiegne, behind the Aisne. Maps 3
The German situation at that time was roughly as
follows : The Second and First Armies formed a gigantic
wedge, of which the apex lay a little south of Ham : the
Second Army, under von Billow, extending from Etreaupont
on the Oise nearly to Ham, with its front towards south
and south-east ; and the First Army, under von Kluck,
from Ham to Albert, with its front to the south-west. Both
of these Armies were already weaker than the German
Higher Command had originally intended. The First
Army had been obliged to leave the ///. Reserve and IX.
Reserve Corps to invest Antwerp ; and upon this day the
Guard Reserve Corps of the Second Army, as well as the
XI. Corps of the Third Army (relieved by the fall of
Namur), after marching back to Aix la Chapelle, began to
move by rail to the Russian front. Further, the Second
Army had to leave the VII. Reserve Corps and part of the
VII. Corps to invest Maubeuge.
Without the B.E.F. to fill the gap between his Fifth
1 See p. 218. 2 Appendix 19.
228 THE RETREAT
and Sixth Armies, even if their initial operations were
successful, General Joffre felt that he could not, in view
of the general situation, risk fighting on the Rheims —
Amiens line.1 His orders for the retirement of the Fifth
Army were issued during the night of the 29th/30th, and
began to take effect about 8.30 A.M. on the 30th, when,
after a very successful counter-stroke, the French I. and
X. Corps began to withdraw. His message to Sir John
French, sent off at 8.45 A.M., said that he had given General
Lanrezac orders to place his Army behind the Serre (which
flows into the Oise at La Fere). The intention was to
make a general retirement, avoiding any decisive action,
but without giving up ground unnecessarily, and he pointed
out that it was of the highest interest that the B.E.F.
should keep in constant liaison with the Fifth Army, " so
" as to profit by favourable opportunities and administer
" to the enemy other severe lessons of the kind that he had
" received on the previous day."
THE 30TH AUGUST
Sketches Sir John French had left the time of starting to be
4 & 5- settled by his corps commanders ; the I. Corps began its
4 marcn southwards at 3 A.M., covered on the eastern flank
by the 5th Cavalry Brigade, and on the western by the
3rd. The day was intensely hot, and in the Forest of St.
Gobain the air was stifling. Since crossing the Somme,
the British had passed into a rugged country of deep wood-
lands, steep hills, narrow valleys and dusty roads. Severe
gradients and crowds of refugees multiplied checks on the
way ; and, what made the march more distressing, the I.
Corps was ordered — in consequence of a false alarm of a
German force moving from Noyon towards the south of
Laon — to turn north-east, so as to cover the left flank of
the Fifth Army. Such was the exhaustion of the men
that it was necessary to curtail the march, and the 1st
Division was halted for the night some eight miles north
of Soissons, with its head at Allemant ; and the 2nd
Division a little to the south-west of it about Pasly. The
II. Corps, together with the 4th Division and the 19th
Infantry Brigade — the two latter from this day constituted
1 Hanotaux, vol. viii. p. 134, gives as the reason for the further
retreat that the Fifth Army was " uncovered on the left by the precipitate
" retirement of the British and on the right by the withdrawal of the
" Fourth Army from which it was separated by a gap of 20 miles watched
" by only a few squadrons."
NO INTERFERENCE FROM THE ENEMY 229
the III. Corps under General Pulteney — after a few hours' 30 Aug.
rest on conclusion of its night march,1 continued its move- 1914-
ment south-east, and halted on the Aisne about Attichy,
the llth Infantry Brigade having been skilfully withdrawn
without mishap by Brigadier-General Hunter- Weston from
its rear-guard position beyond the Oise. The 5th and
3rd Cavalry Brigades lay for the night at Vauxaillon,
between the 1st and 2nd Divisions, and at Fontenoy on
the Aisne, between the I. and II. Corps, respectively ; the
1st, 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades were reunited under the
hand of the divisional commander, on the left of the Army,
round Compiegne. The gap between the two wings of the
B.E.F. was thus reduced to six miles.
There was practically no interference from the enemy
on this day. The rear guard of the Cavalry Division was
slightly engaged by Uhlans at 8 A.M., and two parties of
Engineers were fired on whilst engaged in destroying the
bridges over the Oise, with the result that the bridge at
Bailly was left undemolished.2
General Lanrezac had little difficulty in carrying out his
retirement, though the Germans, apparently emboldened
by news from their aviators that the French were with-
drawing, looked for a time as if they meant to continue
the attack, particularly on his left wing ; but by noon the
movement was well under way, and the Germans seemed
content to let him go.3
General Maunoury's Army had also received orders
to retire, and had fallen back, after sharp fighting, from
the Avre south-westward to a line from Estrees St.
Denis (where his right was within five miles of the British
at Compiegne) to Quiry. Von Kluck had shown signs of a
change of direction, for his left or inner wing had wheeled
nearly due south, though his right was still, for the present,
moving south-west upon Amiens. This seemed to indicate,
though as yet the movement was too imperfectly developed
to make it certain, that von Kluck either considered
Maunoury's force to be for the moment powerless for any
offensive action, or that he considered himself to have
gained the position that he desired for the envelopment of
1 See p. 227.
2 A second attempt was made to destroy this bridge after dark ; but
Major Barstow and the men of his party were killed by a volley at about
fifteen yards' range, fired, according to Vogel, by the cyclists of the Guard
Jdger.
3 The Second Army was given a rest day on the 31st (Biilow, p. 44,
Kluck, p. 76).
230 THE RETREAT
the western flank of the Allied Army. The British Army
he reckoned, as the German official bulletins testify, to
have been thoroughly beaten on the 26th and following
days; and, as from a captured letter he heard of Sir
John French's anxiety to give it rest,1 his appreciation
in this respect was less faulty than it may since have
seemed. If Maunoury's force could also be dismissed as
negligible, there was nothing to hinder von Kluck from
wheeling south-east against the open left flank of the
French Fifth Army, annihilating it in conjunction with
von Billow, and then rolling up the French line from west
to east.2
General Joffre, for his part, on realizing that his counter-
stroke at Guise had not wholly fulfilled his hopes, and as
the British Commander-in-Chief had expressed his inability
on the 29th to take the offensive, came to the conclusion
that he must yield yet further ground before he could
hope to deliver another and decisive one. He therefore
ordered General Maunoury to fall back to the line from
Senlis, through Creil and Clermont, to Beauvais (35 miles
west of Compiegne), and requested Sir John French to
continue to fill the gap between General Lanrezac and
General Maunoury. The Field-Marshal agreed, and at
5.15 P.M. issued orders 3 for his army to move south-west,
the I. Corps and 5th Cavalry Brigade to the area about
Villers Cotterets ; the II. Corps, on the west of the I.
Corps, to the area Feigneux — Bethisy St. Martin — Cre*py
en Valois ; the III. Corps further to the north-west, to the
area St. Sauveur — Verberie, and the Cavalry Division,
most westerly of all, to the line of the Oise beyond Ver-
berie. General Allenby was subsequently informed that, as
the French had closed in on the left, he could use the area
between the III. Corps and the river.
THE 31 ST AUGUST
Sketch 4. On the 31st, accordingly, the British resumed their
Maps a, 4 march under the same trying conditions of dust, heat
& 16' and thirst as on the previous day. The I. Corps opened
the operations with the passage of the Aisne in two
columns, at Soissons and just west of it. The transport
was often in difficulties, owing to the steep gradients of
1 Kluck, p. 81.
2 Billow had called upon Kluck for this very purpose. See p. 233.
3 Appendix 20.
A SHORT MARCH 231
the roads to the south of the river, and the scarcity of 31 Aug.
water everywhere was a great trial both to men and horses. 1914'
Once again the infantry was wholly untroubled by the
enemy — the men of the 6th Infantry Brigade actually had
time for a bathe in the Aisne — , and the cavalry rear
guards, which covered the march, were never really
pressed. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade had to keep some
Uhlans at a distance when crossing the Aisne 6 miles west
of Soissons at Fontenoy ; and heads of German columns
were reported at Noyon and south of it on the road to
Compiegne.1 In this quarter, west of the Oise, the 3rd
Hussars (4th Cavalry Brigade) were in touch with hostile
patrols from daybreak onward, the enemy's force gradu-
ally increasing until it drew the whole regiment into
action. The fight was, however, broken off without
difficulty, and at noon, the 3rd Hussars retired, having
suffered trifling loss and killed a good many troopers of
the German 3rd Hussars — the divisional cavalry of the
German ///. Corps — which, by a curious coincidence, were
opposed to them.
The heat of the day, the difficulty of the country and
the exhaustion of the troops, however, compelled the
greater part of the Army to stop short of their intended
destinations. The I. Corps halted for the night on Map 16.
the northern, instead of on the western side, of the Forest
of Villers Cotte"rets, midway between it and the river
Aisne : 1st Division around Missy, 2nd Division around
Laversine. The left of the French Fifth Army was near
Vauxaillon, 12 miles to the north.
The II. Corps halted at Coyolles, south-west of Villers
Cotterets, and at Cr£py en Valois : 5th Division on the
east, 3rd Division on the west.
The III. Corps, after a flank march through the Forest
of Compiegne, reached its allotted area, at the south-
western corner of the forest about Verberie, but at a
late hour, some units not taking up their billets before
10.15 P.M. It was separated by a gap of some five miles
from the nearest troops of the II. Corps at Cr£py, but in
touch with the French on its left through part of the
Cavalry Division.
The 5th and 3rd Cavalry Brigades halted in the same
area as the I. Corps. Of the other brigades, the 4th was
1 The German 111. Corps crossed the Oise in two columns at Noyon
and Ribecourt, and v. d. Marwitz's cavalry crossed near Compiegne
(see Kluck's map).
232 THE RETREAT
with the III. Corps at Verberie, and the 2nd west of it at
Chevrieres, in touch with the French Sixth Army, which,
on this evening, reached the Chevrieres — Beauvais line.
The 1st Cavalry Brigade and L Battery R.H.A. on the
western flank of the Army had moved out soon after dawn
on the 31st from Compiegne on the road towards Amiens,
and had remained halted for a considerable time, on the
watch for German troops advancing in that quarter.
Seeing no sign of any, the brigade, after a wide sweep
westward, recrossed the Oise to Verberie, and made its
way to Ne"ry, there to form a link — though it could not fill
up the gap — between the II. and III. Corps. It did not
reach its destination until dusk, and L Battery did not
join it until half an hour later.
Aerial reconnaissance upon this day confirmed the
fact that von Kluck had reached the limit of his western
advance, and was wheeling south-eastward, covering his
southern flank with his cavalry.1 At least two cavalry
divisions were known to have reached the Oise during the
afternoon of the 31st ; and it appeared that three actually
crossed the river between Noyon and Compiegne, two of
which were reported to be moving east upon Vauxaillon,
while the third was passing through Bailly (8 miles
north-east of Compiegne) at 2.30 P.M.2 The capture of
a trooper of the German 8th Hussars, by the 2/Royal
Welch Fusiliers after a brush with a German patrol towards
dusk to the north-west of Verberie, seemed to indi-
cate the presence of the German J$h Cavalry Division in
this quarter. A heavy German column, reckoned to be
ten thousand strong, was also reported to have reached
Gournay (about eight miles north-west of Compiegne) at
3 P.M., and to be moving south.8 A captured order issued
to the 8th Division of the German IV. Corps from Beau-
court (14 miles south-east of Amiens) at 6.45 A.M. on the
31st, revealed the project which was in von Kluck's mind
at the time. The order gives the information that the
French troops (Maunoury's) on the Avre had been defeated
1 For the German movements see next page.
8 According to von Kluck, on the 31st von der Marwitz's three cavalry
divisions (2nd, 4th and 9th) crossed the Oise at Thourotte, and thence
marched through the Forest of Laigle to Attichy on the Aisne, but
"Deutsche Kavallerie" (p. 76 and map) puts them at night about six
miles south of Compiegne. Von Richthofen's two divisions (Guard and
6th) reached Noyon on the 30th, and moved on the 31st across the British
front via Bailly and Ribecourt to Vauxaillon and Soissons. This latter
statement is confirmed by Vogel.
8 This would appear to be the 5th Division of the III. Corps.
GERMAN MOVEMENTS 233
on the 29th and had withdrawn ; that the British were 29-31 Aug.
retreating south-eastward (sic) ; that von Biilow had 1914-
defeated at Guise the French Fifth Army, large bodies
of which were retiring through La Fere ; and sets forth
that the task of the German First Army is to cut off its
retreat. " Again, therefore, we must call upon the troops
for forced marches." *• However, at the moment, the one
thing clear to Sir John French was that the German First
Army, which had practically left the British Army alone
since the 26th, was again closing in upon it in great force,
and that he must avoid serious collision with it until the
time for General Joffre's counter-stroke should be ripe.
He therefore issued his orders 2 for the retreat to be con-
tinued on the morrow.
MOVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN FIRST AND SECOND ARMIES.
29TH TO 31sT AUGUST
The movements of the German right wing on the Sketch 5.
30th and 31st August had a decisive effect on the campaign. J*??8*4'
i f • i • -i 1.11 o • 15 & 16.
Instead of pursuing his march towards the lower Seme,
as ordered by O.H.L. on the 28th, and making a wide
sweep which would have caught in it General Maunoury's
Army and the B.E.F., von Kluck wheeled his Army south-
eastwards towards the Oise, in response to von Billow's
request that he should help him to exploit the supposed
success in the battle of Guise and finish off the French
Fifth Army. The messages are of interest.
Von Kluck says : " At 5.55 P.M. on 30th a wireless
" message was received from Second Army Headquarters :
" ' Enemy decisively beaten to-day ; strong forces re-
" ' tiring on La Fere. The British, who were barring the
" ' Oise south-west of La Fere, are also retreating, some in
" ' a southerly, some in a south-easterly direction.' It was
" followed by a second message at 6.30 P.M. ' To gain
" ' the full advantages of the victory a wheel inwards of
" ' the First Army, pivoted on Chauny, towards the line
" * La Fere — Laon is highly desirable.' '
Von Biilow does not give these messages, but says that
on the 29th, " The First Army was asked by wireless to
"support the Second Army on the 30th, and at 7.5 P.M.
1 Hauptmann Bloem relates further that the three battalion com-
manders of his regiment made a protest to the regimental commander
with regard to the excessive marching and were met by the brief reply
" Sweat saves blood."
2 Appendix 21.
234 THE RETREAT
" on the 30th the following information was received from
" the First Army : ' Right wing of First Army has thrown
" ' the enemy over the Avre. Will advance to-morrow
" ' against the Oise section Compiegne — Chauny.' ' Von
Kluck likewise does not give this message, but admits that
" during the evening of the 30th August O.H.L. was
"informed that the First Army had wheeled round to-
" wards the Oise and would advance on the 31st by
"Compiegne and Noyon to exploit the success of the
66 Second Army."
The German Supreme Command concurred in the
proposed move, replying when it was reported : — " The
" movement begun by the First Army is in accordance with
"the wishes of O.H.L." Fortunately von Kluck had
wasted time by his thrust in the air westwards after
Le Cateau and his assistance to von Billow came too
late.
The leading corps of the German First Army, the
IX. and III., managed to cross the Oise between Chauny
and Bailly on the 31st and reached the line Vezaponin —
Vic — Attichy, 12 miles beyond, with the //. Cavalry Corps
on their right front ; the IV. and //. swung round behind
them to the line Mareuil — Tricot — Maignelay, west and
abreast of Noyon, with the IV. Reserve still further in rear,
in and south of Amiens. Thus, on that day, German corps
were moving south-eastwards north of the Aisne, whilst the
B.E.F. was marching more or less south-westwards on the
other side of that river. Von Kluck, therefore, thinking
by " extraordinary forced marches " to outflank the
Allies,1 was actually advancing into the net that Joffre
had in preparation for him.2
1 Kuhl's " Marne," p. 104.
2 The following description of von Kluck at Lassigny (12 miles north
of Compiegne) on the 30th August 1914, by M. Albert Fabre, Conseiller
a la Cour d'appel de Paris (given in M. Hanotaux's " Histoire illustree de
la Guerre de 1914," Tome 8, p. 158), seems worthy of quotation. The
general had dejeuner at M. Fabre's villa and gave him a " safeguard "
for the house signed by his own hand :
" Bientdt, un mouvement se produisit parmi les officiers qui se rangerent
' devant la porte de la propriete. Une automobile s'arreta. Un omcier
* d'allure impressionnante et arrogante en descendit. II s'avan$a seul
' jusqu'au milieu du terre-plein de la villa. II etait grand, majestueux, il
' avait le visage rase et ravag6, les traits durs, le regard effrayant. II tenait,
' a la main droite, un fusil de soldat ; sa main gauche etait appuyee sur la
'crosse d'un revolver d'ordonnance. II fit plusieurs tours sur lui-meme
* en frappant le sol de la crosse de son fusil et s'arreta dans une pose
* th6atrale. Personne ne semblait oser 1'approcher. Le personnage avait
* 1'air veritablement terrible. J'eus la vision d'Attila. C'etait le trop
' fameux von Kluck."
GERMAN MOVEMENTS 235
The German Second Army rested on the 31st after 31 Aug.
its battle at Guise on the previous two days, as already 1914<
related.1
1 Hauptmann Brinckmann of the Second Army staff came over and
reported to the First Army, that the Second Army " was exhausted by the
battle of Guise and unable to pursue " (Kuhl's " Marne," p. 109). Billow
says : " On the 81st the troops of the Second Army were placed in positions
of readiness for the attack on La Fere " (p. 44).
CHAPTER XII
THE RETREAT CONTINUED. COLLISION WITH THE ENEMY.
N^RY, CREPY EN VALOIS AND VILLERS COTTERETS.
1ST SEPTEMBER 1914
(See Sketches 4 & 5 ; Maps 4, 17, 18)
THE AFFAIR OF NERY
Sketch 4. G.H.Q. operation orders 1 sent out at 8.50 P.M. on the
Maps 4 & 3ist August from Dammartin en Goele gave the information
that the enemy appeared to have completed his westerly
movement and to be wheeling to the south, and that large
columns were advancing in a general south or south-
easterly direction on Noyon — Compiegne, covered by at
least two cavalry divisions which had reached the Oise
that afternoon. The following movements towards the
south-west, marches of some ten to fourteen miles, if
all divisions reached their destinations on the 31st, were
ordered to be carried out next day : —
The I. Corps to move to the area La Ferte Milon —
Betz ; the II. Corps to Betz — Nanteuil ; the III. Corps
to Nanteuil — Baron ; and the Cavalry Division to Baron
— Mont 1'Eveque. Special instructions were given that
the rear guard of the III. Corps was to reach a line drawn
east and west through Nery by 6 A.M. ; but, owing to the
lateness of the hour at which many units arrived at their
billets, General Pulteney was obliged to represent that
this was impossible. In obedience to the spirit of the
order, however, he reported that the transport of his
corps would move off at 1 A.M.
The night passed quietly, with rather less than the
usual disturbances and alarms, and there was no indication
that there would be contact with the enemy next day.
Several small actions, however, did take place on the 1st
September. They might be dismissed in a few words,
1 Appendix 21.
236
237
were it not that they show that the British were more i Sept.
than able to hold their own when fortune brought them 1914-
to grips with the enemy.
Dawn broke with dense mist, presaging another day
of excessive heat. The 1st Cavalry Brigade and L Battery
at Nery had been ordered to be ready to resume their
march at 4.30 A.M., but, since it was impossible to see
anything two hundred yards away, this was counter-
manded, and they were directed to stand fast until 5 A.M.
The men were busy preparing their breakfasts and watering
their horses when, at 5.30 A.M., the mist being as thick
as ever, a patrol of the llth Hussars returned with the
report that it had ridden into a body of German cavalry
in the fog, and had been hunted back to Nery. Im-
mediately afterwards high - explosive shells burst over
the village, and there was a roar of guns, machine guns
and rifle fire from the heights, little more than six hundred
yards distant, that overlook the eastern side of the village.
The horses of the Bays took fright and galloped down
the road to the north. The battery was in mass, with
the horses hooked in and poles down ; men and horses
began to fall at once under German fire, and the battery
commander was knocked over and temporarily disabled
whilst hurrying back from brigade headquarters. In his
absence, Captain Bradbury, with the help of the other
officers and of such men as were not busy with the horses,
unlimbered three guns and man-handled them round so
as to reply to the German batteries which were taking
him in flank. One gun was almost instantly put out of
action by a direct hit. The other two opened fire, but
had hardly done so before the gun under Lieut. Giffard
was silenced, he and every man of his detachment being
killed or wounded.
The remaining two subalterns now joined Captain
Bradbury at the third gun, and immediately afterwards
Lieut. Campbell was killed, but the one gun remained in
action against the German twelve with good effect. In
vain the enemy concentrated his fire on it ; he could not
silence it. Meantime, the three cavalry regiments had
manned the eastern face of the village, secured the northern
and southern exits and opened fire, particularly with their
machine guns. The German cavalrymen pushed their
way dismounted to within five hundred yards of the village,
but no nearer. Towards 6 A.M. Brigadier-General Briggs,
after strengthening his own right, ordered two squadrons
238 THE RETREAT
of the 5th Dragoon Guards, his last remaining reserve,
to attack the enemy's right flank. They accordingly
galloped northwards and then wheeling to the east, dis-
mounted and pushed in to close range. Whilst the 1st
Cavalry Brigade was thus holding the German Jfih Cavalry
Division, in response to General Briggs' call for assistance,
just as the mist began to thin in the morning sun, the
4th Cavalry Brigade and I Battery came on the scene
from St. Vaast on the north-west, followed by a com-
posite battalion of the Warwickshire and Dublins of the
10th Infantry Brigade from Verberie from the same direc-
tion, and the 1 /Middlesex from Saintines in the north.
Four guns of I Battery unlimbered two thousand yards
south-west of the German position. As it did so, the fire
of L Battery ceased ; and for good reason. For some time
its fire had been desultory. Lieut. Munday had been
several times wounded, and man after man was struck down
until there only remained Captain Bradbury, who was still
untouched, and Sergt. Nelson, who had been wounded.
Battery -Sergeant -Major Dorrell then joined them, and
immediately Captain Bradbury, whilst fetching ammuni-
tion from a wagon twenty yards off, fell mortally wounded.
The survivors continued to fire until the last round was
expended, and then — but not till then — L Battery was
silent.
I Battery opened fire about 8 A.M. and speedily silenced
the German artillery, and the enemy began to draw off.
He made an attempt to save his guns, but the teams were
caught by I Battery, and the men trying to man-handle
the guns back were shot down by machine-gun fire ;
nevertheless, four out of the twelve were carried off, only,
as will be seen, to fall into British hands next day. The
1 /Middlesex under Major Rowley followed by a squadron
of the llth Hussars charged into the batteries, to find that
there was not a live German left near them. The Hussars
thereupon pressed on in pursuit for a mile until they were
recalled, capturing seventy-eight prisoners belonging to
every regiment of the J^ih Cavalry Division. By 8.45 A.M.
the action was over.
There can be no doubt that the 1st Cavalry Brigade
was taken by surprise ; but it is not less certain that the
German 4th Cavalry Division was equally unaware of the
near presence of a British force. Indeed, in an intercepted
German wireless message, it was reported that the division
had been surprised in its bivouac at Ne*ry and surrounded
239
by considerable hostile forces.1 Captain Bradbury died 1 Sept.
very shortly after he was hit, and never received the 1914-
Victoria Cross which was awarded to him, to his gallant
companion, Sergeant Nelson, and to Battery-Sergeant-
Major Dorrell. The casualties of the 1st Cavalry Brigade
did not exceed one hundred and thirty-five officers and
men killed and wounded ; and of these five officers and
forty-nine men belonged to L Battery. Among the killed
was Colonel Ansell of the 5th Dragoon Guards, who had
already distinguished himself at Elouges. The German
casualties are unknown. They can hardly have been
fewer, and were probably more numerous, than the British.
This was the first encounter with the enemy on the 1st
September.2
•
1 For German movements see p. 246.
* A German account of Nery by an officer of the 18th Dragoon Regi- Map 4.
ment (of the 4th Cavalry Division) has appeared in " Mecklenburgs S6hne
im Weltkriege," Heft 13. He states that the three divisions of von der
Marwitz's Cavalry Corps were sent forward at 4 A.M. on the 31st to recon-
noitre towards Paris, and that his division marched without any halt
worth mentioning ; this agrees with the statements of prisoners, who said
that they had made a forced march of 26 hours to get to Nery. At dawn
the advanced guard reported a British bivouac at Nery, and General von
Gamier at first ordered the division to deploy and charge, but, the ground
being found unsuitable, this was changed to an attack on foot, which
progressed to within 500 yards of the village. British reinforcements then
came up and " we held our ground against greatly superior numbers until
** 2 P.M. (sic). We then had to withdraw or be destroyed. The brigades
" were therefore directed to get through independently as best they could."
Nothing is said about the guns. The Dragoon brigade apparently fled
back into the forest of Compiegne. After dark it marched to the south-
west (through Baron, according to inhabitants) and hid in the woods 15
miles south-west of Nery for 30 hours. On the 3rd September it escaped
via Ermenonville back to Nanteuil. The traces found by the B.E.F. are
noticed in the next chapter.
According to " Deutsche Kavallerie," pp. 78, 79, the 4th Cavalry Division
at first withdrew eastward, but, hearing the sound of firing at St. Sauveur
in the north and at Crepy en Valois to the east (in actions described later
in the text) decided that the path to safety lay to the south, and the
brigades moved independently in that direction with the hope of concealing
themselves in the forest and of doubling back north when the Allies had
passed. This they actually accomplished, though at the cost of their re-
maining guns and of a considerable amount of transport and equipment.
The brigades hid, without food or ammunition, in the great woods on either
side of Rozieres (just north-east of Baron) and saw the British columns
march down the main road through Baron. " On account of want of
" ammunition, an attack of the isolated brigades on the numerically
" superior infantry columns was not possible." They remained in hiding
until the afternoon of the 2nd September.
Von Kluck merely states that after a successful surprise the 4th Cavalry
Division became seriously engaged with superior forces, and incurred heavy
losses. Von Kuhl (" Marne," p. 121) says that it suffered so heavily that on
the 3rd September it was not reassembled and was not able to advance
on the 4th with the rest of the corps. Perhaps this is the reason why it
remained on the Ourcq with the IV. Reserve Corps. Altogether, the
240 THE RETREAT
THE REAR-GUARD ACTION OF CREPY EN VALOIS
Maps 4 Further east, about Mermont and the ground north
& 17' of Crepy en Valois, the outpost line of the 5th Division,
held by the 13th Infantry Brigade, was attacked at 6 A.M.
by mounted troops of the IV. Corps and by Jdger.1 The
pressure did not become serious until 10 A.M., when the
5th Division, which had delayed its march in consequence
of the fighting at Ne*ry, began to retire ; it then fell chiefly
upon the West Kents on the left of the line, where the
Germans delivered an infantry attack from Bethancourt
(4 miles due north of Crepy). The West Kents were
supported by a section of the 119th Battery, which came
into action within one hundred yards of the firing line,
opened at fourteen hundred yards' range and, firing one
hundred and fifty rounds in five minutes, brought the
Germans to a standstill. By noon the outposts having
become rear guard had fallen back to the south of Crepy ;
the Germans did not follow except with cavalry patrols,
and all trouble ceased on this part of the line. On the
right flank, the 2nd Duke of Wellington's holding the
cross roads at " Raperie " (1 mile N.N.E. of Crepy), were
supported by the two remaining batteries of the XXVII.
Brigade R.F.A. ; and under cover of these guns the
brigadier was able to withdraw his battalions with little
difficulty.
THE REAR-GUARD ACTIONS OF VILLERS COTTERETS
Maps 4 Still further to the east, the I. Corps marched at 4 A.M.
& 17- by two roads through the forest of Villers Cotterets. The
1st Division from Missy took the Soissons road, which
skirts the eastern side of Villers Cotterets, and turns thence
south-eastward on La Ferte" Milon.
The 2nd Division, on the west of the 1st, moved by the
road which passes through Vivieres 2 and Rond de la Reine
and the western side of Villers Cotterets south-west upon
Pisseleux and Boursonne.
1st September was decidedly to the disadvantage of the German cavalry,
for, as will be seen, the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions were unable to advance,
far less pursue as ordered (see footnote 2, p. 246).
1 According to von Kluck the IV. Corps was in action north of Crepy en
Valois later in the afternoon, and the first contact was with the five Jdger
battalions of von der Marwitz's Cavalry Corps ("Deutsche Kavallerie,"
p. 77).
8 Spelt Viviers on some maps.
VILLERS COTTfiRETS 241
The 5th Cavalry Brigade covered the right rear from i Sept.
the region of Montgobert, and the 3rd Cavalry Brigade 1914-
the left rear from Mortefontaine and Taillefontaine, both
outside the forest.
Here again it was the western flank that was first
engaged, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade being attacked on
reaching Taillefontaine (5 miles N.N.W. of Villers Cotterets)
by a force of all arms advancing from the north.1 As the
brigade drew back to the north-western corner of the Forest
of Villers Cotterets, the 4th Hussars were continuously
engaged until past noon, and lost their commanding officer,
Lt.- Colonel Hogg, in the sharp fighting in the woodlands.
A little to the east of Taillefontaine the 4th (Guards)
Brigade was covering the retirement of the 2nd Division,
with the Irish Guards and 2/Coldstream, under Lieutenant-
Colonel the Hon. George Morris of the former regiment, in
position between Vivieres and Puiseux, and the 2/Grenadier
and 3/Coldstream in second line at Rond de la Reine.
About 10 A.M. Colonel Morris's troops were attacked by a
force of all arms moving from north-west to south-east.
The 9th Battery replied effectively to the German guns, and
the firing so far died away that Colonel Morris sent back
the 2/Coldstream with orders to retire to the railway north
of Villers Cotterets, and prepared to follow them with the
Irish Guards. Just then, however, he received a verbal
order from the brigadier not to fall back too fast, since it
was intended to give the main body of the division a long
halt from 10 A.M. till 1 P.M. The 2/Coldstream were already
gone past recall, owing to the density of the forest, but the
Irish Guards stood fast, and, about 10.45 A.M., were again
and more seriously attacked. A company of the Grenadiers
was sent forward to reinforce them, but before the Irish
Guards could be extricated, the Germans opened a direct
attack upon the western front and flank of the second line.
This line was drawn up along a grass ride which followed
the highest ridge in the forest, and passes from west to
east through the open space called Rond de la Reine to
another open space, about a mile distant, named Croix de
Belle Vue. The 3/Coldstream were on the west of Rond
de la Reine, being widely extended so as to block the
numerous rides that run from north to south towards
1 Probably the advanced guard of the ///. Corps. " Schlachten und
Gefechte " states that the ///. Corps and the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions
fought at Villers Cotterets, on the 1st September. " Deutsche Kavallerie,"
p. 77, however, states the two cavalry divisions were in action near Ver-
berie and spent the night in two villages north of it.
VOL. I R
242 THE RETREAT
Haramont, and therefore had wide intervals between com-
panies. The 2/Grenadiers were on the right. The Germans
soon detected the gaps between the companies of the Cold-
stream and penetrated between them ; but the battalion,
though compelled to fall back, did so very slowly, each
isolated party fighting vigorously as best it could. The
Grenadiers were in like case, and behaved in like manner,
and both battalions were still close to their original positions
when company by company the Irish Guards at last
joined them. Colonel Morris was killed early in this first
serious engagement of his regiment. Brigadier-General
Scott-Kerr was severely wounded while leaving Rond de
la Reine, the Germans having brought up a machine gun
which raked the broad main ride. Thus there was no one
for a time in general command ; but the three British
battalions were so much intermixed and the fighting in the
woods was unavoidably so confused, that little or no
control was possible. However, Grenadiers, Coldstream
and Irish fought their way back, contesting every inch of
ground, to Villers Cotte*rets, the 3/Coldstream retiring on
their second battalion, which was now on the railway line
just to the north of the town, and the remainder further to
the east. The 17th Battery was in position north of Villers
Cotte"rets to support them, but did not fire, the Guards
having beaten off their assailants for the present. It was
by now about 2 P.M.
Meanwhile the 6th Infantry Brigade had been halted
about a mile south of Pisseleux, immediately south of
Villers Cott6rets, to cover the retreat of the Guards, two
companies of the Royal Berkshire being deployed upon
either flank of the 9th Battery. The 5th Infantry Brigade
had been ordered by 2nd Division Headquarters to entrench
in echelon a little further to the south-west, to serve as a
rallying point for both brigades. Through the 5th In-
fantry Brigade the Guards retired, with the 2/Coldstream
as rear guard ; the 17th Battery moved with them and
unlimbered on the right of the 9th. Towards 4 P.M. the
Germans, having apparently moved south-west from
Villers Cotterets, opened heavy rifle fire from the west of
the railway, while their horse artillery engaged the British
batteries. These last, after a sharp duel, were ordered to
retire ; but the teams of the 17th Battery could not come
up until the 1 /King's had pushed forward to the western
side of the railway and effectually checked the advance of
the German infantry and artillery. Fighting lasted until
GENERAL MOVEMENTS 243
6 P.M., when the King's withdrew, under cover of the i Sept.
2/Coldstream, and the action came to an end. The number 1914-
of the enemy engaged was very superior to the British.1
The fight cost the 4th (Guards) Brigade over three hundred
officers and men, and the 6th Infantry Brigade one hundred
and sixty. Two platoons of the Grenadiers were sur-
rounded and killed at Rond de la Reine, fighting to the last
man. Some weeks later it was ascertained from prisoners
that the Germans had suffered very heavily in this
affair, having lost all sense of direction and fired on each
other.
GENERAL MOVEMENTS ON THE IST SEPTEMBER
During these clashes of the rear guards, the main body sketch 4.
of the British Army tramped on through intense heat MaP 18-
until far into the evening. The 1st Division reached its
halting place about La Ferte Milon, 16 miles from its
starting point, between 7 and 9 P.M. The 2nd Division and
the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades arrived at Betz (8 miles
west of La Ferte Milon), and the villages to the east of it,
after a nineteen-mile march, from one to two hours later. Of
the II. Corps, the 3rd Division marched quite untroubled to
the villages south-west of Betz, while the 5th Division,
with greater precautions, but equally unhindered after
the first bickering of the morning, came into Nanteuil
(7 miles west of Betz) between 7.30 and 9 P.M.
On the extreme west, after the fight at Nery, the llth Map 4.
Infantry Brigade began to withdraw from St. Sauveur
(3 miles east of Verberie), the 12th Infantry Brigade being
already at 9.30 A.M. in position 6 miles south of St.
Sauveur between Mont Cornon and Chamicy. At 10 A.M.
the Germans 2 attacked the I/Somerset L.I. and I/Rifle
Brigade, which were covering the retirement of the two
remaining battalions of the llth Infantry Brigade, and
were beaten off with considerable loss. This ended the
British fighting in this quarter for the day. At 11 A.M.
the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades were sent to take up a
line from Mont Cornon north-westwards to Villeneuve, and
1 See footnote, p. 241.
a The advanced guard of the 11. Corps. Von Kluck says that " the
" 11. Corps, supported by the Cavalry Corps, became involved in heavy
" fighting for the possession of the important Oise crossings at Verberie and
"St. Sauveur." The Provisional Division of Sordet's Cavalry Corps and
some battalions of Chausseurs Alpins, the right of General Maunoury's
Army, which was also falling back, were engaged at Verberie.
244 THE RETREAT
shortly after noon the 4th Division, passing through them,
continued its march southward to Fresnoy, Rozieres and
Map is. Baron, to the west of the 5th Division. The Cavalry
Division took up its billets to the west of the 4th Division
along the northern edge of the Forest of Ermenonville
from Fontaine to Mont 1'Eveque. The march, though
absolutely unhindered by the enemy, was an anxious one,
for there were persistent rumours that German cavalry was
in the Forest of Ermenonville to the south of the British
Cavalry Division. When the 1 /Rifle Brigade entered
Rozieres at 7 P.M., they found that three hundred Uhlans
had just quitted the village in great haste, leaving a machine
gun and sundry articles of equipment behind them.1
During the 31st August several telegrams had passed
between the Secretary of State for War and the British
Commander-in- Chief.2 It appeared to the Cabinet that
Sir John French had determined to retire so far out of the
Allied line that he would frustrate their policy of co-
operating closely with the French and rendering them
continuous support ; the French President and General
Joffre seemed also to be under this impression.3 As it was
difficult to judge of the situation in London, it was decided
that Lord Kitchener should himself proceed to France and
discuss it verbally with the Commander-in-Chief, so as to
ensure that there would be no break-down in the relations
between the Chiefs of the French and British Armies.
Leaving the choice of the meeting place to Sir John French
— who fixed the British Embassy at Paris — Lord Kitchener
left London at 2 A.M. on the 1st September, crossed the
1 These troops are now known to be the survivors of Nery. Von
Kluck says that the 4th Cavalry Division " incurred heavy losses at
Rozieres" (see footnote 2, p. 239).
2 The telegrams will be found in Appendix 22.
8 According to M. Poincare's preface to the French edition of Sir
George Arthur's " Life of Lord Kitchener," p. ix : —
" Field-Marshal French operated with excessive independence, and
" strove, above all, to maintain his divisions intact.
" On Sunday, 30th August, General Joffre, uneasy at seeing French
' hold himself thus aloof, telephoned to M. Millerand, the Minister of
' War, that he feared the British were not for the moment disposed to
' fight. . . . Next day, Monday, the Commander-in-Chief of our Armies
' sent me a liaison officer to beg me to intervene and ensure that Field-
' Marshal French should not carry out his retreat too rapidly, and should
' make up his mind to contain the enemy who was on the British front."
The President then imparted his fears and the request of General
Joffre to the British Ambassador, Sir Francis Bertie. About 10 P.M. Sir
Francis came to the filysee with an orderly officer bearing a written
answer from the British Commander-in-Chief — " An answer, unfortun-
ately, not very conclusive." (This letter cannot be found in the British
records. Sir John French in his " 1914," p. 95, merely says, " I refused.")
LORD KITCHENER'S VISIT 245
Channel to Havre in a destroyer, arrived in Paris about i Sept.
3 P.M., met Sir John shortly after, and spent nearly three 1914-
hours with him.
The result of the interview was recorded in a telegram
sent by Lord Kitchener to the Government at 7.30 P.M.,
before he started on his return journey. It is as follows :
" French's troops are now engaged in the fighting line, where
" he will remain conforming to the movements of the French
" army, though at the same time acting with caution to avoid
" being in any way unsupported on his flanks."
On the 3rd September, Sir John French, having received
a copy of this telegram, replied :
"I fully understand your instructions. ... I am in full
" accord with Joffre and the French."
The British Commander-in Chief, on returning to
his headquarters at Dammartin, 20 miles from Paris, at
6.45 P.M., after the interview with Lord Kitchener, found
that the day's work had not been unsatisfactory : the
enemy had been shaken off after several sharp actions,
and the march, though long and exhausting to the men,
had finally reunited the British Army for the first time
since the I. and II. Corps had been separated on the 25th
August. The Cavalry Division was in touch with the
French cavalry about Senlis, to the westwards of which,
to a line from Creil to the vicinity of Beauvais, General
Maunoury had successfully brought back the French Sixth
Army. The left of the French Fifth Army was at
Soissons ; as it had retired due south from Guise and the
British Expeditionary Force had marched south-west a day
ahead, the gap between the two was widening. Aerial
reconnaissance had been difficult until the afternoon, Sketch 5.
owing to the mist, but from 3 P.M. onward the Flying MaP w.
Corps sent in a series of valuable observations, all tending
to confirm the previous reports of a general wheel of von
Kluck's army to the south-east. German troops were
thick upon both banks of the Oise from Noyon southward
to Verberie ; but the greater number were already on the
eastern side of the river, and the heads of heavy columns
had reached Villers Cotterets and Crepy en Valois. These
seemed to be wheeling to the south. It might be that
this was due to the direction taken by the roads at these
two points, but it was judged most important to withdraw
the British Army out of reach of a night attack.
Soon after midday the corps commanders had been
246 THE RETREAT
warned by the Chief of the General Staff that the retire-
ment would be continued on the morrow towards the
Marne, and roads had been allotted; but at 7 P.M., on
realizing that the enemy was so near and in such force,
and that some of his cavalry were actually behind the
British front, Sir John French decided to continue the
retreat earlier than he had intended and all the corps were
ordered to get clear by a night march.1 At the same time,
G.H.Q., to which German cavalry escaping from N6ry had
passed quite close, commenced moving back from Dam-
martin to Lagny.
GERMAN MOVEMENTS ON IST SEPTEMBER
Sketch 5. Turning back to the movements of the Germans during
{.^e js{. September, von Kluck, whose Army was now again
in contact with the British, states that he made another
effort on that day to catch them up. Their presence on
his flank had compelled him to desist from his attempt to
reach and roll up the left flank of the French Fifth Army.
He therefore ordered his corps to turn south to settle with
the British. His IX. Corps (less the 17th Division, which
was still in rear, as it had been co-operating with units of
the Second Army in the fighting on the Oise south of Mont
d'Origny on the 30th), III. Corps and IV. Corps having
crossed the Aisne between Ambleny and Compiegne were
to press southward ; the 17. Corps was to reach the Oise
at Verberie ; the //. Cavalry Corps, from near Compiegne,
was to move eastwards to attack the French in flank via
Villers Cotterets.2
As a result of the day's operations, the 18th Division
of the IX. Corps reached Longpont (6 miles east of Villers
Cotterets).
The ///. Corps, marching on two roads via Vivieres
and Taillefontaine, came in contact with the rear guard
1 Appendix 23.
2 Kluck, p. 80. These orders seem to have been altered, for " Deutsche
Kavallerie," p. 76, says that at 4 P.M. on the 31st, von der Marwitz ordered
" a relentless pursuit " (riicksichtslose Verfolgung) that same night in the
direction Nanteuil le Haudouin. Led horses, bridging train and telegraph
vehicles were left behind. The 9th Cavalry Division, followed by the 2nd,
marching on the main road Compiegne — Verberie, was held up at the latter
place and St. Sauveur east of it, and got no further on the 1st September.
The 4th Cavalry Division moved east of the others and came to Nery, as we
have seen. The five Jager battalions of the corps were sent to Crepy en
Valois and fought there. Kuhl's "Marne," p. 110, states that the //.
Cavalry Corps was held up at Verberie, and shows it on his map aboi '
five miles south of Nery on the night of the lst/2nd September.
GERMAN MOVEMENTS 247
of the British I. Corps near Villers Cotterets, as already i Sept.
related, and halted there for the night. 1914-
The IV. Corps, also marching by two roads Compiegne
—Crepy and Choisy — Pierrefonds, halted at Crepy, after
its fight with the 5th Division.
The //. Corps, after its action at St. Sauveur with the
4th Division and later at Verberie with the French, halted
at the latter place for the night.
The IV. Reserve Corps, protecting the right flank,
reached Quinquempoix about twenty-five miles south of
Amiens.
The general advance made by the German First Army
on the 1st September, owing to the opposition with which
it met, was under ten miles,1 and von Kluck had not struck
to any purpose either the French Fifth Army or the B.E.F.
1 See Kluck's map.
CHAPTER XIII
THE LAST STAGES OF THE RETREAT. 2ND TO 5TH
SEPTEMBER
2ND SEPTEMBER : RETIREMENT TO MEAUX — DAMMARTIN
(See Sketches 1, 4, 5 ; Maps 2, 4, 19, 20, 21, 22)
Sketch 4. THE Army was growing hardened to continued retirements ;
Maps 4 but in the I. Corps, to make the conditions easier for the
& 19' men, General Haig on the 1st September decided to send
off by train from Villers Cott6rets about half of the am-
munition carried by his divisional ammunition columns,
and to use the fifty empty waggons to carry kits and
exhausted soldiers. This was an extreme measure, taken
only after mature deliberation, but it was more than
justified by the result.
The next day in pursuance of Sir John French's orders,
the divisions began moving back between 1 A.M. and
3 A.M. from their billets between La Ferte Milon and Senlis
to the line of villages between Meaux and Dammartin, a
march of some twelve miles. The I. Corps was on the
right or east, the II. Corps in the centre and the III. Corps
on the left, with the cavalry on either flank of the force.
It was absolutely unmolested during this move. The 5th
Cavalry Brigade, which covered the eastern flank of the
I. Corps, heard news of a German squadron moving from
Villers Cott£rets upon La Fert6 Milon, but saw nothing.
The 3rd Cavalry Brigade, on the west of the 5th, Had been
in motion for fully six hours and was well south of Betz
before German shells began to burst over the extreme tail
of the rear guard. An hour or so later six or eight
German squadrons were seen approaching Bouillancy, the
next village south of Betz, but were driven off by the fire
of D and E Batteries. The brigade, being no further
troubled, then retired slowly to Isles les Villenoy behind
248
RETIREMENT TO MEAUX— DAMMARTIN 249
the right of the I. Corps, where it arrived late in the 2 Sept.
. °
evening.
The three brigades of the Cavalry Division on the left
of the B.E.F. had been disturbed on the night of the lst/2nd
September by more than one report that the whole or
parts of the German ffli Cavalry Division were moving
south through the Forest of Ermenonville behind the
British left flank ; and at 2 A.M. the 2nd Cavalry Brigade,
on the extreme left, had been ordered to march at once
from Mont 1'Eveque to clear the defile through the forest
for the division. The brigade moved off at 2.30 A.M.,
taking the road through the forest towards Ermenonville.
On debouching from the south-eastern edge it found the
road littered with saddles, equipment and clothing. Some
enemy force had evidently been in bivouac there and
had hastily decamped. Reports came in from inhabitants
that two squadrons of Uhlans were at Ermenonville and
the next village east of it ; but the British were too late
to intercept them. The enemy had withdrawn rapidly,
and in the wooded country it was useless to pursue him.
Before reaching Ermenonville the brigade came across
some motor lorries of the 4th Divisional Ammunition
Column, which had run into a party of German cavalry
during the night, and also four abandoned German guns,
the marks upon which proved that they were part of
the batteries that had been in action at Nery. It may
be added here that, except for skirmishes of cavalry
patrols, there was no further contact with the enemy
during the rest of the retreat.
Though the march of the British force this day was
only a short one, averaging about twelve miles, and the
leading units got in early, it was evening before all were
in their billets. The heat of the day was intense and
suffocating, and made marching so exhausting that several
long halts were ordered. In spite of these, there were
some cases of heat-stroke.
The march of the I. Corps proved specially trying,
since the valley of the Ourcq, for the first half of the march,
formed an almost continuous defile. During the passage
of this region, the divisions were directed to piquet the
high ground as in mountain warfare. The movement
presented a fine opportunity to a really active and enter-
prising enemy, but no such enemy appeared.
An inhabitant of the district has put on record the
appearance of the British during this period of the retreat :
250 LAST STAGES OF THE RETREAT
" The soldiers, phlegmatic and stolid, march without
" appearing to hurry themselves ; their calm is in striking
" contrast to the confusion of the refugees. They pass a
" night in the villages of the Ourcq. It is a pacific invasion
" . . . as sportsmen who have just returned from a suc-
" cessful raid, our brave English eat with good appetite,
" drink solidly, and pay royally those who present their
" bills ; . . . and depart at daybreak, silently like ghosts,
" on the whistle of the officer in charge." x
Sketch 4. The position of the Army at nightfall on the 2nd
Map 19. September was as follows :
the villages Just north of Meaux'
3rd Cavalry Brigade . Isles les Villenoy, S.S.W. of Meaux.
II. Corps . . .In the area Monthyon — Montge—
Villeroy.
III. Corps . . . Eve — Dammartin.
Cavalry Division . . In the area Thieux — Moussy le Vieux
— Le Mesnil Amelot.
Roughly speaking, therefore, its front extended from
Meaux north-west to Dammartin. From Dammartin the
French Provisional Cavalry Division 2 prolonged the line
to Senlis, from which point north-westward through Creil
to Mouy and beyond it lay General Maunoury's Sixth
Army. On the right of the British the French Fifth Army
was still a good march north of them, with the left of its
infantry south-west of Fere en Tardenois, some twenty-
five miles away, and its cavalry north of Chateau Thierry
and somewhat nearer.
OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN FIRST AND SECOND
ARMIES, 2ND SEPTEMBER 1914
Map 4. The 2nd September had thus passed more or less un-
eventfully for the troops, but aerial reconnaissance re-
vealed interesting changes on the side of the enemy. His
general march south-eastward seemed for the time to
have come to an end, and to have given place to a southerly
movement. The general front of von Kluck's Army was
covered by cavalry from Villers Cotterets through Crepy
en Valois and Villeneuve to Clermont.3 Behind it from
1 " Les Champs de 1'Ourcq, September 1914." By J. Roussel-Lepine.
2 Formed temporarily from the fittest units of Sordet's Cavalry Corps.
8 The II. Cavalry Corps was, according to von Kluck, in line between
the IV. and //. Corps, so part of the covering cavalry was divisional.
GERMAN MOVEMENTS 251
east to west opposite the British were the ///., IV. and 2 Sept.
//. Corps, and there were indications that the heads of ]
the columns were halting to allow the rear to close up,
as if apprehensive of danger from the south. The IV.
Reserve Corps was to the right rear north-west of Clermont
about St. Just, and the IX. Corps was east of Villers
Cotte*rets, on the same alignment as the cavalry. Up to
4 P.M. no hostile troops of any kind had passed a line, about
ten to twelve miles away, drawn from Mareuil (at the
junction of the Clignon with the Ourcq) westward through
Betz to Nanteuil le Haudouin. In fact, it seemed as
though von Kluck had not foreseen any such collision with
the British as had taken place on the 1st. Possibly he
believed them to have moved south-eastward, and such,
indeed, had been their direction on the 30th, though on
the 31st it had been changed to south-west to leave more
space for the retreat of the French Fifth Army. More-
over, but for the accident which prevented the right and
centre of the British Army from reaching the halting-
places ordered for the evening of the 31st, it is probable
that there would have been no serious collision at all
between the British and the Germans on the 1st September,
but that the Germans would have merely brushed against
the British rear guards, reported the main body to be still
in retreat, and continued their south-easterly march to take
the French Fifth Army in flank.
Events, however, having fallen out as they did, von Sketch 5.
Kluck made one further attempt to cut off the British. MaP 19-
Meanwhile on his left von Billow was pressing forward
against the French Fifth Army and had, with his main
body, reached the line of the Aisne from Pontavert (14
miles north-west of Rheims) to Soissons, the head of his
advance being on the Vesle. On his front, the Fifth Army
had fallen back to the line Rheims — Fere en Tardenois.
The apprehensions of the British Commander-in-Chief
that on the night of the lst/2nd September von Kluck was
making preparations to attack him turn out to have been
fully justified.1 From a captured document,2 the German
general had learnt that " the British Army intended to go
" into rest billets midday on the 1st September south of the
" line Verberie — Cr6py en Valois — La Fert6 Milon. It,
" therefore, seemed still possible to reach it." At 10.15 P.M.
on the 1st September he issued orders for the First Army
1 See p. 245 and Kluck, p. 81.
2 Captured on a cyclist. Kuhl's " Marne," p. 110.
252 LAST STAGES OF THE RETREAT
to attack the British next day : " the ///. and IV. Corps
" against their front, crossing the line Verberie — Crepy at
" 7 A.M. ; the IX. Corps, starting at 2 A.M., to envelop their
" right, and the II. with IV. Reserve in rear of it, to envelop
" their left, whilst keeping a lookout towards Paris. The
" //. Cavalry Corps was to connect the IV. and 17. Corps.
" These arrangements were in vain, the British Army
"escaped envelopment by a timely withdrawal," for it
slipped away in the night, as already related. The only
collision that took place was between the German //. Corps
and French cavalry and infantry near Senlis, where the
latter offered a stubborn resistance.1 " The possibility of
"dealing a decisive blow against the British could no
"longer be reckoned on." Von Kluck, therefore, after
another half day had been wasted, determined to wheel his
two eastern corps south-east against the flank of the French
Fifth Army in order to assist von Billow. The rest of the
First Army was to continue its advance on Paris. Orders
to this effect were issued at 12.15 P.M. and 1 P.M. on
the 2nd. In spite of von Kluck's zigzag movements
subsequent to the battle of Le Cateau, his Army was by
this time a clear day's march ahead of the Second, and at
night his general front curved forward from near La Ferte"
Milon to Senlis.
THE PASSAGE OF THE MARNE
Map 4. Whilst in Paris on the 1st September, Sir John French
made a proposal to the French Minister of War to organize
a line of defence on the Marne and stand the attack of the
enemy. This was rejected on the 2nd by General Joffre,
mainly, apparently, on account of the position of the Fifth
Army, which on that date was close to the Marne with the
enemy near at hand. He added : "I consider that the
" co-operation of the British Army in the defence of Paris is
" the only co-operation which can give useful results." Late
in the evening, his Instruction Generate No. 4, which, forecast
a retreat behind the Seine, reached Sir John French.2 The
Field-Marshal therefore gave orders 3 for the Marne to be
crossed on the 3rd — as did General Lanrezac also to his
Army — and for the retreat of the British Army to be
resumed in a south-easterly direction, as its continuance in
1 Von Kluck says the British Cavalry Division was in action there,
but this is a mistake.
2 Appendices 24 and 25. 3 Appendix 26.
RETIREMENT ACROSS THE MARNE 253
a south-westerly direction would have brought it inside 3 Sept.
the perimeter of the entrenched camp of Paris, besides 1914-
tending to increase the gap between its right and the left
of the Fifth Army. Since this movement was in the nature
of a flank march across the enemy's front — although it
turned out that his columns were marching practically
parallel to the British — it was necessary to make arrange-
ments to keep the Germans off the high ground on the north
bank of the Marne during its execution.
Early in the morning of the 3rd September, therefore,
the 5th and 3rd Cavalry Brigades were thrown out to an
east and west line north-eastwards of Meaux ; the former
(which was supported by a battalion and a battery) cover-
ing the loop of the Marne from St. Aulde westwards to
Lizy sur Ourcq, and the latter the ground thence west-
wards to Barcy. German cavalry patrols appeared on the
front of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade between 8 and 9 A.M., but
did not approach closely, and at 10.30 A.M. the brigade
crossed the Marne at Germigny, behind the centre of its
sector, and then moving south-eastwards behind its sister
brigade, fell into the main road at La Ferte sous Jouarre
at noon. The 5th Cavalry Brigade was not troubled until
4 P.M., when a hostile column, including four batteries,
appeared at May en Multien, due north of Lizy on the
western bank of the Ourcq. There was some exchange of
rifle and artillery fire as Brigadier-General Chetwode
slowly withdrew eastwards, but the Germans were evidently
content to see him go, for they did not follow, but took up
billets quietly on the western bank of the Ourcq from Lizy
northwards. The 5th Cavalry Brigade then crossed the
Marne at La Ferte sous Jouarre and reached its billets at
7 P.M., having had no more than five casualties.
Meanwhile, having started between 3 and 4 A.M., the 1st Sketch 4.
Division had crossed the Marne at Trilport, the 2nd and MaP 2(K
3rd at Meaux, the 5th at Isles les Villenoy, the 4th at
Lagny and the Cavalry Division at Gournay. They blew
up all the bridges behind them as they moved south-east,
and by evening the Army was distributed along a line
south of the Marne from Jouarre westward to Nogent, I.
Corps patrols being again in touch with troops of the
French Fifth Army which was also south of the Marne.
The Sixth Army, north of the Marne, slightly overlapped
the British front on the left.
This march too had proved a trying one ; it was long
in point of time as well as distance, for the roads were
254 LAST STAGES OF THE RETREAT
much crowded with vehicles of refugees, and some units
were as much as eighteen hours on the road.
Aerial reconnaissance on this day established the fact
that von Kluck had resumed his south-eastward move-
ment with rapidity and vigour. By 11 A.M. the head of
the German IX. Corps had already passed the Marne and
had a sharp engagement with the French at Chateau
Thierry, 15 miles north-east of the British right. By
evening the heads of the ///. and IV. Corps had also
crossed the Marne at Che*zy and La Ferte* sous Jouarre,
respectively, heading for the gap between the French Fifth
Army and the British Expeditionary Force. But one and
all arrived too late at the river, for the whole of the French
Fifth Army was by that time safely across the Marne, and
its left had fallen back after the fight at Chateau Thierry,
and was now in line with the British though still separated
by a gap of about ten miles. At 4.35 P.M. the British
Commander-in-Chief, certain from the air information that
von Kluck was moving from west to east and intended no
immediate action against him, warned his corps com-
manders that, unless the situation changed, the troops
would remain in their present billets, and would probably
have complete rest next day. The time, however, was not
yet ripe for General Joffre to make his counter-stroke, and
he even proposed to retire behind the Seine if it should be
necessary for the success of his manoeuvre. At 11.50 P.M.,
therefore, Sir John French issued orders * for the remaining
bridges over the Marne in the British area to be destroyed
and for the Army to continue its retreat southward. The
intention being to bring the whole B.E.F. behind the
Grand Morin, the right or eastern flank had to be swung
back. The I. Corps, therefore, was to move first, through
Coulommiers, with the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades
pushed out to the east, in order to protect its flank and
to gain contact with Conneau's Cavalry Corps, which was
reported to be at Rebais, 7 miles away. The II. and III.
Corps and Cavalry Division were to stand fast until the
I. Corps had reached the Grand Morin, and then fall back
in line with it. Every precaution was to be taken to
conceal the billets of the troops from aircraft. The
movements of the British Army during the past few days
had already misled the enemy once and, if its whereabouts
could now be hidden, might mislead him again.2
1 Appendix 27.
* In this, according to von Kluck, the II. and III. Corps were success-
ful ; the march and bivouacs of the I. Corps only were observed.
RETIREMENT TOWARDS THE SEINE 255
RETIREMENT TO THE GRAND MORIN
Accordingly, on the 4th, soon after daybreak, the 5th 4 Sept.
Cavalry Brigade, with the 3rd in support, advanced east- 1914-
ward to Doue midway between the two Morins, and sent Map 4.
patrols forward along both banks of the Petit Morin. At
the same time it dispatched the Scots Greys to the east
towards Rebais to meet the French cavalry there. At
8 A.M. the patrols reported a hostile column of all arms
moving south-east along the main road north of the Petit
Morin from La Ferte sous Jouarre to Montmirail, but
there were evidently parties of the enemy south of the
valley, for a troop of the Greys found Germans at Rebais,
and had such sharp fighting that only five men of it
escaped. At 11.45 A.M. a column of cavalry with guns
and three battalions of infantry — evidently a flank guard —
were seen moving south-east on the heights between the
Montmirail road and the Petit Morin, from Boitron upon
Sablonnieres ; some of them crossing the stream, attacked
an advanced party of the 5th Cavalry Brigade about a
mile east of Doue, but without success. The enemy seems
then to have decided that it was time to thrust back this
prying English cavalry, and manoeuvred to turn Brigadier-
General Chetwode's position from the south ; but when
he fell back under cover of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade and
the Germans occupied his ground about Doue, the latter
were at once engaged by E Battery, which disabled one of
the German guns and did considerable damage among the
gun teams. At 6 P.M. Brigadier-General Gough in turn
withdrew the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, protected by the fire
of the 113th and 114th Batteries, and by the 2nd Infantry
Brigade, which was in position about Aulnoy. He then
crossed the Petit Morin at Coulommiers, and made for
Chailly, a little to the south-east.
Meanwhile, the I. Corps had marched southward upon
Coulommiers, not wholly without expectation of inter-
ference, for the bridge at La Ferte sous Jouarre from lack
of explosives had not been thoroughly destroyed. About
8 A.M. indeed a German battalion crossed the river by this Sketch 4.
bridge,1 but it did not immediately press on, and the 1st MaP 21-
Division, pursuing its march methodically, halted at
Aulnoy and Coulommiers in the afternoon. The 2nd
1 The German IV. Corps and II. Cavalry Corps crossed at La Fert6
sous Jouarre.
256 LAST STAGES OF THE RETREAT
Division, falling back by brigades in succession, a little
further to the west, upon Mouroux and Giremoutiers, saw
nothing but a few cavalry patrols. The II. and III. Corps
and Cavalry Division actually enjoyed a day of rest on
the 4th until after dark, when they too moved off south
through the night, as will be related. For the moment
the Army was concentrated on the Grand Morin.
The information obtained by the Flying Corps on this
day was particularly full and complete, giving the bivouacs
of all the corps of the German First Army and the lines of
march of their columns in a south-easterly direction across
the front of the B.E.F. It confirmed the observations of the
cavalry to the effect that the main portion of von Kluck's
Army having crossed the Marne, its left on Chateau Thierry
and its right on La Ferte sous Jouarre, was pressing on
through Montmirail — La Ferte Gaucher against the left
of the French Fifth Army (the XVIII. Corps, with Vala-
bregue's Group of Reserve divisions in echelon behind it,
and Conneau's Cavalry Corps), and against the gap between
it and the B.E.F. General Franchet d'Esperey, who had
taken over command of the Fifth Army from General
Lanrezac x the previous day, was continuing the with-
drawal, swinging his left back to meet the threat against it.
It may be noted that on this day the French Ninth
Army, under General Foch, came into existence between
the Fourth and Fifth Armies. It was organized merely
for convenience of command from the left of the Fourth
Army, and its formation did not, therefore, affect the
general situation.2
During the 4th September, General Gallieni, the recently
appointed Military Governor of Paris, under whose direct
orders the French Sixth Army had been acting since the
31st August " in the interests of the defence of Paris," came
with General Maunoury to British headquarters at Melun.3
Sir John French was absent visiting his troops, but to
his Chief of the Staff General Gallieni pointed out that
1 For an account of his sudden removal, see his book, "• Le Plan de
Campagne franyais et le premier mois de la Guerre," p. 276 et seq.
2 The French Ninth Army came officially into existence as an inde-
pendent command at 11 P.M. on the 4th September. It had actually been
formed on the 29th August as a " Detachement d'Armee." It consisted
of the IX. and XI. Corps, 52nd and 60th Reserve Divisions and 9th Cavalry
Division from the left of the Fourth Army, and the 42nd Division from the
Third Army. Its formation merely reduced the size of the Fourth Army,
and put the Fourth and Ninth Armies where the Fourth had been.
8 See " Memoires du General Gallieni. Defense de Paris," p. 121, for
an account of this visit.
GENERAL GALLlENI'S VISIT 257
advantage ought to be taken at once of the opportunity the 4 Sept.
German First Army had given by offering its right flank. 1914«
He added that he had ordered the Army of Paris, as he
called his combined forces of the Sixth Army and Paris
garrison, to move eastwards that afternoon. He stated
that he proposed, with the concurrence of General Joffre,
whom he had informed, to attack the German IV. Reserve
Corps, which was covering the movement of the First Army.
This formation had been reported that morning marching
in two columns towards Trilport and Lizy sur Ourcq.
Galli6ni suggested that the British Army should cease to
retreat, and take the offensive next day in co-operation
with his forces. In the absence of the British Commander-
in-Chief, nothing could be decided, and, after waiting three
hours until 5 P.M., General Gallieni left. When he reached
Paris, he found a telegram from General Joffre 1 stating
that " he considered it more advantageous to bring the
" Sixth Army to the left [south] bank of the Marne, to the
" south of Lagny " (where the British left then was), and
directing him " to come to an understanding with the Field-
Marshal for the execution of the movement."
General Joffre had also written to Sir John French on
this day confirming his intention to adhere to the plan of
retirement already communicated to him.2 He added : —
" In case the German Armies should continue the
" movement south-south-east, thus moving away from the
" Seine and Paris, perhaps you will consider, as I do, that
" your action will be most effective on the right bank of
44 that river between Marne and Seine.
" Your left resting on the Marne, supported by the
" entrenched camp of Paris, will be covered by the mobile
" garrison of the capital, which will attack eastwards on
" the left bank 3 of the Marne."
This letter left no doubt that the Generalissimo wished
the B.E.F. to be withdrawn further to make room for the
Army of Paris south of the Marne,4 and in view of the gap
which existed between the B.E.F. and the Fifth Army,
and " because the Germans were exercising some pressure
" on Haig on this night [4th Sept.]," 5 Sir John French
decided to retire " a few miles further south."
1 " Memoires du General Gallieni," p. 222.
2 See Appendix 28 for the original French.
3 As a result of telephone communications between General Joffre and
Gallieni on the 4th September this was changed to the right bank.
* See Sir John French's letter to Earl Kitchener. Appendix 29.
5 Lord French's " 1914," p. 109.
VOL. I S
258 LAST STAGES OF THE RETREAT
At 6.35 P.M., therefore, orders l were issued from British
G.H.Q. at Melun, for the Army to move south-west on the
5th, pivoting on its left, so that its rear guards would reach,
roughly a line drawn east and west through Tournan. The
times of starting were left to the corps commanders. The
Cavalry Division was further warned to be ready to move
from the western to the eastern flank of the Army early
on the 6th.
A message informing him of the movements ordered
was sent to General Gallieni through the French Mission at
British headquarters.
THE END OF THE RETREAT
Map 4. Accordingly before dawn on the 5th, the I. Corps was
again on the march southwards with the 3rd Cavalry
Brigade as rear guard and the 5th as eastern flank guard.
The latter had a skirmish at Chailly early in the morning,
but otherwise the march was uneventful, and was indeed
compared by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade to a march in peace
time. The fighting troops of the III. Corps started at
4 A.M., but the II. Corps moved off several hours earlier,
at 10 P.M., in order to avoid the heat of the day. Both
corps were unmolested. During the 5th, definite orders
for the Cavalry Division to move to the right flank were
issued, and in the course of the afternoon it started east-
wards across the rear of the Army.
Sketch 4. Thus by nightfall, or a little later, the British force had
Map 22. reached its halting-places south-south-east of Paris, and
faced somewhat east of north : the I. Corps in and west
of Rozoy, the Cavalry Division to its right rear in Mormant
and the villages north of it, the II. Corps on the left of the
I., in and east of Tournan, and the III. Corps on the left
of the II., from Ozoir la Ferriere southwards to Brie Comte
Robert, touching the defences of Paris.
Meanwhile, during the 5th September, north-east of the
capital, General Maunoury's Sixth Army had by General
Gallieni' s orders advanced north of the Marrie towards
the Ourcq, and in the afternoon had come into contact with
the German IV. Reserve Corps between Meaux and St.
Soupplets. This Army was steadily increasing in numbers
as divisions reached it from the east.2 On the right of the
1 Appendix 30.
2 It consisted on the 5th September of the VII. Corps, 45th Division,
55th and 56th Reserve Divisions, the Moroccan Brigade, and Gillet's
LAST DAY OF THE RETREAT 259
British, and slightly to the south of them, General Conneau's 5 Sept.
Cavalry Corps (4th, 8th and 10th Cavalry Divisions) was 1914-
near Provins, on the extreme left of the Fifth Army, which
had also retired during the 5th, and was now extended
north-eastwards from Provins to Sezanne. Thus the gap
in the Allied line on this side was reduced to less than
fourteen miles, with four French and British cavalry
divisions at hand to fill it.
Opposite the French Fifth Army and the right of the Sketch 5.
B.E.F., von Kluck's Army had continued its south-eastward MaP 22-
movement. As aeroplane reconnaissance clearly showed,
the whole of it (except the IV. Reserve Corps and 4th
Cavalry Division, which were observing Paris) had passed
the lines of the Ourcq and the Marne and had wheeled to
the south, its front stretching along the line of the Grand
Morin, which its advanced troops had crossed, from
Esternay (near Sezanne) to Crecy (south of Meaux). On
von Kluck's left, the Second Army was a day's march
behind him, its right slightly overlapped by the IX. Corps,
so that for a time there was an impression that he had been
reinforced. The moment for which General Joffre had
waited was come at last. Von Kluck, in his headlong rush
eastwards, had, it appeared, ignored not only the fortress
of Paris, but the Sixth Army which, with the British, was
now in position, as a glance at the map will show, to fall in
strength upon his right flank and rear.
Similarly, further east, parts of the German Fifth Army
and the Fourth Army had swept past the western side of
Verdun, with which fortress General Sarrail's Third Army,
facing almost due west, was still in touch. Thus, whilst
the German Sixth and Seventh Armies were held up by the
eastern fortresses, the Fifth, Fourth, Third, Second and
First Armies had penetrated into a vast bag or " pocket "
between the fortresses of Verdun and Paris, the sides of
which were held by unbeaten troops, ready to turn on the
enemy directly the command should come to do so. t Credit
has been claimed for General Gallieni that he first dis-
covered the eastward march of von Kluck and brought its
significance to the notice of General Joffre, and that he
Cavalry Brigade — some 70,000 men with Sordet's Cavalry Corps attached.
Behind it were a group of Territorial brigades under General Mercier-
Milon, Ebener's Group of Reserve divisions (61st and 62nd), and the
actual garrison of Paris, four divisions and a brigade of Territorial troops,
with a brigade of Fusiliers Marins sent for police duties. The IV. Corps
was just arriving, so General Gallieni reckoned he had about 150,000 men
available for action as the Army of Paris.
260 LAST STAGES OF THE RETREAT
immediately took appropriate action with the troops under
his command, and prevailed upon the Commander-in-
Chief to change his plan for retiring behind the Seine. Be
this as it may, the decision to resume the offensive rested
with General Joffre.
The retreat of the B.E.F. had continued, with only one
halt, for thirteen days over a distance, as the crow flies, of
one hundred and thirty-six miles, and as the men marched, at
least two hundred miles, and that after two days' strenuous
marching in advance to the Mons Canal. The mere state-
ment of the distance gives no measure of the demands made
upon the physical and moral endurance of the men, and
but little idea of the stoutness with which they had re-
sponded to these demands. The misery that all ranks
suffered is well summed up in the phrase of an officer : "I
" would never have believed that men could be so tired and
" so hungry and yet live." An artillery officer whose brigade
marched and fought throughout the retreat with the same
infantry brigade has noted in his diary that, on the average,
mounted men had three hours', and infantry four hours'
rest per day. The late General Sir Stanley Maude, who
was on the III. Corps Staff, has put it on record that he
did not average three hours' sleep out of the twenty-four ; *
officers of the lower staffs had less. But all these trials
were now behind them : the Retreat from Mons was over.
There have been three other notable retreats in the
history of the British Army. All three, that of Sir
John Moore to Corunna in the winter of 1808-9, of Sir
Arthur Wellesley after the battle of Talavera in 1809,
and again from Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812, were
marred by serious lack of discipline, though the first was
redeemed by its results and the success of the final action at
Corunna, and the last was reckoned by critics to be the
greatest of Wellington's achievements. The Retreat from
Mons, on the other hand, was in every way honourable to
the Army. The troops suffered under every disadvantage.
The number of reservists in the ranks was on an average
over one-half of the full strength, and the units were owing
to the force of circumstances hurried away to the area of con-
centration before all ranks could resume acquaintance with
their officers and comrades, and re-learn their business as
soldiers. Arrived there, they were hastened forward by
forced marches to the battle, confronted with greatly
superior numbers of the most renowned army in Europe,
1 CallwelPs " Sir Stanley Maude," p, 120.
SUMMARY 261
and condemned at the very outset to undergo the severest 5 Sept.
ordeal which can be imposed upon an army. They were 1914-
short of food and sleep when they began their retreat, they
continued it, always short of food and sleep, for thirteen
days, as has been told ; and at the end they were still an
army, and a formidable army. They were never de-
moralized, for they rightly judged that they had never
been beaten.1
The B.E.F., forming as it did only a very small portion
of the line of the French Armies commanded by General
Joffre, had no independent strategical role in the opening
phases of the war. When the Germans turned the Allied
left by an unexpectedly wide movement through Belgium,
the Generalissimo decided that his only chance of stopping
them was " by abandoning ground and mounting a new
operation " ; 2 to this Sir John French had naturally to
conform. The operation, which involved the assembly of a
new Army in the west to outflank the enemy, required time
to prepare. General Joffre at first hoped, whilst his First
and Second Armies held Lorraine, to be able to stand on Maps 2,
the line Verdun — river Aisne (Vouziers — Berry au Bac) — & 4-
Craonne — Laon — La Fere — Ham, and thence along the
Somme. This line he intended to entrench.3 The Germans,
however, pressed on too closely to permit of it, and
widened their turning movement. There was no alternative
to fighting at a strategical and tactical disadvantage but
a further general retirement — "hanging on as long as
possible, avoiding any decisive action," but giving the
enemy severe lessons as opportunities occurred.4
Instead of being beaten piecemeal by superior forces
as in 1870, the French, after the initial failure of their
offensive, withdrew in good time. Such fights as took
place, and there were many all along the front besides
Guise,5 resulted not in a Woerth or a Spicheren, but
in the Allies slipping away after inflicting severe losses on
the enemy.6 In these operations, the B.E.F., at Mons and
Le Cateau and in smaller actions, was eminently successful :
1 A table of the length of the daily marches will be found in Appendix 31 .
2 Rapport du General Joffre au Ministre de la Guerre, 25th Aug. 1914.
3 Directive of 25th August, 22 hours.
4 General Joffre's letter to G.H.Q. of 30th August.
5 Beaufort, La Marfee, Murtin, Tremblois, Chilly, Launais, besides the
battles of Signy 1'Abbaye and Rethel.
6 General Graf Stiirgkh, head of the Austrian Mission at German
G.H.Q. , gives the heavy losses suffered by the Germans in the preliminary
engagements as one of the principal reasons for the defeat at the Marne
(" Im Deutschen Grossen Hauptquartier," p. 88).
262 LAST STAGES OF THE RETREAT
it had no difficulty in more than holding its own whenever
contact occurred, hitting hard and then marching off un-
molested. Only those who have commanded British
infantry can have any conception of what it can accomplish.
By some it has been thought that the B.E.F. could
have done more ; in particular it might have assisted the
French at Guise. It has, however, been shown in the
narrative1 that one of the reasons that General Joffre
ordered General Lanrezac to take the offensive was to
relieve the pressure on the British, and he did not call on
Sir John French to assist. The British Commander-in-
Chief, in his dangerous position on the outer flank of the
Allied Armies for many days, had not only to bear in mind
General Joffre's general instructions to avoid decisive
action and the necessity of husbanding his force for the
coming battle when the Armies should turn, but to recall
that he commanded nearly all the available trained staff
officers, officers and men of the British Empire, the
nucleus on which the New Armies were to be trained and
initiated in war ; above all, he had to remember the in-
structions of the Government, that " the greatest care must
be exercised towards a minimum of losses and wastage."
On the 5th September there were some twenty thousand
men absent of the original numbers of the B.E.F. ; but,
as in all great retreats, a large proportion of these rejoined
later ; the official returns show a figure of a little over
fifteen thousand killed, wounded and missing. The loss
of war material is difficult to set down exactly. Some
transport was abandoned as is inevitable at such times ;
many of the valises and great-coats were discarded or burnt,
and a very large proportion of the entrenching tools left
behind. As to guns, forty-two fell into the enemy's hands
as the result of active combat, and two or three more,
through one mishap or another, were left behind. Such
a casualty list can, in the circumstances, be only considered
as astonishingly light. Its seriousness lay in the fact that,
whether in guns or men, the loss had fallen almost wholly
upon the left wing : the II. and III. Corps, and above all
upon the II. Corps.
THE CHANGE OF BASE
Sketch i. It was impossible to expect that the deficiencies in men
Map 2. an(j material could be immediately made good. Practi-
cally all units received their first reinforcements — the " ten
1 See pp. 218 and 227.
THE CHANGE OF BASE 263
per cent reinforcements " — on the 4th and 5th September, 1-5 Sept.
and these, added to the replacement of the Ministers in the 1914)-
1st (Guards) Brigade by the Cameron Highlanders (hitherto
Army Troops), brought the I. Corps more or less up to
strength. But the far graver losses of the II. Corps,
especially in guns and vehicles, could not be so quickly
repaired. The rapid advance of the Germans to the
west had made the bases at Boulogne and Havre
unsafe, and had actually dispossessed the British of
their advanced base at Amiens. The advisability of a
change of base was foreseen by the Q.M.G., Major-General
Sir William Robertson, as early as the 24th August,
and from that date all further movement of men or
stores to Havre or Boulogne was stopped. By the 27th,
Boulogne had been cleared of stores and closed as a port
of disembarkation; and on the 29th St. Nazaire on the
Loire was selected as the new base.1 At that time there
were sixty thousand tons of stores at Havre ; also fifteen
thousand men and fifteen hundred horses, besides eight
hundred tons of hay at Rouen, all awaiting transfer to St.
Nazaire. By the 30th of August the Inspector-General of
Communications, Major-General Robb, had telegraphed his
requirements in tonnage to Southampton ; and on the 1st
September the transports for the troops were ordered to
Havre. By the 3rd September all stores had been cleared
from Rouen, and all troops from Havre ; and by the 5th
every pound of stores had been removed from Havre. In
fact, in these four days twenty thousand officers and men,
seven thousand horses and sixty thousand tons of stores had
been shipped from Havre to St. Nazaire, a very considerable
feat of organization.
A mere comparison of dates, however, will show that,
despite this great effort, some days were bound to elapse
before the gigantic mass of stores could be landed, the new
base thoroughly organized, and all arrangements working
smoothly for the despatch of what was needed to the front
by a longer line of communication. The arrival of the first
reinforcements on the 4th and 5th September was only
secured by extraordinary exertions ; and it was obvious
that the II. Corps must enter upon the new operations
with its ranks still much depleted, and lacking one-third
of its divisional artillery.
1 The L. of C. ran from St. Nazaire by two railway routes — one via
Saumur and the other by Le Mans — to Villeneuve St. Georges, just south-
east of Paris, whence there was one route to a varying railhead.
264 LAST STAGES OF THE RETREAT
OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN FIRST AND SECOND
ARMIES, SRD-STH SEPTEMBER 1914
Sketch 5. On the 28th August, it will be recalled,1 the German
' SuPreme Command (O.H.L.) had ordered the Second Army
to march on Paris, and the First Army on the lower Seine,
on the supposition that at least the French centre and left
were in full retreat on the capital.2 After the battle of
Guise (29th-30th August) both von Kluck and von Billow
had departed from these orders : the former turned south-
eastwards to help von Bulow who, instead of marching on
Paris, was preparing to follow the French Fifth Army due
south.
Approval of this change had been given by O.H.L.
late on the 30th, but it was not until the night of the
2nd/3rd September that further orders, embodying a new
plan, evidently founded on the optimistic reports received
from the Armies, were issued by O.H.L. in the form of a
message to the First and Second Armies. This ran : —
"The French are to be forced away from Paris in a south-
" easterly direction.
" The First Army will follow in echelon behind the Second
" Army, and will be responsible henceforward for the flank
" protection of the force.
" The appearance of some of our cavalry before Paris, as
" well as the destruction of all roads leading to Paris is desired."
These orders placed von Kluck in an unpleasant
dilemma ; 3 the Second Army was " a heavy day's march
behind the mass of the First Army" To march back a
day to get into the echelon position ordered would have
made it impossible to drive the French south-eastwards,
an operation which the First Army had initiated and alone
was at the moment in a position to attempt. For it to
mark time for two days was even further out of the question ;
the success that O.H.L. hoped for could not be achieved
if it stood still. Von Kluck, therefore, considered that he
could best carry out the spirit of the orders if he detailed
1 See p. 222.
2 It may however have been in pursuance of von Schlieffen's plan drawn
up in 1905 . According to this, part of the Second Army reinforced by Ersatz
divisions was to invest Paris, whilst the First Army passing round the
capital was then to move east and envelop the French Armies or drive
them towards Switzerland. Sufficient forces for this scheme were however
no longer available.
3 See Kluck, p. 85 el seq.
GERMAN OPERATIONS 265
the IV. Reserve Corps and a cavalry division for the flank 3-4 Sept.
protection against Paris, and moved forward with the rest 1914-
of his Army across the Marne to drive the French south-
eastwards. He kept a second corps, the //., in echelon
behind his right as further cover against Paris, and in-
formed O.H.L. that " the proposed driving of the enemy
" from Paris in a south-easterly direction could only be
" carried out by the advance of the First Army." On the
evening of the 3rd he issued orders to his corps in accord-
ance with his own views. They began : —
" The First Army will continue its advance over the Marne
" to-morrow in order to drive the French south-eastwards.
" If any British are met with, they are to be driven back." 1
The importance attached to the flank guard is indicated
by the fact that it was formed only of a Reserve corps,
short of a brigade left behind at Brussels, and the 4th
Cavalry Division, which had been cut up at Nery.
On the 4th September, therefore, von Kluck continued
his march south-south-east between the Marne and the Petit
Morin, whilst von Biilow crossed the Marne and advanced a
short way south of it " without important fighting." At
7.30 P.M. von Kluck, still under the impression that his
principal task was to drive the Allies south-eastwards from
Paris, and as usual quite in the dark as to the whereabouts
of the B.E.F., issued the following orders for next day : —
" The First Army will continue its advance against the Seine
" with protection towards Paris. Should the British be caught
" up anywhere they will be attacked."
His corps were directed to cross the Grand Morin, and
reach : the IX. Esternay, the ///. Sancy ; the IV. Choisy :
even the //. Corps was to cross the Marne and reach the
Grand Morin below Coulommiers ; the IV. Reserve Corps
with the 4th Cavalry Division was to come further south-
wards, to the north of Meaux, and the //. Cavalry Corps
go J
In
consequence of the Third Army being somewhat in
rear of its place in the line south and south-east of Rheims,
von Biilow ordered for the 5th only a short march to
Montmirail — Vertus for the Second Army.
During the afternoon of the 4th September, the true
situation — that the Allies were by no means beaten and
that the French were preparing to envelop the German
1 Kluck, p. 91. 2 Kluck, pp. 93, 94.
266 LAST STAGES OF THE RETREAT
right instead of submitting to being enveloped — dawned
on O.H.L.
How von Moltke felt is recorded by Herr Helfferich,
the Foreign Secretary. On the evening of the 4th Sep-
tember, he says : —
" I found Generaloberst von Moltke by no means in
" a cheerful mood inspired by victory, he was serious
" and depressed. He confirmed that our advanced troops
" were only thirty miles from Paris [the Kaiser had just
" announced this triumphantly to Helfferich], ' but,' he
" added, ' we've hardly a horse in the army that can go
out of a walk.' After a short pause, he continued :
We must not deceive ourselves. We have had suc-
cesses, but we have not yet had victory. Victory
means annihilation of the enemy's power of resistance.
When armies of millions of men are opposed, the
victor has prisoners. Where are ours ? There were
some 20,000 taken in the Lorraine fighting, another
10,000 here and perhaps another 10,000 there. Besides,
the relatively small number of captured guns shows
me that the French have withdrawn in good order and
according to plan. The hardest work is still to be
" ' done.' " *
At 6.45 P.M. the Supreme Command issued the following
Memorandum and orders to all Armies. They appear of
sufficient importance to quote in extenso.2 The substance
was sent out by wireless, and reached the First and Second
Armies about 6 A.M. on the 5th ; the originals were carried
by officers in motor cars, who did not arrive until
" evening."
" 4tth September — 7.45 p.m. [German time]
" To all Armies
" The enemy has evaded the enveloping attack of the
' First and Second Armies, and a part of his forces has joined
' up with those about Paris. From reports and other in-
' formation, it appears that the enemy is moving troops
4 westwards from the front Toul — Belfort, and is also taking
' them from the front of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies.
1 The attempt to force the whole French Army back in a
' south-easterly direction towards the Swiss frontier is thus
1 " Der Weltkrieg," vol. ii. pp. 17, 18.
2 Their probable meaning is discussed on page 301. See also foot-
note 3, p. 300.
GERMAN OPERATIONS 267
" rendered impracticable, and the new situation to be ap- 4 Sept.
" preciated shows that the enemy is bringing up new formations 1914.
" and concentrating superior forces in the neighbourhood of
" Paris, to protect the capital and to threaten the right flank
" of the German Army.
44 The First and Second Armies must therefore remain facing
44 the east front of Paris. Their task is to act against any
" operations of the enemy from the neighbourhood of Paris
" and to give each other mutual support to this end.
44 The Fourth and Fifth Armies are still operating against
" superior forces. They must maintain constant pressure to
" force them south - eastwards, and by this means open a
" passage for the Sixth Army over the Moselle between Toul
" and Epinal. Whether by co-operating with the Sixth and
" Seventh Armies they will then succeed in forcing any con-
" siderable part of the enemy's forces towards Swiss territory
" cannot yet be foreseen.
" The Sixth and Seventh Armies will continue to hold the
44 enemy in position on their front, but will take the offensive
44 as soon as possible against the line of the Moselle between
44 Toul and Epinal, securing their flanks against these fortresses.
44 The Third Army will march in the direction Troyes —
44 Vendeuvre [that is south]. It will be employed, as the
44 situation demands, either to the west to support the crossing
44 of the First and Second Armies over the Seine, or to the south
44 and south-east to co-operate in the fighting of our armies
44 on the left wing.
44 His Majesty therefore orders :
44 (1) The First and Second Armies will remain facing the
44 eastern front of Paris, to act offensively against any opera-
44 tions of the enemy from Paris. The First Army will be
44 between the Oise and the Marne, the Second Army between
44 the Marne and the Seine. //. Cavalry Corps will be with
44 the First Army. I. Cavalry Corps with the Second Army.
44 (2) The Third Army will advance on Troyes — Vendeuvre.
44 (3) The Fourth and Fifth Armies, by a determined advance
44 in a south-easterly direction, will open a passage across the
14 Upper Moselle for the Sixth and Seventh Armies. The right
44 wing of the Fourth Army will move through Vitry (on the
44 Marne, 45 miles south-east of Rheims), and the right wing
44 of the Fifth Army will move through Revigny (20 miles
44 E.N.E. of Vitry). The IV. Cavalry Corps will operate in
44 front of the Fourth and Fifth Armies.
44 (4) The task of the Sixth and Seventh Armies remains
44 unchanged." * VON MOLTKE.
1 Next day, it may be added, von Moltke began withdrawing the XV.
Corps and 7th Cavalry Division from the left, to be railed through Belgium
to reinforce the right.
268 LAST STAGES OF THE RETREAT
The orders to the First and Second Armies, it will be
observed, clearly intended emphasis to be laid on their
remaining facing Paris and not attacking unless the
enemy moved against them, for, in accordance with German
principles, every commander would act offensively if
within reach of the enemy.
Von Billow took immediate steps to obey O.H.L.
orders literally. He stopped the advance of his Army,
and wheeled the left wing slightly forward, so as to begin
changing the front gradually from south to west, in ex-
pectation that the First Army would conform.1
The staff of the First Army, however, was puzzled by
the orders, for the position of the troops in detail had been
reported by wireless to O.H.L. ; and the Army could not
44 remain " between Oise and Marne, for the greater part
of it had crossed the Marne. If there was danger brewing
for the right flank in consequence of further transfers of
troops to Maunoury, von Kluck considered the best
method of conjuring it was to attack all along the line.
After receipt of the wireless summary of the orders, he
therefore sent the following message to O.H.L. : — 2
44 First Army in compliance with previous instructions of
4 O.H.L. is advancing via Rebais — Montmirail against the Seine.
4 Two corps cover it towards Paris, on either side of the Marne.
4 At Coulommiers there is contact with about three English
' divisions, at Montmirail with the west flank of the French.
4 The latter are offering lively resistance with rear guards,
4 and should suffer very considerably if pursuit is continued
4 to the Seine. They have hitherto only been driven back
4 frontally and are noways beaten out of the field. Their
4 retreat is directed on Nogent sur Seine. If the investment
4 of Paris that has been ordered is carried out, the enemy
4 would be free to manoeuvre towards Troyes. The strong
4 forces suspected in Paris are only in the act of assembly.
' Parts of the Field Army will no doubt be sent there, but this
4 will require time. Consider breaking contact with the
4 thoroughly battle-fit Field Army and shifting of the First
4 and Second Armies is undesirable. I propose instead : —
4 pursuit to be continued to the Seine and then investment
4 of Paris."
The First Army, notwithstanding this proposal, began
to make preparations to obey O.H.L. orders, but it was
practically impossible to get new instructions to the corps
in time to stop the marches in progress. The IV. Reserve
1 Billow, p. 52.
2 Kuhl's " Marne," p. 128 et seq. The time is not given.
GERMAN OPERATIONS 269
Corps, close at hand, was directed to halt where it happened 5 Sept.
to be on receipt of the message ; as this did not reach it 1914-
until 11 A.M., it had already completed its march for the
day. To the //. Cavalry Corps instructions were sent by
wireless not to get out of touch of the Army Headquarters
by advancing further south. As there was no signal
communication with the other corps and the officers to
receive orders were due at 11 A.M. in Rebais, no instruc-
tions were sent out to them. It was decided that orders
for the new situation should be issued in the evening.
During the day reports showed that the Allies were
retreating on the whole front from Montmirail to Coulom-
miers and " there was no sign of danger to the right flank
north of the Marne." Towards evening Lieut. -Colonel
Hentsch arrived from O.H.L. to explain the situation, and
another officer brought the written copy of the morning
wireless orders. Lieut. -Colonel Hentsch stated that the
general situation was dubious (misslich). The left wing
was held up before Nancy — Epinal, and, in spite of heavy
losses, could not get on. The Fourth and Fifth Armies
were only making slow progress. Apparently transfers
of troops were being made from the French right wing in
the direction of Paris. " It was reported that further
" British troops were about to land, perhaps at Ostend.
" Assistance to Antwerp by the British was probable."
When Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch was informed of the pre-
parations that had been made to stop the advance, he
said " that they corresponded to the wishes of O.H.L.,
" and that the movement could be made at leisure ; no
" special haste was necessary." *
Thus, on the afternoon of the 5th September, four corps
of the German First Army were across the Grand Morin
with two cavalry divisions ahead of them, but with only a
weak flank guard behind the western flank. The Army was
thus well inside the angle formed by the fronts of the French
Fifth Army and the British Expeditionary Force with that
of the French Sixth Army. Von Kluck's orders for the 6th
were not issued from Rebais until 10 P.M. They will be
1 Kuhl's " Marne," p. 128. These remarks, it is stated by von Kuhl,
were made in the presence of a witness, Lieut.-Colonel Grautoff, the senior
General Staff officer of the First Army. In judging of the proceedings, von
Kuhl points out that it should be borne in mind that " Neither O.H.L. nor
" the First Army staff had the remotest idea that an immediate offensive
" of the whole French army was imminent. The continuation of the
" French retreat was accepted as certain. . . . Not a sign, not a word from
" prisoners, not a newspaper paragraph gave warning."
270 LAST STAGES OF THE RETREAT
given after the British operations for that day have been
described. There was a collision between the flank guard
and the French Sixth Army near St. Soupplets (7 miles
N.N.W. of Meaux) on the afternoon of the 5th ; but news
of this did not reach von Kluck until " late at night long
after his orders had gone out," x and did not therefore
affect his decision.
1 Kuhl's "Marne," p. 133. According to Kluck, p. 98, hostile forces
had been reported near Dammartin and St. Mard on the 4th September,
and General von Gronau, commanding the IV. Reserve Corps, attacked on
the 5th to clear up the situation.
CHAPTER XIV
THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
GTH SEPTEMBER : THE RETURN TO THE OFFENSIVE
(See Sketches 2, 5, 6 & 7 ;
Maps 2, 4, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 & 29)
IN the early morning of the 5th, at 3 A.M., a copy of General Sketch 5.
Joffre's " Instruction " for an offensive on the 6th was ^a?s243'
brought to British G.H.Q. by a representative of French 4
General Headquarters. Some inkling of what this might
contain had already reached Sir John French, for two of his
staff officers had seen General Franchet d'Esperey at his
headquarters on the afternoon of the 4th, and to them that
commander had explained the plan of a proposed attack,
which was practically the same as that now ordered.
During the 5th, General Maunoury, and later General
Joffre, visited the Field-Marshal ; the situation was fully
discussed, and all arrangements were made to begin the
attack all along the line next day.
It was significant that General Joffre's instructions for
the offensive x dealt first with the Armies of the left. Their
general purport was that the two centre Armies should hold
on whilst the three Armies on the left (including the British
Army), and the Third Army on the right, attacked the
flanks of the German forces which were endeavouring to
push forward between Verdun and Paris. On the extreme
left, the Sixth Army, with the I. Cavalry Corps, was to cross
the Ourcq north-east of Meaux, between Lizy sur Ourcq and
May en Multien (4 miles north of Lizy), and attack east-
wards in the direction of Chateau Thierry. (Owing to the
progress of the enemy, these orders were subsequently
altered to an advance on Meaux.) The British Army,
facing east, was to attack from the front Changis (7 miles
east of Meaux) — Coulommiers in the general direction of
Montmirail, the French II. Cavalry Corps ensuring connec-
1 See Appendices 32 and 33 where they are given in exlenso.
271
272 THE MARNE
tion between it and the Fifth Army. The Fifth Army
(General Franchet d'Esperey) was to attack northwards.
In the centre, the Ninth Army (General Foch) was to cover
the right of the Fifth Army, by holding the southern exits
of the passages over the St. Gond marshes (the gathering
ground of the Petit Morin), but with part of its forces on the
plateau west of the marshes. On the right, the Fourth (de
Langle de Gary) and Third (Sarrail) Armies were to act in
conjunction, the former holding the enemy whilst the latter
was to attack westwards against the flank of the Germans
advancing along the eastern edge of the Argonne.
Unfortunately, these orders not having reached Sir John
French's headquarters until the early morning of the 5th,
the British Army acted on General Joffre's previous in-
structions, and starting early — the II. Corps before mid-
night and the I. and III. Corps before daybreak, — continued
to retire as already related during the early part of the day.
Thus on the night of the 5th it was 12 to 15 miles in rear
of the position in which the French Commander-in-Chief
expected it to be.
The ground over which the British Army was about to
advance forms part of the great plateau, east and north-east
of Paris, whose eastern edge, roughly indicated by Craonne
— Rheims — Epernay — Nogent sur Seine, is 400 to 500 feet
above the plain of Champagne. It is a country of great
open spaces ; highly cultivated, dotted with woods and
villages, but with no great forests except those of Crecy,
Armainvillers and Malvoisine, all south of Coulommiers. It
is cut into from east to west by the deep valleys, almost
ravines, of the Grand Morin, the Petit Morin, the Marne,
the upper course of the Ourcq, the Vesle, the Aisne and the
Ailette. These rivers are passable only at the bridges or by
bridging, and form ideal lines on which to fight delaying
actions. Otherwise, the region on the east of the line
Soissons — Meaux presents no definite positions.
Sir John French's operation orders issued at 5.15 P.M.
on the 5th September directed the Army to advance east-
ward with a view to attacking, and, as a preliminary, to
wheel to the east pivoting on its right, so that it would come
on to the line — roughly parallel to the Grand Morin and
7 miles from it — La Chapelle Iger (south-east of Rozoy) —
Villeneuve le Comte — Bailly (5 miles south-west of Crecy).1
1 Sir John French's operation orders and the operation orders of the
Cavalry Division and the I., II. and III. Corps will be found in Appendices
34 to 38.
SKETCH t>
OPERATIONS, 6-13 SEPTEMBER, 1914.
A dvance of B.E.F.
Positions at night are shown by dates.
GOMP1EGNE
/Foret
de
Compiegne
Brie-Comte-
Robert
MELUN
EsternayJ Fere o
-P f Champenoise
Sezanne
o Provins
MILES 543210
SCALE
|Q
20 MILES
Ordnance Survey, 1920.
THE CAVALRY ADVANCE 273
This movement was to be completed by the right wing by 6 Sept.
9 A.M. and the left by 10 A.M. The Cavalry Division, and 1914-
the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades acting together under
General Gough,1 were to cover the front and flanks of the
force, and connect with the French Armies between which
the British were moving.
Pezarches, 5 miles to the north of Rozoy, the 1st Divi-
sion's halting-place on the 5th, was reached about 7 A.M.
by General Gough without opposition, and thence patrols
were pushed out northwards- towards the Forest of Mal-
voisine, north-eastwards upon Mauperthuis and eastwards
upon Touquin. At all these points and also in the Forest
of Crecy touch was gained with the enemy ; and the
advanced parties of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade on the right
flank, pressing on to Pecy (5 miles south-east of Rozoy),
found themselves in the presence of formidable forces.
Large masses of German cavalry could be seen moving
southwards upon Jouy le Chatel (east of Pe*cy),2 but heavy
hostile columns observed on the road north of Pe*cy,
suddenly and without assignable cause, turned about while
still two miles distant, and counter-marched to the north.3
This happened between 8 and 9 A.M. ; but immediately
afterwards the German cavalry and artillery became aggres-
sive on the right flank. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade was
shelled out of Pecy and compelled to retire for a short
distance until the rest of the division could come up. The
leading regiment of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, somewhat
later, was forced back from Touquin, then shelled out of
Pezarches and finally, having no guns in support, was
driven back to Rigny (1 mile south-west of Pezarches).
As it retired German battalions * were seen moving west-
ward from Vaudoy towards Rozoy ; this column, which
had been sighted by the Flying Corps earlier in the morning,
was described by the observers as being of the strength of
1 Henceforward, until officially designated the 2nd Cavalry Division
on the 16th September, the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades acted together
under the command of Brig.-General Hubert Gough, and the Cavalry
Division contained the 1st, 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades. Brig.-General
J. Vaughan succeeded General Gough in command of the 3rd Cavalry
Brigade.
8 The German 11. Cavalry Corps had orders to demonstrate towards
Lumigny — Rozoy to cover the withdrawal of the right of the German
First Army.
3 This was part of the German IV. Corps.
4 If von Kluck's map is correct, these must have been Jdger. There
were four battalions, Nos. 3, 4, 9, 10, with the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions
(" Militar Wochenblatt," No. 11, 1920). According to Kluck, pp. 152-3; the
3rd and 4th Jdger were carried in motor lorries.
VOL. I T
274 THE MARNE
a brigade, with a brigade of artillery attached to it.
Sketch o. The leading troops of the I. Corps, the advanced guard
Map 23. of the 1st (Guards) Brigade, found themselves checked
when no more than two miles east of Rozoy by this party
of the enemy ; and, the II. Corps being still near La
Houssaye (6 miles north-west of Rozoy), 5 miles in rear
of the I., General Haig felt uneasy about his left, over-
shadowed as it was by the great forests of Crecy and Mal-
voisine, which could easily conceal large numbers of the
enemy. He therefore directed the 1st Division to halt, and
its advanced guard to take up a covering position. On
receiving Haig's report of this action, the Commander-in-
Chief sent orders to the II. Corps to close in on the I. to
Lumigny (4 miles north of Rozoy).
West of the I. Corps, the II. and III. Corps had marched
north-eastward at 5 A.M. and 3 A.M., respectively, to a line
running from CreVecreur (4 miles W.N.W. of Pezarches),
north-westward through Villeneuve le Comte to Serris (6
miles west of Cr6cy). Both corps reached this destination
in the forenoon, without molestation ; for, though hostile
patrols were encountered as the columns moved through
the Forest of Crecy, the main body of the Germans, esti-
mated at a cavalry division, retired at once. Shortly
after 11 A.M., however, the II. Corps as already mentioned,
and also the III. Corps, received the Commander-in-Chief s
orders to close in to the left of the I. Corps ; and between 1
and 1.30 P.M. they resumed their march in the new direction.
By 3 P.M. their approach had cleared the enemy from the
left flank of the I. Corps ; and shortly afterwards the 1st
Division, again advancing upon Vaudoy, found that the
Germans had evacuated their positions and retreated north-
ward. The enemy had, in fact, upon this day reached the
extreme limit of his advance, and by 6 P.M. the Flying Corps
reported that there were no important bodies south of the
Petit Morin except at Rebais.
At 3.30 P.M. Sir John French issued orders by telegraph
for the I. Corps to advance to a line just short of the Grand
Morin, from Marolles (4 miles E.S.E. of Coulommiers) to
Les Parichets (1 mile south-west of Coulommiers)'; for the
II. Corps to come up to west of it from Les Parichets to
Mortcerf (5 miles south of Cr£cy) ; and for the III. Corps
to move up into the loop of the Grand Morin south-
westward of Crecy, between Tigeaux (2J miles south of
Crecy) and Villiers sur Morin (2J miles north-west of
Tigeaux). The Cavalry Division was to advance north-
SITUATION AT NIGHT 275
east to the line Choisy — Chevru (4 miles and 6 miles 6 Sept.
south-west of La Ferte Gaucher), and cover the right 1914-
flank ; and Gough's cavalry brigades were sent in rear of
the left of the I. Corps. But by the time that these orders
reached the I. Corps, it was too late for it to make more
than a short move to the line Vaudoy — Touquin — Pe-
zarches, 8 miles short of its intended destination, where it
halted at 6.30 P.M. In the II. Corps, however, the head of
the 3rd Division reached Faremoutiers : whence, after a
few skirmishes with the German piquets, the 1st Wiltshire
of the 7th Infantry Brigade, at 11 P.M., forced the passage
of the Grand Morin and seized the heights of Le Chamois,
about a mile north of the river. The other divisions of
the II. and III. Corps also got to their places. The final
positions taken up for the night were as follows, the heads
of the II. and III. Corps being up to the Grand Morin and
the I. Corps and cavalry echeloned to the right rear : —
Cavalry Division . Jouy le Chatel. Sketch 6
I. Corps Vaudoy— Touquin— Pezarches.
Gough's Cavalry Brigades . Pezarches — Lumigny.
II. Corps :
3rd Division . . . . Lumigny northward to Fare-
moutiers.
5th Division .... Mortcerf northward to La Celle
sur Morin (1J miles west of
Faremoutiers).
III. Corps Villiers sur Morin southward
to Villeneuve le Comte and
Villeneuve St. Denis.
The intelligence gathered during the day was that the
///. and IX. German Corps, with the Guard Cavalry Division
on their western flank, were opposing the French Fifth
Army south of the Grand Morin on the line Esternay —
Montceaux — Couperdriz (5 miles W.S.W. of Montceaux).
Echeloned to the west in second line between the Grand and
Petit Morin were part of the German IV. Corps at Rebais,
with the 5th Cavalry Division in front of it north of
Marolles, and the X. Reserve Corps (as was conjectured)
west of Montmirail. The //. Corps and 2nd and 9th
Cavalry Divisions were opposite the British ; and the
remainder of the IV. Corps9 the IV. Reserve Corps and the
4th Cavalry Division opposite the French Sixth Army. The
operations had also established the fact that the units of
the 17. Corps which had been engaged with the British left
276 THE MARNE
during the day, had withdrawn across the Grand Morin.
The 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions were at nightfall north-
east of Crecy and moving to cross the Marne a little east
of Meaux. Both the Fifth and Sixth French Armies were
reported to have pressed the enemy back ; but their situa-
tion was still so imperfectly known that at 7 P.M. Sir John
French issued no orders for the 7th September except a
Special Order of the Day * and a warning that all the troops
should be ready to move at short notice any time after 8
A.M. By evening practically all the " First reinforcements "
for the British Army had arrived from the Base.
7TH SEPTEMBER : THE MARCH TO THE GRAND MORIN
Sketch 6. Owing to delay in transit, the instructions from General
2*a&S t' JonC]re to push on, giving information that the Sixth Army
' had been successful, did not reach G.H.Q. at Melun till
11 A.M. on the 7th. But the British cavalry was early on the
move ; the Cavalry Division on the right pushed eastward
to the Grand Morin, upon Leudon (3£ miles south of La
Ferte Gaucher) and Choisy, and the 3rd and 5th Cavalry
Brigades on its left, northward upon Chailly and Coulom-
miers. The advanced parties of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade
found that the Germans had left Mauperthuis (3 miles
south of the Grand Morin) just as they themselves entered
it, and overtook a few stragglers a mile further on, who were
driven towards the river under effective fire from E Battery
R.H.A. The enemy seemed to be withdrawing his covering
troops northward. The 4th Cavalry Brigade, advancing
further east, came upon cavalry, cyclists and guns south
of Dagny (2 miles south-west of Choisy), and forced
them back north and east across the front of the 2nd
Cavalry Brigade ; and the 9th Lancers, who were at the
head of the latter brigade, thereupon pushed on to the
hamlet of Moncel, a mile and a half to the south-east of
Dagny, which was held by the enemy. A German patrol
was driven out, and it was then occupied by a squadron of
the 9th. A troop of the 9th was sent northward to protect
the left flank of this squadron ; another troop, with Lieut. -
Colonel D. G. M. Campbell and the headquarters of the regi-
ment, halted at the northern outskirts of the village, and the
machine-gun section was posted in an orchard to the west
of it. A patrol presently reported the advance of a German
squadron, one hundred and twenty strong, which came up
1 Appendix 39.
ADVANCE TO THE GRAND MORIN 277
at a canter in one rank towards Colonel Campbell's party. 7 Sept.
Unfortunately the machine gun jammed immediately ; 1 1914-
but Colonel Campbell with about thirty men charged
at once at top speed. The Germans did not increase
their pace to meet the shock and were completely over-
whelmed, as far as the narrow front of the 9th Lancers
extended. Colonel Campbell was wounded, but the sur-
vivors were rallied and led back into Moncel ; the Germans,
fearing a trap, did not follow. Further to the right, a
squadron of the 18th Hussars working its way forward on
foot was charged just beyond Faujus (2J miles south of
Choisy) by a weak German squadron,2 which it practically
annihilated by rapid fire at two hundred yards' range.
Sixty -three of the 1st Guard Dragoons were killed or
wounded in this affair, and only three escaped ; the 18th
Hussars had only two of their led horses slightly wounded.
To the west of the cavalry, the Wiltshire, in their ad-
vanced position across the Grand Morin near Le Chamois
(4 miles west of Coulommiers), were attacked at 6 A.M.
by some two hundred dismounted men of the Guard
Cavalry Division, whom they beat off without any difficulty.
The 2/South Lancashire, also, making their way forward to
cover the right of the Wiltshire, were engaged by the enemy
in the woodlands and suffered some loss. Cyclist patrols
of the III. Corps ascertained that by 7 A.M. the ground
within a radius of 3 miles north and north-west of Crecy
on the Grand Morin was clear. Aerial reconnaissances con-
firmed the general impression that the enemy was with-
drawing northward, though there were still considerable
bodies both of cavalry and infantry just north of the
Grand Morin beyond La Ferte Gaucher.
Acting upon this information the Field-Marshal issued
orders at 8 A.M. for the Army to continue its advance north-
eastward across the river in the general direction of Rebais.
The corps were to march upon as close a front as the roads
would permit, and on reaching the line Dagny — Coulom-
miers— Maisoncelles (6 miles north-west of Coulommiers),
heads of columns were to halt and await further orders.
Meanwhile, the Cavalry Division moved northward, making
good the course of the Grand Morin as far east as La Ferte
1 The German account in Vogel is that the gun was spotted, and that
a sergeant and six men galloped up, drove off' the gun crew and damaged
the mechanism with a stone ; otherwise the two accounts agree. The
attackers were Rittmeister von Gayling's (2nd) squadron, 1st Guard Dragoons.
2 Two-thirds of the 4th Squadron, 1st Guard Dragoons ("Deutsche
Kavallerie," p. 99).
THE MARNE
Gaucher; it met nothing but a few patrols, but ascer-
tained that a German cavalry brigade and a battery had
re-crossed the Grand Morin at 3 P.M. The 5th and 3rd
Cavalry Brigades also pushed northward, the former on
Rebais, the latter on Coulommiers. The 3rd met with
some little resistance at the bridges over the Grand Morin
just east of Coulommiers, and its guns came into action to
silence some German artillery on the north bank of the
stream, and to shell retiring parties of the enemy. This
caused some delay, but the brigade was able to pursue its
way 4 miles towards Doue, where it was checked by
infantry and machine guns. The 5th Cavalry Brigade,
with little hindrance, between 5 and 6 P.M. reached Rebais,
whence the German rear parties retired leaving a few
prisoners in the hands of the British.
Behind the cavalry screen, the infantry continued its
march without serious incident ; and there was cheering
evidence of the enemy's demoralization. The country near
the roads was littered with empty bottles ; and the in-
habitants reported much drunkenness among the Germans.
Indeed, some British artillery drivers while cutting hay
discovered German soldiers, helplessly drunk, concealed
under the topmost layer of the stack. The arrival of the
44 First reinforcements " had also tended to raise the spirits
of the men.
Sketch 6. The positions taken up by the Army for the night of
Map 24. the 7th beyond and along the Grand Morin were as follows : —
5th and 3rd Cavalry Brigades, North of the Grand Morin on
and 4th (Guards) Brigade the west side of Rebais.
Cavalry Division . , . . South of the Grand Morin at
Choisy, Feraubry.
3rd Infantry Brigade . . La Bochetiere (1J miles south-
east of Choisy).
I. Corps (less 3rd and 4th South of the Grand Morin from
Brigades) Jouy sur Morin to St. Simeon.
II. Corps North of the Grand Morin from
Chauffry to Coulommiers.
III. Corps North of the Grand Morin from
Giremoutiers to La Haute
Maison.
Maps 4 Throughout this day the Fifth and Sixth French
&24. Armies continued to make good progress. By evening
General Franchet d'Esperey, with three out of his four
INTELLIGENCE ABOUT THE GERMANS 279
corps across the Grand Morin, had reached the line 7 Sept.
from Charleville (7 miles south-east of Montmirail) to 1914-
La Ferte Gaucher ; while General Maunoury, having ad-
vanced to the line Penchard — fitrepilly — Betz, some five
miles west of the Ourcq, was able to report that German
artillery was retiring to the western bank of that river.1
Aerial reconnaissance indicated that von Kluck was with-
drawing two of his corps (//. and IV.) with all haste north-
ward ; and, from identifications by contact during the day
and the fact that two German cavalry divisions had been
seen between 5.15 and 6.30 P.M. moving into bivouac at
Orly (3J miles north and a little west of Rebais), with yet
more cavalry passing northward to the east of them,
it seemed as if the enemy was trusting to the /. and
//. Cavalry Corps 2 to hold the British in check during
a change of dispositions. But the Marne lay in the way of
any German movement northward, and the congestion
reported at the bridge of La Fert6 sous Jouarre was such
as to offer good results from a rapid advance towards that
point. It was also reported, however, that a considerable
force of the enemy lay at Pierre Levee (5 miles south-
west of the bridge) to guard against any such attempt.3
Indeed, the left of the British III. Corps had not been
allowed to take up its position between Maisoncelles and La
Haute Maison, some two or three miles only from Pierre
Levee, without being shelled. The 8th September, there-
fore, promised to be an important day.
General Joffre's General Order No. 7, issued at 5.20 P.M.
on the 7th September, directed the Armies on the left to
follow the enemy with the bulk of their forces, but in such
a manner as always to retain the possibility of enveloping
the German right wing. For this purpose, the French
Sixth Army was to gain ground gradually towards the north
on the right bank of the Ourcq ; the British forces were to
endeavour to get a footing "in succession (sic) across the Petit
" Morin, the Grand Morin and the Marne " ; the Fifth Army
was to accentuate the movement of its left wing, and with
its right support the Ninth Army. The road Sablonnieres
1 The fighting on the western flank during the battle of the Marne
between the French Sixth Army and the German First Army is known
as the " Battle of the Ourcq."
2 It is again recalled that each of these cavalry corps contained at
least five infantry (Jdger) battalions besides cyclist companies and machine-
gun companies. (See Appendix 7.)
3 Four Jager battalions and a cavalry brigade according to Kuhl's
" Marne," p. 207.
280 THE MARNE
— Nogent PArtaud — Chateau Thierry, allotted to the
British, was made the boundary between them and the
Fifth Army.
Accordingly, on the evening of the 7th September, the
Field-Marshal issued orders x for the advance to be con-
tinued against the line of the Marne from Nogent PArtaud
to La Ferte sous Jouarre : the cavalry to push on in pur-
suit, keeping touch with the French Fifth Army on the
right, and with the Sixth Army on the left. The Grand
Morin was already behind the British, but before the Marne
could be reached, the Petit Morin had to be crossed : a
stream running through a narrow valley, with steep,
wooded sides, approachable only through close, intricate
country, studded with innumerable copses, villages and
hamlets, and with only six bridges in the section in
question. The Marne itself runs through a valley of
similar character, though on a larger scale, so that the
ground was all in favour of the enemy's rear guards.
STH SEPTEMBER : THE FORCING OF THE PETIT MORIN
Sketch 6. The cavalry moved off at 4 A.M. covering the front of
^e ^* an<^ ^* ^orPs* ^n ^ne Cavalry Division, the 1st and
2nd Brigades made for the line of the Petit Morin from
Bellot (due north of La Ferte Gaucher) westward to La
Tretoire, with the 4th Cavalry Brigade in support. Gough's
5th and 3rd Cavalry Brigades on its left headed for the river
from La Tretoire to St. Cyr. The 5th Dragoon Guards, at
the head of the Cavalry Division, moved by La Ferte
Gaucher on Sablonnieres, a little to the west of Bellot, and
driving scattered parties of German horsemen before them,
plunged down into the wooded valley of the Petit Morin.
The two bridges at Sablonnieres were reported to be lightly
held, but a direct advance upon them was found to be
impossible owing to the enemy's rifle fire ; and an attempt
to turn the position from the east by way of Bellot was also
checked. At the western bridge, to which the approach
lay over the railway bridge, the 4th Dragoon Guards of
the 2nd Cavalry Brigade tried to carry both by a rush,
and secured the first, but were foiled at the river bridge
which was barricaded. On their left, 3 miles further
westward, a reconnoitring party of the Greys discovered
just south of the river, near Gibraltar (1J miles S.S.W. of
Orly), half a battalion of Jager and a cavalry brigade com-
1 Appendix 40.
THE GERMANS RECROSS THE MARNE 281
fortably eating their breakfasts. Stealing back unper- 8 Sept.
ceived they were able to indicate this target to a section of *
J Battery at Boisbaudry, which broke up the German
picnic abruptly with shrapnel, and sent the enemy fleeing
across the valley with considerable loss. German artillery,
however, forbade any further advance of the 2nd Cavalry
Brigade, and the 5th was likewise brought to a standstill.
On the left of it again, the 5th Lancers of the 3rd Cavalry
Brigade penetrated into St. Cyr, and D Battery did some
execution among the Germans retreating before them. But
very soon the enemy counter-attacked, drove the 5th
Lancers out of St. Cyr, and stopped further progress by a
heavy crossfire of artillery from the high ground above
Orly (opposite Gibraltar). D and E Batteries, being in an
exposed position, were for the time out of action, for their
teams could not come up to shift them, and the detach-
ments were obliged to leave their guns and take cover. By
about 8.30 A.M. the whole of the British cavalry was at a
standstill, the hostile rear guards being too strong and too
well posted to be dislodged until further forces arrived.
On the extreme left, infantry of the 4th Division ascer-
tained between 3 and 4 A.M. that the enemy had evacuated
Pierre Levee, which defended the approaches to La Ferte
sous Jouarre ; and at 6 A.M. the 12th and 19th Infantry
Brigades advanced, the former upon Jouarre, the latter on
its left upon Signy Signets. Aerial reconnaissances about
this hour reported a great number of the enemy massed
about La Ferte sous Jouarre, waiting their turn to cross the
river, whilst the passage of infantry over the bridge was un-
ceasing.1 But the movement of the British was necessarily
slow, for there were many copses and coverts to be cleared
in front, and a large belt of wood — the Bois de Jouarre — on
the right flank. No serious opposition however was en-
countered until about 11 A.M., when the leading battalion
of the 19th Infantry Brigade had passed beyond Signy
Signets and reached the ridge overlooking the Marne,
where it was caught by artillery fire from the heights just
north-west of La Ferte sous Jouarre. No great damage was
done ; and the German guns were soon silenced by two
batteries of the XXIX. Brigade R.F.A. But the brushing
away of the enemy's advanced troops revealed the German
main body holding the north bank of the Marne in strength,
with a bridgehead, well provided with machine guns, at La
1 According to the maps in von Kuhl's " Marne," the whole of the 5th
Division passed through La Ferte sous Jouarre on the 8th.
282 THE MARNE
Fert£ sous Jouarre.1 It was thus evident that the passage
of the Marne would not be easily forced ; and there was
nothing for the moment to be done but to bring the artillery
forward to knock out the machine guns, and to seek a way
round. This was exasperating, for heavy columns of the
enemy were still crossing the river at La Ferte, and masses
of men were in sight on the northern bank, but out of
range.
Meanwhile on the right of the Force, shortly before 9
A.M., the advanced guard of the 1st (Guards) Brigade (the
I/Black Watch and the 117th Battery R.F.A.) reached the
edge of the plateau above Bellot, and passed down a narrow
defile into the valley of the Petit Morin, German shrapnel
bursting over their heads as they marched. The 118th and
119th Batteries unlimbered near the crest of the hill, and
soon silenced the German guns. By 9.30 A.M. the Black
Watch reached Bellot, where they found French cavalry in
possession but unable to advance ; pushing through the
village, they crossed the river and entered the woods on its
north side. They then turned westward upon Sablonnieres
to facilitate the crossing there, but were stubbornly opposed
by dismounted cavalry and the Guard Jager, until the
Cameron Highlanders, with dismounted troopers of the 4th
Cavalry Brigade, came to their assistance. The advent of
the Camerons was decisive ; and soon after 1 P.M. the
British were masters of Sablonnieres and of over sixty
German prisoners.2
While this was going forward, the 2nd Division, next on
the left, headed by the 4th (Guards) Brigade and the
XXXVI. and XLI. Brigades R.F.A., had come up to La
Tretoire at the edge of the plateau overlooking the Petit
Morin, and had been greeted, like the 1st Brigade, with
continuous shrapnel fire from batteries on the heights
opposite in the vicinity of Boitron. The British guns soon
compelled the Germans to move ; but skilfully placed
machine guns made the advance of infantry across the river
valley a very difficult matter ; and the 3rd Coldstream
tried in vain to make their way down to the water. The
Irish Guards were sent to their help, but could make no
1 According to von Kluck, La Ferte was defended by the 2nd Cavalry
Division, with the 9th west of it ; according to von Altheim's " lste Garde-
Dragoner Regiment im Kriege, 1914-18," the 5th was at Orly and the Guard
at Boitron. The retirement to the north of the Marne was ordered by von
der Marwitz at 10 A.M. ("Deutsche Kavallerie," p. 102).
2 According to Vogel, the troops which defended Bellot and Sablon-
nieres were the Garde-du-korps and Garde-Kilrassiere regiments and part
of the Garde-Jdger battalion.
THE FORCING OF THE PETIT MORIN 283
progress ; and both battalions were withdrawn whilst the & Sept.
valley was further searched by artillery. The XLIV.
Brigade R.F.A. came into action, and also the 35th Heavy
Battery, near La Tretoire. About noon the two battalions
again advanced, whilst on their left the 2 /Worcestershire,
at the head of the 5th Infantry Brigade, moved down
on Becherelle (1J miles N.N.W. of La Tretoire), east of
which was a bridge ; and on their right the 2/Grenadiers
and 2/Coldstream on La Forge, where there was another
bridge. This attack on a front of nearly a mile and a half
was pushed successfully as far as the road which runs
parallel with the Petit Morin on its southern bank. The
Worcestershire then carried the bridge near Becherelle,
capturing a few prisoners in the farm close to it ; and, with
the approach of this battalion on his right flank and of the
two battalions of Guards on his left, the enemy retired.
Thus, before 2 P.M. the passage of the Petit Morin had been
forced at the eastern extremity of the line ; and the
Cavalry Division was able to cross the valley and push
northward. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade pursued the hostile
guns a short distance, taking some prisoners and inflicting
appreciable losses ; whilst the 4th Cavalry Brigade, reliev-
ing it at 3.30 P.M., struck the flank of a German column seen
on its left retiring northward from Orly and did some
execution with its guns.
The I. Corps was now free to send help further to the
west ; and not before it was needed. The 8th Infantry
Brigade1 had come up to the support of the 5th Cavalry
Brigade about Gibraltar between 9 and 10 A.M., but could
make no progress. The enemy was entrenched on the
slopes on the north side of the Petit Morin about half a mile
west of Orly, and his machine guns were so cunningly hidden
that field guns could not find them. It was noon before
howitzers could be brought up, but even then the machine
guns could not be located, and they rendered a frontal
attack impossible. Further west the 13th Infantry Brigade
and the 121st Battery had joined the 3rd Cavalry Brigade
between 8 and 9 A.M. ; and two battalions were deployed
for attack on St. Cyr. But the fire from the enemy's con-
cealed batteries was exceedingly trying, and little or no
progress was made. Soon after 9 A.M., therefore, the 14th
Infantry Brigade, which was halted at Doue, was sent for-
1 Only about two thousand strong in spite of " first reinforcements," as
a result of the heavy losses of the 2/Royal Irish and 4/Middlesex at Mons,
and of the I/Gordons at Le Cateau.
284
THE MARNE
ward to the attack of St. Ouen, a mile east of St. Cyr.
The Duke of Cornwall's L.I. and the East Surreys led the
way, advancing in open formation for two miles under
shrapnel fire till they reached the valley and plunged into
the dense wood that shrouded the descent to the river. So
steep was the declivity and so thickly tangled the under-
growth, that the Cornishmen, though little opposed, were
obliged to work down to the water man by man and re-form
by the railway at the foot of the slope. They found before
them two seemingly impassable streams, traversed by a
single continuous bridge which was swept by two machine
guns. After a time, however, a foot-bridge was found over
one stream and a ford through the other ; and thus the
battalion was able gradually to effect its passage. The
East Surreys crossed just as slowly by means of a single
boat ; but Lieut. -Colonel Longley used the time thus
afforded to discover the exact position of the enemy's
trenches and then attacked them in flank, whilst the Duke
of Cornwall's cleared St. Ouen and occupied the village of
St. Cyr.
It was now nearly 3 P.M. The river had been crossed
on both sides of Orly (2J miles east of St. Cyr), and the
enemy's position at that place became perilous. In the
2nd Division, the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light
Infantry and the Connaught Rangers of the 5th Infantry
Brigade turned westward from Becherelle after they had
crossed the Petit Morin, and approached Orly from the east.
The 4th (Guards) Brigade had pushed on 3 miles from
the river to the cross roads about Belle Idee on the Mont-
mirail — La Ferte sous Jouarre main road, almost behind
the German position. The 60th Howitzer Battery now
began to search the woods with high-explosive shell, with
the result that German cavalry and infantry soon emerged
from their cover within close range of the Guards at La
Belle Idee and were heavily punished ; the few that
remained in the wood were enveloped by the 3/Coldstream
and Irish Guards and shot down or captured. Such fugi-
tives as made their escape were pursued so vigorously by
the shells of the British guns that the infantry could not
follow up its success. Meanwhile the 8th Infantry Brigade
began again to press upon Orly itself from the south, and
the 9th Infantry Brigade from the east ; and about 4 P.M.
the village was captured and one hundred and fifty prisoners1
with it. Simultaneously, the Cyclist Company of the 5th
1 Guard Schiitzen and men of the 5th Cavalry Division.
ORLY AND LA FERTE SOUS JOUARRE 285
Division reached the main road, La Ferte sous Jouarre — 8 Sept.
Montmirail, 3 miles west of the point where the 4th 1914-
(Guards) Brigade had struck it, and came upon the flank of
two hundred German Guard Schutzen, and after five minutes'
fighting compelled them to lay down their arms. Unfor-
tunately, a battery of the 3rd Division which had been
pushed forward to north of Orly, peppered both captors and
captured so energetically with shrapnel that all but seventy
of the prisoners were able to escape. Both divisions how-
ever of the II. Corps pressed northward from Orly and
St. Ouen as soon as they could, and by dusk the head
of the 3rd Division was at Les Feucheres (1J miles east
of Rougeville), and the head of the 5th Division at
Rougeville, where they were within less than a mile of the
Marne.
The reaction of these operations on the right made
itself felt about La Ferte sous Jouarre between 3 and 4 P.M.
The guns of the 4th Division had come up about noon, and
had shelled the bridges at La Ferte and the ground in front
of Jouarre very heavily.1 The 108th Heavy Battery of
the 5th Division, unlimbering at Doue (4J miles S.S.E. of
Jouarre) and firing by the map, silenced one troublesome
battery near Jouarre and another some distance further
east. At 1 P.M. the German fire ceased opposite to the 4th
Division ; and soon after 2 P.M. orders were issued for the
llth and 19th Infantry Brigades to advance on the bridge
at La Ferte" over the Petit Morin, and for the 12th Infantry
Brigade to move upon that of Courcelles (1 mile north-east
of Jouarre) about a mile and a half to the eastward.
Courcelles was quickly evacuated by the enemy at the
approach of the 2/Essex and 2/Inniskilling Fusiliers, who
thereupon moved on to La Ferte, where both bridges were
found to have been blown up. These battalions were
joined there by the King's Own, who had already cleared
Jouarre, and by some of the Welch Fusiliers. The Germans
firing from the houses made some show of resistance, but
by dark the portion of the town that lies south of the Marne
had been cleared of the enemy and was in full occupation
of the British.
The day's operations now practically came to an end.
Troops of the I. Corps did indeed advance as far as Basse-
velle, midway between the Petit Morin and the Marne ; but
at 6 P.M. a very sultry day ended in a violent thunderstorm
1 La Fert6 sous Jouarre lies in the valley, on the Marne ; Jouarre is
on the height above it, on the south side of the valley.
286 THE MARNE
with such torrents of rain as made it difficult either to see
or to move. Nearly the whole of the 8th had been spent
in forcing the passage of the Petit Morin. The ground was
ideally suited to a rear-guard action, and the enemy's
positions were well chosen, and most skilfully and gallantly
defended. It is difficult to say precisely what number of
Germans held the river ; but it is certain that there was
all of von Richthofen's Cavalry Corps, and at least half of
von der Marwitz's, including seven or more infantry bat-
talions amply supplied with machine guns, and a consider-
able force of artillery.1 The total loss of the British
was under six hundred killed and wounded, against which
were to be set some five hundred Germans captured,
at least the same number killed and wounded, and
about a dozen machine guns taken in the trenches by the
river.2
Sketch 6. The troops halted for the night, all south of the Marne,
Map 25. in the following positions : —
Cavalry Division * . . Replonges.
I. Corps . . . . . Basse velle, Hondevillers (2J
miles south of last named),
Boitron.
II. Corps Les Feucheres, Rougeville,
Charnesseuil (1J miles west
of Bussieres), Orly.
1 The latest account, Baumgarten-Crusius's '* Deutsche Heerfiihrung
im Marnefeldzug, 1914," p. 118, states : " On 8th September the line of
44 the Petit Morin was to be held. This was a failure (misslang). The
' 9th Cavalry Division was pulled out early to act as battle-cavalry
' behind the centre of the Ourcq front, where a break-through was
4 apparently threatening. The 2nd Cavalry Division together with rear-
4 guard battalions of the 11. and 111. Corps managed to bar the Marne
' for a little time longer. But further to the east the screen was torn
* aside. The /. Cavalry Corps about midday was thrown back from
' the Petit Morin over the Dollau (which enters the Marne from
4 the south just above Chezy) with considerable loss. The attempt
' to stand there failed. The 5th Cavalry Division withdrew north-
' westwards over the Marne (at Nanteuil, according to the sketch), the
" Guard Cavalry Division eastward on Cond6 (7 miles south-east of Chateau
" Thierry), rear guards on the Dollau. ... A gap of 21 miles was thus
44 occasioned between the First and Second Armies. To close it the
" First Army detailed Kraewel's brigade, and the 9th Cavalry Division
44 was sent back to General yon der Marwitz."
A few lines lower down it is mentioned that the 2nd Cavalry Division
had four Jager battalions.
2 Vogel speaks of 4' the celebrated heavy-in-losses and important
fight at Orly." The Guard and 5th Cavalry Divisions were engaged ;
44 many of the companies of the Guard Jager and Schutzen came out of
action with only 45 men."
SITUATION AT NIGHT 287
III. Corps Grand Glairet (1 mile west of 8 Sept.
3rd Cavalry Brigade Jouarre), Venteuil Chateau 1914.
(1 mile south of La Ferte
sous Jouarre), Signy Signets.
5th Cavalry Brigade . . . Between Gibraltar and Rebais.
The news that came in at nightfall from the French Maps 4
Armies on the right and left was less satisfactory than on & 25»
the 7th. To the eastward the French Fifth Army had made
good progress and had encountered no very serious opposi-
tion. On its extreme left the XVIII. Corps had crossed the
Petit Morin to L'Epine aux Bois (4 miles west of Mont-
mirail), and the rest of the Army was extended from Mont-
mirail eastward to Champaubert, beyond which General
Foch's Ninth Army stretched from St. Prix (3 miles south
of Champaubert) to La Fere Champenoise. To the west-
ward the Germans, having been strongly reinforced by
the troops withdrawn by von Kluck from the south, were
offering a determined resistance to the French on the
Ourcq ; and General Maunoury, in spite of all efforts, had
failed to gain ground. Indeed, his centre had actually been
forced back, and he had been obliged to recall the French
8th Division, which should have linked his right to the
British Army, from the east to the west bank of the Ourcq.
From this information it became evident that the quicker
the advance of the British upon the left flank and rear of
von Kluck, the speedier would be General Maunoury 's
deliverance, and the more telling the damage inflicted upon
the Germans.1
The Special Instruction No. 19, issued by General Joffre
at 8.7 P.M. on the 8th September, drew attention to the fact
that the right wing of the German Army was now divided
into two groups, connected only by some cavalry divisions,
supported, in front of the British troops, by detachments of
all arms. It was therefore important to defeat the German
extreme right before it could be reinforced by other formations
released by the fall of Maubeuge. This task was confided
to the Sixth Army and the British. The Sixth Army was
to hold on to the troops opposing it on the right bank of
the Ourcq, whijst the British forces crossing the Marne
between Nogent 1'Artaud and La Ferte sous Jouarre were
to advance against the left and rear of the enemy on the
Ourcq ; the Fifth Army was to cover the right flank of the
British Army by sending a strong detachment against
Chateau Thierry — Azy.
1 The German account of the day's fighting will be found on p. 296.
288 THE MARNE
THE PASSAGE or THE MARNE
Maps 4, The orders issued by the British Commander-in-Chief
25 & 26. on ^e evening of the 8th September directed the Army to
continue its advance northward at 5 A.M., attacking the
enemy rear guards wherever met, the cavalry maintaining
touch with the French Armies to right and left, as before.1
It had been expected that the Germans would offer stubborn
resistance on the line of the Marne, which, with its steep
wooded sides, presented very favourable ground for a rear-
guard action ; but it was already tolerably evident from
the reports of the Flying Corps on the 8th that this was not
their intention. Their main bodies were by evening in
bivouac between Nanteuil (5 miles north-east of La Ferte
sous Jouarre) and Chateau Thierry, and there were signs
during the afternoon of troops moving hastily northward
from this area. Not even were the bridges destroyed, except
those of La Ferte sous Jouarre, Sammeron (2 miles west
of La Ferte), and Changis (3 miles west of Sammeron). The
llth Hussars, who had reconnoitred towards the bridge over
the Marne at Charly and found it occupied by the enemy
on the evening of the 8th, ascertained that the Germans
had retired during the night leaving the passage clear.
9TH SEPTEMBER 1914 : OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY
AND THE I. CORPS
Maps 4 Early on the 9th September therefore the 1st Cavalry
& 26. Brigade was pushed forward on Nogent and Charly, and by
5.30 A.M. it was in possession of both bridges, whilst the
4th Cavalry Brigade seized that at Azy further to the east
and 3 miles below Chateau Thierry. The two brigades
then moved about three miles northward from Nogent to
Mont de Bonneil to cover the passage of the infantry. By
7.30 A.M. the Queen's, the leading battalion of the 3rd
Infantry Brigade, the advanced guard of the 1st Division,
had passed the Marne at Nogent and was crowning the
heights north of the river. The 6th Infantry Brigade, with
the XXXIV. Brigade R.F.A., the advanced guard of the
2nd Division, on reaching Charly found a barricade on the
bridge which took three-quarters of an hour to remove.
By 8.15 A.M. however it also had secured the high ground
north of the river without fighting. By 10.15 A.M. the 3rd
1 Appendix 41 .
PASSAGE OF THE MARNE 289
Infantry Brigade had pushed on to Beaurepaire Farm 9 Sept.
(2J miles north of Charly) without seeing a sign of 1914-
the enemy. The 1st Cavalry Brigade had already made
good the next ridge to the north, and the 3rd Infantry
Brigade had advanced about another mile to Les Aulnois
Bontemps, when the advanced guards received orders to
stand fast. The Flying Corps had reported large hostile
forces halted north of Chateau Thierry and others moving
westward upon Domptin, just west of the position of the
3rd Infantry Brigade.1
The whole of the I. Corps was therefore ordered to halt
until the situation could be cleared up ; and such of the
artillery of the 2nd Division as had not crossed the Marne
was directed to remain in observation on the south bank of
the river, and the 5th Infantry Brigade to entrench there.
The rest of the Cavalry Division joined the 1st Cavalry
Brigade to the left front of the 3rd Infantry Brigade early
in the afternoon, and a few men of the German rear parties
were cut off and captured. The remainder of the 1st
Division crossed the river at Nogent, and in due time the
2nd Division also, at Charly. But no further advance was
made by the I. Corps until 3 P.M., when both divisions
moved forward until their heads reached the vicinity of
the Chateau Thierry — Montreuil road at Le Thiolet and
Coupru respectively. They then halted and billeted in
depth along their roads of advance.
OPERATIONS OF THE II. CORPS
The II. Corps found the Marne bridges at Nanteuil and Maps 4
Saacy intact ; the 3rd Division crossed by the former, the & 26>
5th Division by the latter. Before 9 A.M. the vanguards of
both divisions had established themselves on the heights
of the northern bank, and the 9th Infantry Brigade, which
with a brigade of artillery formed the advanced guard of
the 3rd Division, at once sent forward two battalions to
Bezu les Guery, two and a half miles from the river. The
vanguard (the Fifth Fusiliers), pushing on for another
mile to Ventelet Farm, found the ridge before it clear of
the enemy. By 10.30 A.M. Brigadier-General Shaw had
fixed his headquarters at Bezu ; and all seemed to be
1 From an article in the " Militar Wochenblatt," 73/1920, it would
appear that the troops near Chateau Thierry were the main body of the
17th Division, and those moving west the 5th Cavalry Division, which on
the 9th September was at Marigny, 7 miles west of Chateau Thierry.
VOL. I
290 THE MARNE
going well. On the left of the 3rd Division also everything
appeared at the outset to promise an easy advance for the
5th Division to Montreuil (2 miles north-west of Bezu, on
the Chateau Thierry — La Ferte sous Jouarre main road), at
which point it would cut off the Germans who were defend-
ing the passage of the Marne about La Ferte. No sooner,
however, did the 14th Infantry Brigade show itself about
La Limon (1 mile north of Saacy) than it was greeted by
heavy shell fire from concealed batteries at various points.
The Germans were using against the British the tactics of
L Battery and the 119th Battery at Elouges. Harassed
by bursting shells on front and flank, the 14th Infantry
Brigade, with the 65th (Howitzer) Battery and the 80th
Battery, began its advance upon Montreuil. The direct
road from Saacy along the bank of the northward bend of
the Marne, via Mery, being too much exposed to the German
fire, the brigade moved through the woods half a mile to the
east, while the batteries unlimbered south of La Limon.
The growth of small trees was so dense that it was ex-
tremely difficult for the men to keep touch and maintain
direction, and consequently progress was slow. In fact the
14th Infantry Brigade was swallowed up by the woods for
more than an hour.
Meanwhile about 11 A.M. Brigadier-General Shaw at
Bezu, to the east of this attack, observing that the British
batteries were unable to silence the German guns opposing
the 5th Division, sent two companies of the Lincolnshire to
work through the woods west of Bezu and try to capture the
German guns upon Pisseloup Ridge (1 mile west of Bezu).
The Lincolnshire crept up unseen to within a hundred and
fifty yards of them, and in a few minutes shot down the
German gunners and their escort literally almost to a man.
Dashing out of the thicket to secure the guns, however,
they were fired upon by the 65th (Howitzer) Battery, and
compelled again to seek cover, with a loss of four officers
and some thirty men killed or wounded ; and the guns
were not captured until next morning. This unfortunate
mistake arose from the 65th believing that the. German
battery had been silenced by some other British artillery,
and that the men of the Lincolnshire were German gunners
returning to their abandoned guns.
Just about this time — 11.30 A.M. — the Cornwall L.I. at
the head of the 14th Infantry Brigade at last emerged from
the woods, and were fired upon by German infantry in
position to the south of Montreuil. Thereupon, the brigade
MONTREUIL AUX LIONS 291
was ordered to attack towards the north, on a front of two 9 Sept.
battalions, with the left flank on the road from Mery to 1914>
Montreuil ; while the 15th Infantry Brigade was directed
by 5th Division Headquarters to move round further to the
east, by Bezu and Bois des Essertis (J mile north-west of
Bezu), and attack Hill 189 (immediately to south-east of
Montreuil) from the flank. The 14th Infantry Brigade
meanwhile continued its advance, always slowly, owing to
the density of the woods ; and, on the left, the leading
companies of the Duke of Cornwall's losing touch of their
supports, came under heavy fire from infantry entrenched
on Hill 189 and from two batteries, which were still un-
silenced, at La Sablonniere and Chamoust (south-west and
north of Montreuil, respectively). Under this crossfire of
artillery, the Cornishmen, after struggling for a time to
work forward, were compelled to fall back, leaving a few
prisoners behind them ; and the 14th Infantry Brigade was
thus brought to a dead stop. The Germans at 2 P.M. even
launched a counter-attack against the left of its line, but the
effort was at once smothered by the British shrapnel. After
more than an hour of deadlock, the Norfolks and Dorsets
of the 15th Infantry Brigade came up between 3 and 4 P.M.
to the western edge of the Bois des Essertis, on the flank of
Hill 189, where they were abruptly checked by a violent
fire from rifles and machine guns and from the battery at
La Sablonniere. Unable to make progress, they stood fast,
and engaged in a short-range fight with the German in-
fantry, which was entrenched within a hundred and twenty
yards of them. Forty-seven dead Germans were found
next day in the trenches opposite to the Dorsets ; but the
15th Infantry Brigade needed the support of artillery, and
the British batteries could find no positions from which to
give it. Some time before — about 3 P.M. — two battalions
of the 15th Infantry Brigade had been ordered to the left
via Moitiebard (2 miles south of Montreuil) to discover
and, if possible, destroy the battery at Chamoust ; but it
was not until 6 P.M. that an officer of artillery, by a personal
reconnaissance, at last found the exact position of the
German guns. They were silenced within ten minutes by
the 37th (Howitzer) Battery ; but by that time the light
was waning, and the best of the day was gone.1
1 The enemy at Montreuil was at first Kraewel's Composite Brigade,
hastily formed on the evening of the 8th of two infantry regiments and six
batteries of artillery from the two divisions of the IX. Corps. General
Kraewel's instructions were to hold the line of the Marne from Nogent
to La Ferte (actually the British front) and destroy the bridges (which
292 THE MARNE
The 3rd Division, when it found that neither the I. Corps
on its right nor the 5th Division on its left, was coming up
in line with it, after helping the 5th Division as already
related, remained from the morning onwards with its head
at Ventelet Farm on the Chateau Thierry — Montr euil road.
Thus, the road marked the limit of British progress in this
quarter.
OPERATIONS OF THE III. CORPS
Maps 4 Further to the west, the III. Corps was delayed by most
&26- effective opposition. The enemy was holding the right
bank of the Marne at all likely points of passage, with
artillery near Caumont at the top of the big loop of the
river enfilading the western reach of it nearly as far as La
Ferte sous Jouarre, and with other guns north-west of the
town. The only intact bridge was the railway viaduct half-
way down the above-mentioned enfiladed reach of the
river. The service pontoons and trestles at the disposal of
the corps were insufficient to bridge the Marne at any point
in this section — for it was from 70 to 90 yards wide and very
deep — without the help of additional material, and there
was none to be found ready for use except at La Ferte sous
Jouarre.
Pursuant to General Pulteney's orders, the llth and
12th Infantry Brigades advanced at 4.45 A.M. in two
columns, with the intention of repairing the bridges in
front of them, and if possible of crossing the river and
establishing a bridgehead north of La Ferte'. They seized
the high ground at Tarterel, immediately to the east of La
Ferte, so that artillery could be brought up to deal with
the German guns and the portion of the town south of
the river. The broken bridges at La Ferte were, how-
ever, found by the llth Infantry Brigade to be unapproach-
able, the buildings adjacent to them on the northern bank
he did not do), whilst the three cavalry divisions held the Petit Morin
(which they had already abandoned). He slipped away at 8 p.m. on
the 9th, leaving the guns of one battery behind him (" Militar Wochen-
blatt," Nos. 73 and 74 of 1920).
In the course of the fight, Kraewel's brigade " was supported by the
" 9th Cavalry Division, which attacked towards Monbertoin, and by the
" leading troops of the Prussian 5th Division, which had been sent by
" [First] Army Headquarters to reinforce it, and had marched via Cocherel."
(Lieut.-Colonel Miiller Loebnitz, formerly of the Great General Staff, in
" Der Wendepunkt des Weltkrieges," p. 35.)
Four Jdger battalions and " a detachment of the 3rd Division from
Mary " (6 miles to the west of Montreuil) were also present according to
Kuhl's " Marne," p. 207.
LA FERTE SOUS JOUARRE 293
of the river being full of German snipers and machine guns. 9 Sept.
Attempts to cross by boat further down were also un- 1914-
successful. It was extremely difficult to tell which Jiouses
were occupied, and impossible to deal effectively with them,
except by howitzer fire ; and the greater part of the fore-
noon was occupied with dropping shells on the most likely
ones from Tarter el, and from Jouarre, south of La Ferte.
Meanwhile, however, the 12th Infantry Brigade pushed two
battalions up the left bank of the river into the loop between
Chamigny and Luzancy, and these succeeded in driving
the Germans from a weir to the west of Luzancy. Then,
crossing the Marne by the weir, they climbed to the road
that leads from La Ferte to Montreuil, which was the line
of the German retreat, but reached it too late to intercept
any German troops.
During this movement, shortly before noon, the British
infantry was withdrawn from the southern half of La Fert6
and the town was heavily bombarded, with the result that
the Germans about 2.30 P.M. abandoned the approaches
to the bridges, which Royal Engineer officers were then
able to reconnoitre. But it was 4 P.M. or later before
any effectual repair work could be begun. However, the
1 /Rifle Brigade followed the two battalions of the 12th
Infantry Brigade across the weir, and the 2/Inniskilling
Fusiliers crossed the river higher up by the railway via-
duct which was still intact. They were shelled as they
did so, but suffered no loss. The I/East Lancashire and
the I/Hampshire were ferried across in boats below La
Ferte, and this tedious operation on a broad and rapid
river was not completed until 9 P.M., by which time the
Engineers had sufficient barrel piers, etc., ready at site to
supplement the pontoons and begin the construction of a
floating bridge. When darkness fell on the 9th, ten of the
sixteen battalions of the III. Corps were still on the south
side of the river : the 10th Infantry Brigade being at Grand '
Mont Menard (2 miles east of La Ferte), the King's Own (12th
Brigade) at Luzancy, the Somerset Light Infantry (llth
Brigade) at Les Abymes (just south of La Ferte) and the
19th Infantry Brigade between Jouarre and Signy Signets.
The positions of the Army at the end of the day were as sketch (
follows, extending from Chateau Thierry (exclusive) through MaP 20.
Bezu and La Ferte sous Jouarre to Jouarre.
Cavalry Division . . . Lucy le Bocage, Domptin.
5th Cavalry Brigade . . .La Baudiere (half a mile west
of Domptin).
294 THE MARNE
I. Corps Le Thiolet, Mont de Bonneil,
Domptin, Coupru.
II. Corps Bezu, Crouttes, Caumont.
3rd Cavalry Brigade . • Grand Mont Menard (south of
the Marne).
III. Corps Luzancy, Grand Mont Menard,
Jouarre, Chamigny.
The left of the French Fifth Army had reached the
northern edge of Chateau Thierry, in line with the British.
Maps 4 The 9th September, though we now know that the
& 26< advance of the B.E.F. was the decisive factor in influen-
cing the Germans to abandon the field of battle,1 seemed
at the time a disappointing day for the British, and the
more so since General Maunoury, having been hard pressed
on his left and left flank throughout the 8th, had asked for
a brisk attack against the left flank and rear of von Kluck.
Had the entire British line been able to come up level
with the 9th Infantry Brigade when it reached the road
from Chateau Thierry through Montreuil to Lizy sur Ourcq
at 9 A.M., great results might have followed, for von Kluck's
left was well to south of Lizy. But the I. and III. Corps
on either flank were checked until late in the day. Not
until 5 P.M., after a hard day's fighting, in which he had
been reinforced by every man that General Gallieni could
spare him from the Paris garrison, was General Maunoury
able to report that von Kluck was retiring north-eastward,
covering his retreat with his heavy artillery.
Reports from the Flying Corps in the evening confirmed
General Maunoury 's statement that the road from Lizy
sur Ourcq north-eastward to Coulombs was filled with one
continuous column of marching Germans.2 Everywhere
else along the great battle line from Verdun to the Ourcq
the same retrograde movements of the enemy were reported.
Sketch 5. The gigantic struggle of the 6th to the 9th September,
known as the battle of the Marne, in which, so far as can be
ascertained, 49 Allied divisions, with eight cavalry divi-
sions, contended against 46 German divisions, with seven
cavalry divisions,3 was over, and with it all the hopes of
the rapid knock-out blow with which Germany had counted
1 See p. 303.
2 It would seem that this was von Kluck's 5th Division retiring to
Crouy — Coulombs to assist the cavalry and Kraewel's Composite Brigade
in stopping the British advance (see " Militar Wochenblatt," 12/1920).
8 Palat, vi. p. 464, says 1,275,000 Germans against 1,125,000 Allies.
The Germans lost 38,000 prisoners and 160 guns.
GENERAL SITUATION AT NIGHT 295
on winning the war against her unprepared opponents. 9 Sept.
Tactically it was not fought to a finish, but strategically its 1914-
results were far-reaching, so that it must be regarded as one
of the decisive battles of the world.1 Its general result is
well summarized in a proclamation issued by General
Franchet d'Esperey on the evening of the 9th September
to the Fifth Army :
" Held on his flanks, his centre broken, the enemy is
" now retreating towards the east and north by forced
" marches."
In the area between Verdun and Paris the Armies of
Generals Sarrail and de Langle de Gary on the right had held
their ground against the German Fifth, Fourth and part of
the Third Armies, just as Maunoury had against the First
Army ; in the centre, the right of General Foch's Army had
been driven back by the left of the German Second Army
and the right of the Third (he was about to restore the situa-
tion by a division transferred from his left to his right, when
the German retreat made this unnecessary) ; but General
Franchet d'Esperey, and with him Foch's left, to which he
had lent the X. Corps, had been entirely successful, and
after severe fighting had hurled back the western wing of
von Billow's Army, which first faced south-west and west
instead of south, and then retreated.2
On Franchet d'Esperey's left, the B.E.F. had driven
back a strong screen under General von der Marwitz, a
body of troops little inferior in numbers to itself, composed
of four cavalry divisions (including at least eight J tiger
battalions), the 5th Division, a composite brigade of the
IX. Corps, rear guards of the //. and IV. Corps, and a
detachment of the ///. Corps.3 In ground eminently ad-
vantageous to the defence, it had forced the passage of
the Marne and other rivers, and had not only interposed
itself between the German First and Second Armies, but
1 Falkenhayn (p. 1) tells us that the removal of von Moltke from
the post of Chief of the General Staff which followed (see p. 365, below), was
concealed so that the change of leadership should not give the enemy
propaganda " further ostensible proof of the completeness of the victory
obtained on the Marne."
2 It may be added that the German Sixth and Seventh Armies, opposed
to Generals Dubail and de Castelnau in Lorraine, were also in difficulties.
Von Moltke, according to Foerster (p. 34) wrote in a memorandum :
" The Seventh Army, just as little as the Sixth, was unable to advance
" to the Moselle in spite of a long and heavy struggle. . . . Both Armies
" reported definitely that the enemy opposite them always had superiority
" in numbers."
3 All these formations are definitely mentioned in different German
accounts.
296 THE MARNE
whilst the former was fully engaged in front with Maun-
oury's Army, had turned its left flank. The Germans had
no choice, as von Kluck's Chief of Staff admits,1 except
between complete disaster to their right wing and retreat,
in order to make good the 25 miles gap in their line of battle.
This gap was certainly first created by their own action,
but it was widened and exploited by the French Fifth Army
and the B.E.F.
The advance of the British has been adversely com-
mented upon as slow and hesitating by several French
writers.2 It has been pointed out 3 that owing to the delay
in General Joffre's order reaching Sir John French, the
B.E.F. retired on the 5th, instead of advancing, and there-
fore started two marches behind where the French expected
it to be on the morning of the 6th. The average advance
on the 6th was eleven miles ; on the 7th nine, and included
crossing the Grand Morin ; on the 8th, ten, and included
crossing the Petit Morin ; and on the 9th, seven, and
included crossing the Marne. In view of the previous
labours of the B.E.F., the difficulties of the ground, and
the opposition of the enemy, no more could be expected.4
As will be seen from the German account of the battle
of the Marne, the advance of the British Expeditionary
Force was the main factor in determining the German
Second Army to abandon the struggle.5
THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE (6TH TO 9TH SEPTEMBER)
FROM THE GERMAN SIDE
Sketch 5. Without knowledge of what happened on the German
Maps 4, side, the end of the battle of the Marne is something of an
25'&3264' erngma" Although the information available is not quite
complete, and two of the officers principally concerned in
the decision to retreat — Generaloberst von Moltke and
Oberst Hentsch — are dead, the three Army commanders
of the right wing — von Kluck, von Billow and von Hausen
— and von Kuhl (von Kluck's Chief of the Staff) have
written their versions ; and Generalmajor von Baumgarten-
1 See p. 300.
2 E.g. General Palat. He adds, however, " It seems likely that their
" confidence in themselves and particularly in us, had suffered in the
" first encounters, which were so little encouraging " (vol. vi. p. 248).
3 See p. 272.
4 Cf. von Kluck's ten-mile advance against the British rear guards
on the 1st September, when no line of defence interposed, p. 247.
6 See p. 303.
GERMAN ORDERS 297
Crusius has compiled a lengthy account from official 5 Sept.
sources, containing operation orders and extracts from 1914-
the war diaries, and more recently has published extracts
from a statement written by Hentsch, which practically
tell the whole story.1 The lengthy German apologia must
necessarily be given here in a very condensed form.
On the evening of the 5th September, the German First
Army had four corps and two cavalry divisions south of Map 22.
the Marne, along the Grand Morin, and a flank guard of one
corps and one cavalry division north of the Marne near
Meaux, facing west. Part of the latter force, advancing to
clear up the situation, had come in contact with General
Maunoury's troops during the afternoon. At 10 P.M. von
Kluck gave the following orders preparatory to getting into
position between the Marne and Oise to face Paris. They
were to take effect at 5 A.M. next day. Whilst his left corps,
the IX., and the flank guard stood fast, the other three
corps were to face about, and begin wheeling to the right
on the IX. Corps. Very full directions were given as
regards transport, which was to be got clear at once ; and
the withdrawal was to be covered by the 2nd and 9th
Cavalry Divisions and weak rear guards of the //. and IV.
Corps on the Grand Morin. In detail, the ///. Corps was to
march to La Ferte Gaucher, the IV. to Doue and the //.
in two columns to Isles les Meldeuses and Germigny, in the
loop south of the Marne, north-east of Meaux.
On receipt during the night of the information that the
IV. Reserve Corps had been in action with strong French Map 23.
forces, instructions were sent to General von Linsingen,
commanding the //. Corps, to start as soon as possible to
its assistance, and his two divisions crossed the Marne
at Vareddes and the Ourcq at Lizy, respectively, and co-
operated with the IV. Reserve Corps on the 6th. During
the day, the IV. Corps also, instead of halting at Doue, was
moved back over the Marne north of La Ferte sous Jouarre,
and at 10.30 P.M. was ordered to make a night march to the
assistance of the right wing. Thus by the morning of the
7th, the //., IV. and IV. Reserve Corps were engaged against
Maunoury, but the ///. and IX. Corps were still south of
the Marne.
During the 6th September the rear guards of the //.
and IV. Corps, and the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions were
1 Since the above was written, Hentsch' s statement and other docu-
ments and evidence in connection with the case have been published in
"Die Sendung des Oberstleutnants Hentsch" (Berlin, Mittler).
298 THE MARNE
in action against the British. The ///. and IX. Corps were
attacked by the French Fifth Army, and the IX. was only
extricated from envelopment by the intervention of the
Second Army, under whose orders von Kluck had tempor-
arily placed these two corps. Meanwhile, the Second Army,
in accordance with O.H.L. instructions, was wheeling gradu-
ally to the right, so as to face Paris on the line Montmirail—
Marigny le Grand ; its left thus came into collision with
General Foch's Ninth Army.
By the morning of the 7th von Kluck seems to have
Map 24. become thoroughly alarmed. According to von Billow, he
sent him the following messages, which von Kluck does not
give or allude to in his own book :
10.10 A.M. " //., IV. and IV. Reserve Corps heavily engaged
" west of the Lower Ourcq. Where are the ///. and IX. ? What
" is the situation there ? Reply urgent."
11.15 A.M. " Assistance of ///. and IX. Corps on Ourcq is
" very urgent. Enemy considerably reinforced. Send corps
" in direction La Ferte Milon and Crouy." 1
At 1.15 P.M. von Kluck issued orders to these corps also
to press forward to the Ourcq battlefield as fast as possible
and by the shortest route. He states that, " owing to the
" increasing gravity of the situation, divisions had to be
" thrown in simply as they became available, and thus
" became separated from their corps." He therefore formed
four groups under the four corps commanders, Sixt von
Armin, von Quast, von Lochow and von Linsingen.
The effect of the change of front of the whole First Army,
which from facing south beyond the Marne now faced west
beyond the Ourcq, and of the simultaneous wheel back of
the Second Army to the right to face south-west towards
Paris, was to create a gap in the German front from west
of Montmirail to Lizy on the Ourcq — some twenty miles.
To fill the gap there were available only the Guard and 5th
Cavalry Divisions of von Richthofen's Corps and the 2nd
and 9th Cavalry Divisions of von der Marwitz's Corps. To
support them von Kluck on the 8th September sent the
5th Division, Kraewel's Composite Brigade formed .of units
of the IX. Corps, and part of the 3rd Division.
As his divisions came up von Kluck endeavoured to out-
flank Maunoury from the north, and, in view of the British
Maps 25 advance, ordered the destruction of the Marne bridges.
& 26. £[e was nearly captured, as he himself tells us, on the evening
of the 8th near La Ferte Milon by a raid of General Cornulier-
1 Billow, p. 56.
BULOW'S VIEWS 299
Luciniere's Provisional Cavalry Division.1 Of the Second 7-8 Sept.
Army von Billow says : " Although the fight on the 8th 1914-
" September made further progress in the centre and on
" the left wing,2 no decisive result was achieved. The un-
" supported right wing, — 1 3th Division and X. Reserve Corps
" — on the other hand, in order not to be enveloped, had to
" be withdrawn in the evening to the line Margny — Le
" Thoult." 3 Von Biilow now, on the evening of the 8th,
seems to have lost heart. Aeroplanes had reported the
advance of the British columns " northwards via Rebais
" and Doue (3rd and 5th Divisions) ; a third column (4th
" Division) advancing north-eastwards from La Haute
" Maison " ; 4 and Franchet d'Esperey was continuing the
attack on his right, with one column wide on the west
moving to outflank him. He says, " in these circumstances
'* the probability of a break-through of strong enemy forces
" between the First and Second Armies had to be reckoned
" with, unless the First Army decided to retire in an easterly
" direction and regain touch with the Second Army" Far
from doing so, it was attacking westwards. Von Billow's
map shows the French Fifth Army and the British Expedi-
tionary Force breaking in between him and von Kluck and
enveloping his right, and the latter's left wing, on either
side of the gap, — a sufficiently alarming situation to face.
This situation would become even more critical on the 9th
September, if the pressure developed. Von Kluck, how-
ever, had a piece of luck, as one of his brigades (LepeFs
belonging to the IV. Reserve Corps) which had been left
behind in Brussels came up and appeared almost behind
Maunoury's left flank. He, as reported by General von
Kuhl, his Chief of the Staff, took a totally different view of
the situation from von Biilow.5
" On the right wing of the First Army a successful decision
" was certain. The Army had been so disposed that the
" enemy's (Maunoury's) northern flank was enveloped and
" a brigade was to be sent to interrupt his line of retreat.
" On the 9th the fight was making favourable • progress
" and the enemy had begun to give way. A decision was
1 See Kluck, p. 119 ; and Hethay, " R61e de la Cavalerie Fran9aise,"
p. 148 et seq.
a Against General Foch, with the assistance of the XII. Reserve Corps
and 52nd Division and 2 3rd Reserve Division of the German Third Army.
8 See p. 304. Col. Hentsch reported that the right wing of the Second
Army was " driven back not drawn back."
4 Biilow, pp. 59, 60.
5 " Militar Wochenblatt," No. 39/1919.
300 THE MARNE
" certain to be obtained by next morning : we were
convinced of it. ... Generaloberst von Kluck had not
underestimated the danger of an advance of the British
into the gap between the First and Second Armies. He
did not, however, consider that much could be expected
from the British troops. After their long retreat and
many defeats, they could, he thought, be effectually
held up on .the Marne [which they were not]. Even if
they succeeded in advancing, the victory over Maunoury
" on the 10th would compel them to make a hasty retreat.
" Further, the British would not dare to make an un-
" supported advance whilst the French were being defeated
" on their left, and their communications with the sea
" threatened. Even if the right wing of the Second Army
" were forced back, it would not affect the final issue :
" rather, if the victory of the First Army were decisive,
" it would make the enemy's position more precarious."
Von Kuhl himself, writing later, takes a somewhat
different view. He says : " After it was established that
" the Second Army had decided in the morning to retire and
" at midday the troops were already in retreat, as there was
" no means of reversing this decision, the First Army Com-
" mand had to conform. Even a victory over Maunoury
" could not prevent us from having our left flank enveloped
" by superior force, and from being driven away from the
" main army. The First Army stood isolated." x
All this time, from the 5th to the 9th September,2 no
orders came from the Supreme Command, which was
established more than 130 miles away at Luxembourg, in
no better communication with the Armies than was possible
by wireless and by liaison officers in motor cars.3 Much of
its attention seems to have been directed towards the
Russian front. Tannenberg had been fought (26th-29th
August) and Samsonov's Army annihilated, but the battle
of the Masurian Lakes against Rennenkampf was beginning
only on the 8th September. On the south-east front,
though the Austrians had had some small initial successes
on the left at Krasnik (25th August), and Komarow(26th
August to 2nd September), the Russians had steadily
1 Kuhl's " Marne," p. 219.
2 Kuhl's " Marne," p. 187.
8 The grave delay in the transmission of wireless messages was due
to there being only one receiving station at O.H.L. and to interruptions
by weather and the Eiffel Tower. They arrived in such a mutilated
state that they had to be repeated three or four times. Kuhl's " Marne,"
p. 28.
THE GERMAN SUPREME COMMAND 301
pressed on, and had routed the Austrians at the first battle 4 Sept.
of Lemberg (31st August to 2nd September), and on the 6th, 1914-
the very day of the commencement of the battle of the
Marne, continuing their offensive, they began the battle of
Grodek (6th to 12th September) and drove the Austrians
headlong across the San.
From the evidence of the German operation orders,
it would appear that up to the 4th September the Supreme
Command assumed that in France all was going well and
according to plan. On the right, the First and Second
Armies were forcing the French away from Paris south-
eastwards ; on the left the Sixth and Seventh were pressing
on to the Moselle. In the centre the Third, Fourth and
Fifth Armies were " heavily engaged against superior
forces " ; but strategically their slow progress was of
advantage, because it gave time for the wing Armies to
move forward and envelop the enemy. It looked as if
the French would either be surrounded in the open field,
or if by withdrawal they evaded the " pincers " preparing
for them, would be driven up against the Swiss frontier.
In the orders of the 4th September, 7.45 P.M.,1 the
failure to enclose all the French Armies and the B.E.F. was
recognized. " The enemy has evaded the envelopment of
" the First and Second Armies, and part of his force has
" joined up with those about Paris." The First and
Second Armies were therefore detailed to face Paris and
act against any attack from that direction, whilst the
Fourth and Fifth Armies were to press south-east and the
Sixth and Seventh take the offensive westwards against
the Troupe des Charmes between Toul and Epinal, so as
to drive together, enclose and capture the French Armies
of the right that were opposing them. Thus von Moltke
seems to have conceived two separate battles, one near
Paris, and the other near Verdun. The Third Army was
to be prepared to take part in either, as required.
So important did he consider the attack in Lorraine, that
when the threat from Paris began to materialize, he still
persevered there, instead of sending every man who could
be spared from the left to the vital right wing in accord-
ance with the original plan. For this purpose there were
trains actually waiting on the sidings. It was not until
the 9th September that orders were given for the transfer
of the XV. Corps from the Seventh Army to the west.
So confident was Great Headquarters of success, that
1 See p. 266.
302 THE MARNE
arrangements were actually made on the 7th for the visit
of the Kaiser to his victorious Armies, and he was due to
be at Second Army headquarters on the evening of the
8th,1 when a meeting of a very different kind took place
there, as will be seen.
No orders were sent to the First and Second Armies
from O.H.L. on the 5th, 6th, 7th or 8th — it seems to have
still assumed that all was going well near Paris ; the
critical aspect of the situation there and the imperative
necessity of co-ordinating the operations of the Armies
forming the German right wing escaped its attention until
the 8th September, when after a five days' battle the
attempt of the Sixth and Seventh Armies to break through
in Lorraine and cross the Moselle had to be abandoned.
In its dilemma, the Supreme Command on the morning of
the 8th September despatched Lieut. -Colonel Hentsch of the
Intelligence Section of the General Staff to visit the Fifth,
Fourth, Third, Second and First Armies — a round trip of
some 400 miles — to bring back a clear idea of the situation,
and with full powers, but without instructions in writing,
to order in the name of O.H.L. such movements as he
might decide on in order to co-ordinate the retreat, " should
rearward movements have already been initiated." 2
Possibly he was told to be guided by the views of General-
oberst von Biilow, the senior of the three Army commanders
on the right wing.
Colonel Hentsch went to the Fifth and Fourth Armies,
which were in general holding their own, and then to the
headquarters of the Third Army in Chalons, where he
arrived in the afternoon of the 8th. He reported the situa-
tion of that Army to O.H.L. as thoroughly satisfactory.
He reached the headquarters of the Second Army at
Montmort (13 miles E.N.E. of Montmirail) on the evening
of the 8th and spent the night there. Judging by von
Billow's version of the situation, which has already been
given, he must have found gloomy company. Neither von
Biilow nor Hentsch seems to have known that the First
Army was, as von Kluck now states, hoping for 9, decisive
victory next day ; the last news that he had sent on the
evening of the 8th was that he was still engaged with strong
forces on the line Cuvergnon — Congis.3
1 Baumgarten-Crusius, p. 110. For an account of the operations in
Lorraine see the " Army Quarterly," vol. ii. p. 312.
2 " M.W.B.," 12/1920.
3 That is, facing west, west of the Ourcq (von Biilow, p. 59). Cuvergnon
is near Betz, Congis near Lizy.
LIEUT.-COLONEL HENTSCH 303
Hentsch's report of what occurred at Second Army 8-9 Sepi ,
headquarters is as follows : 1 1914-
" I discussed the situation thoroughly with General-
" oberst v. Billow, General von Lauenstein (his Chief
" of Staff) and Oberstleutnant Matthes (Operations) on
" the evening of the 8th September in the Chateau of
" Montmort. We weighed every possibility for avoiding
" a retreat ; the tone of the Army Staff was calm and con-
" fident. At 5.30 A.M. on the 9th September I examined
" the situation once again with General von Lauenstein, on
" the basis of the reports that had come in during the night.
" After the First Army had withdrawn the ///. and IX.
" Corps from the Marne to its right wing, there was no
" other possibility but to go back across the Marne at
" once."
Von Billow gives more definitely the reasons that forced
the retreat upon him. He adds to what he had already
said on the evening of the 8th : 2 — " When early on the 9th
" September numerous enemy columns crossed the Marne
" between La Ferte sous Jouarre and Chateau Thierry,
ic there remained no doubt that the retreat of the First
" Army was, for both tactical and strategical reasons,
" unavoidable, and that the Second Army must also go
" back, in order not to have its right flank completely
44 enveloped."
From this statement of von Billow, it seems clear that
it was the advance of the B.E.F. which had influenced him
in making the decision to retreat. This view is confirmed
by a statement of an officer of the German Great General
Staff,3 as follows :—
" At Second Army headquarters the order for retreat
" was given without consultation with the two neighbour-
" ing Armies, and only after an aeroplane report had come
" in of the advance of five long columns against the Marne
" between La Ferte sous Jouarre and Chateau Thierry.4
" Generaloberst von Billow now sent a wireless message to
" the First Army that he was beginning the retreat behind
" the Marne between Damery and Epernay. Lieut.-Colonel
" Hentsch had left before this happened, to order the retire-
" ment of the First Army to the north-east."
1 " M.W.B.," 12/1920. « See p. 299.
3 Lt.-Col. Miiller-Loebnitz, formerly of the Great General Staff, in
" Wissen und Wehr," p. 449/1920.
* Six British columns and a French cavalry column directed on Azy
were moving against this section.
304 THE MARNE
Von Billow's decision was recorded in a message sent
to O.H.L. as follows :—
" Retirement of First Army behind the Aisne compelled by
" strategic and tactical situation. Second Army must support
" First Army north of the Marne, otherwise the right wing of
44 the force will be driven in and rolled up."
After a counter-attack, claimed as successful, by the
centre and left, the Second Army commenced its retirement
44 about 1 P.M." (German time). In anticipation of this, a
wireless message, received at 1.4 P.M. (German time),1 was
sent by von Biilow to the First Army as follows : —
'4 Aviators report advance of four long enemy columns
44 against the Marne. Heads at 8 A.M. Citry — Pavant —
44 Nogent TArtaud. Second Army is beginning retirement
44 right flank Damery." 2
Meanwhile, Lieut. -Colonel Hentsch had motored to
First Army Headquarters at Mareuil, which he reached
shortly after 12.30 P.M. (German time). 44 Owing to panics
" behind the line," 3 he took seven hours to travel the 60
miles that separated them from those of the Second Army.
There, as von Kluck bitterly complains, he did not see the
Army commander, but had a long conference with General-
major von Kuhl, the Chief of the Staff. A full account of
the interview is given in the German First Army War
Diary.4 According to this, Hentsch stated :
Sketch 5. 44 The position is not favourable. The Fifth Army is
Map 2. " firmly held up in front of Verdun, and the Sixth and
" Seventh also, on the line Nancy — Epinal. The Second
" Army is a mere remnant : the decision for its retreat
44 behind the Marne cannot be altered. Its right wing
44 was driven back and not withdrawn voluntarily. It is
" necessary, therefore, to readjust the whole line to the rear
44 simultaneously : Third Army to north of Chalons,
44 Fourth and Fifth Armies in touch with one another
44 through Clermont en Argonne towards Verdun. The
1 Kluck, p. 121. This is no doubt the wireless message mentioned
just above.
2 Damery was corrected twenty hours later to Dormans. • Citry is
opposite Crouttes. Pavant is between Nogent and Crouttes. The four
long columns were the British 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Divisions. Baum-
garten-Crusius, ii. p. 122, says this message was sent at 11.45 (German
time).
» " M.W.B.," 12/1920.
4 Baumgarten-Crusius, p. 134, and Kuhl's " Marne," p. 218. Von
Kuhl says that he made his report to von Kluck whilst Lt.-Col. Hentsch
waited outside for that commander's decision ; so that apparently von
Kluck could have seen Hentsch had he wanted to do so.
HENTSCH AT KLUCK'S HEADQUARTERS 305
" First Army must also retire — direction Soissons — Fere en 9 Sept.
" Tardenois ; and if absolutely necessary, still further, even 1914-
:c as far as the line Laon — La Fere. A new Army is being
" assembled at St. Quentin, so that fresh operations can
" be begun."
General von Kuhl urged that the attack of the First Maps 4
Army was at that moment in full swing and that retreat & 26-
would be a difficult matter, as formations were much mixed
and the troops very tired. Lieut. -Colonel Hentsch replied
that, nevertheless, no other course was open but to retire,
at any rate, as far as Soissons, with the left wing behind the
Aisne, and emphasized that his instructions were to be
operative in spite of any further information which might
be received, as he had " full full-powers (voile Vollmacht)"
General von Kuhl states that, " in spite of lively pro-
11 tests, the headquarters of the First Army had to obey
" and, with heavy hearts [at 2 P.M. (German time)], issued
" orders for the retreat."
Hentsch's account is somewhat different.1 It is :
;c The situation of the First Army about midday [when
" the conference took place] was such that the left wing
" had already received the order to go back to the line
" Crouy— Coulombs.2
" The possibility of the Second Army holding the line
of the Marne was therefore out of the question ; it must
" go further back, if its flank and rear were not to be en-
' veloped by the British on the 10th at latest.
1 "M.W.B.," 12/1920.
8 That is, across the Ourcq and to face south against the British.
Crouy is on the Ourcq about ten miles north of La Fert6 sous Jouarre,
where the British 4th Division, the left of the B.E.F., crossed the Marne,
and Coulombs is 8 miles east of Crouy. Von Kluck's map shows the
5th Division, 3rd Division and IV. Reserve Corps on this line. Von Kuhl
(" Marne," p. 217) admits that this order sent at 10.80 A.M. reached Lin-
singen's Group, but says it contained a telephone mistake. What was
intended was that he should " bend the left flank back over the Ourcq and
" send the 5th Division against the British in the direction Dhuisy (2 miles
" south-east of Coulombs)." He says Linsingen withdrew to May en Multien
— Coulombs, the same line as Crouy— Coulombs but extended, westwards
to May. His situation map for 9th September shows von Kluck's right
attacking south-west from Betz, and the First Army line then curving
south-east of May en Multien and then east to Coulombs, with the 5th
Division attacking south-east to support Kraewel's Composite Brigade.
Hentsch's statement that orders for retirement were issued before he
arrived at von Kluck's headquarters is confirmed by two officers of Lepel's
brigade (extreme west flank), writing in the M.W.B. of 12th Nov. 1921. It
is therein said that the orders for the brigade to retire were sent "in the
forenoon of the 9th." The italics of "already" are his. Orders to von
Linsingen to swing back his left to face the British went out at 11.30 A.M.
(German time).
VOL. I X
306 THE MARNE
" My question, whether the Second Army could not be
" assisted at once, was replied to in the negative, on account
" of the situation on the left wing.
" General von Kuhl then said that ' the position of the
" ' right wing was favourable : the IV. and IX. Corps were
" * attacking, and had every prospect of a success. More
" * was not yet known.' '
But Hentsch adds :
" I know, however, for certain that just at this time,
" a report from the IV. Corps came in that it could not carry
" out the attack, as it was itself attacked by strong forces.
" I also know for certain that I asked General von Kuhl
" if the First Army would not be in a position to support
" the Second with its whole force next day [10th September],
"if it succeeded in defeating its own immediate enemy
" on the 9th. This was negatived on account of the state
" of the Army." *
During the evening of the 9th September the Third
Army received a wireless message from O.H.L. ordering it
to remain south of the Marne. At 9.30 P.M. Lieut. -Colonel
Hentsch again arrived at Third Army headquarters at
Chalons on his way back to O.H.L. at Luxembourg. He
informed Third Army headquarters that the order to
remain south of the Marne had been issued by O.H.L.
under a misapprehension of the situation on the German
right and that, as the First and Second Armies were, as a
matter of fact, retreating next day, the Third Army should
act on its own responsibility and not read O.H.L. order
literally.2 On this view of the situation the Staff of the
Third Army had come to a decision to retreat, when at
10.30 P.M. a direct order was received from O.H.L. by
wireless, instructing the Third and Fourth Armies to attack
as early as possible on the 10th September. In compliance
with this order, the Third Army resumed the offensive,
which soon became abortive, owing to the withdrawal of the
Second Army on its right in accordance with the decision
made by Generaloberst von Bulow.
It was not until 1.15 P.M. on the 10th September that
von Biilow learnt that O.H.L. approved of Hentsch's
1 Von Kluck, p. 123, says that Hentsch gave the reasons " shaking clear
" from Maunoury, reorganization of the corps [divisions and brigades were
" mixed up], replacing ammunition and supplies, sending off the Train,
" arranging for security of communications, all measures taking up much
" time."
2 Baumgarten-Crusius, p. 139.
GERMAN ORDERS 307
action. He then received the following order, which must 10 Sept.
have been bitter reading for von Kluck : 1914-
" First Army until further orders is placed under com-
44 mander of Second Army."
At 5.45 P.M. further orders arrived : 1 Maps 2
& 4.
44 Second Army will go back behind the Vesle, left flank
14 Thuizy (10 miles south-east of Rheims). First Army will
44 receive instructions from Second Army. Third Army, in
44 touch with Second Army, will hold the line Mourmelon le
44 Petit — Franch. Fourth Army, in touch with Third, north of
44 the Rhine — Marne Canal as far as Revigny area. Fifth Army
44 will remain where it is. The positions reached by the Armies
44 will be entrenched and held."
On this, von Billow sent the following order to von
Kluck : 2
44 The First Army on llth September will retire behind the
44 Aisne and, covered by the Aisne valley, will close on the right
44 of the Second Army. The passages of the Vesle valley at
44 Braisne and Fismes are being blocked by the Second Army
44 with a mixed brigade at each place."
Meantime, on the 9th, von Kluck, acting on Hentsch's
instructions, had issued preliminary orders at 2 P.M.,
followed by others at 8.15 P.M., for a retirement in the
general direction of Soissons.
Ludendorff has said, and we may for the moment agree
with him :—
" Whether the decision of the Second Army head-
;t quarters and the order of Lieut. -Colonel Hentsch to the
44 First Army headquarters to retreat were actually
" necessary from the situation must be decided by historical
" research in later years." 3
IOTH SEPTEMBER :
THE BEGINNING OF THE PURSUIT
As the line of retreat of the German First Army appeared
to lie more or less across the British front, there seemed
some hope of intercepting it. Acting, therefore, in anti-
1 Billow, p. 63. 2 Biilow, p. 63.
3 Memorandum with reference to Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch's responsibility
for the order to retreat from the Marne, circulated down to Divisional
Staffs 24th May 1917. In this it was stated that " he acted solely in
" accordance with instructions given to him by the then Chief of the General
" Staff of the Field Armies " (" M.W.B.," 12/1920).
308 THE MARNE
cipation of General Joffre's written instructions — which
arrived next day, — to the effect that, in order to confirm
and take advantage of the success already gained, the
German forces should be followed with energy so as to
allow them no rest — Sir John French at 8.15 P.M. on the
9th September ordered his troops to continue the pursuit
northwards at 5 A.M. the next morning.1
The instructions issued by G.Q.G. to General Maunoury
directed him to continue to gain ground with the Sixth
Army to the north, supporting his right on the Ourcq,
so as to endeavour to envelop the enemy's right. General
Bridoux, who had replaced General Sordet in command of
the Cavalry Corps, was to extend this action and reach the
flank and rear of the enemy. The 8th Division was to
support the left of the British, who, General Joffre hoped,
would reach the heights south of the Clignon.
Sketch 6. Low clouds and heavy mists made aerial reconnaissance
Maps 4, aimOst impossible until late in the forenoon of the 10th
September ; the pursuit ordered by Sir John French was
begun, but it appeared by 7.15 A.M. that the Germans
were clear of the valleys of the Ourcq and Marne; from
Ocquerre (2 miles north-east of Lizy) to Changis, nothing
was visible from the air, except a small convoy and its
escort on an unimportant road 7 miles north-east of
Lizy. Meanwhile, the Cavalry Division, under Major-
General Allenby, on the extreme right of the B.E.F., had
marched at 5 A.M. to the high ground north-west of
Bonnes (7 miles north-west of Chateau Thierry), where
it came under heavy artillery fire from Latilly, about two
miles to the north, and suffered some loss. The 5th
Dragoon Guards pushed on to Latilly, but, finding the
village strongly occupied by German cyclists and cavalry,
awaited the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Brigade and Z
Battery R.H.A. ; 2 when they came up the Germans de-
camped.
Proceeding to the summit of a hill a little further north-
east, the 1st Cavalry Brigade, between 11 A.M. and noon,
caught sight of the main body of a German rear guard —
five regiments of cavalry, two batteries, a couple of hundred
cyclists, and five hundred wagons, moving from La Croix
(2 miles north-east of Latilly) northwards upon Oulchy
1 Appendix 42.
2 On 4th Sept. one section each from D and I Batteries were formed
temporarily into a four-gun battery and called Z ; on 16th Sept. a section
from J Battery replaced the section from D. When H Battery joined the
1st Cavalry Division, Z Battery was broken up (28th Sept.).
THE PURSUIT 309
le Chateau. This party was not more than two miles away, 10 Sept.
but, as the ground had been soaked by heavy rain, Z Battery 1914-
could not get into action until all but the wagons of the
column had passed out of reach ; and when it did open fire,
it was silenced by German guns of greater range. The four
batteries of the Cavalry Division therefore advanced north-
eastwards through La Croix, and at 1.30 P.M. again opened
fire on the convoy. Then a French cavalry division of
Conneau's Corps, supported by infantry in motor lorries,
came up from Rocourt (3 miles east of Latilly), fell on
the flank of the column of wagons, and captured the greater
part of it.
On the left of General Allenby's cavalry, the 1st Division
advanced from Le Thiolet north-north-west upon Cour-
champs, the 2nd Infantry Brigade leading. Soon after 8 A.M.
the Divisional Cavalry brought intelligence that the enemy
was in position beyond Priez, a couple of miles to the north
of Courchamps on the northern side of the Alland, a small
stream in a wide shallow valley. The Sussex and North-
amptons were therefore pushed through Priez, where they
deployed and began to ascend the hill beyond it. They were
met by heavy artillery and rifle fire at a range of less than
a thousand yards, but continued to advance slowly until
some British battery in rear, mistaking them for Germans,
also shelled them severely and they fell back on Priez.
Some of the men in retiring passed by the observing station
of the 40th Battery and through the intervals between the
howitzers, drawing the German fire upon both ; Brigadier-
General Findlay, who was reconnoitring a position for
his guns, was killed by a shell. There then ensued a lull
in the fighting during which the 1st (Guards) Brigade,
heading for Latilly, came up on the right of the 2nd Infantry
Brigade and the 5th Infantry Brigade on its left, making
for Monnes against slight opposition. In face of this display
of force, between 2 and 3 P.M., the Germans began to fall
back slowly. The British batteries followed them up, but
did not arrive within effective range until the German
columns, after crossing the Ourcq, were filing out of Chouy
(5 miles north of Priez), when both field guns and howitzers
opened fire on them, apparently with good effect.
Further west, the two cavalry brigades under Brigadier-
General Gough, and the 2nd and 3rd Divisions were more
successful. The 5th Cavalry Brigade led the way, with
the 20th Hussars as advanced guard covering a front
of 5 miles from Bussiares (1 mile west of Torcy) to
310 THE MARNE
Germigny. At 6.30 A.M. a hostile column was sighted
moving north-eastward from Brumetz (3 miles north of
Germigny) upon Chezy, while another, composed chiefly
of wagons, was halted on the slopes between those two
villages. The brigade therefore moved westwards to
Fremont (1 mile north-east of Germigny), whence J
Battery opened fire at long range ; and, as there was no
reply to this fire, Brigadier-General Chetwode at 9 A.M.
advanced for about another mile northward to the high
ground south of Gandelu, whence he sent two squadrons
of the Scots Greys to clear that village, and ordered the
12th Lancers to cross the Clignon a little further to the west
at Brumetz, and to cut off the enemy's retreat.
Meanwhile, the 6th Infantry Brigade and the XXXIV.
Brigade R.F.A., which formed the advanced guard of the
2nd Division, were crossing the valley of the Clignon
at Bussiares (4 miles east of Gandelu) to the right of
Gough's cavalry ; and, when Hautevesnes, 2 miles further
on, was reached soon after 9 A.M., a German convoy could
be seen a mile or more to the west toiling up the road from
Vinly in the valley of the Clignon north-westwards towards
Chezy. Four guns, which formed part of its escort, un-
limbered on the heights above Brumetz, while the infantry
took up a position in a sunken road, facing eastward, to
meet the storm that threatened them from Hautevesnes.
The British batteries coming into action soon forced the
German guns to retire; and shortly after 10 A.M. the 6th
Infantry Brigade was ordered to attack. The 1 /King's
Royal Rifle Corps deployed and advanced over ground
which offered not an atom of cover. Nevertheless, the
riflemen closed to within seven hundred yards of the
Germans, and at that range pinned them to their cover,
whilst the 1/R. Berks, on the right, and the 2 /South
Staffordshire on the left worked round both of their flanks,
when the whole line of Germans surrendered, having lost
about one hundred and fifty killed and wounded out of a
total of about five hundred present. They were found to
be men of the 4th Jager, the 2nd Cavalry Division, the
Guard Cavalry Division, and the 27th Infantry Regiment
of the IV. Corps.
Meanwhile, in Gough's force the 12th Lancers had
caught a party of nearly three hundred more, with thirty
wagons and four machine guns, who had been driven from
Gandelu by the Greys. Moreover, the 9th Infantry Brigade
and the 107th Battery, the advanced guard of the 3rd
THE PURSUIT 311
Division, coming up between the 2nd Division and the 10 Sept.
cavalry, had struck into the wood from Veuilly (2 miles 1914-
west of Bussiares) north-westward upon Vinly whilst the
6th Infantry Brigade was attacking from Hautevesnes,
and had taken another six hundred prisoners, a most
variegated assortment, consisting of men of the //., ///.
and IV. Corps 9 of all three J tiger battalions of the 9th
Cavalry Division, and of Jager battalions of the 2nd and
4th Cavalry Divisions ; all divisions of von der Marwitz's
Cavalry Corps were thus represented. These, with the excep-
tion of a party entrenched to north of Vinly, had offered
no very serious resistance. The country was, however,
so close that many Germans were left undiscovered in
the valley of the Clignon, from which they continued to
issue for some days to plunder the neighbouring villages
and oppress the villagers, until they were gradually
captured.
Throughout this little action, General Haig had been
chafing to act on a message received about 9 A.M. from
General Maud'huy of the French XVIII. Corps on his
right, giving him intelligence that fifty-four German heavy
guns were moving from Lizy sur Ourcq north-eastward
upon Oulchy and offering to co-operate in capturing them.
As the heads of both the 1st and 2nd Divisions were sharply
engaged at the moment, he could give no immediate orders ;
and the clouds were so low that later in the forenoon, when
he asked for more exact indications from the Flying Corps, ,
such observation as was possible gave no definite result.
By 1 P.M. the German column was too far north to be
intercepted.
West of the 3rd Division, the 5th Division and the
III. Corps met with no opposition. The former advanced
to Montreuil early, but Kraewel's Brigade had slipped
away, and it was too late to cut off any of it except a few
wounded. The III. Corps, being occupied for the best
part of the day with the passage of the Marne by a pontoon
bridge at La Fert£ sous Jouarre and the railway bridge
at Le Saussoy, was obliged to content itself with occasion-
ally shelling distant targets and with the collection of
stragglers. The British casualties on this day did not
exceed three hundred and fifty, two-thirds of which were
incurred by the 2nd Infantry Brigade in its check near
Priez, and the remainder by the 6th Infantry Brigade in
its successful action near Hautevesnes. For these the
capture of some eighteen hundred Germans, including
312 THE MARNE
wounded,1 as well as the battery taken by the Lincoln-
shire, offered some compensation ; and the spirits of
the troops rose high at the sight of so much abandoned
German transport and of so many German stragglers,
all pointing to the beginning of some confusion among
the enemy. Nevertheless, it was a disappointment that
the Germans had not been more severely punished. The
Sketch 6. general advance during the day was about ten miles. On
Maps 4 the evening of the 10th September the four divisions of
the I. and II Corps were astride the river Alland, with the
cavalry in front astride the upper course of the Ourcq,
and the III. Corps behind the left flank. In detail, the
positions were : —
Cavalry Division . . Breny, Rozet.
3rd and 5th Cavalry Macogny (1J miles east of
Brigades Passy), Marizy, Passy, Mosloy
(2 miles west of Passy).
I. Corps . . . . Latilly, westward through Rassy
to Monnes.
II. Corps , . . Dammard, St. Quentin, Chezy.
III. Corps . . . Vaux sous Coulombs, and south-
ward through Coulombs to
Chaton.
HTH SEPTEMBER : THE INCLINE TO THE NORTH-EAST
Sketch 6. On the evening of the 10th September Conneau's Cavalry
Corps had reached Fere en Tardenois, level with the right
of the British Cavalry Division ; the French XVIII. Corps
was abreast of the British I. Corps, but the remainder of
the Fifth Army was still close to the Marne. On the left
of the British Army, the French Sixth Army was changing
front to the north by wheeling up its right, which was
approaching La Ferte* Milon — practically level with the
British. By General Joffre's Special Instruction No. 21,
dated 10th September, the British force had definite
boundaries assigned to it between which it was to advance :
the road Fere en Tardenois — Bazoches (3 miles west of
Fismes) on the right and La Ferte Milon — Longpont —
Soissons (but exclusive of this town) on the left ; these
involved the Army's inclining half right. Accordingly
1 The I. and II. Corps took 1,000 prisoners, the III. Corps 500 (chiefly
wounded and stragglers), and the cavalry 300. The total British casualties
from the 6th to 10th Sept. were :— I. Corps, 779 ; II. Corps, 654 ; III. Corps
(4th Division and 19th Infantry Brigade), 133 ; Cavalry, 135 ; total 1,701,
THE PURSUIT 313
operation orders for the Army on the llth directed it to 11 Sept.
continue the pursuit north-eastward at 5 A.M., crossing the 1914-
Ourcq and making for a line from Bruyeres (3 miles west
of Fere en Tardenois), north-westward through Cugny to St.
Remy and thence 2J miles westward to La Loge Farm.1
The march proved a troublesome one, for the front allotted
was so narrow that it was impossible to assign a separate
road to each division. The advance was covered by the
cavalry, General Allenby's division making good the ground
from Fere en Tardenois westward to within about a mile
of the road from Chateau Thierry to Soissons, and General
Gough's two brigades the space from that line for some
three miles further west. The advance of the cavalry
brought it to a line: Cuiry Housse (6J miles north of
Fere en Tardenois) through Buzancy to Vierzy (9 miles
west of Cuiry Housse). No large parties of the enemy
were seen except a brigade of cavalry at Braisne on the
Vesle (3J miles north-east of Cuiry Housse) and a party
of infantry throwing up entrenchments at Noyant (9 miles
west of Braisne). There were clear indications that hostile
cavalry had retired in two bodies upon Braisne and
Soissons, the former in good order, the latter in some
confusion ; but although wounded and stragglers were
picked up there was no encounter of any kind with the
Germans.
The march of the infantry, therefore, was wholly un-
disturbed, except for the congestion of the roads — the III.
Corps, in particular, was long delayed by a French column
— and by rain which came down heavily in the afternoon
and drenched the men to the skin.
The general advance on the llth was again about ten Sketch 6.
miles. At nightfall the three centre divisions were across MaP 28*
the Ourcq with the cavalry in front 5 miles from the Vesle,
and the 1st and 4th Divisions echeloned back on either
flank. In detail : —
Cavalry Division . Loupeigne (3J miles N.N.E. of Fere
en Tardenois), westward to Arcy
Ste. Restitue (4J miles N.N.W. of
Fere).
Gough's Cavalry Parcy Tigny (6} miles west of Arcy),
Brigades north to Villemontoire.
I. Corps . . . Beugneux (3 miles W.S.W. of Arcy),
Bruyeres, south-west to Rocourt,
Oulchy le Chateau.
1 Appendix 43.
314 THE MARNE
II. Corps . . Hartennes, south - east to Grand
Rozoy (just west of Beugneux),
Oulchy la Ville, Billy sur Ourcq,
St. Remy (all just north-west of
Oulchy le Chateau).
III. Corps . . La Loge Farm to Chouy.
G.H.Q. . . • Coulommiers.
The inner flanks of the French Armies on either side
of the B.E.F, were abreast of and in touch with it.
12TH SEPTEMBER : THE ADVANCE TO THE AISNE
Sketches Low clouds and rain made aerial reconnaissance so
* Difficult that the Flying Corps could furnish no reports
. of value on the 12th. News, however, came that Maubeuge
had fallen on the 7th, an event which was most opportune
for the enemy, since it released the VII. Reserve Corps and
other German troops for work further south. The German
Armies were falling back, mostly in a north-easterly
direction, along the whole front as far as the Argonne, with
exhausted horses, deficient supplies, and signs of failing
ammunition. It remained to be seen how much further
the Allies could push their success. There was no sign
yet of any movement of enemy reinforcements from the
north, but there were some indications that the enemy
might hold the line of the Aisne : it was impossible, how-
ever, to forecast in what strength, and whether as a mere
rear-guard or as a battle position.
The situation with which the Allies were now confronted
was by no means clear. If the retreat of the German
Armies from the Marne had been followed by disorganiza-
tion and loss of moral, as appeared probable from the
numerous stragglers and the mix-up of units evident from
the prisoners captured, the operation of converting con-
fusion into disaster must be of the nature of a pursuit.
If, on the other hand, their power of resistance, though
diminished by heavy loss, was unbroken, as had been the
case of the Allies in the retreat to the Seine, the problem
of completing their discomfiture would involve bringing
them to action again, and winning a fresh battle before
pursuit, properly so called, could be resumed. Orders
quite appropriate to the pursuit of a broken and dis-
organized enemy can be wholly unsuited to the very
different problem of beating an unbroken f